Answer in brief
CVE-2026-50168 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in URL Parser Differential in @angular/platform-server leading to SSRF Allowlist Bypass. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps @angular/platform-server (npm), @angular/platform-server (npm), @angular/platform-server (npm), @angular/platform-server (npm) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps @angular/platform-server (npm), @angular/platform-server (npm), @angular/platform-server (npm), @angular/platform-server (npm) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @angular/platform-servernpm | >=22.0.0-next.0,<22.0.0-rc.2 | 22.0.0-rc.2 |
| @angular/platform-servernpm | >=20.0.0-next.0,<20.3.22 | 20.3.22 |
| @angular/platform-servernpm | >=19.0.0-next.0,<19.2.23 | 19.2.23 |
| @angular/platform-servernpm | <=18.2.14 | Not reported |
| @angular/platform-servernpm | >=21.0.0-next.0,<21.2.15 | 21.2.15 |
| @angular/platform-servernpm | >=22.0.0-next.0<22.0.0-rc.2 | Not reported |
| @angular/platform-servernpm | >=21.0.0-next.0<21.2.15 | Not reported |
| @angular/platform-servernpm | >=20.0.0-next.0<20.3.22 | Not reported |
| @angular/platform-servernpm | >=19.0.0-next.0<19.2.23 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 28, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Jul 15, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 19, 2026
An issue in the `@angular/platform-server` package allows remote attackers to bypass host allowlist constraints and direct server-side outgoing requests to arbitrary external endpoints. This occurs due to a parser differential between the strict WHATWG URL parser used for allowlist validation and the lenient Domino URL parser used to initialize the server emulated DOM. When a server-side request contains a malformed URL with a double port structure (e.g., `http://evil.com:80:80/path`), Node's strict `URL.canParse(url)` logic returns `false` and skips host check validation entirely. However, the same malformed URL is later accepted and parsed leniently by Domino's internal parser, which resolves the origin to `http://evil.com:80`. The Angular SSR HTTP request interceptor (`relativeUrlsTransformerInterceptorFn`) then resolves all relative backend HTTP requests against this adopted origin, executing the SSRF attack. ### Impact Any Angular application utilizing server-side rendering (`@angular/platform-server`) that configures host routing allowlists (`allowedHosts`) is vulnerable to this allowlist bypass. By sending an HTTP request with a malformed Host header (e.g. `Host: evil.com:80:80`) or an absolute-form request URI, an attacker can bypass the allowlist logic completely (even when configured with a strict default deny setup). The SSR application will then route all relative `HttpClient` outgoing API queries—which commonly carry sensitive credentials, session cookies, and internal authorization tokens—to the attacker-controlled server instead of the intended backend services. Additionally, the attacker can supply custom payloads back to the emulated DOM, leading to response injection and content poisoning within the rendered HTML served to users. ### Attack Preconditions To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the following environment parameters and application states must all concurrently exist: 1. **Active Server-Side Rendering (SSR):** The application must be configured to run with Angular Server-Side Rendering (`@angular/platform-server`). 2. **Host Header/URI Propagation:** The SSR handler must reconstruct the request URL using raw client inputs (such as request Host headers or absolute-form URIs) and pass it as `config.url` to the rendering API (`renderApplication` or `renderModule`). 3. **Outbound Relative HTTP Requests:** The server application must perform outbound backend API requests using relative paths (e.g., `this.http.get('/api/data')`) that undergo base-URL interceptor rewriting. 4. **Enabled Allowed Hosts Check:** The server must use the framework-provided `allowedHosts` options to limit valid server locations. ### Patches * 22.0.0-rc.2 * 21.2.15 * 20.3.22 * 19.2.23 ### References * https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/68928
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.