Answer in brief
CVE-2026-53604 records a High severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in nebula-mesh: CA private key not zeroized on web mobile-bundle error paths. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps forgekeep/nebula-mesh (generic), github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps forgekeep/nebula-mesh (generic), github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| forgekeep/nebula-meshgeneric | < 0.3.8 | Not reported |
| github.com/forgekeep/nebula-meshgo | <=0.3.7 | 0.3.8 |
Published upstream
Sep 4, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 15, 2026
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh VPN. Prior to version 0.3.8, the web handler renderMobileBundle passes the real *pki.CAResolver directly into mobilebundle.Build. Inside Build, resolver.LoadByID decrypts the CA's ed25519 private key into a *pki.CAManager, but Build never calls CAManager.Wipe() on any return path. As a result, when a mobile-bundle request goes through the web UI and Build returns — especially on error (missing network, invalid prefix, DB error, signing failure) — the plaintext CA private key remains on the Go heap, unwiped, until garbage collection. An attacker able to read process memory (core dump, swap, memory-scraping) can recover the CA signing key, which would allow minting arbitrary host certificates for the mesh. The API handler already does this correctly: it loads the CAManager, defer caMgr.Wipe(), and wraps it in caManagerResolver. Only the web path is affected. This issue has been patched in version 0.3.8.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.