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  4. CVE 2026 54266 angularcommon weak 32 bit cache key hashing in
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Back to active CVEs
High · CVSS 8.8CVE-2026-54266GHSA-39PV-4J6C-2G6V

@angular/common: Weak 32-Bit Cache Key Hashing in `HttpTransferCache` Leading to Cross-Request Data Leakage and State PoisoningCVE-2026-54266

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-54266 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in @angular/common: Weak 32-Bit Cache Key Hashing in `HttpTransferCache` Leading to Cross-Request Data Leakage and State Poisoning. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps @angular/common (npm), @angular/common (npm), @angular/common (npm), @angular/common (npm) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Jun 10, 2026Updated Jul 15, 2026Source checked Nov 1, 2026First seen by HOL Jun 19, 2026Material review Jul 15, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
XSS
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-328, CWE-345
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Nov 1, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
High · CVSS 8.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
7 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps @angular/common (npm), @angular/common (npm), @angular/common (npm), @angular/common (npm) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
@angular/commonnpm<=19.2.25Not reported
@angular/commonnpm>=22.0.0-next.0,<22.0.122.0.1
@angular/commonnpm>=21.0.0-next.0,<21.2.1721.2.17
@angular/commonnpm>=20.0.0-next.0,<20.3.2520.3.25
@angular/commonnpm>=22.0.0-next.0<22.0.1Not reported
@angular/commonnpm>=21.0.0-next.0<21.2.17Not reported
@angular/commonnpm>=20.0.0-next.0<20.3.25Not reported

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for @angular/common, @angular/common, @angular/common.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update @angular/common to 22.0.1; @angular/common to 21.2.17; @angular/common to 20.3.25 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Jun 10, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Jul 15, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Jun 19, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
Upstream source description

Angular's `HttpTransferCache` caches HTTP requests made during Server-Side Rendering (SSR) so that they can be reused during client-side hydration. This avoids repeating the same HTTP requests on the client. The cached responses are stored in `TransferState` using a cache key generated by hashing request properties (method, response type, mapped URL, serialized body, and sorted query parameters). The cache keys are generated using a weak 32-bit DJB2-like polynomial rolling hash. The 32-bit hash space is extremely small, allowing attackers to find hash collisions. An attacker can easily find a query parameter string (e.g., `q=aaCAZMMM` for a search request) that produces the exact same 32-bit hash as a sensitive endpoint (e.g., `/api/user/profile`). When a victim visits a crafted link containing the colliding parameter, the SSR process executes both the search request and the profile request. Due to the hash collision, the search response overwrites the profile response in the `TransferState` cache. ### Impact When the application attempts to retrieve the cached response for the sensitive endpoint (such as the user's profile), it receives the attacker-controlled response instead. This results in: * **State Poisoning**: The application runs with attacker-forged data, which can lead to bypassing client-side security controls or DOM-based Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) if the data is rendered unsafely. * **Information Leakage**: If the sensitive response is mistakenly associated with the attacker's search results and rendered on the page, the victim's sensitive data may be disclosed to the attacker. ### Patched Versions * 22.0.1 * 21.2.17 * 20.3.25 ### Framework-Level Fix The logic has been updated to use a cryptographically secure **SHA-256** hash algorithm for generating `TransferState` cache keys in `HttpTransferCache`. The cache keys are now 256-bit hexadecimal strings. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, configure your `HttpClient` requests to skip transfer caching for sensitive endpoints: ```ts this.http.get('/api/user/profile', { transferCache: false }); ``` Alternatively, disable the HTTP transfer cache globally in your application bootstrap config: ```ts import { provideClientHydration, withNoHttpTransferCache } from '@angular/platform-browser'; export const appConfig = { providers: [ provideClientHydration( withNoHttpTransferCache() ) ] }; ``` ### References * https://github.com/angular/angular/pull/69153 ### Credits This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [CodeMender from Google DeepMind](https://deepmind.google/blog/introducing-codemender-an-ai-agent-for-code-security/).

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.