### Summary `js-toml`'s interpreter checks whether a key already exists in a parser-built container with `if (object[key])` instead of `if (key in object)`. When the prior value is a falsy primitive — `false`, `0`, `0n`, `0.0`, `-0`, or `""` — the duplicate-key branch is skipped and the value is silently overwritten by a later sub-table, dotted-key sub-table, or array-of-tables sharing the same name. Per the TOML 1.0.0 spec ("Defining a key multiple times is invalid"; "You cannot define any key or table more than once"), this should be a parse error. The result is **structural type confusion of attacker-named keys** in the value returned by `load()`. A boolean-typed `false` (or numeric `0`) becomes a truthy object. Host applications that gate behavior on `if (config.flag)`, `if (!user.banned)`, `if (config.allowDelete)`, or `if (config.publicMode)` will silently take the truthy branch. This is **distinct** from [GHSA-65fc-cr5f-v7r2](https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/security/advisories/GHSA-65fc-cr5f-v7r2) (the 1.0.2 prototype-pollution fix). `Object.prototype` is **not** polluted. The `Object.create(null)` mitigation from 1.0.2 is intact; the bug here is in the duplicate-key state machine, not in container construction. ### Details Two truthy checks are wrong: `src/load/interpreter.ts:214` — `Interpreter.tryCreatingObject` ```js if (object[key]) { // falsy primitives slip through // duplicate-key logic } else { object[key] = createSafeObject(); // silently overwrites the prior falsy value ... } ``` `src/load/interpreter.ts:278` — `Interpreter.getOrCreateArray` ```js if (object[first] && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { // same flaw throw new DuplicateKeyError(); } object[first] = object[first] || []; // overwrites the prior falsy value ``` Both should use the `in` operator. Containers are created via `Object.create(null)`, so `in` is unambiguous (no inherited keys to worry about). The bug is reachable through every parent-walking interpreter path: - `assignValue` — dotted keys in `key = value` - `createTable` — `[stdTable]` headers - `getOrCreateArray` — `[[arrayOfTables]]` headers ### PoC ```toml isAdmin = false [isAdmin] forced = "yes" ``` ```js import { load } from 'js-toml'; const config = load(` isAdmin = false [isAdmin] forced = "yes" `); console.log(JSON.stringify(config)); // {"isAdmin":{"forced":"yes"}} console.log(config.isAdmin ? 'BYPASS' : 'safe'); // BYPASS if (config.isAdmin) { // attacker reaches admin-only code } ``` ### Impact Spec-violating input acceptance leading to structural type confusion. (CWE-697) ### Suggested fix in `src/load/interpreter.ts` ```diff export class Interpreter extends BaseCstVisitor { ignoreImplicitDeclared, ignoreExplicitDeclared ) { - if (object[key]) { + if (key in object) { if ( !isPlainObject(object[key]) || (!ignoreExplicitDeclared && ``` ```diff export class Interpreter extends BaseCstVisitor { return this.getOrCreateArray(keys, object[first], idx + 1); } - if (object[first] && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { + if (first in object && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { throw new DuplicateKeyError(); } object[first] = object[first] || []; ```
### Summary `js-toml`'s interpreter checks whether a key already exists in a parser-built container with `if (object[key])` instead of `if (key in object)`. When the prior value is a falsy primitive — `false`, `0`, `0n`, `0.0`, `-0`, or `""` — the duplicate-key branch is skipped and the value is silently overwritten by a later sub-table, dotted-key sub-table, or array-of-tables sharing the same name. Per the TOML 1.0.0 spec ("Defining a key multiple times is invalid"; "You cannot define any key or table more than once"), this should be a parse error. The result is **structural type confusion of attacker-named keys** in the value returned by `load()`. A boolean-typed `false` (or numeric `0`) becomes a truthy object. Host applications that gate behavior on `if (config.flag)`, `if (!user.banned)`, `if (config.allowDelete)`, or `if (config.publicMode)` will silently take the truthy branch. This is **distinct** from [GHSA-65fc-cr5f-v7r2](https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/security/advisories/GHSA-65fc-cr5f-v7r2) (the 1.0.2 prototype-pollution fix). `Object.prototype` is **not** polluted. The `Object.create(null)` mitigation from 1.0.2 is intact; the bug here is in the duplicate-key state machine, not in container construction. ### Details Two truthy checks are wrong: `src/load/interpreter.ts:214` — `Interpreter.tryCreatingObject` ```js if (object[key]) { // falsy primitives slip through // duplicate-key logic } else { object[key] = createSafeObject(); // silently overwrites the prior falsy value ... } ``` `src/load/interpreter.ts:278` — `Interpreter.getOrCreateArray` ```js if (object[first] && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { // same flaw throw new DuplicateKeyError(); } object[first] = object[first] || []; // overwrites the prior falsy value ``` Both should use the `in` operator. Containers are created via `Object.create(null)`, so `in` is unambiguous (no inherited keys to worry about). The bug is reachable through every parent-walking interpreter path: - `assignValue` — dotted keys in `key = value` - `createTable` — `[stdTable]` headers - `getOrCreateArray` — `[[arrayOfTables]]` headers ### PoC ```toml isAdmin = false [isAdmin] forced = "yes" ``` ```js import { load } from 'js-toml'; const config = load(` isAdmin = false [isAdmin] forced = "yes" `); console.log(JSON.stringify(config)); // {"isAdmin":{"forced":"yes"}} console.log(config.isAdmin ? 'BYPASS' : 'safe'); // BYPASS if (config.isAdmin) { // attacker reaches admin-only code } ``` ### Impact Spec-violating input acceptance leading to structural type confusion. (CWE-697) ### Suggested fix in `src/load/interpreter.ts` ```diff export class Interpreter extends BaseCstVisitor { ignoreImplicitDeclared, ignoreExplicitDeclared ) { - if (object[key]) { + if (key in object) { if ( !isPlainObject(object[key]) || (!ignoreExplicitDeclared && ``` ```diff export class Interpreter extends BaseCstVisitor { return this.getOrCreateArray(keys, object[first], idx + 1); } - if (object[first] && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { + if (first in object && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { throw new DuplicateKeyError(); } object[first] = object[first] || []; ```
Update js-toml to 1.1.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanjs-toml has silent type confusion via falsy-primitive duplicate-key bypass affects js-toml (npm). Severity is medium. ### Summary `js-toml`'s interpreter checks whether a key already exists in a parser-built container with `if (object[key])` instead of `if (key in object)`. When the prior value is a falsy primitive — `false`, `0`, `0n`, `0.0`, `-0`, or `""` — the duplicate-key branch is skipped and the value is silently overwritten by a later sub-table, dotted-key sub-table, or array-of-tables sharing the same name. Per the TOML 1.0.0 spec ("Defining a key multiple times is invalid"; "You cannot define any key or table more than once"), this should be a parse error. The result is **structural type confusion of attacker-named keys** in the value returned by `load()`. A boolean-typed `false` (or numeric `0`) becomes a truthy object. Host applications that gate behavior on `if (config.flag)`, `if (!user.banned)`, `if (config.allowDelete)`, or `if (config.publicMode)` will silently take the truthy branch. This is **distinct** from [GHSA-65fc-cr5f-v7r2](https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/security/advisories/GHSA-65fc-cr5f-v7r2) (the 1.0.2 prototype-pollution fix). `Object.prototype` is **not** polluted. The `Object.create(null)` mitigation from 1.0.2 is intact; the bug here is in the duplicate-key state machine, not in container construction. ### Details Two truthy checks are wrong: `src/load/interpreter.ts:214` — `Interpreter.tryCreatingObject` ```js if (object[key]) { // falsy primitives slip through // duplicate-key logic } else { object[key] = createSafeObject(); // silently overwrites the prior falsy value ... } ``` `src/load/interpreter.ts:278` — `Interpreter.getOrCreateArray` ```js if (object[first] && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { // same flaw throw new DuplicateKeyError(); } object[first] = object[first] || []; // overwrites the prior falsy value ``` Both should use the `in` operator. Containers are created via `Object.create(null)`, so `in` is unambiguous (no inherited keys to worry about). The bug is reachable through every parent-walking interpreter path: - `assignValue` — dotted keys in `key = value` - `createTable` — `[stdTable]` headers - `getOrCreateArray` — `[[arrayOfTables]]` headers ### PoC ```toml isAdmin = false [isAdmin] forced = "yes" ``` ```js import { load } from 'js-toml'; const config = load(` isAdmin = false [isAdmin] forced = "yes" `); console.log(JSON.stringify(config)); // {"isAdmin":{"forced":"yes"}} console.log(config.isAdmin ? 'BYPASS' : 'safe'); // BYPASS if (config.isAdmin) { // attacker reaches admin-only code } ``` ### Impact Spec-violating input acceptance leading to structural type confusion. (CWE-697) ### Suggested fix in `src/load/interpreter.ts` ```diff export class Interpreter extends BaseCstVisitor { ignoreImplicitDeclared, ignoreExplicitDeclared ) { - if (object[key]) { + if (key in object) { if ( !isPlainObject(object[key]) || (!ignoreExplicitDeclared && ``` ```diff export class Interpreter extends BaseCstVisitor { return this.getOrCreateArray(keys, object[first], idx + 1); } - if (object[first] && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { + if (first in object && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { throw new DuplicateKeyError(); } object[first] = object[first] || []; ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| js-tomlnpm | <=1.1.1 | 1.1.2 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate js-toml to 1.1.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanjs-toml has silent type confusion via falsy-primitive duplicate-key bypass affects js-toml (npm). Severity is medium. ### Summary `js-toml`'s interpreter checks whether a key already exists in a parser-built container with `if (object[key])` instead of `if (key in object)`. When the prior value is a falsy primitive — `false`, `0`, `0n`, `0.0`, `-0`, or `""` — the duplicate-key branch is skipped and the value is silently overwritten by a later sub-table, dotted-key sub-table, or array-of-tables sharing the same name. Per the TOML 1.0.0 spec ("Defining a key multiple times is invalid"; "You cannot define any key or table more than once"), this should be a parse error. The result is **structural type confusion of attacker-named keys** in the value returned by `load()`. A boolean-typed `false` (or numeric `0`) becomes a truthy object. Host applications that gate behavior on `if (config.flag)`, `if (!user.banned)`, `if (config.allowDelete)`, or `if (config.publicMode)` will silently take the truthy branch. This is **distinct** from [GHSA-65fc-cr5f-v7r2](https://github.com/sunnyadn/js-toml/security/advisories/GHSA-65fc-cr5f-v7r2) (the 1.0.2 prototype-pollution fix). `Object.prototype` is **not** polluted. The `Object.create(null)` mitigation from 1.0.2 is intact; the bug here is in the duplicate-key state machine, not in container construction. ### Details Two truthy checks are wrong: `src/load/interpreter.ts:214` — `Interpreter.tryCreatingObject` ```js if (object[key]) { // falsy primitives slip through // duplicate-key logic } else { object[key] = createSafeObject(); // silently overwrites the prior falsy value ... } ``` `src/load/interpreter.ts:278` — `Interpreter.getOrCreateArray` ```js if (object[first] && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { // same flaw throw new DuplicateKeyError(); } object[first] = object[first] || []; // overwrites the prior falsy value ``` Both should use the `in` operator. Containers are created via `Object.create(null)`, so `in` is unambiguous (no inherited keys to worry about). The bug is reachable through every parent-walking interpreter path: - `assignValue` — dotted keys in `key = value` - `createTable` — `[stdTable]` headers - `getOrCreateArray` — `[[arrayOfTables]]` headers ### PoC ```toml isAdmin = false [isAdmin] forced = "yes" ``` ```js import { load } from 'js-toml'; const config = load(` isAdmin = false [isAdmin] forced = "yes" `); console.log(JSON.stringify(config)); // {"isAdmin":{"forced":"yes"}} console.log(config.isAdmin ? 'BYPASS' : 'safe'); // BYPASS if (config.isAdmin) { // attacker reaches admin-only code } ``` ### Impact Spec-violating input acceptance leading to structural type confusion. (CWE-697) ### Suggested fix in `src/load/interpreter.ts` ```diff export class Interpreter extends BaseCstVisitor { ignoreImplicitDeclared, ignoreExplicitDeclared ) { - if (object[key]) { + if (key in object) { if ( !isPlainObject(object[key]) || (!ignoreExplicitDeclared && ``` ```diff export class Interpreter extends BaseCstVisitor { return this.getOrCreateArray(keys, object[first], idx + 1); } - if (object[first] && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { + if (first in object && !Array.isArray(object[first])) { throw new DuplicateKeyError(); } object[first] = object[first] || []; ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| js-tomlnpm | <=1.1.1 | 1.1.2 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard