## Summary Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in the Edit Comment admin function. An authenticated administrator can delete arbitrary files within the application root (e.g., `config.php`) by injecting a crafted `attach` parameter, rendering the application inoperable. ## Affected Component `modules/comment/admin/edit.php` ## Root Cause In the vulnerable version, the `attach` parameter received via HTTP POST was not validated before being processed: ```php // Vulnerable code (before fix) $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', '', true); if (!empty($attach)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } ``` `substr()` strips the first N characters (equal to the length of the upload URL prefix, e.g. 26 chars for `/nukeviet/uploads/comment/`). By padding the payload with exactly 26 arbitrary characters followed by a path traversal sequence, an attacker can store `../../<target>` directly into the database. When the comment is subsequently deleted, `del.php` reads `attach` from the database and calls: ```php nv_deletefile(NV_UPLOADS_REAL_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/' . $row['attach']); ``` `nv_deletefile()` resolves the path via `realpath()` and only verifies the result is within `NV_ROOTDIR` — it does **not** restrict deletion to the uploads directory — allowing deletion of any file in the installation root. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator and navigate to **Admin → Comment Management**. 2. Select any comment and open the Edit form. 3. Intercept the POST request and set the `attach` parameter to: ``` aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa../../config.php ``` *(26 padding characters + traversal path)* 4. Submit the request. The value `../../config.php` is now stored in the database. 5. Delete the comment. `config.php` is deleted from the application root. 6. The application immediately redirects to the install wizard, confirming the file has been removed. ## Impact - Any file readable by the web server process within `NV_ROOTDIR` can be permanently deleted. - Deleting `config.php` causes a full application outage and exposes the install wizard. ## Severity **CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.7 (High)** ``` CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H ``` | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | Attack Vector | Network | | Attack Complexity | Low | | Privileges Required | High (Admin required) | | User Interaction | None | | Scope | Changed | | Confidentiality | None | | Integrity | High | | Availability | High | ## Fix Added `nv_is_file()` validation before processing the `attach` value. This function uses `realpath()` and a regex check to ensure the file resolves to a path within the intended upload directory, rejecting any traversal attempts. ```php // Fixed code $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', ''); if (!empty($attach) and nv_is_file($attach, NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } else { $attach = ''; } ```
## Summary Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in the Edit Comment admin function. An authenticated administrator can delete arbitrary files within the application root (e.g., `config.php`) by injecting a crafted `attach` parameter, rendering the application inoperable. ## Affected Component `modules/comment/admin/edit.php` ## Root Cause In the vulnerable version, the `attach` parameter received via HTTP POST was not validated before being processed: ```php // Vulnerable code (before fix) $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', '', true); if (!empty($attach)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } ``` `substr()` strips the first N characters (equal to the length of the upload URL prefix, e.g. 26 chars for `/nukeviet/uploads/comment/`). By padding the payload with exactly 26 arbitrary characters followed by a path traversal sequence, an attacker can store `../../<target>` directly into the database. When the comment is subsequently deleted, `del.php` reads `attach` from the database and calls: ```php nv_deletefile(NV_UPLOADS_REAL_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/' . $row['attach']); ``` `nv_deletefile()` resolves the path via `realpath()` and only verifies the result is within `NV_ROOTDIR` — it does **not** restrict deletion to the uploads directory — allowing deletion of any file in the installation root. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator and navigate to **Admin → Comment Management**. 2. Select any comment and open the Edit form. 3. Intercept the POST request and set the `attach` parameter to: ``` aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa../../config.php ``` *(26 padding characters + traversal path)* 4. Submit the request. The value `../../config.php` is now stored in the database. 5. Delete the comment. `config.php` is deleted from the application root. 6. The application immediately redirects to the install wizard, confirming the file has been removed. ## Impact - Any file readable by the web server process within `NV_ROOTDIR` can be permanently deleted. - Deleting `config.php` causes a full application outage and exposes the install wizard. ## Severity **CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.7 (High)** ``` CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H ``` | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | Attack Vector | Network | | Attack Complexity | Low | | Privileges Required | High (Admin required) | | User Interaction | None | | Scope | Changed | | Confidentiality | None | | Integrity | High | | Availability | High | ## Fix Added `nv_is_file()` validation before processing the `attach` value. This function uses `realpath()` and a regex check to ensure the file resolves to a path within the intended upload directory, rejecting any traversal attempts. ```php // Fixed code $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', ''); if (!empty($attach) and nv_is_file($attach, NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } else { $attach = ''; } ```
## Summary Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in the Edit Comment admin function. An authenticated administrator can delete arbitrary files within the application root (e.g., `config.php`) by injecting a crafted `attach` parameter, rendering the application