Answer in brief
CVE-2026-52733 records a Medium severity vulnerability in ZEBRA: Persistent on-disk corruption of Sapling/Orchard subtree roots after chain fork via pop_tip. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), ZcashFoundation/zebra-state (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-state (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), ZcashFoundation/zebra-state (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-state (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ZcashFoundation/zebrageneric | < 4.5.0 | Not reported |
| ZcashFoundation/zebra-stategeneric | < 7.0.0 | Not reported |
| zebradrust | <=4.4.1 | 4.5.0 |
| zebra-staterust | <=6.0.0 | 7.0.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 2, 2026
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a natural or attacker-influenced chain fork can leave stale Sapling and Orchard note-commitment subtree roots in Zebra state. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::pop_tip removed a reverted tip block but did not remove subtree entries whose end_height belonged to that block, unlike the cleanup performed by pop_root. When the winning fork later finalized, the abandoned branch's stale subtree data could be written to RocksDB and survive node restarts. The corrupted history can cause z_getsubtreesbyindex consumers such as lightwalletd and light wallets to receive incorrect subtree roots, producing wallet synchronization failures or incorrect wallet state and requiring a full state rebuild for recovery. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-52733 records a Medium severity vulnerability in ZEBRA: Persistent on-disk corruption of Sapling/Orchard subtree roots after chain fork via pop_tip. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), ZcashFoundation/zebra-state (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-state (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), ZcashFoundation/zebra-state (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-state (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ZcashFoundation/zebrageneric | < 4.5.0 | Not reported |
| ZcashFoundation/zebra-stategeneric | < 7.0.0 | Not reported |
| zebradrust | <=4.4.1 | 4.5.0 |
| zebra-staterust | <=6.0.0 | 7.0.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 2, 2026
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a natural or attacker-influenced chain fork can leave stale Sapling and Orchard note-commitment subtree roots in Zebra state. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::pop_tip removed a reverted tip block but did not remove subtree entries whose end_height belonged to that block, unlike the cleanup performed by pop_root. When the winning fork later finalized, the abandoned branch's stale subtree data could be written to RocksDB and survive node restarts. The corrupted history can cause z_getsubtreesbyindex consumers such as lightwalletd and light wallets to receive incorrect subtree roots, producing wallet synchronization failures or incorrect wallet state and requiring a full state rebuild for recovery. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.