Answer in brief
CVE-2026-54285 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in OpenTelemetry Core: Unbounded memory allocation in W3C Baggage propagation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps @opentelemetry/core (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps @opentelemetry/core (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:opentelemetry:opentelemetry:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @opentelemetry/corenpm | <2.8.0 | 2.8.0 |
Published upstream
Jun 15, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 25, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 19, 2026
## Overview `W3CBaggagePropagator.extract()` in `@opentelemetry/core` does not enforce size limits when parsing inbound `baggage` HTTP headers. The W3C Baggage specification recommends a maximum of 8,192 bytes and 180 entries; these limits were only enforced on the outbound (`inject()`) path, not on the inbound (`extract()`) path. Parsing oversized baggage causes memory allocation proportional to the header size without any cap. ## Impact The practical availability impact for most Node.js deployments is limited. Node.js enforces a default `--max-http-header-size` of 16,384 bytes on the total combined size of all HTTP headers, constraining what an external attacker can deliver before the propagator is reached. Additionally, the header is already in memory (parsed by the HTTP layer) by the time it reaches the propagator - the additional allocation is the overhead of splitting into entry objects, not an unbounded read. The risk is higher when transport-layer limits are absent - e.g., non-HTTP transports (messaging systems, custom `TextMapGetter` implementations) or deployments that have raised `--max-http-header-size`. ## Remediation Update `@opentelemetry/core` to version 2.8.0 or later. The fix enforces limits consistent with the W3C Baggage specification at the propagator level: - Maximum total baggage size: 8,192 bytes - Maximum number of entries: 180 - Maximum per-entry size: 4,096 bytes Headers that exceed these limits are truncated at the point the limit is reached. ## Workarounds Ensure header size limits are configured at the server or gateway level. The default Node.js HTTP header limit (16 KB) mitigates external attack vectors independently of this fix. For non-HTTP transports receiving baggage from untrusted sources, validate input size before passing it to the propagator. ## References - [W3C Baggage Specification - Limits](https://www.w3.org/TR/baggage/#limits) - opentelemetry-java: [GHSA-rcgg-9c38-7xpx](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-java/security/advisories/GHSA-rcgg-9c38-7xpx) - opentelemetry-go: [GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475) ## Credit Reported by tonghuaroot.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.