# SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names ## Summary The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`. PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable. ## Affected Code Tested against current `main` commit: `6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796` The current source still contains: ```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ``` `_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching. ## Root Cause The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-text regex problem. The regex requires the `pg_...` function token to be followed directly by optional whitespace and `(`, but PostgreSQL accepts equivalent calls through quoted identifiers, comments, and schema-qualified names. Because `_validate_query` only uses `sqlglot` to enforce the top-level statement type, those normalized function names are never checked after parsing. ## Auth Boundary The boundary is the default `SQLChatAgent` safety policy between attacker-influenced SQL generation and database operations that can read server-side files. With `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, a user or prompt that influences generated SQL should not be able to bypass the guard and execute PostgreSQL file-read functions such as `pg_read_file`. This is not a new unauthenticated endpoint or product-wide SQL injection; it applies when untrusted user content can influence SQLChatAgent's generated SQL. ## Reproduction The local harness uses the current `sql_chat_agent.py`, extracts the real shipped dangerous regex list, validates the queries with real `sqlglot==30.8.0`, then executes the accepted bypasses against a local throwaway PostgreSQL 16 container. Transcript excerpt: ```text CONTROL "SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')" -> REJECTED: matches '\\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\s*\\(' BYPASS 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('/etc/passwd')" -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) === Part B: real PostgreSQL execution of the bypass === connected; is_superuser=t executed bypass 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('<file>')" -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' RESULT: VULNERABLE ``` The control query is blocked by the current regex, while all three equivalent PostgreSQL forms are allowed by the validator and return the mounted proof file contents from a real PostgreSQL server. The `LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...` value is a harmless marker generated inside the throwaway local container for this proof. ## Impact On a deployment using `SQLChatAgent` against PostgreSQL with a role able to call `pg_read_file` (superuser, or a role granted `pg_read_server_files`), an attacker who can influence LLM-generated SQL can coerce the agent into emitting one of the obfuscated queries and read files accessible to the PostgreSQL server process through `pg_read_file`. This is the same impact and precondition shape as the published `pg_read_file` advisory, but it targets the bypassability of the current regex-based fix rather than the pre-fix absence of a `pg_read_file` block. Severity: High by parity with the published parent advisory; not Critical. CWE-184 leading to server-side file read. ## Suggested Fix Do not rely on raw-text regex matching for dangerous-call detection. After the existing `sqlglot` parse, walk the AST and reject any function invocation whose normalized, unquoted, schema-stripped, case-folded name is in a dangerous set such as `pg_read_file`, `pg_read_binary_file`, `pg_ls_dir`, `pg_stat_file`, `lo_import`, `lo_export`, `load_file`, or `load_extension`. Also recommend running SQLChatAgent with a least-privilege database role that lacks `pg_read_server_files`.
# SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names ## Summary The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`. PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable. ## Affected Code Tested against current `main` commit: `6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796` The current source still contains: ```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ``` `_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching. ## Root Cause The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-text regex problem. The regex requires the `pg_...` function token to be followed directly by optional whitespace and `(`, but PostgreSQL accepts equivalent calls through quoted identifiers, comments, and schema-qualified names. Because `_validate_query` only uses `sqlglot` to enforce the top-level statement type, those normalized function names are never checked after parsing. ## Auth Boundary The boundary is the default `SQLChatAgent` safety policy between attacker-influenced SQL generation and database operations that can read server-side files. With `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, a user or prompt that influences generated SQL should not be able to bypass the guard and execute PostgreSQL file-read functions such as `pg_read_file`. This is not a new unauthenticated endpoint or product-wide SQL injection; it applies when untrusted user content can influence SQLChatAgent's generated SQL. ## Reproduction The local harness uses the current `sql_chat_agent.py`, extracts the real shipped dangerous regex list, validates the queries with real `sqlglot==30.8.0`, then executes the accepted bypasses against a local throwaway PostgreSQL 16 container. Transcript excerpt: ```text CONTROL "SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')" -> REJECTED: matches '\\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\s*\\(' BYPASS 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('/etc/passwd')" -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) === Part B: real PostgreSQL execution of the bypass === connected; is_superuser=t executed bypass 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('<file>')" -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' RESULT: VULNERABLE ``` The control query is blocked by the current regex, while all three equivalent PostgreSQL forms are allowed by the validator and return the mounted proof file contents from a real PostgreSQL server. The `LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...` value is a harmless marker generated inside the throwaway local container for this proof. ## Impact On a deployment using `SQLChatAgent` against PostgreSQL with a role able to call `pg_read_file` (superuser, or a role granted `pg_read_server_files`), an attacker who can influence LLM-generated SQL can coerce the agent into emitting one of the obfuscated queries and read files accessible to the PostgreSQL server process through `pg_read_file`. This is the same impact and precondition shape as the published `pg_read_file` advisory, but it targets the bypassability of the current regex-based fix rather than the pre-fix absence of a `pg_read_file` block. Severity: High by parity with the published parent advisory; not Critical. CWE-184 leading to server-side file read. ## Suggested Fix Do not rely on raw-text regex matching for dangerous-call detection. After the existing `sqlglot` parse, walk the AST and reject any function invocation whose normalized, unquoted, schema-stripped, case-folded name is in a dangerous set such as `pg_read_file`, `pg_read_binary_file`, `pg_ls_dir`, `pg_stat_file`, `lo_import`, `lo_export`, `load_file`, or `load_extension`. Also recommend running SQLChatAgent with a least-privilege database role that lacks `pg_read_server_files`.
# SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names ## Summary The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`. PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable. ## Affected Code Tested against current `main` commit: `6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796` The current source still contains: ```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ``` `_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching. ## Root Cause The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-text regex problem. The regex requires the `pg_...` function token to be followed directly by optional whitespace and `(`, but PostgreSQL accepts equivalent calls through quoted identifiers, comments, and schema-qualified names. Because `_validate_query` only uses `sqlglot` to enforce the top-level statement type, those normalized function names are never checked after parsing. ## Auth Boundary The boundary is the default `SQLChatAgent` safety policy between attacker-influenced SQL generation and database operations that can read server-side files. With `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, a user or prompt that influences generated SQL should not be able to bypass the guard and execute PostgreSQL file-read functions such as `pg_read_file`. This is not a new unauthenticated endpoint or product-wide SQL injection; it applies when untrusted user content can influence SQLChatAgent's generated SQL. ## Reproduction The local harness uses the current `sql_chat_agent.py`, extracts the real shipped dangerous regex list, validates the queries with real `sqlglot==30.8.0`, then executes the accepted bypasses against a local throwaway PostgreSQL 16 container. Transcript excerpt: ```text CONTROL "SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')" -> REJECTED: matches '\\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\s*\\(' BYPASS 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('/etc/passwd')" -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) === Part B: real PostgreSQL execution of the bypass === connected; is_superuser=t executed bypass 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('<file>')" -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' RESULT: VULNERABLE ``` The control query is blocked by the current regex, while all three equivalent PostgreSQL forms are allowed by the validator and return the mounted proof file contents from a real PostgreSQL server. The `LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...` value is a harmless marker generated inside the throwaway local container for this proof. ## Impact On a deployment using `SQLChatAgent` against PostgreSQL with a role able to call `pg_read_file` (superuser, or a role granted `pg_read_server_files`), an attacker who can influence LLM-generated SQL can coerce the agent into emitting one of the obfuscated queries and read files accessible to the PostgreSQL server process through `pg_read_file`. This is the same impact and precondition shape as the published `pg_read_file` advisory, but it targets the bypassability of the current regex-based fix rather than the pre-fix absence of a `pg_read_file` block. Severity: High by parity with the published parent advisory; not Critical. CWE-184 leading to server-side file read. ## Suggested Fix Do not rely on raw-text regex matching for dangerous-call detection. After the existing `sqlglot` parse, walk the AST and reject any function invocation whose normalized, unquoted, schema-stripped, case-folded name is in a dangerous set such as `pg_read_file`, `pg_read_binary_file`, `pg_ls_dir`, `pg_stat_file`, `lo_import`, `lo_export`, `load_file`, or `load_extension`. Also recommend running SQLChatAgent with a least-privilege database role that lacks `pg_read_server_files`.
# SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names ## Summary The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`. PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable. ## Affected Code Tested against current `main` commit: `6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796` The current source still contains: ```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ``` `_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching. ## Root Cause The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-text regex problem. The regex requires the `pg_...` function token to be followed directly by optional whitespace and `(`, but PostgreSQL accepts equivalent calls through quoted identifiers, comments, and schema-qualified names. Because `_validate_query` only uses `sqlglot` to enforce the top-level statement type, those normalized function names are never checked after parsing. ## Auth Boundary The boundary is the default `SQLChatAgent` safety policy between attacker-influenced SQL generation and database operations that can read server-side files. With `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, a user or prompt that influences generated SQL should not be able to bypass the guard and execute PostgreSQL file-read functions such as `pg_read_file`. This is not a new unauthenticated endpoint or product-wide SQL injection; it applies when untrusted user content can influence SQLChatAgent's generated SQL. ## Reproduction The local harness uses the current `sql_chat_agent.py`, extracts the real shipped dangerous regex list, validates the queries with real `sqlglot==30.8.0`, then executes the accepted bypasses against a local throwaway PostgreSQL 16 container. Transcript excerpt: ```text CONTROL "SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')" -> REJECTED: matches '\\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\s*\\(' BYPASS 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('/etc/passwd')" -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) === Part B: real PostgreSQL execution of the bypass === connected; is_superuser=t executed bypass 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('<file>')" -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' RESULT: VULNERABLE ``` The control query is blocked by the current regex, while all three equivalent PostgreSQL forms are allowed by the validator and return the mounted proof file contents from a real PostgreSQL server. The `LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...` value is a harmless marker generated inside the throwaway local container for this proof. ## Impact On a deployment using `SQLChatAgent` against PostgreSQL with a role able to call `pg_read_file` (superuser, or a role granted `pg_read_server_files`), an attacker who can influence LLM-generated SQL can coerce the agent into emitting one of the obfuscated queries and read files accessible to the PostgreSQL server process through `pg_read_file`. This is the same impact and precondition shape as the published `pg_read_file` advisory, but it targets the bypassability of the current regex-based fix rather than the pre-fix absence of a `pg_read_file` block. Severity: High by parity with the published parent advisory; not Critical. CWE-184 leading to server-side file read. ## Suggested Fix Do not rely on raw-text regex matching for dangerous-call detection. After the existing `sqlglot` parse, walk the AST and reject any function invocation whose normalized, unquoted, schema-stripped, case-folded name is in a dangerous set such as `pg_read_file`, `pg_read_binary_file`, `pg_ls_dir`, `pg_stat_file`, `lo_import`, `lo_export`, `load_file`, or `load_extension`. Also recommend running SQLChatAgent with a least-privilege database role that lacks `pg_read_server_files`.
Update langroid to 0.65.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanLangroid: SQLChatAgent dangerous-function blocklist can be bypassed with quoted or schema-qualified pg_read_file calls affects langroid (pip). Severity is critical. # SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names ## Summary The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`. PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable. ## Affected Code Tested against current `main` commit: `6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796` The current source still contains: ```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ``` `_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching. ## Root Cause The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-text regex problem. The regex requires the `pg_...` function token to be followed directly by optional whitespace and `(`, but PostgreSQL accepts equivalent calls through quoted identifiers, comments, and schema-qualified names. Because `_validate_query` only uses `sqlglot` to enforce the top-level statement type, those normalized function names are never checked after parsing. ## Auth Boundary The boundary is the default `SQLChatAgent` safety policy between attacker-influenced SQL generation and database operations that can read server-side files. With `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, a user or prompt that influences generated SQL should not be able to bypass the guard and execute PostgreSQL file-read functions such as `pg_read_file`. This is not a new unauthenticated endpoint or product-wide SQL injection; it applies when untrusted user content can influence SQLChatAgent's generated SQL. ## Reproduction The local harness uses the current `sql_chat_agent.py`, extracts the real shipped dangerous regex list, validates the queries with real `sqlglot==30.8.0`, then executes the accepted bypasses against a local throwaway PostgreSQL 16 container. Transcript excerpt: ```text CONTROL "SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')" -> REJECTED: matches '\\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\s*\\(' BYPASS 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('/etc/passwd')" -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) === Part B: real PostgreSQL execution of the bypass === connected; is_superuser=t executed bypass 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('<file>')" -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' RESULT: VULNERABLE ``` The control query is blocked by the current regex, while all three equivalent PostgreSQL forms are allowed by the validator and return the mounted proof file contents from a real PostgreSQL server. The `LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...` value is a harmless marker generated inside the throwaway local container for this proof. ## Impact On a deployment using `SQLChatAgent` against PostgreSQL with a role able to call `pg_read_file` (superuser, or a role granted `pg_read_server_files`), an attacker who can influence LLM-generated SQL can coerce the agent into emitting one of the obfuscated queries and read files accessible to the PostgreSQL server process through `pg_read_file`. This is the same impact and precondition shape as the published `pg_read_file` advisory, but it targets the bypassability of the current regex-based fix rather than the pre-fix absence of a `pg_read_file` block. Severity: High by parity with the published parent advisory; not Critical. CWE-184 leading to server-side file read. ## Suggested Fix Do not rely on raw-text regex matching for dangerous-call detection. After the existing `sqlglot` parse, walk the AST and reject any function invocation whose normalized, unquoted, schema-stripped, case-folded name is in a dangerous set such as `pg_read_file`, `pg_read_binary_file`, `pg_ls_dir`, `pg_stat_file`, `lo_import`, `lo_export`, `load_file`, or `load_extension`. Also recommend running SQLChatAgent with a least-privilege database role that lacks `pg_read_server_files`.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| langroidpip | <=0.65.0 | 0.65.1 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate langroid to 0.65.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
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hol-guard supply-chain scanLangroid: SQLChatAgent dangerous-function blocklist can be bypassed with quoted or schema-qualified pg_read_file calls affects langroid (pip). Severity is critical. # SQLChatAgent `_validate_query` dangerous-pattern regex is bypassable via quoted/commented/qualified function names ## Summary The `SQLChatAgent` SQL-injection mitigation, with default `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, combines a raw-text regex blocklist (`_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`) with a `sqlglot` SELECT-only statement allowlist. The blocklist entries that target callable functions require the function name to be immediately followed by `\s*\(`. PostgreSQL accepts the same call with the name separated from `(` by a quoted identifier, an inline comment, or schema qualification. These forms evade the regex, still parse as `SELECT`, and execute the same PostgreSQL function. This restores the `pg_read_file` server-side file-read primitive that the prior CVE-2026-25879 / GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr fix was meant to block: the parent advisory fixed a missing `pg_read_file` blocklist entry, while this report shows that the added regex is bypassable. ## Affected Code Tested against current `main` commit: `6e8e7b2bb23ec04c1c25be479f16b8cc9a4f8796` The current source still contains: ```python re.compile(r"\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\s*\(", re.IGNORECASE) ``` `_validate_query` checks the raw query against `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS`, then parses with `sqlglot` and allows `SELECT` statements. The dangerous-call check is raw text, not normalized AST function-name matching. ## Root Cause The current mitigation treats dangerous PostgreSQL function calls as a raw-text regex problem. The regex requires the `pg_...` function token to be followed directly by optional whitespace and `(`, but PostgreSQL accepts equivalent calls through quoted identifiers, comments, and schema-qualified names. Because `_validate_query` only uses `sqlglot` to enforce the top-level statement type, those normalized function names are never checked after parsing. ## Auth Boundary The boundary is the default `SQLChatAgent` safety policy between attacker-influenced SQL generation and database operations that can read server-side files. With `allow_dangerous_operations=False`, a user or prompt that influences generated SQL should not be able to bypass the guard and execute PostgreSQL file-read functions such as `pg_read_file`. This is not a new unauthenticated endpoint or product-wide SQL injection; it applies when untrusted user content can influence SQLChatAgent's generated SQL. ## Reproduction The local harness uses the current `sql_chat_agent.py`, extracts the real shipped dangerous regex list, validates the queries with real `sqlglot==30.8.0`, then executes the accepted bypasses against a local throwaway PostgreSQL 16 container. Transcript excerpt: ```text CONTROL "SELECT pg_read_file('/etc/passwd')" -> REJECTED: matches '\\bpg_(read|stat|ls|current_logfile)[A-Za-z0-9_]*\\s*\\(' BYPASS 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('/etc/passwd')" -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) BYPASS 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'/etc/passwd\')' -> ALLOWED (validator returned None -> would execute) === Part B: real PostgreSQL execution of the bypass === connected; is_superuser=t executed bypass 'SELECT "pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass "SELECT pg_read_file/**/('<file>')" -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' executed bypass 'SELECT pg_catalog."pg_read_file"(\'<file>\')' -> file contents returned: 'LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...' RESULT: VULNERABLE ``` The control query is blocked by the current regex, while all three equivalent PostgreSQL forms are allowed by the validator and return the mounted proof file contents from a real PostgreSQL server. The `LANGROID_SAFE_MARKER_...` value is a harmless marker generated inside the throwaway local container for this proof. ## Impact On a deployment using `SQLChatAgent` against PostgreSQL with a role able to call `pg_read_file` (superuser, or a role granted `pg_read_server_files`), an attacker who can influence LLM-generated SQL can coerce the agent into emitting one of the obfuscated queries and read files accessible to the PostgreSQL server process through `pg_read_file`. This is the same impact and precondition shape as the published `pg_read_file` advisory, but it targets the bypassability of the current regex-based fix rather than the pre-fix absence of a `pg_read_file` block. Severity: High by parity with the published parent advisory; not Critical. CWE-184 leading to server-side file read. ## Suggested Fix Do not rely on raw-text regex matching for dangerous-call detection. After the existing `sqlglot` parse, walk the AST and reject any function invocation whose normalized, unquoted, schema-stripped, case-folded name is in a dangerous set such as `pg_read_file`, `pg_read_binary_file`, `pg_ls_dir`, `pg_stat_file`, `lo_import`, `lo_export`, `load_file`, or `load_extension`. Also recommend running SQLChatAgent with a least-privilege database role that lacks `pg_read_server_files`.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| langroidpip | <=0.65.0 | 0.65.1 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
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