inoperable. ## Affected Component `modules/comment/admin/edit.php` ## Root Cause In the vulnerable version, the `attach` parameter received via HTTP POST was not validated before being processed: ```php // Vulnerable code (before fix) $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', '', true); if (!empty($attach)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } ``` `substr()` strips the first N characters (equal to the length of the upload URL prefix, e.g. 26 chars for `/nukeviet/uploads/comment/`). By padding the payload with exactly 26 arbitrary characters followed by a path traversal sequence, an attacker can store `../../<target>` directly into the database. When the comment is subsequently deleted, `del.php` reads `attach` from the database and calls: ```php nv_deletefile(NV_UPLOADS_REAL_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/' . $row['attach']); ``` `nv_deletefile()` resolves the path via `realpath()` and only verifies the result is within `NV_ROOTDIR` — it does **not** restrict deletion to the uploads directory — allowing deletion of any file in the installation root. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator and navigate to **Admin → Comment Management**. 2. Select any comment and open the Edit form. 3. Intercept the POST request and set the `attach` parameter to: ``` aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa../../config.php ``` *(26 padding characters + traversal path)* 4. Submit the request. The value `../../config.php` is now stored in the database. 5. Delete the comment. `config.php` is deleted from the application root. 6. The application immediately redirects to the install wizard, confirming the file has been removed. ## Impact - Any file readable by the web server process within `NV_ROOTDIR` can be permanently deleted. - Deleting `config.php` causes a full application outage and exposes the install wizard. ## Severity **CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.7 (High)** ``` CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H ``` | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | Attack Vector | Network | | Attack Complexity | Low | | Privileges Required | High (Admin required) | | User Interaction | None | | Scope | Changed | | Confidentiality | None | | Integrity | High | | Availability | High | ## Fix Added `nv_is_file()` validation before processing the `attach` value. This function uses `realpath()` and a regex check to ensure the file resolves to a path within the intended upload directory, rejecting any traversal attempts. ```php // Fixed code $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', ''); if (!empty($attach) and nv_is_file($attach, NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } else { $attach = ''; } ```
## Summary Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in the Edit Comment admin function. An authenticated administrator can delete arbitrary files within the application root (e.g., `config.php`) by injecting a crafted `attach` parameter, rendering the application inoperable. ## Affected Component `modules/comment/admin/edit.php` ## Root Cause In the vulnerable version, the `attach` parameter received via HTTP POST was not validated before being processed: ```php // Vulnerable code (before fix) $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', '', true); if (!empty($attach)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } ``` `substr()` strips the first N characters (equal to the length of the upload URL prefix, e.g. 26 chars for `/nukeviet/uploads/comment/`). By padding the payload with exactly 26 arbitrary characters followed by a path traversal sequence, an attacker can store `../../<target>` directly into the database. When the comment is subsequently deleted, `del.php` reads `attach` from the database and calls: ```php nv_deletefile(NV_UPLOADS_REAL_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/' . $row['attach']); ``` `nv_deletefile()` resolves the path via `realpath()` and only verifies the result is within `NV_ROOTDIR` — it does **not** restrict deletion to the uploads directory — allowing deletion of any file in the installation root. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator and navigate to **Admin → Comment Management**. 2. Select any comment and open the Edit form. 3. Intercept the POST request and set the `attach` parameter to: ``` aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa../../config.php ``` *(26 padding characters + traversal path)* 4. Submit the request. The value `../../config.php` is now stored in the database. 5. Delete the comment. `config.php` is deleted from the application root. 6. The application immediately redirects to the install wizard, confirming the file has been removed. ## Impact - Any file readable by the web server process within `NV_ROOTDIR` can be permanently deleted. - Deleting `config.php` causes a full application outage and exposes the install wizard. ## Severity **CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.7 (High)** ``` CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H ``` | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | Attack Vector | Network | | Attack Complexity | Low | | Privileges Required | High (Admin required) | | User Interaction | None | | Scope | Changed | | Confidentiality | None | | Integrity | High | | Availability | High | ## Fix Added `nv_is_file()` validation before processing the `attach` value. This function uses `realpath()` and a regex check to ensure the file resolves to a path within the intended upload directory, rejecting any traversal attempts. ```php // Fixed code $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', ''); if (!empty($attach) and nv_is_file($attach, NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } else { $attach = ''; } ```
Update nukeviet/nukeviet to 4.6.00 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNukeViet: Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in Edit Comment Function affects nukeviet/nukeviet (composer). Severity is high. ## Summary Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in the Edit Comment admin function. An authenticated administrator can delete arbitrary files within the application root (e.g., `config.php`) by injecting a crafted `attach` parameter, rendering the application inoperable. ## Affected Component `modules/comment/admin/edit.php` ## Root Cause In the vulnerable version, the `attach` parameter received via HTTP POST was not validated before being processed: ```php // Vulnerable code (before fix) $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', '', true); if (!empty($attach)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } ``` `substr()` strips the first N characters (equal to the length of the upload URL prefix, e.g. 26 chars for `/nukeviet/uploads/comment/`). By padding the payload with exactly 26 arbitrary characters followed by a path traversal sequence, an attacker can store `../../<target>` directly into the database. When the comment is subsequently deleted, `del.php` reads `attach` from the database and calls: ```php nv_deletefile(NV_UPLOADS_REAL_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/' . $row['attach']); ``` `nv_deletefile()` resolves the path via `realpath()` and only verifies the result is within `NV_ROOTDIR` — it does **not** restrict deletion to the uploads directory — allowing deletion of any file in the installation root. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator and navigate to **Admin → Comment Management**. 2. Select any comment and open the Edit form. 3. Intercept the POST request and set the `attach` parameter to: ``` aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa../../config.php ``` *(26 padding characters + traversal path)* 4. Submit the request. The value `../../config.php` is now stored in the database. 5. Delete the comment. `config.php` is deleted from the application root. 6. The application immediately redirects to the install wizard, confirming the file has been removed. ## Impact - Any file readable by the web server process within `NV_ROOTDIR` can be permanently deleted. - Deleting `config.php` causes a full application outage and exposes the install wizard. ## Severity **CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.7 (High)** ``` CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H ``` | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | Attack Vector | Network | | Attack Complexity | Low | | Privileges Required | High (Admin required) | | User Interaction | None | | Scope | Changed | | Confidentiality | None | | Integrity | High | | Availability | High | ## Fix Added `nv_is_file()` validation before processing the `attach` value. This function uses `realpath()` and a regex check to ensure the file resolves to a path within the intended upload directory, rejecting any traversal attempts. ```php // Fixed code $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', ''); if (!empty($attach) and nv_is_file($attach, NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } else { $attach = ''; } ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| nukeviet/nukevietcomposer | <4.6.00 | 4.6.00 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate nukeviet/nukeviet to 4.6.00 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNukeViet: Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in Edit Comment Function affects nukeviet/nukeviet (composer). Severity is high. ## Summary Path Traversal to Arbitrary File Deletion in the Edit Comment admin function. An authenticated administrator can delete arbitrary files within the application root (e.g., `config.php`) by injecting a crafted `attach` parameter, rendering the application inoperable. ## Affected Component `modules/comment/admin/edit.php` ## Root Cause In the vulnerable version, the `attach` parameter received via HTTP POST was not validated before being processed: ```php // Vulnerable code (before fix) $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', '', true); if (!empty($attach)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } ``` `substr()` strips the first N characters (equal to the length of the upload URL prefix, e.g. 26 chars for `/nukeviet/uploads/comment/`). By padding the payload with exactly 26 arbitrary characters followed by a path traversal sequence, an attacker can store `../../<target>` directly into the database. When the comment is subsequently deleted, `del.php` reads `attach` from the database and calls: ```php nv_deletefile(NV_UPLOADS_REAL_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/' . $row['attach']); ``` `nv_deletefile()` resolves the path via `realpath()` and only verifies the result is within `NV_ROOTDIR` — it does **not** restrict deletion to the uploads directory — allowing deletion of any file in the installation root. ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator and navigate to **Admin → Comment Management**. 2. Select any comment and open the Edit form. 3. Intercept the POST request and set the `attach` parameter to: ``` aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa../../config.php ``` *(26 padding characters + traversal path)* 4. Submit the request. The value `../../config.php` is now stored in the database. 5. Delete the comment. `config.php` is deleted from the application root. 6. The application immediately redirects to the install wizard, confirming the file has been removed. ## Impact - Any file readable by the web server process within `NV_ROOTDIR` can be permanently deleted. - Deleting `config.php` causes a full application outage and exposes the install wizard. ## Severity **CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 8.7 (High)** ``` CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H ``` | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | Attack Vector | Network | | Attack Complexity | Low | | Privileges Required | High (Admin required) | | User Interaction | None | | Scope | Changed | | Confidentiality | None | | Integrity | High | | Availability | High | ## Fix Added `nv_is_file()` validation before processing the `attach` value. This function uses `realpath()` and a regex check to ensure the file resolves to a path within the intended upload directory, rejecting any traversal attempts. ```php // Fixed code $attach = $nv_Request->get_string('attach', 'post', ''); if (!empty($attach) and nv_is_file($attach, NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload)) { $attach = substr($attach, strlen(NV_BASE_SITEURL . NV_UPLOADS_DIR . '/' . $module_upload . '/')); } else { $attach = ''; } ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| nukeviet/nukevietcomposer | <4.6.00 | 4.6.00 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard