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Critical · CVSS 9.3CVE-2026-52735GHSA-GF9R-M956-97QX

ZEBRA: Consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-52735 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.3) vulnerability in ZEBRA: Consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 18, 2026Updated Sep 30, 2026Source checked Oct 2, 2026First seen by HOL Jul 2, 2026Material review Sep 30, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Critical · CVSS 9.3
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
3 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
ZcashFoundation/zebrageneric<4.5.04.5.0
zebradrust<=4.4.14.5.0
zebra-scriptrust<=6.0.17.0.0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for ZcashFoundation/zebra, zebrad, zebra-script.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update ZcashFoundation/zebra to 4.5.0; zebrad to 4.5.0; zebra-script to 7.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Aug 18, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Sep 30, 2026

    Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Jul 2, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, Zebra can accept a block that zcashd rejects because the P2SH signature-operation counter undercounts redeem scripts containing a disabled opcode followed by signature opcodes. In zebra-script/src/lib.rs, p2sh_input_sigop_count used the pure-Rust script::Code::sig_op_count path, whose try_fold parser stops at disabled opcodes such as OP_CODESEPARATOR and returns only the partial count accumulated before the error. The zcashd reference implementation continues static signature-operation counting through disabled opcodes, so an attacker can broadcast P2SH spends that Zebra counts below MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS while zcashd counts above the 20,000-operation limit. If a Zebra miner includes those transactions, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it, creating a consensus chain split that affects network integrity and availability without requiring the attacker to produce a block. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

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Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-684
Source
CVE List V5
Source checked
Oct 2, 2026
References
7 linked sources
Open source record