### Impact The `routeAllowList` server option restricts external client access to a configured list of REST API routes. The check is only enforced as Express middleware against the outer HTTP request URL, so the `/batch` handler dispatches each sub-request to the internal router without re-running the allow-list check. An external caller whose outer route matches `batch` can issue batch sub-requests to any REST API route that the operator omitted from the allow-list. Authentication, ACL, CLP, and other inner-route authorization controls still apply — only the operator-configured route firewall is bypassed. ### Patches `routeAllowList` is now re-enforced for each batch sub-request inside the batch handler before dispatch, mirroring the existing per-sub-request rate-limit enforcement pattern. The path-normalization and regex-match logic was extracted into a shared helper used by both the outer middleware and the batch handler. Master and maintenance keys bypass the per-sub-request check on the same terms as the outer middleware. ### Workarounds Operators who use `routeAllowList` and have allowlisted `batch` can mitigate without upgrading by explicitly including every inner route they intend to allow via batch in the allow-list (for example, `routeAllowList: ['batch', 'classes/Public.*', 'functions/allowedFunction']`). This approach makes those inner routes reachable as direct REST requests as well, so it is broader than the post-patch behavior, but it eliminates the bypass. Operators who do not configure `routeAllowList` are not affected. Parse Server v8 LTS is not affected because `routeAllowList` was introduced in v9.8.0.
### Impact The `routeAllowList` server option restricts external client access to a configured list of REST API routes. The check is only enforced as Express middleware against the outer HTTP request URL, so the `/batch` handler dispatches each sub-request to the internal router without re-running the allow-list check. An external caller whose outer route matches `batch` can issue batch sub-requests to any REST API route that the operator omitted from the allow-list. Authentication, ACL, CLP, and other inner-route authorization controls still apply — only the operator-configured route firewall is bypassed. ### Patches `routeAllowList` is now re-enforced for each batch sub-request inside the batch handler before dispatch, mirroring the existing per-sub-request rate-limit enforcement pattern. The path-normalization and regex-match logic was extracted into a shared helper used by both the outer middleware and the batch handler. Master and maintenance keys bypass the per-sub-request check on the same terms as the outer middleware. ### Workarounds Operators who use `routeAllowList` and have allowlisted `batch` can mitigate without upgrading by explicitly including every inner route they intend to allow via batch in the allow-list (for example, `routeAllowList: ['batch', 'classes/Public.*', 'functions/allowedFunction']`). This approach makes those inner routes reachable as direct REST requests as well, so it is broader than the post-patch behavior, but it eliminates the bypass. Operators who do not configure `routeAllowList` are not affected. Parse Server v8 LTS is not affected because `routeAllowList` was introduced in v9.8.0.
Update parse-server to 9.9.1-alpha.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanparse-server: Server option routeAllowList is bypassable through batch sub-requests affects parse-server (npm). Severity is medium. ### Impact The `routeAllowList` server option restricts external client access to a configured list of REST API routes. The check is only enforced as Express middleware against the outer HTTP request URL, so the `/batch` handler dispatches each sub-request to the internal router without re-running the allow-list check. An external caller whose outer route matches `batch` can issue batch sub-requests to any REST API route that the operator omitted from the allow-list. Authentication, ACL, CLP, and other inner-route authorization controls still apply — only the operator-configured route firewall is bypassed. ### Patches `routeAllowList` is now re-enforced for each batch sub-request inside the batch handler before dispatch, mirroring the existing per-sub-request rate-limit enforcement pattern. The path-normalization and regex-match logic was extracted into a shared helper used by both the outer middleware and the batch handler. Master and maintenance keys bypass the per-sub-request check on the same terms as the outer middleware. ### Workarounds Operators who use `routeAllowList` and have allowlisted `batch` can mitigate without upgrading by explicitly including every inner route they intend to allow via batch in the allow-list (for example, `routeAllowList: ['batch', 'classes/Public.*', 'functions/allowedFunction']`). This approach makes those inner routes reachable as direct REST requests as well, so it is broader than the post-patch behavior, but it eliminates the bypass. Operators who do not configure `routeAllowList` are not affected. Parse Server v8 LTS is not affected because `routeAllowList` was introduced in v9.8.0.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| parse-servernpm | >=9.8.0,<9.9.1-alpha.3 | 9.9.1-alpha.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate parse-server to 9.9.1-alpha.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanparse-server: Server option routeAllowList is bypassable through batch sub-requests affects parse-server (npm). Severity is medium. ### Impact The `routeAllowList` server option restricts external client access to a configured list of REST API routes. The check is only enforced as Express middleware against the outer HTTP request URL, so the `/batch` handler dispatches each sub-request to the internal router without re-running the allow-list check. An external caller whose outer route matches `batch` can issue batch sub-requests to any REST API route that the operator omitted from the allow-list. Authentication, ACL, CLP, and other inner-route authorization controls still apply — only the operator-configured route firewall is bypassed. ### Patches `routeAllowList` is now re-enforced for each batch sub-request inside the batch handler before dispatch, mirroring the existing per-sub-request rate-limit enforcement pattern. The path-normalization and regex-match logic was extracted into a shared helper used by both the outer middleware and the batch handler. Master and maintenance keys bypass the per-sub-request check on the same terms as the outer middleware. ### Workarounds Operators who use `routeAllowList` and have allowlisted `batch` can mitigate without upgrading by explicitly including every inner route they intend to allow via batch in the allow-list (for example, `routeAllowList: ['batch', 'classes/Public.*', 'functions/allowedFunction']`). This approach makes those inner routes reachable as direct REST requests as well, so it is broader than the post-patch behavior, but it eliminates the bypass. Operators who do not configure `routeAllowList` are not affected. Parse Server v8 LTS is not affected because `routeAllowList` was introduced in v9.8.0.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| parse-servernpm | >=9.8.0,<9.9.1-alpha.3 | 9.9.1-alpha.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard