ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks (CVE-2026-52738) | HOL Guard CVE

Medium · CVSS 6.9CVE-2026-52738GHSA-W834-CF6P-9M9W

ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-52738 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.9) vulnerability in ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), ZcashFoundation/zebra-state (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-state (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Aug 18, 2026Updated Sep 9, 2026Source checked Sep 17, 2026First seen by HOL Jul 2, 2026Material review Sep 9, 2026

Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk: Medium · CVSS 6.9
Exploitation: Not marked as known exploited
Affected software: 4 mapped packages or products
Fix availability: Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 6.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps ZcashFoundation/zebra (generic), ZcashFoundation/zebra-state (generic), zebrad (rust), zebra-state (rust). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
Package	Affected range	Fixed version
ZcashFoundation/zebrageneric	< 4.5.0	Not reported
ZcashFoundation/zebra-stategeneric	< 7.0.0	Not reported
zebradrust	<=4.4.1	4.5.0
zebra-staterust	<=6.0.0	7.0.0

Recommended response

Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for ZcashFoundation/zebra, ZcashFoundation/zebra-state, zebrad.
Review the reported fix. Update zebrad to 4.5.0; zebra-state to 7.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

Published upstream
Aug 18, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
Source modified
Sep 9, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:record
First seen by HOL
Jul 2, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

Upstream source description

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.