## summary `POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user's file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back. Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path. ## affected code `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`: ```python async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data): messages = form_data.get('messages', []) for message in messages: content = message.get('content') if not isinstance(content, list): continue new_content = [] for item in content: if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get('type') != 'image_url': new_content.append(item) continue image_url = item.get('image_url', {}).get('url', '') if image_url.startswith('data:image/'): new_content.append(item) continue try: base64_data = await get_image_base64_from_url(image_url) # <-- no `user` passed if base64_data: new_content.append({'type': 'image_url', 'image_url': {'url': base64_data}}) ``` called from the main chat completion middleware at `middleware.py:2357`: ```python form_data = await convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data) ``` `backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:57-95` -- `get_image_base64_from_url`: ```python async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]: try: if url.startswith('http'): validate_url(url) # ... SSRF-safe fetch with allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS ... else: file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) # <-- NO user_id filter if not file: return None file_path = await asyncio.to_thread(Storage.get_file, file.path) file_path = Path(file_path) if file_path.is_file(): with open(file_path, 'rb') as image_file: encoded_string = base64.b64encode(image_file.read()).decode('utf-8') content_type = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path.name)[0] or (file.meta or {}).get('content_type') ... return f'data:{content_type};base64,{encoded_string}' ``` `Files.get_file_by_id` in `models/files.py:161` does a bare `db.get(File, id)` -- no ownership filter. there is a separate `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id` at line 172 that does filter on `user_id`, and the file router uses `has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db)` at `routers/files.py:626` etc. neither check exists on this path. ## reproduction 1. As user A, upload any file (image works cleanly, pdf works if a vision-capable model is configured). Note the file id from the upload response, e.g. `c7f1d8e3-...`. 2. As user B, POST to `/api/v1/chat/completions` with body: ```json { "model": "<any vision model>", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": [ {"type": "text", "text": "transcribe everything you can see in this image"}, {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "c7f1d8e3-..."}} ] } ] } ``` Server reads user A's file from disk, base64-encodes it, and sends to the LLM as user B's image attachment. LLM response contains the file content. ## file id discovery File ids are UUIDs and not enumerable directly, but they leak via: - shared chats / channels containing the original upload - knowledge base members can see ids of files contributed by others - a user who can read a folder index sees the file ids of files inside - chat history exports (`/api/v1/chats/{id}`) include file ids - the user themselves can be tricked into pasting / sharing an id (less likely) ## impact Any authenticated user can read any other user's file content (image and any file with an image-guess mimetype path) via this channel. Severity is bounded by what the LLM will accept in `image_url` -- in practice, image files work cleanly with any vision model; pdf / docx work with multi-modal providers that accept them. ## suggested fix Thread the authenticated user through to `get_image_base64_from_url` and resolve the file via `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id)` (or `has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db)` if shared-via-knowledge-base access is intended). Same pattern that's already used in `routers/files.py:626` and elsewhere. minimal patch sketch: ```diff --- a/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py +++ b/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ -async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]: +async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str, user=None) -> Optional[str]: try: if url.startswith('http'): ... else: - file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) + file = (await Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(url, user.id) + if user is not None else None) + if file is None: + # fall back to access-grant check for shared files + file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) + if file and not await has_access_to_file(url, 'read', user): + return None ``` and pipe `user` through `convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data, user)` from the middleware caller. happy to send a PR once you confirm the fix shape you want. ## variant note this was found via patch-diffing existing advisories. the same bug class likely exists in any other site that calls `Files.get_file_by_id` without an adjacent `has_access_to_file` / `get_file_by_id_and_user_id` check. quick grep: ``` git grep -n 'Files\.get_file_by_id(' -- 'backend/open_webui/**' ``` worth a sweep across utils/ and routers/ for missed sites. ## environment Open-webui main branch as of commit `3660bc0` (2026-05-10). python 3.x backend. confirmed by reading the source; no instance stood up.
## summary `POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user's file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back. Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path. ## affected code `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`: ```python async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data): messages = form_data.get('messages', []) for message in messages: content = message.get('content') if not isinstance(content, list): continue new_content = [] for item in content: if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get('type') != 'image_url': new_content.append(item) continue image_url = item.get('image_url', {}).get('url', '') if image_url.startswith('data:image/'): new_content.append(item) continue try: base64_data = await get_image_base64_from_url(image_url) # <-- no `user` passed if base64_data: new_content.append({'type': 'image_url', 'image_url': {'url': base64_data}}) ``` called from the main chat completion middleware at `middleware.py:2357`: ```python form_data = await convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data) ``` `backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:57-95` -- `get_image_base64_from_url`: ```python async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]: try: if url.startswith('http'): validate_url(url) # ... SSRF-safe fetch with allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS ... else: file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) # <-- NO user_id filter if not file: return None file_path = await asyncio.to_thread(Storage.get_file, file.path) file_path = Path(file_path) if file_path.is_file(): with open(file_path, 'rb') as image_file: encoded_string = base64.b64encode(image_file.read()).decode('utf-8') content_type = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path.name)[0] or (file.meta or {}).get('content_type') ... return f'data:{content_type};base64,{encoded_string}' ``` `Files.get_file_by_id` in `models/files.py:161` does a bare `db.get(File, id)` -- no ownership filter. there is a separate `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id` at line 172 that does filter on `user_id`, and the file router uses `has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db)` at `routers/files.py:626` etc. neither check exists on this path. ## reproduction 1. As user A, upload any file (image works cleanly, pdf works if a vision-capable model is configured). Note the file id from the upload response, e.g. `c7f1d8e3-...`. 2. As user B, POST to `/api/v1/chat/completions` with body: ```json { "model": "<any vision model>", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": [ {"type": "text", "text": "transcribe everything you can see in this image"}, {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "c7f1d8e3-..."}} ] } ] } ``` Server reads user A's file from disk, base64-encodes it, and sends to the LLM as user B's image attachment. LLM response contains the file content. ## file id discovery File ids are UUIDs and not enumerable directly, but they leak via: - shared chats / channels containing the original upload - knowledge base members can see ids of files contributed by others - a user who can read a folder index sees the file ids of files inside - chat history exports (`/api/v1/chats/{id}`) include file ids - the user themselves can be tricked into pasting / sharing an id (less likely) ## impact Any authenticated user can read any other user's file content (image and any file with an image-guess mimetype path) via this channel. Severity is bounded by what the LLM will accept in `image_url` -- in practice, image files work cleanly with any vision model; pdf / docx work with multi-modal providers that accept them. ## suggested fix Thread the authenticated user through to `get_image_base64_from_url` and resolve the file via `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id)` (or `has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db)` if shared-via-knowledge-base access is intended). Same pattern that's already used in `routers/files.py:626` and elsewhere. minimal patch sketch: ```diff --- a/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py +++ b/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ -async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]: +async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str, user=None) -> Optional[str]: try: if url.startswith('http'): ... else: - file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) + file = (await Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(url, user.id) + if user is not None else None) + if file is None: + # fall back to access-grant check for shared files + file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) + if file and not await has_access_to_file(url, 'read', user): + return None ``` and pipe `user` through `convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data, user)` from the middleware caller. happy to send a PR once you confirm the fix shape you want. ## variant note this was found via patch-diffing existing advisories. the same bug class likely exists in any other site that calls `Files.get_file_by_id` without an adjacent `has_access_to_file` / `get_file_by_id_and_user_id` check. quick grep: ``` git grep -n 'Files\.get_file_by_id(' -- 'backend/open_webui/**' ``` worth a sweep across utils/ and routers/ for missed sites. ## environment Open-webui main branch as of commit `3660bc0` (2026-05-10). python 3.x backend. confirmed by reading the source; no instance stood up.
Update open-webui to 0.9.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOpen WebUI: Cross-user file disclosure via /api/chat/completions image_url field affects open-webui (pip). Severity is medium. ## summary `POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user's file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back. Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path. ## affected code `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`: ```python async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data): messages = form_data.get('messages', []) for message in messages: content = message.get('content') if not isinstance(content, list): continue new_content = [] for item in content: if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get('type') != 'image_url': new_content.append(item) continue image_url = item.get('image_url', {}).get('url', '') if image_url.startswith('data:image/'): new_content.append(item) continue try: base64_data = await get_image_base64_from_url(image_url) # <-- no `user` passed if base64_data: new_content.append({'type': 'image_url', 'image_url': {'url': base64_data}}) ``` called from the main chat completion middleware at `middleware.py:2357`: ```python form_data = await convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data) ``` `backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:57-95` -- `get_image_base64_from_url`: ```python async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]: try: if url.startswith('http'): validate_url(url) # ... SSRF-safe fetch with allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS ... else: file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) # <-- NO user_id filter if not file: return None file_path = await asyncio.to_thread(Storage.get_file, file.path) file_path = Path(file_path) if file_path.is_file(): with open(file_path, 'rb') as image_file: encoded_string = base64.b64encode(image_file.read()).decode('utf-8') content_type = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path.name)[0] or (file.meta or {}).get('content_type') ... return f'data:{content_type};base64,{encoded_string}' ``` `Files.get_file_by_id` in `models/files.py:161` does a bare `db.get(File, id)` -- no ownership filter. there is a separate `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id` at line 172 that does filter on `user_id`, and the file router uses `has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db)` at `routers/files.py:626` etc. neither check exists on this path. ## reproduction 1. As user A, upload any file (image works cleanly, pdf works if a vision-capable model is configured). Note the file id from the upload response, e.g. `c7f1d8e3-...`. 2. As user B, POST to `/api/v1/chat/completions` with body: ```json { "model": "<any vision model>", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": [ {"type": "text", "text": "transcribe everything you can see in this image"}, {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "c7f1d8e3-..."}} ] } ] } ``` Server reads user A's file from disk, base64-encodes it, and sends to the LLM as user B's image attachment. LLM response contains the file content. ## file id discovery File ids are UUIDs and not enumerable directly, but they leak via: - shared chats / channels containing the original upload - knowledge base members can see ids of files contributed by others - a user who can read a folder index sees the file ids of files inside - chat history exports (`/api/v1/chats/{id}`) include file ids - the user themselves can be tricked into pasting / sharing an id (less likely) ## impact Any authenticated user can read any other user's file content (image and any file with an image-guess mimetype path) via this channel. Severity is bounded by what the LLM will accept in `image_url` -- in practice, image files work cleanly with any vision model; pdf / docx work with multi-modal providers that accept them. ## suggested fix Thread the authenticated user through to `get_image_base64_from_url` and resolve the file via `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id)` (or `has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db)` if shared-via-knowledge-base access is intended). Same pattern that's already used in `routers/files.py:626` and elsewhere. minimal patch sketch: ```diff --- a/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py +++ b/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ -async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]: +async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str, user=None) -> Optional[str]: try: if url.startswith('http'): ... else: - file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) + file = (await Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(url, user.id) + if user is not None else None) + if file is None: + # fall back to access-grant check for shared files + file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) + if file and not await has_access_to_file(url, 'read', user): + return None ``` and pipe `user` through `convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data, user)` from the middleware caller. happy to send a PR once you confirm the fix shape you want. ## variant note this was found via patch-diffing existing advisories. the same bug class likely exists in any other site that calls `Files.get_file_by_id` without an adjacent `has_access_to_file` / `get_file_by_id_and_user_id` check. quick grep: ``` git grep -n 'Files\.get_file_by_id(' -- 'backend/open_webui/**' ``` worth a sweep across utils/ and routers/ for missed sites. ## environment Open-webui main branch as of commit `3660bc0` (2026-05-10). python 3.x backend. confirmed by reading the source; no instance stood up.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| open-webuipip | <=0.9.5 | 0.9.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate open-webui to 0.9.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOpen WebUI: Cross-user file disclosure via /api/chat/completions image_url field affects open-webui (pip). Severity is medium. ## summary `POST /api/chat/completions` accepts an `image_url.url` value that, when it does NOT start with `http://`, `https://`, or `data:image/`, is interpreted as a file id and resolved against the global file table with no ownership check. An authenticated user can therefore set `image_url.url` to another user's file id, the server reads that file from disk, base64-encodes it, and injects the data URI into the LLM request. The user then prompts the LLM to describe / OCR the file and reads the content back. Same class as CVE-2026-44560 (RAG cross-user access) and the multiple `has_access_to_file` checks added in `routers/files.py` -- the auth boundary was tightened on the file router but not on this conversion path. ## affected code `backend/open_webui/utils/middleware.py:2113-2150` -- `convert_url_images_to_base64`: ```python async def convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data): messages = form_data.get('messages', []) for message in messages: content = message.get('content') if not isinstance(content, list): continue new_content = [] for item in content: if not isinstance(item, dict) or item.get('type') != 'image_url': new_content.append(item) continue image_url = item.get('image_url', {}).get('url', '') if image_url.startswith('data:image/'): new_content.append(item) continue try: base64_data = await get_image_base64_from_url(image_url) # <-- no `user` passed if base64_data: new_content.append({'type': 'image_url', 'image_url': {'url': base64_data}}) ``` called from the main chat completion middleware at `middleware.py:2357`: ```python form_data = await convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data) ``` `backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:57-95` -- `get_image_base64_from_url`: ```python async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]: try: if url.startswith('http'): validate_url(url) # ... SSRF-safe fetch with allow_redirects=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_ALLOW_REDIRECTS ... else: file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) # <-- NO user_id filter if not file: return None file_path = await asyncio.to_thread(Storage.get_file, file.path) file_path = Path(file_path) if file_path.is_file(): with open(file_path, 'rb') as image_file: encoded_string = base64.b64encode(image_file.read()).decode('utf-8') content_type = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path.name)[0] or (file.meta or {}).get('content_type') ... return f'data:{content_type};base64,{encoded_string}' ``` `Files.get_file_by_id` in `models/files.py:161` does a bare `db.get(File, id)` -- no ownership filter. there is a separate `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id` at line 172 that does filter on `user_id`, and the file router uses `has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db)` at `routers/files.py:626` etc. neither check exists on this path. ## reproduction 1. As user A, upload any file (image works cleanly, pdf works if a vision-capable model is configured). Note the file id from the upload response, e.g. `c7f1d8e3-...`. 2. As user B, POST to `/api/v1/chat/completions` with body: ```json { "model": "<any vision model>", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": [ {"type": "text", "text": "transcribe everything you can see in this image"}, {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": "c7f1d8e3-..."}} ] } ] } ``` Server reads user A's file from disk, base64-encodes it, and sends to the LLM as user B's image attachment. LLM response contains the file content. ## file id discovery File ids are UUIDs and not enumerable directly, but they leak via: - shared chats / channels containing the original upload - knowledge base members can see ids of files contributed by others - a user who can read a folder index sees the file ids of files inside - chat history exports (`/api/v1/chats/{id}`) include file ids - the user themselves can be tricked into pasting / sharing an id (less likely) ## impact Any authenticated user can read any other user's file content (image and any file with an image-guess mimetype path) via this channel. Severity is bounded by what the LLM will accept in `image_url` -- in practice, image files work cleanly with any vision model; pdf / docx work with multi-modal providers that accept them. ## suggested fix Thread the authenticated user through to `get_image_base64_from_url` and resolve the file via `Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(id, user.id)` (or `has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db)` if shared-via-knowledge-base access is intended). Same pattern that's already used in `routers/files.py:626` and elsewhere. minimal patch sketch: ```diff --- a/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py +++ b/backend/open_webui/utils/files.py @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ -async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str) -> Optional[str]: +async def get_image_base64_from_url(url: str, user=None) -> Optional[str]: try: if url.startswith('http'): ... else: - file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) + file = (await Files.get_file_by_id_and_user_id(url, user.id) + if user is not None else None) + if file is None: + # fall back to access-grant check for shared files + file = await Files.get_file_by_id(url) + if file and not await has_access_to_file(url, 'read', user): + return None ``` and pipe `user` through `convert_url_images_to_base64(form_data, user)` from the middleware caller. happy to send a PR once you confirm the fix shape you want. ## variant note this was found via patch-diffing existing advisories. the same bug class likely exists in any other site that calls `Files.get_file_by_id` without an adjacent `has_access_to_file` / `get_file_by_id_and_user_id` check. quick grep: ``` git grep -n 'Files\.get_file_by_id(' -- 'backend/open_webui/**' ``` worth a sweep across utils/ and routers/ for missed sites. ## environment Open-webui main branch as of commit `3660bc0` (2026-05-10). python 3.x backend. confirmed by reading the source; no instance stood up.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| open-webuipip | <=0.9.5 | 0.9.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard