Answer in brief
CVE-2026-53983 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.2) vulnerability in Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 Unauthenticated Persistent Blind Server-Side Request Forgery via Orbital Data Source URL. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Efstratios Goudelis/Ground Station (generic), Efstratios Goudelis/Ground Station (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Efstratios Goudelis/Ground Station (generic), Efstratios Goudelis/Ground Station (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Efstratios Goudelis/Ground Stationgeneric | * | Not reported |
| Efstratios Goudelis/Ground Stationgeneric | >=0 <0.6.0 | 0.6.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 6, 2026
Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the orbital-source configuration path that allows any unauthenticated Socket.IO client to cause the ground-station process to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then submit a data_submission event with submit-orbital-sources action to persist an attacker-supplied URL in the database, then trigger an orbital sync via the equally unauthenticated background_task:start event. The URL is stored with no scheme allowlist, no host validation, and no rejection of loopback, RFC1918, or link-local (cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254) addresses, and is passed directly to requests.get in _fetch_http_3le and _fetch_http_omm in backend/tlesync/source_adapters.py. HTTP status codes and error messages from the outbound request are emitted in the orbital_sync_state Socket.IO event to all connected clients, providing a serviceable oracle for interpreting internal-service and cloud-metadata responses even though the raw response body is not directly leaked. Because the malicious source persists in the database across restarts and re-fires every 24 hours on the scheduled sync cycle, the primitive gives durable long-term SSRF without the attacker needing to remain connected.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.