### Impact The FiftyOne App/API server (`fiftyone/server/app.py`) and the `/media` route (`fiftyone/server/routes/media.py`) unconditionally set a permissive CORS header (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`) on their responses. Because the embedded App server runs locally and is unauthenticated, this allows **any website a user visits to make cross-origin requests to that user's running FiftyOne server and read the responses**. Combined with the unauthenticated `/media` endpoint — which serves files from the local filesystem by path — the wildcard CORS policy turns a local-only file read into a **remotely exploitable, drive-by data exfiltration** vulnerability. A malicious web page can silently issue requests such as `http://localhost:5151/media?filepath=/etc/passwd` and read arbitrary files accessible to the server process (SSH keys, cloud credentials, `.env` files, dataset media, etc.), then exfiltrate them to an attacker-controlled endpoint. The victim only needs to have a FiftyOne server running locally and visit a malicious page — no clicks or other interaction are required. Browsers that have shipped Private Network Access / local-network-access protections (e.g. Chromium 142+) mitigate this for some users, but Safari and Firefox do not yet, so the attack remains viable in common configurations. **Who is impacted:** any user running FiftyOne (the open-source, embedded App server) locally while also browsing the web. **Not affected:** media stored in cloud buckets, which is served via signed URLs on a separate origin. ### Patches Fixed in **FiftyOne 1.17.0**. The hard-coded `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` has been removed and the server now responds **same-origin only by default**, which covers local desktop usage and the supported notebook integrations (each served through a same-origin proxy or iframe). Cross-origin access is now opt-in via a new `allowed_origins` config option (environment variable `FIFTYONE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`), an explicit comma-separated list of trusted origins, e.g.: ```shell export FIFTYONE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS='https://app.example.com,http://localhost:3000' ``` The literal value `*` restores the legacy wildcard behavior for users who explicitly require it and emits a warning. **Users should upgrade to FiftyOne 1.17.0 or later.** ### Workarounds In affected versions there is no configuration flag to disable the wildcard CORS header without upgrading. Until you can upgrade: - Do not run the FiftyOne App server while browsing untrusted websites. - Keep the App server bound to `localhost` (the default) and avoid exposing it on a network interface. - Use a browser that enforces Private Network Access protections. ### Resources - OWASP A01:2025 – Broken Access Control: https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A01_2025-Broken_Access_Control/
### Impact The FiftyOne App/API server (`fiftyone/server/app.py`) and the `/media` route (`fiftyone/server/routes/media.py`) unconditionally set a permissive CORS header (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`) on their responses. Because the embedded App server runs locally and is unauthenticated, this allows **any website a user visits to make cross-origin requests to that user's running FiftyOne server and read the responses**. Combined with the unauthenticated `/media` endpoint — which serves files from the local filesystem by path — the wildcard CORS policy turns a local-only file read into a **remotely exploitable, drive-by data exfiltration** vulnerability. A malicious web page can silently issue requests such as `http://localhost:5151/media?filepath=/etc/passwd` and read arbitrary files accessible to the server process (SSH keys, cloud credentials, `.env` files, dataset media, etc.), then exfiltrate them to an attacker-controlled endpoint. The victim only needs to have a FiftyOne server running locally and visit a malicious page — no clicks or other interaction are required. Browsers that have shipped Private Network Access / local-network-access protections (e.g. Chromium 142+) mitigate this for some users, but Safari and Firefox do not yet, so the attack remains viable in common configurations. **Who is impacted:** any user running FiftyOne (the open-source, embedded App server) locally while also browsing the web. **Not affected:** media stored in cloud buckets, which is served via signed URLs on a separate origin. ### Patches Fixed in **FiftyOne 1.17.0**. The hard-coded `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` has been removed and the server now responds **same-origin only by default**, which covers local desktop usage and the supported notebook integrations (each served through a same-origin proxy or iframe). Cross-origin access is now opt-in via a new `allowed_origins` config option (environment variable `FIFTYONE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`), an explicit comma-separated list of trusted origins, e.g.: ```shell export FIFTYONE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS='https://app.example.com,http://localhost:3000' ``` The literal value `*` restores the legacy wildcard behavior for users who explicitly require it and emits a warning. **Users should upgrade to FiftyOne 1.17.0 or later.** ### Workarounds In affected versions there is no configuration flag to disable the wildcard CORS header without upgrading. Until you can upgrade: - Do not run the FiftyOne App server while browsing untrusted websites. - Keep the App server bound to `localhost` (the default) and avoid exposing it on a network interface. - Use a browser that enforces Private Network Access protections. ### Resources - OWASP A01:2025 – Broken Access Control: https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A01_2025-Broken_Access_Control/
Update fiftyone to 1.17.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanFiftyOne App server uses wildcard CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *), enabling cross-origin reads of local server data affects fiftyone (pip). Severity is medium. ### Impact The FiftyOne App/API server (`fiftyone/server/app.py`) and the `/media` route (`fiftyone/server/routes/media.py`) unconditionally set a permissive CORS header (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`) on their responses. Because the embedded App server runs locally and is unauthenticated, this allows **any website a user visits to make cross-origin requests to that user's running FiftyOne server and read the responses**. Combined with the unauthenticated `/media` endpoint — which serves files from the local filesystem by path — the wildcard CORS policy turns a local-only file read into a **remotely exploitable, drive-by data exfiltration** vulnerability. A malicious web page can silently issue requests such as `http://localhost:5151/media?filepath=/etc/passwd` and read arbitrary files accessible to the server process (SSH keys, cloud credentials, `.env` files, dataset media, etc.), then exfiltrate them to an attacker-controlled endpoint. The victim only needs to have a FiftyOne server running locally and visit a malicious page — no clicks or other interaction are required. Browsers that have shipped Private Network Access / local-network-access protections (e.g. Chromium 142+) mitigate this for some users, but Safari and Firefox do not yet, so the attack remains viable in common configurations. **Who is impacted:** any user running FiftyOne (the open-source, embedded App server) locally while also browsing the web. **Not affected:** media stored in cloud buckets, which is served via signed URLs on a separate origin. ### Patches Fixed in **FiftyOne 1.17.0**. The hard-coded `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` has been removed and the server now responds **same-origin only by default**, which covers local desktop usage and the supported notebook integrations (each served through a same-origin proxy or iframe). Cross-origin access is now opt-in via a new `allowed_origins` config option (environment variable `FIFTYONE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`), an explicit comma-separated list of trusted origins, e.g.: ```shell export FIFTYONE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS='https://app.example.com,http://localhost:3000' ``` The literal value `*` restores the legacy wildcard behavior for users who explicitly require it and emits a warning. **Users should upgrade to FiftyOne 1.17.0 or later.** ### Workarounds In affected versions there is no configuration flag to disable the wildcard CORS header without upgrading. Until you can upgrade: - Do not run the FiftyOne App server while browsing untrusted websites. - Keep the App server bound to `localhost` (the default) and avoid exposing it on a network interface. - Use a browser that enforces Private Network Access protections. ### Resources - OWASP A01:2025 – Broken Access Control: https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A01_2025-Broken_Access_Control/
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| fiftyonepip | <1.17.0 | 1.17.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate fiftyone to 1.17.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanFiftyOne App server uses wildcard CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *), enabling cross-origin reads of local server data affects fiftyone (pip). Severity is medium. ### Impact The FiftyOne App/API server (`fiftyone/server/app.py`) and the `/media` route (`fiftyone/server/routes/media.py`) unconditionally set a permissive CORS header (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`) on their responses. Because the embedded App server runs locally and is unauthenticated, this allows **any website a user visits to make cross-origin requests to that user's running FiftyOne server and read the responses**. Combined with the unauthenticated `/media` endpoint — which serves files from the local filesystem by path — the wildcard CORS policy turns a local-only file read into a **remotely exploitable, drive-by data exfiltration** vulnerability. A malicious web page can silently issue requests such as `http://localhost:5151/media?filepath=/etc/passwd` and read arbitrary files accessible to the server process (SSH keys, cloud credentials, `.env` files, dataset media, etc.), then exfiltrate them to an attacker-controlled endpoint. The victim only needs to have a FiftyOne server running locally and visit a malicious page — no clicks or other interaction are required. Browsers that have shipped Private Network Access / local-network-access protections (e.g. Chromium 142+) mitigate this for some users, but Safari and Firefox do not yet, so the attack remains viable in common configurations. **Who is impacted:** any user running FiftyOne (the open-source, embedded App server) locally while also browsing the web. **Not affected:** media stored in cloud buckets, which is served via signed URLs on a separate origin. ### Patches Fixed in **FiftyOne 1.17.0**. The hard-coded `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` has been removed and the server now responds **same-origin only by default**, which covers local desktop usage and the supported notebook integrations (each served through a same-origin proxy or iframe). Cross-origin access is now opt-in via a new `allowed_origins` config option (environment variable `FIFTYONE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS`), an explicit comma-separated list of trusted origins, e.g.: ```shell export FIFTYONE_ALLOWED_ORIGINS='https://app.example.com,http://localhost:3000' ``` The literal value `*` restores the legacy wildcard behavior for users who explicitly require it and emits a warning. **Users should upgrade to FiftyOne 1.17.0 or later.** ### Workarounds In affected versions there is no configuration flag to disable the wildcard CORS header without upgrading. Until you can upgrade: - Do not run the FiftyOne App server while browsing untrusted websites. - Keep the App server bound to `localhost` (the default) and avoid exposing it on a network interface. - Use a browser that enforces Private Network Access protections. ### Resources - OWASP A01:2025 – Broken Access Control: https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/A01_2025-Broken_Access_Control/
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| fiftyonepip | <1.17.0 | 1.17.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard