Answer in brief
CVE-2026-54592 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in Oj: Stack Buffer Overflow in Oj::Doc#each_child via Deeply Nested Input. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps oj (rubygems), oj (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps oj (rubygems), oj (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ojrubygems | <3.17.3 | 3.17.3 |
| ojrubygems | >=0 <3.17.3 | 3.17.3 |
Published upstream
Jun 19, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 19, 2026
### Summary `Oj::Doc#each_child`, when invoked recursively over a deeply nested JSON document, overflows a fixed-size stack buffer and aborts the process. This is a denial of service reachable from untrusted JSON. ### Details Two-step chain in `ext/oj/fast.c`: 1. **`doc_each_child` (~line 1501)** increments `doc->where` past the `where_path[MAX_STACK = 100]` array with no bounds check, and never restores it (`doc->where--` is missing). Calling `each_child` recursively from inside the yield block therefore drives `doc->where` beyond the array. 2. **On the next entry (~line 1478)** the function copies the path into a stack-local buffer: ```c Leaf save_path[MAX_STACK]; // 800-byte stack buffer size_t wlen = doc->where - doc->where_path; if (0 < wlen) { memcpy(save_path, doc->where_path, sizeof(Leaf) * (wlen + 1)); } ``` When the previous recursive call left `doc->where` past `where_path[100]`, `wlen` exceeds `MAX_STACK` and the `memcpy` overflows `save_path` on the C stack. The `Oj::Doc` parser imposes no JSON nesting-depth limit (it relies on a C-stack pressure check), so deeply nested attacker input reaches this path. ### Proof of Concept ```ruby require 'oj' depth = 200 payload = '[' * depth + '1' + ']' * depth Oj::Doc.open(payload) do |doc| r = lambda { doc.each_child { |_| r.call } } r.call end ``` Recursion depth <= 99 iterates normally; depth >= 101 aborts. lldb backtrace on the affected build (`ruby 3.3.8 / arm64-darwin24`): ``` SIGABRT #2 __abort #3 __stack_chk_fail #4 doc_each_child (oj.bundle, fast.c) ``` ### Impact Reliable denial of service: any endpoint that calls `Oj::Doc.open(untrusted) { |d| d.each_child ... }` recursively can be crashed with a small deeply-nested payload. On builds with a stack protector (the default, `-fstack-protector-strong`) the canary aborts the process before the saved return address is used. The Step-1 heap OOB writes into `struct _doc` fields do occur, but are masked in practice because the Step-2 stack overflow crashes first; turning them into anything beyond a crash has not been demonstrated. ### Patches Fixed in **3.17.3**: `doc_each_child` now bounds-checks before incrementing `doc->where` (raising `Oj::DepthError`) and restores `doc->where` after the loop, matching the existing `each_leaf` pattern. Verified on the fixed build: depth >= 101 raises a clean `Oj::DepthError` instead of aborting. ### Credit Reported by Zac Wang (@7a6163).
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.