### Impact Vantage6 currently provides an initial user with username `root` and password `root`. This is not ideal for the following reasons: - Attackers know that almost all vantage6 servers have a user with username `root` that probably has admin rights - The initial password is very weak and it is possible that administrators forget to reset it. ### Patches No ### Workarounds It is possible to delete the `root` user after it has been used to create other users ### References We could consider doing this like [mongodb](https://hub.docker.com/_/mongo) ### Additional info Luis uses the following patch to mitigate it: ```diff diff --git a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py index ea362c1e..c6dcbbd9 100644 --- a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py +++ b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py @@ -618,18 +618,30 @@ class ServerApp: # TODO use constant instead of 'Root' literal root = db.Role.get_by_name("Root") - log.warn( - f"Creating root user: " - f"username={SUPER_USER_INFO['username']}, " - f"password={SUPER_USER_INFO['password']}" - ) + # Temporary patch + # read initial root password from file (docker secret) if provided + # TODO: This is a workaround so we don't have an insecure vserver + # at the start. Ideally, we would provide an already hashed + # password. But as hashing is implemented via @validates on + # the field 'password', there isn't a nice way around this. + if os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"): + with open( + os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE") + ) as password_file: + initial_root_password = password_file.read().strip() + log.info( + f"Creating root user with password provided via V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE" + ) + else: + initial_root_password = SUPER_USER_INFO["password"] + log.warn(f"Creating root user with default credentials!") user = db.User( username=SUPER_USER_INFO["username"], roles=[root], organization=org, email="[email protected]", - password=SUPER_USER_INFO["password"], + password=initial_root_password, failed_login_attempts=0, last_login_attempt=None, ) ```
### Impact Vantage6 currently provides an initial user with username `root` and password `root`. This is not ideal for the following reasons: - Attackers know that almost all vantage6 servers have a user with username `root` that probably has admin rights - The initial password is very weak and it is possible that administrators forget to reset it. ### Patches No ### Workarounds It is possible to delete the `root` user after it has been used to create other users ### References We could consider doing this like [mongodb](https://hub.docker.com/_/mongo) ### Additional info Luis uses the following patch to mitigate it: ```diff diff --git a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py index ea362c1e..c6dcbbd9 100644 --- a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py +++ b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py @@ -618,18 +618,30 @@ class ServerApp: # TODO use constant instead of 'Root' literal root = db.Role.get_by_name("Root") - log.warn( - f"Creating root user: " - f"username={SUPER_USER_INFO['username']}, " - f"password={SUPER_USER_INFO['password']}" - ) + # Temporary patch + # read initial root password from file (docker secret) if provided + # TODO: This is a workaround so we don't have an insecure vserver + # at the start. Ideally, we would provide an already hashed + # password. But as hashing is implemented via @validates on + # the field 'password', there isn't a nice way around this. + if os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"): + with open( + os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE") + ) as password_file: + initial_root_password = password_file.read().strip() + log.info( + f"Creating root user with password provided via V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE" + ) + else: + initial_root_password = SUPER_USER_INFO["password"] + log.warn(f"Creating root user with default credentials!") user = db.User( username=SUPER_USER_INFO["username"], roles=[root], organization=org, email="[email protected]", - password=SUPER_USER_INFO["password"], + password=initial_root_password, failed_login_attempts=0, last_login_attempt=None, ) ```
Update vantage6 to 5.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanVantage6: Set admin user and password from environment or configuration affects vantage6 (pip). Severity is medium. ### Impact Vantage6 currently provides an initial user with username `root` and password `root`. This is not ideal for the following reasons: - Attackers know that almost all vantage6 servers have a user with username `root` that probably has admin rights - The initial password is very weak and it is possible that administrators forget to reset it. ### Patches No ### Workarounds It is possible to delete the `root` user after it has been used to create other users ### References We could consider doing this like [mongodb](https://hub.docker.com/_/mongo) ### Additional info Luis uses the following patch to mitigate it: ```diff diff --git a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py index ea362c1e..c6dcbbd9 100644 --- a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py +++ b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py @@ -618,18 +618,30 @@ class ServerApp: # TODO use constant instead of 'Root' literal root = db.Role.get_by_name("Root") - log.warn( - f"Creating root user: " - f"username={SUPER_USER_INFO['username']}, " - f"password={SUPER_USER_INFO['password']}" - ) + # Temporary patch + # read initial root password from file (docker secret) if provided + # TODO: This is a workaround so we don't have an insecure vserver + # at the start. Ideally, we would provide an already hashed + # password. But as hashing is implemented via @validates on + # the field 'password', there isn't a nice way around this. + if os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"): + with open( + os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE") + ) as password_file: + initial_root_password = password_file.read().strip() + log.info( + f"Creating root user with password provided via V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE" + ) + else: + initial_root_password = SUPER_USER_INFO["password"] + log.warn(f"Creating root user with default credentials!") user = db.User( username=SUPER_USER_INFO["username"], roles=[root], organization=org, email="[email protected]", - password=SUPER_USER_INFO["password"], + password=initial_root_password, failed_login_attempts=0, last_login_attempt=None, ) ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vantage6pip | <=4.2.3 | 5.0.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate vantage6 to 5.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanVantage6: Set admin user and password from environment or configuration affects vantage6 (pip). Severity is medium. ### Impact Vantage6 currently provides an initial user with username `root` and password `root`. This is not ideal for the following reasons: - Attackers know that almost all vantage6 servers have a user with username `root` that probably has admin rights - The initial password is very weak and it is possible that administrators forget to reset it. ### Patches No ### Workarounds It is possible to delete the `root` user after it has been used to create other users ### References We could consider doing this like [mongodb](https://hub.docker.com/_/mongo) ### Additional info Luis uses the following patch to mitigate it: ```diff diff --git a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py index ea362c1e..c6dcbbd9 100644 --- a/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py +++ b/vantage6-server/vantage6/server/__init__.py @@ -618,18 +618,30 @@ class ServerApp: # TODO use constant instead of 'Root' literal root = db.Role.get_by_name("Root") - log.warn( - f"Creating root user: " - f"username={SUPER_USER_INFO['username']}, " - f"password={SUPER_USER_INFO['password']}" - ) + # Temporary patch + # read initial root password from file (docker secret) if provided + # TODO: This is a workaround so we don't have an insecure vserver + # at the start. Ideally, we would provide an already hashed + # password. But as hashing is implemented via @validates on + # the field 'password', there isn't a nice way around this. + if os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE"): + with open( + os.environ.get("V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE") + ) as password_file: + initial_root_password = password_file.read().strip() + log.info( + f"Creating root user with password provided via V6_INITIAL_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE" + ) + else: + initial_root_password = SUPER_USER_INFO["password"] + log.warn(f"Creating root user with default credentials!") user = db.User( username=SUPER_USER_INFO["username"], roles=[root], organization=org, email="[email protected]", - password=SUPER_USER_INFO["password"], + password=initial_root_password, failed_login_attempts=0, last_login_attempt=None, ) ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vantage6pip | <=4.2.3 | 5.0.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard