Answer in brief
CVE-2026-53431 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in Boruta accepts expired JWT client assertions due to missing exp claim validation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps malach-it/boruta (generic), malach-it/malach-it/boruta_auth (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps malach-it/boruta (generic), malach-it/malach-it/boruta_auth (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| malach-it/borutageneric | >=2.3.0 <2.3.7 || >=3.0.0-beta.1 <* | 2.3.7, * |
| malach-it/malach-it/boruta_authgeneric | >=5bfbe1c5443bffe71cf1bf954bbdff61327d9a83 <* | * |
Published upstream
Jul 30, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 20, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 28, 2026
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay vulnerability in malach-it Boruta allows an attacker who has obtained a previously valid JWT client assertion to authenticate as the issuing OAuth client after the assertion has expired. Boruta accepts JWT-based client authentication (client_secret_jwt and private_key_jwt token endpoint authentication methods) but never enforces that the assertion's exp claim is in the future. The pre-check helper Boruta.Oauth.Request.Base.check_expiration/1 in lib/boruta/oauth/request/base.ex only verifies that an exp claim is present (it pattern-matches on the existence of the key and returns success), and the Joken token configuration used for signature verification, Boruta.Oauth.Authorization.Client.Token.token_config/0 in lib/boruta/oauth/authorization/client.ex, returns an empty map, so Joken's default exp claim validator is not engaged either. Any attacker who obtains a validly-signed client assertion (for example through logs, reverse proxies, browser tooling, or other observability surfaces) can replay it indefinitely to authenticate as the client and obtain access tokens with that client's privileges. This issue affects boruta: from 2.3.0 before 2.3.7 and from 3.0.0-beta.1 onward.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.