Answer in brief
CVE-2026-54265 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.1) vulnerability in @angular/compiler: Two-Way Property Binding Sanitization Bypass (XSS). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm), @angular/compiler (npm) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @angular/compilernpm | >=22.0.0-next.0 <22.0.1 | 22.0.1 |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=22.0.0-next.0,<22.0.1 | 22.0.1 |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=21.0.0-next.0,<21.2.17 | 21.2.17 |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=20.0.0-next.0,<20.3.25 | 20.3.25 |
| @angular/compilernpm | <=19.2.25 | Not reported |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=22.0.0-next.0<22.0.1 | Not reported |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=21.0.0-next.0<21.2.17 | Not reported |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=20.0.0-next.0<20.3.25 | Not reported |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=21.0.0-next.0 <21.2.17 | 21.2.17 |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=20.0.0-next.0 <20.3.25 | 20.3.25 |
| @angular/compilernpm | >=0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jun 10, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 19, 2026
An issue in the `@angular/compiler` package allows bypassing DOM property sanitization through the use of two-way property bindings. Specifically, when a native DOM property that requires sanitization (such as `innerHTML`, `srcdoc`, `src`, `href`, `data`, or `sandbox`) is bound using the two-way binding syntax (e.g., `[(innerHTML)]="value"` or `bindon-innerHTML="value"`), the Angular template compiler failed to apply the appropriate schema-derived sanitizer resolution to the `TwoWayProperty` operation. As a result, native two-way DOM bindings were emitted without the required sanitizer function, whereas equivalent one-way bindings would be properly sanitized. This flaw enables an attacker who can control the value of a two-way bound sensitive property to bypass Angular's built-in sanitization logic, potentially leading to client-side Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). ### Impact Any Angular application that uses two-way data binding (`[()]` or `bindon-`) on security-sensitive native DOM properties (like `innerHTML`, `href` on `<a>`, `src` on `<img>`/`<iframe>`, etc.) is vulnerable to this security bypass. Once exploited, this allows a malicious actor to supply an unsanitized property binding value that bypasses core sanitization constraints. This could lead to the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the target user's browser context, potentially resulting in session hijacking, sensitive data exposure, or unauthorized actions on behalf of the user. ### Attack Preconditions To successfully exploit this vulnerability, the following environment parameters and application states must concurrently exist: 1. **Two-Way Binding on Sensitive Properties:** The application must bind to a sensitive native DOM property using the two-way binding syntax (e.g., `<div [(innerHTML)]="userContent"></div>`). 2. **User-Controlled Input:** The value bound to this property must be influenceable by user-controlled input. 3. **Absence of Additional Sanitization:** The application does not perform separate manual sanitization (e.g., via `DomSanitizer`) before passing the value to the bound property. ### Patches * 22.0.1 * 21.2.17 * 20.3.25 ### References * https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69107
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.