Answer in brief
CVE-2026-53830 records a Medium severity vulnerability in OpenClaw: Slack and Zalo webhook secrets could remain active after secrets.reload. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps openclaw (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps openclaw (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| openclawnpm | <=2026.4.21 | 2026.4.22 |
Published upstream
Jul 2, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 24, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 2, 2026
### Summary Slack and Zalo webhook secrets could remain active after secrets.reload. In affected versions, a caller with an old webhook secret during the stale-secret window could keep accepting the previous secret after `secrets.reload`. This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed. ### Impact When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could deliver webhook events briefly after the operator expected revocation. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path. ### Patched Versions The first stable patched version is `2026.4.22`. ### Mitigations restart the affected channel runtime after rotating webhook secrets until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.