## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store ### Summary `garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim's Garmin Connect account. - **Severity:** High - **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) - **Affected versions:** `<= 0.3.4` - **Patched version:** `0.3.5` ### Details `Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask: ```python def dump(self, path: str) -> None: p = Path(path).expanduser() if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(".json"): p = p / "garmin_tokens.json" p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # no mode= p.write_text(self.dumps()) # no permission restriction ``` The serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`. Under `umask 022` the resulting permissions were: - token directory → `0o755` - `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable) A separate, unprivileged user on the same machine could read the file with a plain `open()` — no elevated privileges required — and extract the refresh token. ### Impact Local credential theft / privilege escalation on multi-user Linux or macOS hosts running under a permissive umask. The stolen refresh token can be exchanged for fresh access tokens via Garmin's OAuth endpoint, granting ongoing access to the victim's account (health/fitness data, activity history, device management) until the token is revoked. ### Patch Fixed in **0.3.5** (commit `77a3837`). `dump()` now creates the directory as `0o700` and writes the token file as `0o600` regardless of umask — using `os.open(..., O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0o600)` with `O_NOFOLLOW` where available, plus a defensive `chmod` that also tightens a pre-existing loose file: ```python p.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True) with contextlib.suppress(OSError): p.parent.chmod(0o700) flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"): flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW fd = os.open(p, flags, 0o600) with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write(self.dumps()) with contextlib.suppress(OSError): p.chmod(0o600) ``` Verified under `umask 022`: directory `0o700`, file `0o600`, no group/other access. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict the token store manually and keep it owner-only: ```bash chmod 700 ~/.garminconnect chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json ``` ### Remediation 1. **Upgrade** to `garminconnect >= 0.3.5`: ```bash pip install --upgrade garminconnect ``` 2. **Fix any token file already on disk** — upgrading only tightens permissions on the *next* write, so an existing world-readable file stays exposed until then: ```bash chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json # or remove it and log in again to mint a fresh token store ``` 3. **If the file was exposed on a shared host, treat the refresh token as compromised.** Re-authenticate (delete the token store and log in again) so a new token is issued; consider the previously stored token potentially read by others until rotated. ### Credit Reported by **EQSTLab** via a private security advisory. garminconnect thanks them for the detailed, responsible disclosure.
## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store ### Summary `garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim's Garmin Connect account. - **Severity:** High - **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) - **Affected versions:** `<= 0.3.4` - **Patched version:** `0.3.5` ### Details `Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask: ```python def dump(self, path: str) -> None: p = Path(path).expanduser() if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(".json"): p = p / "garmin_tokens.json" p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # no mode= p.write_text(self.dumps()) # no permission restriction ``` The serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`. Under `umask 022` the resulting permissions were: - token directory → `0o755` - `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable) A separate, unprivileged user on the same machine could read the file with a plain `open()` — no elevated privileges required — and extract the refresh token. ### Impact Local credential theft / privilege escalation on multi-user Linux or macOS hosts running under a permissive umask. The stolen refresh token can be exchanged for fresh access tokens via Garmin's OAuth endpoint, granting ongoing access to the victim's account (health/fitness data, activity history, device management) until the token is revoked. ### Patch Fixed in **0.3.5** (commit `77a3837`). `dump()` now creates the directory as `0o700` and writes the token file as `0o600` regardless of umask — using `os.open(..., O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0o600)` with `O_NOFOLLOW` where available, plus a defensive `chmod` that also tightens a pre-existing loose file: ```python p.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True) with contextlib.suppress(OSError): p.parent.chmod(0o700) flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"): flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW fd = os.open(p, flags, 0o600) with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write(self.dumps()) with contextlib.suppress(OSError): p.chmod(0o600) ``` Verified under `umask 022`: directory `0o700`, file `0o600`, no group/other access. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict the token store manually and keep it owner-only: ```bash chmod 700 ~/.garminconnect chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json ``` ### Remediation 1. **Upgrade** to `garminconnect >= 0.3.5`: ```bash pip install --upgrade garminconnect ``` 2. **Fix any token file already on disk** — upgrading only tightens permissions on the *next* write, so an existing world-readable file stays exposed until then: ```bash chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json # or remove it and log in again to mint a fresh token store ``` 3. **If the file was exposed on a shared host, treat the refresh token as compromised.** Re-authenticate (delete the token store and log in again) so a new token is issued; consider the previously stored token potentially read by others until rotated. ### Credit Reported by **EQSTLab** via a private security advisory. garminconnect thanks them for the detailed, responsible disclosure.
Update garminconnect to 0.3.5 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scangarminconnect Has Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store affects garminconnect (pip). Severity is high. ## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store ### Summary `garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim's Garmin Connect account. - **Severity:** High - **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) - **Affected versions:** `<= 0.3.4` - **Patched version:** `0.3.5` ### Details `Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask: ```python def dump(self, path: str) -> None: p = Path(path).expanduser() if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(".json"): p = p / "garmin_tokens.json" p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # no mode= p.write_text(self.dumps()) # no permission restriction ``` The serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`. Under `umask 022` the resulting permissions were: - token directory → `0o755` - `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable) A separate, unprivileged user on the same machine could read the file with a plain `open()` — no elevated privileges required — and extract the refresh token. ### Impact Local credential theft / privilege escalation on multi-user Linux or macOS hosts running under a permissive umask. The stolen refresh token can be exchanged for fresh access tokens via Garmin's OAuth endpoint, granting ongoing access to the victim's account (health/fitness data, activity history, device management) until the token is revoked. ### Patch Fixed in **0.3.5** (commit `77a3837`). `dump()` now creates the directory as `0o700` and writes the token file as `0o600` regardless of umask — using `os.open(..., O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0o600)` with `O_NOFOLLOW` where available, plus a defensive `chmod` that also tightens a pre-existing loose file: ```python p.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True) with contextlib.suppress(OSError): p.parent.chmod(0o700) flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"): flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW fd = os.open(p, flags, 0o600) with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write(self.dumps()) with contextlib.suppress(OSError): p.chmod(0o600) ``` Verified under `umask 022`: directory `0o700`, file `0o600`, no group/other access. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict the token store manually and keep it owner-only: ```bash chmod 700 ~/.garminconnect chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json ``` ### Remediation 1. **Upgrade** to `garminconnect >= 0.3.5`: ```bash pip install --upgrade garminconnect ``` 2. **Fix any token file already on disk** — upgrading only tightens permissions on the *next* write, so an existing world-readable file stays exposed until then: ```bash chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json # or remove it and log in again to mint a fresh token store ``` 3. **If the file was exposed on a shared host, treat the refresh token as compromised.** Re-authenticate (delete the token store and log in again) so a new token is issued; consider the previously stored token potentially read by others until rotated. ### Credit Reported by **EQSTLab** via a private security advisory. garminconnect thanks them for the detailed, responsible disclosure.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| garminconnectpip | <=0.3.4 | 0.3.5 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate garminconnect to 0.3.5 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scangarminconnect Has Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store affects garminconnect (pip). Severity is high. ## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store ### Summary `garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim's Garmin Connect account. - **Severity:** High - **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) - **Affected versions:** `<= 0.3.4` - **Patched version:** `0.3.5` ### Details `Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask: ```python def dump(self, path: str) -> None: p = Path(path).expanduser() if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(".json"): p = p / "garmin_tokens.json" p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # no mode= p.write_text(self.dumps()) # no permission restriction ``` The serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`. Under `umask 022` the resulting permissions were: - token directory → `0o755` - `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable) A separate, unprivileged user on the same machine could read the file with a plain `open()` — no elevated privileges required — and extract the refresh token. ### Impact Local credential theft / privilege escalation on multi-user Linux or macOS hosts running under a permissive umask. The stolen refresh token can be exchanged for fresh access tokens via Garmin's OAuth endpoint, granting ongoing access to the victim's account (health/fitness data, activity history, device management) until the token is revoked. ### Patch Fixed in **0.3.5** (commit `77a3837`). `dump()` now creates the directory as `0o700` and writes the token file as `0o600` regardless of umask — using `os.open(..., O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0o600)` with `O_NOFOLLOW` where available, plus a defensive `chmod` that also tightens a pre-existing loose file: ```python p.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True) with contextlib.suppress(OSError): p.parent.chmod(0o700) flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"): flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW fd = os.open(p, flags, 0o600) with os.fdopen(fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write(self.dumps()) with contextlib.suppress(OSError): p.chmod(0o600) ``` Verified under `umask 022`: directory `0o700`, file `0o600`, no group/other access. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict the token store manually and keep it owner-only: ```bash chmod 700 ~/.garminconnect chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json ``` ### Remediation 1. **Upgrade** to `garminconnect >= 0.3.5`: ```bash pip install --upgrade garminconnect ``` 2. **Fix any token file already on disk** — upgrading only tightens permissions on the *next* write, so an existing world-readable file stays exposed until then: ```bash chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json # or remove it and log in again to mint a fresh token store ``` 3. **If the file was exposed on a shared host, treat the refresh token as compromised.** Re-authenticate (delete the token store and log in again) so a new token is issued; consider the previously stored token potentially read by others until rotated. ### Credit Reported by **EQSTLab** via a private security advisory. garminconnect thanks them for the detailed, responsible disclosure.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| garminconnectpip | <=0.3.4 | 0.3.5 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard