Answer in brief
CVE-2026-54897 records a High severity (CVSS 2.1) vulnerability in Oj: Use-After-Free in Oj::Doc Iterators via Reentrant Close. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps oj (rubygems), oj (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 2.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps oj (rubygems), oj (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| ojrubygems | <3.17.2 | 3.17.3 |
| ojrubygems | >=0 <3.17.3 | 3.17.3 |
Published upstream
Jun 19, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 19, 2026
### Summary `Oj::Doc` iterators (`each_value`, `each_child`, `each_leaf`) are vulnerable to a heap use-after-free. When a Ruby block yielded during iteration calls `doc.close` or `d.close`, the document's heap memory is freed while the C iterator is still running. When control returns from the block, the iterator reads from the freed region, producing a use-after-free accessible from pure Ruby. ### Version - **Software**: oj gem - **Affected**: all versions with `ext/oj/fast.c` - **Latest tested**: 3.17.1 (confirmed present) ### Details The iterators in `ext/oj/fast.c` follow the pattern: ```c // fast.c:1505 (doc_each_child) static VALUE doc_each_child(VALUE self, ...) { ... while (cur != NULL) { rb_yield(...); // ← Ruby block executes here cur = cur->next; // ← cur is now freed if block called close() } } ``` `rb_yield` can invoke arbitrary Ruby code, including calling `close()` on the `Doc` or any child node, which calls `ruby_sized_xfree` on the backing buffer. On return, the C code reads `cur->next` from the freed region. All three iterators are affected. ASAN report (each_child variant): ``` ==253632==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x5210000bd080 READ of size 8 at 0x5210000bd080 thread T0 #0 doc_each_child /ext/oj/fast.c:1505 0x5210000bd080 is located 896 bytes inside of 4064-byte region [0x5210000bcd00, 0x5210000bdce0) freed by thread T0 here: #0 free #1 ruby_sized_xfree (libruby-3.3.so.3.3) ``` All three iterators trigger the same freed region (`fd` shadow bytes): ``` 0x5210000bd080:[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd ``` ### Reproduce ```ruby require 'oj' # each_child Oj::Doc.open('[1,2]') { |doc| doc.each_child { |d| d.close } } # each_value Oj::Doc.open('[1,2]') { |doc| doc.each_value { |v| doc.close } } # each_leaf Oj::Doc.open('[1,[2]]') { |doc| doc.each_leaf { |d| d.close } } ```
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.