### Impact `POST /two-factor` had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (`config/google2fa.php window=1`), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted. After a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (`two_factor_enabled='1'`), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via `POST /account/profile` with `two_factor_optin=0`. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (`='2'`), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, `POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset` additionally clears another user's 2FA secret. ### Patches Patched in v8.6.0
Update snipe/snipe-it to 8.6.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanSnipe-IT's TOTP is Brute-Forceable Due to Missing Rate Limiting on `POST /two-factor` affects snipe/snipe-it (composer). Severity is medium. ### Impact `POST /two-factor` had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (`config/google2fa.php window=1`), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted. After a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (`two_factor_enabled='1'`), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via `POST /account/profile` with `two_factor_optin=0`. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (`='2'`), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, `POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset` additionally clears another user's 2FA secret. ### Patches Patched in v8.6.0
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
### Impact `POST /two-factor` had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (`config/google2fa.php window=1`), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted. After a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (`two_factor_enabled='1'`), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via `POST /account/profile` with `two_factor_optin=0`. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (`='2'`), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, `POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset` additionally clears another user's 2FA secret. ### Patches Patched in v8.6.0
Update snipe/snipe-it to 8.6.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanSnipe-IT's TOTP is Brute-Forceable Due to Missing Rate Limiting on `POST /two-factor` affects snipe/snipe-it (composer). Severity is medium. ### Impact `POST /two-factor` had no rate limiting, lockout, or attempt counter. An attacker with valid credentials can submit unlimited TOTP guesses. The TOTP implementation accepts the current code plus one step on either side (`config/google2fa.php window=1`), so at any instant 3 of 1,000,000 codes are accepted. After a correct guess the attacker holds a fully authenticated session. If the instance is configured with 2FA in optional mode (`two_factor_enabled='1'`), the attacker can additionally disable 2FA via `POST /account/profile` with `two_factor_optin=0`. No OTP re-verification is required. The account is then accessible with the password alone on future logins. If 2FA is in required-for-all mode (`='2'`), the per-user opt-out path is closed and the impact stops at session-level account takeover. For an admin target, `POST /api/v1/users/two_factor_reset` additionally clears another user's 2FA secret. ### Patches Patched in v8.6.0
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package |
|---|
| Affected range |
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| Fixed version |
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| snipe/snipe-itcomposer | <8.6.0 | 8.6.0 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard| Package |
|---|
| Affected range |
|---|
| Fixed version |
|---|
| snipe/snipe-itcomposer | <8.6.0 | 8.6.0 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard