## Summary The Timesheet API `PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}` and `POST /api/timesheets` endpoints accept a user-supplied `project` ID and resolve it through a Symfony `EntityType` whose `query_builder` allows the submitted ID to satisfy the access predicate via an unconditional OR branch. As a result, any authenticated user can re-assign their own timesheet to any project in the database — including projects that belong to teams or customers they have no membership in and cannot otherwise see. The user can then read serialized project/customer details via `GET /api/timesheets/{id}?full=true`, leaking metadata (name, currency, customer hierarchy) that would otherwise be filtered out by the team ACL. ## Details ### Entry point — only ownership is checked in `src/API/TimesheetController.php:317-355` ```php #[IsGranted('edit', 'timesheet')] #[Route(methods: ['PATCH'], path: '/{id}', name: 'patch_timesheet', requirements: ['id' => '\d+'])] public function patchAction(Request $request, Timesheet $timesheet): Response { ... $form = $this->createForm(TimesheetApiEditForm::class, $timesheet, [...]); $form->setData($timesheet); $form->submit($request->request->all(), false); if (false === $form->isValid()) { ... } $this->service->saveTimesheet($timesheet); ... } ``` `src/Voter/TimesheetVoter.php:134-142`: ```php if ($subject->getUser()?->getId() === $user->getId()) { return $this->permissionManager->hasRolePermission($user, $permission . '_own_timesheet'); } if (!$this->permissionManager->checkTeamAccessTimesheet($subject, $user)) { return false; } ``` For an own-timesheet, only `edit_own_timesheet` is required. The voter does **not** look at the *new* project being submitted; it only validates the existing record's ownership. ### Form replays user-controlled project ID into the access query `src/Form/TimesheetEditForm.php:60-71`: ```php $isNew = true; if (isset($options['data']) && $options['data'] instanceof Timesheet) { ... if (null !== $entry->getId()) { $isNew = false; } ... } $this->addProject($builder, $isNew, $project, $customer); ``` `src/Form/FormTrait.php:59-100`: ```php $builder->addEventListener( FormEvents::PRE_SUBMIT, function (FormEvent $event) use ($builder, $project, $customer, $isNew, $options): void { $data = $event->getData(); $customer = \array_key_exists('customer', $data) && $data['customer'] !== '' ? $data['customer'] : null; $project = \array_key_exists('project', $data) && $data['project'] !== '' ? $data['project'] : $project; $event->getForm()->add('project', ProjectType::class, array_merge($options, [ 'group_by' => null, 'query_builder' => function (ProjectRepository $repo) use ($builder, $project, $customer, $isNew) { $project = \is_string($project) ? (int) $project : $project; ... if ($isNew && \is_int($project)) { $project = $repo->find($project); if ($project !== null) { if (!$project->getCustomer()->isVisible()) { ... $project = null; } elseif (!$project->isVisible()) { $project = null; } } } ... $query = new ProjectFormTypeQuery($project, $customer); $query->setUser($builder->getOption('user')); $query->setWithCustomer(true); return $repo->getQueryBuilderForFormType($query); }, ])); } ); ``` Two problems compound: 1. The visibility re-check on line 73 is gated on `$isNew`. For PATCH, `$isNew = false`, so the closure passes the attacker-supplied ID straight through. 2. Even when `$isNew = true` (POST), the re-check only validates `isVisible()` — it does not validate team membership. ### The query-builder unconditionally accepts the submitted ID `src/Repository/ProjectRepository.php:150-208`: ```php public function getQueryBuilderForFormType(ProjectFormTypeQuery $query): QueryBuilder { ... $mainQuery = $qb->expr()->andX(); $mainQuery->add($qb->expr()->eq('p.visible', ':visible')); $mainQuery->add($qb->expr()->eq('c.visible', ':customer_visible')); if (!$query->isIgnoreDate()) { ... } if ($query->hasCustomers()) { ... } $permissions = $this->getPermissionCriteria($qb, $query->getUser(), $query->getTeams()); if ($permissions->count() > 0) { $mainQuery->add($permissions); } $outerQuery = $qb->expr()->orX(); if ($query->hasProjects()) { $outerQuery->add($qb->expr()->in('p.id', ':project')); // <-- unconditional $qb->setParameter('project', $query->getProjects()); } ... $outerQuery->add($mainQuery); $qb->andWhere($outerQuery); return $qb; } ``` The final WHERE clause is roughly: ``` WHERE (p.id IN (:project)) OR (p.visible AND c.visible AND <date> AND <team-ACL>) ``` Because `:project` is the submitted ID itself, the first branch matches unconditionally, completely bypassing the team-ACL applied by `getPermissionCriteria`. Symfony's `EntityType` happily resolves the foreign `Project` entity, the form passes validation, and the timesheet is persisted with the new `project_id`. ### No downstream validation closes the gap - `TimesheetService::saveTimesheet` → `updateTimesheet` (`src/Timesheet/TimesheetService.php:154-177`) is explicitly documented as *not* validating. - `TimesheetBasicValidator` only validates begin/end and project/activity coherence. - `TimesheetDeactivatedValidator::validateActivityAndProject` (`src/Validator/Constraints/TimesheetDeactivatedValidator.php:36-42`) returns early for non-running existing timesheets. - No validator anywhere in the timesheet pipeline checks that the project's team membership intersects the acting user's teams. *A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.* ## Impact - **Integrity:** any authenticated user can attribute their own tracked time to any project ID in the database — including projects belonging to teams/customers they cannot see. This pollutes per-project budgets, billing exports and reports for other teams. There is no in-app warning that records belonging to outsiders have been added. - **Confidentiality:** by reading the timesheet back via `?full=true`, the attacker obtains serialized project and customer details (name, currency, start/end dates, customer hierarchy) which would normally be filtered by the team ACL. - **Privilege model:** the `edit_own_timesheet` permission is part of the default ROLE_USER, so the bypass is reachable by every regular user without any administrator action. The blast radius is bounded by what an attacker can persist (their own timesheet rows) and what the `?full=true` serializer exposes — there is no direct ability to modify other teams' existing data. ## Solution - The FormTrait was updated to only pass the project forward for new timesheets - A new `TimesheetTeamAccessValidator`was added, which checks if `project` or `activity` were changed. If that is the case, the team access permission is checked first Find out more at [https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-vrr2-g9gh-c3jc](https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-vrr2-g9gh-c3jc)
## Summary The Timesheet API `PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}` and `POST /api/timesheets` endpoints accept a user-supplied `project` ID and resolve it through a Symfony `EntityType` whose `query_builder` allows the submitted ID to satisfy the access predicate via an unconditional OR branch. As a result, any authenticated user can re-assign their own timesheet to any project in the database — including projects that belong to teams or customers they have no membership in and cannot otherwise see. The user can then read serialized project/customer details via `GET /api/timesheets/{id}?full=true`, leaking metadata (name, currency, customer hierarchy) that would otherwise be filtered out by the team ACL. ## Details ### Entry point — only ownership is checked in `src/API/TimesheetController.php:317-355` ```php #[IsGranted('edit', 'timesheet')] #[Route(methods: ['PATCH'], path: '/{id}', name: 'patch_timesheet', requirements: ['id' => '\d+'])] public function patchAction(Request $request, Timesheet $timesheet): Response { ... $form = $this->createForm(TimesheetApiEditForm::class, $timesheet, [...]); $form->setData($timesheet); $form->submit($request->request->all(), false); if (false === $form->isValid()) { ... } $this->service->saveTimesheet($timesheet); ... } ``` `src/Voter/TimesheetVoter.php:134-142`: ```php if ($subject->getUser()?->getId() === $user->getId()) { return $this->permissionManager->hasRolePermission($user, $permission . '_own_timesheet'); } if (!$this->permissionManager->checkTeamAccessTimesheet($subject, $user)) { return false; } ``` For an own-timesheet, only `edit_own_timesheet` is required. The voter does **not** look at the *new* project being submitted; it only validates the existing record's ownership. ### Form replays user-controlled project ID into the access query `src/Form/TimesheetEditForm.php:60-71`: ```php $isNew = true; if (isset($options['data']) && $options['data'] instanceof Timesheet) { ... if (null !== $entry->getId()) { $isNew = false; } ... } $this->addProject($builder, $isNew, $project, $customer); ``` `src/Form/FormTrait.php:59-100`: ```php $builder->addEventListener( FormEvents::PRE_SUBMIT, function (FormEvent $event) use ($builder, $project, $customer, $isNew, $options): void { $data = $event->getData(); $customer = \array_key_exists('customer', $data) && $data['customer'] !== '' ? $data['customer'] : null; $project = \array_key_exists('project', $data) && $data['project'] !== '' ? $data['project'] : $project; $event->getForm()->add('project', ProjectType::class, array_merge($options, [ 'group_by' => null, 'query_builder' => function (ProjectRepository $repo) use ($builder, $project, $customer, $isNew) { $project = \is_string($project) ? (int) $project : $project; ... if ($isNew && \is_int($project)) { $project = $repo->find($project); if ($project !== null) { if (!$project->getCustomer()->isVisible()) { ... $project = null; } elseif (!$project->isVisible()) { $project = null; } } } ... $query = new ProjectFormTypeQuery($project, $customer); $query->setUser($builder->getOption('user')); $query->setWithCustomer(true); return $repo->getQueryBuilderForFormType($query); }, ])); } ); ``` Two problems compound: 1. The visibility re-check on line 73 is gated on `$isNew`. For PATCH, `$isNew = false`, so the closure passes the attacker-supplied ID straight through. 2. Even when `$isNew = true` (POST), the re-check only validates `isVisible()` — it does not validate team membership. ### The query-builder unconditionally accepts the submitted ID `src/Repository/ProjectRepository.php:150-208`: ```php public function getQueryBuilderForFormType(ProjectFormTypeQuery $query): QueryBuilder { ... $mainQuery = $qb->expr()->andX(); $mainQuery->add($qb->expr()->eq('p.visible', ':visible')); $mainQuery->add($qb->expr()->eq('c.visible', ':customer_visible')); if (!$query->isIgnoreDate()) { ... } if ($query->hasCustomers()) { ... } $permissions = $this->getPermissionCriteria($qb, $query->getUser(), $query->getTeams()); if ($permissions->count() > 0) { $mainQuery->add($permissions); } $outerQuery = $qb->expr()->orX(); if ($query->hasProjects()) { $outerQuery->add($qb->expr()->in('p.id', ':project')); // <-- unconditional $qb->setParameter('project', $query->getProjects()); } ... $outerQuery->add($mainQuery); $qb->andWhere($outerQuery); return $qb; } ``` The final WHERE clause is roughly: ``` WHERE (p.id IN (:project)) OR (p.visible AND c.visible AND <date> AND <team-ACL>) ``` Because `:project` is the submitted ID itself, the first branch matches unconditionally, completely bypassing the team-ACL applied by `getPermissionCriteria`. Symfony's `EntityType` happily resolves the foreign `Project` entity, the form passes validation, and the timesheet is persisted with the new `project_id`. ### No downstream validation closes the gap - `TimesheetService::saveTimesheet` → `updateTimesheet` (`src/Timesheet/TimesheetService.php:154-177`) is explicitly documented as *not* validating. - `TimesheetBasicValidator` only validates begin/end and project/activity coherence. - `TimesheetDeactivatedValidator::validateActivityAndProject` (`src/Validator/Constraints/TimesheetDeactivatedValidator.php:36-42`) returns early for non-running existing timesheets. - No validator anywhere in the timesheet pipeline checks that the project's team membership intersects the acting user's teams. *A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.* ## Impact - **Integrity:** any authenticated user can attribute their own tracked time to any project ID in the database — including projects belonging to teams/customers they cannot see. This pollutes per-project budgets, billing exports and reports for other teams. There is no in-app warning that records belonging to outsiders have been added. - **Confidentiality:** by reading the timesheet back via `?full=true`, the attacker obtains serialized project and customer details (name, currency, start/end dates, customer hierarchy) which would normally be filtered by the team ACL. - **Privilege model:** the `edit_own_timesheet` permission is part of the default ROLE_USER, so the bypass is reachable by every regular user without any administrator action. The blast radius is bounded by what an attacker can persist (their own timesheet rows) and what the `?full=true` serializer exposes — there is no direct ability to modify other teams' existing data. ## Solution - The FormTrait was updated to only pass the project forward for new timesheets - A new `TimesheetTeamAccessValidator`was added, which checks if `project` or `activity` were changed. If that is the case, the team access permission is checked first Find out more at [https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-vrr2-g9gh-c3jc](https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-vrr2-g9gh-c3jc)
Update kimai/kimai to 2.57.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanKimai: Timesheet PATCH/POST allows assigning to project outside user's team via query_builder OR-bypass affects kimai/kimai (composer). Severity is medium. ## Summary The Timesheet API `PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}` and `POST /api/timesheets` endpoints accept a user-supplied `project` ID and resolve it through a Symfony `EntityType` whose `query_builder` allows the submitted ID to satisfy the access predicate via an unconditional OR branch. As a result, any authenticated user can re-assign their own timesheet to any project in the database — including projects that belong to teams or customers they have no membership in and cannot otherwise see. The user can then read serialized project/customer details via `GET /api/timesheets/{id}?full=true`, leaking metadata (name, currency, customer hierarchy) that would otherwise be filtered out by the team ACL. ## Details ### Entry point — only ownership is checked in `src/API/TimesheetController.php:317-355` ```php #[IsGranted('edit', 'timesheet')] #[Route(methods: ['PATCH'], path: '/{id}', name: 'patch_timesheet', requirements: ['id' => '\d+'])] public function patchAction(Request $request, Timesheet $timesheet): Response { ... $form = $this->createForm(TimesheetApiEditForm::class, $timesheet, [...]); $form->setData($timesheet); $form->submit($request->request->all(), false); if (false === $form->isValid()) { ... } $this->service->saveTimesheet($timesheet); ... } ``` `src/Voter/TimesheetVoter.php:134-142`: ```php if ($subject->getUser()?->getId() === $user->getId()) { return $this->permissionManager->hasRolePermission($user, $permission . '_own_timesheet'); } if (!$this->permissionManager->checkTeamAccessTimesheet($subject, $user)) { return false; } ``` For an own-timesheet, only `edit_own_timesheet` is required. The voter does **not** look at the *new* project being submitted; it only validates the existing record's ownership. ### Form replays user-controlled project ID into the access query `src/Form/TimesheetEditForm.php:60-71`: ```php $isNew = true; if (isset($options['data']) && $options['data'] instanceof Timesheet) { ... if (null !== $entry->getId()) { $isNew = false; } ... } $this->addProject($builder, $isNew, $project, $customer); ``` `src/Form/FormTrait.php:59-100`: ```php $builder->addEventListener( FormEvents::PRE_SUBMIT, function (FormEvent $event) use ($builder, $project, $customer, $isNew, $options): void { $data = $event->getData(); $customer = \array_key_exists('customer', $data) && $data['customer'] !== '' ? $data['customer'] : null; $project = \array_key_exists('project', $data) && $data['project'] !== '' ? $data['project'] : $project; $event->getForm()->add('project', ProjectType::class, array_merge($options, [ 'group_by' => null, 'query_builder' => function (ProjectRepository $repo) use ($builder, $project, $customer, $isNew) { $project = \is_string($project) ? (int) $project : $project; ... if ($isNew && \is_int($project)) { $project = $repo->find($project); if ($project !== null) { if (!$project->getCustomer()->isVisible()) { ... $project = null; } elseif (!$project->isVisible()) { $project = null; } } } ... $query = new ProjectFormTypeQuery($project, $customer); $query->setUser($builder->getOption('user')); $query->setWithCustomer(true); return $repo->getQueryBuilderForFormType($query); }, ])); } ); ``` Two problems compound: 1. The visibility re-check on line 73 is gated on `$isNew`. For PATCH, `$isNew = false`, so the closure passes the attacker-supplied ID straight through. 2. Even when `$isNew = true` (POST), the re-check only validates `isVisible()` — it does not validate team membership. ### The query-builder unconditionally accepts the submitted ID `src/Repository/ProjectRepository.php:150-208`: ```php public function getQueryBuilderForFormType(ProjectFormTypeQuery $query): QueryBuilder { ... $mainQuery = $qb->expr()->andX(); $mainQuery->add($qb->expr()->eq('p.visible', ':visible')); $mainQuery->add($qb->expr()->eq('c.visible', ':customer_visible')); if (!$query->isIgnoreDate()) { ... } if ($query->hasCustomers()) { ... } $permissions = $this->getPermissionCriteria($qb, $query->getUser(), $query->getTeams()); if ($permissions->count() > 0) { $mainQuery->add($permissions); } $outerQuery = $qb->expr()->orX(); if ($query->hasProjects()) { $outerQuery->add($qb->expr()->in('p.id', ':project')); // <-- unconditional $qb->setParameter('project', $query->getProjects()); } ... $outerQuery->add($mainQuery); $qb->andWhere($outerQuery); return $qb; } ``` The final WHERE clause is roughly: ``` WHERE (p.id IN (:project)) OR (p.visible AND c.visible AND <date> AND <team-ACL>) ``` Because `:project` is the submitted ID itself, the first branch matches unconditionally, completely bypassing the team-ACL applied by `getPermissionCriteria`. Symfony's `EntityType` happily resolves the foreign `Project` entity, the form passes validation, and the timesheet is persisted with the new `project_id`. ### No downstream validation closes the gap - `TimesheetService::saveTimesheet` → `updateTimesheet` (`src/Timesheet/TimesheetService.php:154-177`) is explicitly documented as *not* validating. - `TimesheetBasicValidator` only validates begin/end and project/activity coherence. - `TimesheetDeactivatedValidator::validateActivityAndProject` (`src/Validator/Constraints/TimesheetDeactivatedValidator.php:36-42`) returns early for non-running existing timesheets. - No validator anywhere in the timesheet pipeline checks that the project's team membership intersects the acting user's teams. *A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.* ## Impact - **Integrity:** any authenticated user can attribute their own tracked time to any project ID in the database — including projects belonging to teams/customers they cannot see. This pollutes per-project budgets, billing exports and reports for other teams. There is no in-app warning that records belonging to outsiders have been added. - **Confidentiality:** by reading the timesheet back via `?full=true`, the attacker obtains serialized project and customer details (name, currency, start/end dates, customer hierarchy) which would normally be filtered by the team ACL. - **Privilege model:** the `edit_own_timesheet` permission is part of the default ROLE_USER, so the bypass is reachable by every regular user without any administrator action. The blast radius is bounded by what an attacker can persist (their own timesheet rows) and what the `?full=true` serializer exposes — there is no direct ability to modify other teams' existing data. ## Solution - The FormTrait was updated to only pass the project forward for new timesheets - A new `TimesheetTeamAccessValidator`was added, which checks if `project` or `activity` were changed. If that is the case, the team access permission is checked first Find out more at [https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-vrr2-g9gh-c3jc](https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-vrr2-g9gh-c3jc)
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| kimai/kimaicomposer | <=2.56.0 | 2.57.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate kimai/kimai to 2.57.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanKimai: Timesheet PATCH/POST allows assigning to project outside user's team via query_builder OR-bypass affects kimai/kimai (composer). Severity is medium. ## Summary The Timesheet API `PATCH /api/timesheets/{id}` and `POST /api/timesheets` endpoints accept a user-supplied `project` ID and resolve it through a Symfony `EntityType` whose `query_builder` allows the submitted ID to satisfy the access predicate via an unconditional OR branch. As a result, any authenticated user can re-assign their own timesheet to any project in the database — including projects that belong to teams or customers they have no membership in and cannot otherwise see. The user can then read serialized project/customer details via `GET /api/timesheets/{id}?full=true`, leaking metadata (name, currency, customer hierarchy) that would otherwise be filtered out by the team ACL. ## Details ### Entry point — only ownership is checked in `src/API/TimesheetController.php:317-355` ```php #[IsGranted('edit', 'timesheet')] #[Route(methods: ['PATCH'], path: '/{id}', name: 'patch_timesheet', requirements: ['id' => '\d+'])] public function patchAction(Request $request, Timesheet $timesheet): Response { ... $form = $this->createForm(TimesheetApiEditForm::class, $timesheet, [...]); $form->setData($timesheet); $form->submit($request->request->all(), false); if (false === $form->isValid()) { ... } $this->service->saveTimesheet($timesheet); ... } ``` `src/Voter/TimesheetVoter.php:134-142`: ```php if ($subject->getUser()?->getId() === $user->getId()) { return $this->permissionManager->hasRolePermission($user, $permission . '_own_timesheet'); } if (!$this->permissionManager->checkTeamAccessTimesheet($subject, $user)) { return false; } ``` For an own-timesheet, only `edit_own_timesheet` is required. The voter does **not** look at the *new* project being submitted; it only validates the existing record's ownership. ### Form replays user-controlled project ID into the access query `src/Form/TimesheetEditForm.php:60-71`: ```php $isNew = true; if (isset($options['data']) && $options['data'] instanceof Timesheet) { ... if (null !== $entry->getId()) { $isNew = false; } ... } $this->addProject($builder, $isNew, $project, $customer); ``` `src/Form/FormTrait.php:59-100`: ```php $builder->addEventListener( FormEvents::PRE_SUBMIT, function (FormEvent $event) use ($builder, $project, $customer, $isNew, $options): void { $data = $event->getData(); $customer = \array_key_exists('customer', $data) && $data['customer'] !== '' ? $data['customer'] : null; $project = \array_key_exists('project', $data) && $data['project'] !== '' ? $data['project'] : $project; $event->getForm()->add('project', ProjectType::class, array_merge($options, [ 'group_by' => null, 'query_builder' => function (ProjectRepository $repo) use ($builder, $project, $customer, $isNew) { $project = \is_string($project) ? (int) $project : $project; ... if ($isNew && \is_int($project)) { $project = $repo->find($project); if ($project !== null) { if (!$project->getCustomer()->isVisible()) { ... $project = null; } elseif (!$project->isVisible()) { $project = null; } } } ... $query = new ProjectFormTypeQuery($project, $customer); $query->setUser($builder->getOption('user')); $query->setWithCustomer(true); return $repo->getQueryBuilderForFormType($query); }, ])); } ); ``` Two problems compound: 1. The visibility re-check on line 73 is gated on `$isNew`. For PATCH, `$isNew = false`, so the closure passes the attacker-supplied ID straight through. 2. Even when `$isNew = true` (POST), the re-check only validates `isVisible()` — it does not validate team membership. ### The query-builder unconditionally accepts the submitted ID `src/Repository/ProjectRepository.php:150-208`: ```php public function getQueryBuilderForFormType(ProjectFormTypeQuery $query): QueryBuilder { ... $mainQuery = $qb->expr()->andX(); $mainQuery->add($qb->expr()->eq('p.visible', ':visible')); $mainQuery->add($qb->expr()->eq('c.visible', ':customer_visible')); if (!$query->isIgnoreDate()) { ... } if ($query->hasCustomers()) { ... } $permissions = $this->getPermissionCriteria($qb, $query->getUser(), $query->getTeams()); if ($permissions->count() > 0) { $mainQuery->add($permissions); } $outerQuery = $qb->expr()->orX(); if ($query->hasProjects()) { $outerQuery->add($qb->expr()->in('p.id', ':project')); // <-- unconditional $qb->setParameter('project', $query->getProjects()); } ... $outerQuery->add($mainQuery); $qb->andWhere($outerQuery); return $qb; } ``` The final WHERE clause is roughly: ``` WHERE (p.id IN (:project)) OR (p.visible AND c.visible AND <date> AND <team-ACL>) ``` Because `:project` is the submitted ID itself, the first branch matches unconditionally, completely bypassing the team-ACL applied by `getPermissionCriteria`. Symfony's `EntityType` happily resolves the foreign `Project` entity, the form passes validation, and the timesheet is persisted with the new `project_id`. ### No downstream validation closes the gap - `TimesheetService::saveTimesheet` → `updateTimesheet` (`src/Timesheet/TimesheetService.php:154-177`) is explicitly documented as *not* validating. - `TimesheetBasicValidator` only validates begin/end and project/activity coherence. - `TimesheetDeactivatedValidator::validateActivityAndProject` (`src/Validator/Constraints/TimesheetDeactivatedValidator.php:36-42`) returns early for non-running existing timesheets. - No validator anywhere in the timesheet pipeline checks that the project's team membership intersects the acting user's teams. *A PoC was provided, but removed for security reasons.* ## Impact - **Integrity:** any authenticated user can attribute their own tracked time to any project ID in the database — including projects belonging to teams/customers they cannot see. This pollutes per-project budgets, billing exports and reports for other teams. There is no in-app warning that records belonging to outsiders have been added. - **Confidentiality:** by reading the timesheet back via `?full=true`, the attacker obtains serialized project and customer details (name, currency, start/end dates, customer hierarchy) which would normally be filtered by the team ACL. - **Privilege model:** the `edit_own_timesheet` permission is part of the default ROLE_USER, so the bypass is reachable by every regular user without any administrator action. The blast radius is bounded by what an attacker can persist (their own timesheet rows) and what the `?full=true` serializer exposes — there is no direct ability to modify other teams' existing data. ## Solution - The FormTrait was updated to only pass the project forward for new timesheets - A new `TimesheetTeamAccessValidator`was added, which checks if `project` or `activity` were changed. If that is the case, the team access permission is checked first Find out more at [https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-vrr2-g9gh-c3jc](https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-vrr2-g9gh-c3jc)
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| kimai/kimaicomposer | <=2.56.0 | 2.57.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard