Answer in brief
CVE-2026-52735 records a Critical severity vulnerability in ZEBRA: Consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-52735 records a Critical severity vulnerability in ZEBRA: Consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ZcashFoundation/zebrageneric | < 4.5.0 | Not reported |
| zebradrust | <=4.4.1 | 4.5.0 |
| zebra-scriptrust | <=6.0.1 | 7.0.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 2, 2026
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, Zebra can accept a block that zcashd rejects because the P2SH signature-operation counter undercounts redeem scripts containing a disabled opcode followed by signature opcodes. In zebra-script/src/lib.rs, p2sh_input_sigop_count used the pure-Rust script::Code::sig_op_count path, whose try_fold parser stops at disabled opcodes such as OP_CODESEPARATOR and returns only the partial count accumulated before the error. The zcashd reference implementation continues static signature-operation counting through disabled opcodes, so an attacker can broadcast P2SH spends that Zebra counts below MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS while zcashd counts above the 20,000-operation limit. If a Zebra miner includes those transactions, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it, creating a consensus chain split that affects network integrity and availability without requiring the attacker to produce a block. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ZcashFoundation/zebrageneric | < 4.5.0 | Not reported |
| zebradrust | <=4.4.1 | 4.5.0 |
| zebra-scriptrust | <=6.0.1 | 7.0.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 2, 2026
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, Zebra can accept a block that zcashd rejects because the P2SH signature-operation counter undercounts redeem scripts containing a disabled opcode followed by signature opcodes. In zebra-script/src/lib.rs, p2sh_input_sigop_count used the pure-Rust script::Code::sig_op_count path, whose try_fold parser stops at disabled opcodes such as OP_CODESEPARATOR and returns only the partial count accumulated before the error. The zcashd reference implementation continues static signature-operation counting through disabled opcodes, so an attacker can broadcast P2SH spends that Zebra counts below MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS while zcashd counts above the 20,000-operation limit. If a Zebra miner includes those transactions, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it, creating a consensus chain split that affects network integrity and availability without requiring the attacker to produce a block. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.