## Summary A sandbox volume reference (`volumeId`, which may also be a volume name) was forwarded to the runner and used to build the host bind-mount source path without confinement. A reference containing path-traversal sequences could in principle resolve the mount source outside the intended per-volume base directory. ## Impact Had the traversal been reachable, an authenticated user could have caused the runner to bind-mount an unintended host path into their sandbox, with a worst-case impact of read and write access to other tenants' volume data (per-volume FUSE mounts are world-readable and writable). Important: this path was not exploitable in any released version. A volume reference is validated against the database before it reaches the runner, and the volume id column is a UUID type, so a reference containing traversal sequences is rejected at validation time and the request fails before any mount is constructed. We could not reproduce cross-tenant access or an out-of-base host mount on a released build; the observable effect of the documented payload was a server-side validation error. Severity is assessed as Medium on that basis. ## Patches Fixed in v0.186.0. Volume references are now resolved to the canonical volume UUID server-side before reaching the runner, so a name can never flow downstream as a path component, and the runner confines the mount source to the volume base directory and rejects any non-UUID reference. ## Workarounds Upgrade to v0.186.0 or later. No configuration workaround is required for released versions, which were not exploitable. ## Credit Reported by @vnth4nhnt from CyStack.
## Summary A sandbox volume reference (`volumeId`, which may also be a volume name) was forwarded to the runner and used to build the host bind-mount source path without confinement. A reference containing path-traversal sequences could in principle resolve the mount source outside the intended per-volume base directory. ## Impact Had the traversal been reachable, an authenticated user could have caused the runner to bind-mount an unintended host path into their sandbox, with a worst-case impact of read and write access to other tenants' volume data (per-volume FUSE mounts are world-readable and writable). Important: this path was not exploitable in any released version. A volume reference is validated against the database before it reaches the runner, and the volume id column is a UUID type, so a reference containing traversal sequences is rejected at validation time and the request fails before any mount is constructed. We could not reproduce cross-tenant access or an out-of-base host mount on a released build; the observable effect of the documented payload was a server-side validation error. Severity is assessed as Medium on that basis. ## Patches Fixed in v0.186.0. Volume references are now resolved to the canonical volume UUID server-side before reaching the runner, so a name can never flow downstream as a path component, and the runner confines the mount source to the volume base directory and rejects any non-UUID reference. ## Workarounds Upgrade to v0.186.0 or later. No configuration workaround is required for released versions, which were not exploitable. ## Credit Reported by @vnth4nhnt from CyStack.
Update github.com/daytonaio/daytona to 0.186.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanDaytona: Path traversal in sandbox volume id mounts arbitrary host paths into the sandbox — cross-tenant data access and host escape affects github.com/daytonaio/daytona (go). Severity is medium. ## Summary A sandbox volume reference (`volumeId`, which may also be a volume name) was forwarded to the runner and used to build the host bind-mount source path without confinement. A reference containing path-traversal sequences could in principle resolve the mount source outside the intended per-volume base directory. ## Impact Had the traversal been reachable, an authenticated user could have caused the runner to bind-mount an unintended host path into their sandbox, with a worst-case impact of read and write access to other tenants' volume data (per-volume FUSE mounts are world-readable and writable). Important: this path was not exploitable in any released version. A volume reference is validated against the database before it reaches the runner, and the volume id column is a UUID type, so a reference containing traversal sequences is rejected at validation time and the request fails before any mount is constructed. We could not reproduce cross-tenant access or an out-of-base host mount on a released build; the observable effect of the documented payload was a server-side validation error. Severity is assessed as Medium on that basis. ## Patches Fixed in v0.186.0. Volume references are now resolved to the canonical volume UUID server-side before reaching the runner, so a name can never flow downstream as a path component, and the runner confines the mount source to the volume base directory and rejects any non-UUID reference. ## Workarounds Upgrade to v0.186.0 or later. No configuration workaround is required for released versions, which were not exploitable. ## Credit Reported by @vnth4nhnt from CyStack.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/daytonaio/daytonago | <=0.185.0 | 0.186.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/daytonaio/daytona to 0.186.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanDaytona: Path traversal in sandbox volume id mounts arbitrary host paths into the sandbox — cross-tenant data access and host escape affects github.com/daytonaio/daytona (go). Severity is medium. ## Summary A sandbox volume reference (`volumeId`, which may also be a volume name) was forwarded to the runner and used to build the host bind-mount source path without confinement. A reference containing path-traversal sequences could in principle resolve the mount source outside the intended per-volume base directory. ## Impact Had the traversal been reachable, an authenticated user could have caused the runner to bind-mount an unintended host path into their sandbox, with a worst-case impact of read and write access to other tenants' volume data (per-volume FUSE mounts are world-readable and writable). Important: this path was not exploitable in any released version. A volume reference is validated against the database before it reaches the runner, and the volume id column is a UUID type, so a reference containing traversal sequences is rejected at validation time and the request fails before any mount is constructed. We could not reproduce cross-tenant access or an out-of-base host mount on a released build; the observable effect of the documented payload was a server-side validation error. Severity is assessed as Medium on that basis. ## Patches Fixed in v0.186.0. Volume references are now resolved to the canonical volume UUID server-side before reaching the runner, so a name can never flow downstream as a path component, and the runner confines the mount source to the volume base directory and rejects any non-UUID reference. ## Workarounds Upgrade to v0.186.0 or later. No configuration workaround is required for released versions, which were not exploitable. ## Credit Reported by @vnth4nhnt from CyStack.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/daytonaio/daytonago | <=0.185.0 | 0.186.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard