Answer in brief
CVE-2026-52735 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.3) vulnerability in ZEBRA: Consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-script (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ZcashFoundation/zebrageneric | <4.5.0 | 4.5.0 |
| zebradrust | <=4.4.1 | 4.5.0 |
| zebra-scriptrust | <=6.0.1 | 7.0.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 30, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 2, 2026
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, Zebra can accept a block that zcashd rejects because the P2SH signature-operation counter undercounts redeem scripts containing a disabled opcode followed by signature opcodes. In zebra-script/src/lib.rs, p2sh_input_sigop_count used the pure-Rust script::Code::sig_op_count path, whose try_fold parser stops at disabled opcodes such as OP_CODESEPARATOR and returns only the partial count accumulated before the error. The zcashd reference implementation continues static signature-operation counting through disabled opcodes, so an attacker can broadcast P2SH spends that Zebra counts below MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS while zcashd counts above the 20,000-operation limit. If a Zebra miner includes those transactions, Zebra validators accept the block while zcashd validators reject it, creating a consensus chain split that affects network integrity and availability without requiring the attacker to produce a block. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.