### Summary Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the `email_verified` claim was only enforced when present as a boolean `false` so an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified. ### Impact An attacker who could authenticate at the configured OIDC provider with an email matching a victim's Coder account could log in as that victim and gain full access to their workspaces, templates and resources. This required OIDC authentication, attacker control of a matching email at the IdP and a victim account not yet linked to a different IdP subject. ### Patches The fix restricts the email fallback to first-time and legacy linking and defaults `email_verified` to false when the claim is absent or of an unexpected type. The fix was backported to all supported release lines: | Release line | Patched version | |---|---| | 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) | | 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) | | 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) | | 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) | ### Workarounds Configure the OIDC provider to disallow self-registration or to require email verification before issuing tokens. ### Resources - Fix: #25712, #25713 ### Credits Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22450) for independently disclosing this issue!
### Summary Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the `email_verified` claim was only enforced when present as a boolean `false` so an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified. ### Impact An attacker who could authenticate at the configured OIDC provider with an email matching a victim's Coder account could log in as that victim and gain full access to their workspaces, templates and resources. This required OIDC authentication, attacker control of a matching email at the IdP and a victim account not yet linked to a different IdP subject. ### Patches The fix restricts the email fallback to first-time and legacy linking and defaults `email_verified` to false when the claim is absent or of an unexpected type. The fix was backported to all supported release lines: | Release line | Patched version | |---|---| | 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) | | 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) | | 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) | | 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) | ### Workarounds Configure the OIDC provider to disallow self-registration or to require email verification before issuing tokens. ### Resources - Fix: #25712, #25713 ### Credits Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22450) for independently disclosing this issue!
Update github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.34.2; github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.33.8; github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.32.7; github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.29.17 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanCoder vulnerable to OIDC account takeover via email-based user matching and email_verified bypass affects github.com/coder/coder/v2 (go), github.com/coder/coder/v2 (go), github.com/coder/coder/v2 (go), github.com/coder/coder/v2 (go). Severity is high. ### Summary Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the `email_verified` claim was only enforced when present as a boolean `false` so an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified. ### Impact An attacker who could authenticate at the configured OIDC provider with an email matching a victim's Coder account could log in as that victim and gain full access to their workspaces, templates and resources. This required OIDC authentication, attacker control of a matching email at the IdP and a victim account not yet linked to a different IdP subject. ### Patches The fix restricts the email fallback to first-time and legacy linking and defaults `email_verified` to false when the claim is absent or of an unexpected type. The fix was backported to all supported release lines: | Release line | Patched version | |---|---| | 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) | | 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) | | 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) | | 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) | ### Workarounds Configure the OIDC provider to disallow self-registration or to require email verification before issuing tokens. ### Resources - Fix: #25712, #25713 ### Credits Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22450) for independently disclosing this issue!
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/coder/coder/v2go | >=2.34.0,<2.34.2 | 2.34.2 |
| github.com/coder/coder/v2go | >=2.33.0,<2.33.8 | 2.33.8 |
| github.com/coder/coder/v2go | >=2.30.0,<2.32.7 | 2.32.7 |
| github.com/coder/coder/v2go | <2.29.17 | 2.29.17 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.34.2; github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.33.8; github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.32.7; github.com/coder/coder/v2 to 2.29.17 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanCoder vulnerable to OIDC account takeover via email-based user matching and email_verified bypass affects github.com/coder/coder/v2 (go), github.com/coder/coder/v2 (go), github.com/coder/coder/v2 (go), github.com/coder/coder/v2 (go). Severity is high. ### Summary Two flaws in Coder's OIDC login chained into account takeover: email-based user matching fell back to linking by email without checking for an existing link to a different IdP subject and the `email_verified` claim was only enforced when present as a boolean `false` so an absent or non-boolean claim was treated as verified. ### Impact An attacker who could authenticate at the configured OIDC provider with an email matching a victim's Coder account could log in as that victim and gain full access to their workspaces, templates and resources. This required OIDC authentication, attacker control of a matching email at the IdP and a victim account not yet linked to a different IdP subject. ### Patches The fix restricts the email fallback to first-time and legacy linking and defaults `email_verified` to false when the claim is absent or of an unexpected type. The fix was backported to all supported release lines: | Release line | Patched version | |---|---| | 2.34 | [v2.34.2](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.34.2) | | 2.33 | [v2.33.8](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.33.8) | | 2.32 | [v2.32.7](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.32.7) | | 2.29 (ESR) | [v2.29.17](https://github.com/coder/coder/releases/tag/v2.29.17) | ### Workarounds Configure the OIDC provider to disallow self-registration or to require email verification before issuing tokens. ### Resources - Fix: #25712, #25713 ### Credits Coder would like to thank Anthropic's Security Team (ANT-2026-22450) for independently disclosing this issue!
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/coder/coder/v2go | >=2.34.0,<2.34.2 | 2.34.2 |
| github.com/coder/coder/v2go | >=2.33.0,<2.33.8 | 2.33.8 |
| github.com/coder/coder/v2go | >=2.30.0,<2.32.7 | 2.32.7 |
| github.com/coder/coder/v2go | <2.29.17 | 2.29.17 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard