## Summary An unauthenticated attacker can coerce the server into issuing HTTP requests to an attacker-chosen host by spoofing the `X Forwarded-Host` (and `X-Forwarded-Proto`) request headers. The forwarded host is used, without validation, to build the URL that `server_info_update()` fetches with cURL, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that requires no authentication. ## Affected component - File: `includes/ini.php` — function `server_info_update()` (cURL sink) - File: `vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Server.php` — `standardizeHost()` and the forwarded-header handling in the constructor (source of the tainted host) - Trigger: `POST` request containing the field `__serverInfoUpdate=1`, handled early in `includes/ini.php` before any authentication. ## Details `NukeViet\Core\Server` derives `original_host` / `original_protocol` from the `X-Forwarded-Host` / `X-Forwarded-Proto` headers and exposes them via `getOriginalHost()` / `getOriginalProtocol()`. These values are attacker-controlled and were not validated against the site's configured domains (`my_domains`). In `server_info_update()` the tainted host and scheme are concatenated directly into a cURL URL: ```php $proto = $nv_Server->getOriginalProtocol(); // from X-Forwarded-Proto $host = $nv_Server->getOriginalHost(); // from X-Forwarded-Host $ch = curl_init($proto . '://' . $host . NV_BASE_SITEURL . 'index.php?response_headers_detect=1'); curl_exec($ch); ``` Two factors made this reliably reachable: 1. The `__serverInfoUpdate` handler runs very early in `includes/ini.php`, before authentication, so the sink is reachable pre-auth. 2. The host sanitiser `standardizeHost()` stripped a trailing port only with the regex `(\:[0-9]+)$`, which is bypassed by appending a slash (e.g. `127.0.0.1:8081/`): the string no longer ends in `:digits`, so the port survives and an arbitrary `host:port` reaches the cURL call. ## Proof of Concept ```http POST /index.php HTTP/1.1 Host: <victim> X-Forwarded-Proto: http X-Forwarded-Host: <attacker-controlled-host>:<port>/ Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 20 __serverInfoUpdate=1 ``` The server then issues a request to the attacker-supplied host, confirmed via an out-of-band interaction (DNS + HTTP) on a collaborator endpoint. ## Impact The SSRF is **blind**, **HEAD-only**, and uses a **fixed request path** (`…/index.php?response_headers_detect=1`): - The fetched response is stored server-side in the `config_ini` cache and is **not reflected** to the attacker, so internal data cannot be exfiltrated directly. - Because the path is fixed and not attacker-controlled, cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...`) cannot be reached, and `gopher://` / `dict://` request smuggling cannot inject arbitrary payloads. What an attacker **can** do: unauthenticated internal host/port discovery (connection success/timing, with the port reachable through the regex bypass), and poisoning of the cached `server_headers` (the SSRF target's response headers are stored and applied to the site). ## Severity Rated **High** rather than Critical, because the blind + fixed-path + HEAD design of the sink prevents data exfiltration, cloud credential theft, and internal RCE. - CVSS v3.1 Base Score: **7.2 (High)** - Vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N` ## Weakness - Primary: **CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** - Contributing: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), CWE-644 (Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers used by downstream components / trusting `X-Forwarded-*`). ## Remediation Fixed by validating and normalising the forwarded values at the source and gating the request before the sink: - `standardizeHost()` now extracts the host with `parse_url()` (defeats the `:port/` bypass) and lower-cases it. - `X-Forwarded-Proto` is restricted to a `{http, https}` allow-list and falls back to the real server protocol otherwise. - `X-Forwarded-Port` is validated as numeric and within range. - The incoming host is checked against `my_domains` before `includes/ini.php` is reached; non-matching hosts are rejected/redirected, and `server_info_update()` additionally re-validates its target host against `my_domains` (defense in depth). ## Workaround Configure the reverse proxy / web server to strip or override client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-Port` headers, and ensure `my_domains` is configured with the site's canonical domain(s).
## Summary An unauthenticated attacker can coerce the server into issuing HTTP requests to an attacker-chosen host by spoofing the `X Forwarded-Host` (and `X-Forwarded-Proto`) request headers. The forwarded host is used, without validation, to build the URL that `server_info_update()` fetches with cURL, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that requires no authentication. ## Affected component - File: `includes/ini.php` — function `server_info_update()` (cURL sink) - File: `vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Server.php` — `standardizeHost()` and the forwarded-header handling in the constructor (source of the tainted host) - Trigger: `POST` request containing the field `__serverInfoUpdate=1`, handled early in `includes/ini.php` before any authentication. ## Details `NukeViet\Core\Server` derives `original_host` / `original_protocol` from the `X-Forwarded-Host` / `X-Forwarded-Proto` headers and exposes them via `getOriginalHost()` / `getOriginalProtocol()`. These values are attacker-controlled and were not validated against the site's configured domains (`my_domains`). In `server_info_update()` the tainted host and scheme are concatenated directly into a cURL URL: ```php $proto = $nv_Server->getOriginalProtocol(); // from X-Forwarded-Proto $host = $nv_Server->getOriginalHost(); // from X-Forwarded-Host $ch = curl_init($proto . '://' . $host . NV_BASE_SITEURL . 'index.php?response_headers_detect=1'); curl_exec($ch); ``` Two factors made this reliably reachable: 1. The `__serverInfoUpdate` handler runs very early in `includes/ini.php`, before authentication, so the sink is reachable pre-auth. 2. The host sanitiser `standardizeHost()` stripped a trailing port only with the regex `(\:[0-9]+)$`, which is bypassed by appending a slash (e.g. `127.0.0.1:8081/`): the string no longer ends in `:digits`, so the port survives and an arbitrary `host:port` reaches the cURL call. ## Proof of Concept ```http POST /index.php HTTP/1.1 Host: <victim> X-Forwarded-Proto: http X-Forwarded-Host: <attacker-controlled-host>:<port>/ Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 20 __serverInfoUpdate=1 ``` The server then issues a request to the attacker-supplied host, confirmed via an out-of-band interaction (DNS + HTTP) on a collaborator endpoint. ## Impact The SSRF is **blind**, **HEAD-only**, and uses a **fixed request path** (`…/index.php?response_headers_detect=1`): - The fetched response is stored server-side in the `config_ini` cache and is **not reflected** to the attacker, so internal data cannot be exfiltrated directly. - Because the path is fixed and not attacker-controlled, cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...`) cannot be reached, and `gopher://` / `dict://` request smuggling cannot inject arbitrary payloads. What an attacker **can** do: unauthenticated internal host/port discovery (connection success/timing, with the port reachable through the regex bypass), and poisoning of the cached `server_headers` (the SSRF target's response headers are stored and applied to the site). ## Severity Rated **High** rather than Critical, because the blind + fixed-path + HEAD design of the sink prevents data exfiltration, cloud credential theft, and internal RCE. - CVSS v3.1 Base Score: **7.2 (High)** - Vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N` ## Weakness - Primary: **CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** - Contributing: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), CWE-644 (Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers used by downstream components / trusting `X-Forwarded-*`). ## Remediation Fixed by validating and normalising the forwarded values at the source and gating the request before the sink: - `standardizeHost()` now extracts the host with `parse_url()` (defeats the `:port/` bypass) and lower-cases it. - `X-Forwarded-Proto` is restricted to a `{http, https}` allow-list and falls back to the real server protocol otherwise. - `X-Forwarded-Port` is validated as numeric and within range. - The incoming host is checked against `my_domains` before `includes/ini.php` is reached; non-matching hosts are rejected/redirected, and `server_info_update()` additionally re-validates its target host against `my_domains` (defense in depth). ## Workaround Configure the reverse proxy / web server to strip or override client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-Port` headers, and ensure `my_domains` is configured with the site's canonical domain(s).
Update nukeviet/nukeviet to 4.6.00 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNukeViet: Pre-authentication SSRF via X-Forwarded-Host affects nukeviet/nukeviet (composer). Severity is high. ## Summary An unauthenticated attacker can coerce the server into issuing HTTP requests to an attacker-chosen host by spoofing the `X Forwarded-Host` (and `X-Forwarded-Proto`) request headers. The forwarded host is used, without validation, to build the URL that `server_info_update()` fetches with cURL, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that requires no authentication. ## Affected component - File: `includes/ini.php` — function `server_info_update()` (cURL sink) - File: `vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Server.php` — `standardizeHost()` and the forwarded-header handling in the constructor (source of the tainted host) - Trigger: `POST` request containing the field `__serverInfoUpdate=1`, handled early in `includes/ini.php` before any authentication. ## Details `NukeViet\Core\Server` derives `original_host` / `original_protocol` from the `X-Forwarded-Host` / `X-Forwarded-Proto` headers and exposes them via `getOriginalHost()` / `getOriginalProtocol()`. These values are attacker-controlled and were not validated against the site's configured domains (`my_domains`). In `server_info_update()` the tainted host and scheme are concatenated directly into a cURL URL: ```php $proto = $nv_Server->getOriginalProtocol(); // from X-Forwarded-Proto $host = $nv_Server->getOriginalHost(); // from X-Forwarded-Host $ch = curl_init($proto . '://' . $host . NV_BASE_SITEURL . 'index.php?response_headers_detect=1'); curl_exec($ch); ``` Two factors made this reliably reachable: 1. The `__serverInfoUpdate` handler runs very early in `includes/ini.php`, before authentication, so the sink is reachable pre-auth. 2. The host sanitiser `standardizeHost()` stripped a trailing port only with the regex `(\:[0-9]+)$`, which is bypassed by appending a slash (e.g. `127.0.0.1:8081/`): the string no longer ends in `:digits`, so the port survives and an arbitrary `host:port` reaches the cURL call. ## Proof of Concept ```http POST /index.php HTTP/1.1 Host: <victim> X-Forwarded-Proto: http X-Forwarded-Host: <attacker-controlled-host>:<port>/ Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 20 __serverInfoUpdate=1 ``` The server then issues a request to the attacker-supplied host, confirmed via an out-of-band interaction (DNS + HTTP) on a collaborator endpoint. ## Impact The SSRF is **blind**, **HEAD-only**, and uses a **fixed request path** (`…/index.php?response_headers_detect=1`): - The fetched response is stored server-side in the `config_ini` cache and is **not reflected** to the attacker, so internal data cannot be exfiltrated directly. - Because the path is fixed and not attacker-controlled, cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...`) cannot be reached, and `gopher://` / `dict://` request smuggling cannot inject arbitrary payloads. What an attacker **can** do: unauthenticated internal host/port discovery (connection success/timing, with the port reachable through the regex bypass), and poisoning of the cached `server_headers` (the SSRF target's response headers are stored and applied to the site). ## Severity Rated **High** rather than Critical, because the blind + fixed-path + HEAD design of the sink prevents data exfiltration, cloud credential theft, and internal RCE. - CVSS v3.1 Base Score: **7.2 (High)** - Vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N` ## Weakness - Primary: **CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** - Contributing: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), CWE-644 (Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers used by downstream components / trusting `X-Forwarded-*`). ## Remediation Fixed by validating and normalising the forwarded values at the source and gating the request before the sink: - `standardizeHost()` now extracts the host with `parse_url()` (defeats the `:port/` bypass) and lower-cases it. - `X-Forwarded-Proto` is restricted to a `{http, https}` allow-list and falls back to the real server protocol otherwise. - `X-Forwarded-Port` is validated as numeric and within range. - The incoming host is checked against `my_domains` before `includes/ini.php` is reached; non-matching hosts are rejected/redirected, and `server_info_update()` additionally re-validates its target host against `my_domains` (defense in depth). ## Workaround Configure the reverse proxy / web server to strip or override client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-Port` headers, and ensure `my_domains` is configured with the site's canonical domain(s).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| nukeviet/nukevietcomposer | <4.6.00 | 4.6.00 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate nukeviet/nukeviet to 4.6.00 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNukeViet: Pre-authentication SSRF via X-Forwarded-Host affects nukeviet/nukeviet (composer). Severity is high. ## Summary An unauthenticated attacker can coerce the server into issuing HTTP requests to an attacker-chosen host by spoofing the `X Forwarded-Host` (and `X-Forwarded-Proto`) request headers. The forwarded host is used, without validation, to build the URL that `server_info_update()` fetches with cURL, resulting in a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that requires no authentication. ## Affected component - File: `includes/ini.php` — function `server_info_update()` (cURL sink) - File: `vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Server.php` — `standardizeHost()` and the forwarded-header handling in the constructor (source of the tainted host) - Trigger: `POST` request containing the field `__serverInfoUpdate=1`, handled early in `includes/ini.php` before any authentication. ## Details `NukeViet\Core\Server` derives `original_host` / `original_protocol` from the `X-Forwarded-Host` / `X-Forwarded-Proto` headers and exposes them via `getOriginalHost()` / `getOriginalProtocol()`. These values are attacker-controlled and were not validated against the site's configured domains (`my_domains`). In `server_info_update()` the tainted host and scheme are concatenated directly into a cURL URL: ```php $proto = $nv_Server->getOriginalProtocol(); // from X-Forwarded-Proto $host = $nv_Server->getOriginalHost(); // from X-Forwarded-Host $ch = curl_init($proto . '://' . $host . NV_BASE_SITEURL . 'index.php?response_headers_detect=1'); curl_exec($ch); ``` Two factors made this reliably reachable: 1. The `__serverInfoUpdate` handler runs very early in `includes/ini.php`, before authentication, so the sink is reachable pre-auth. 2. The host sanitiser `standardizeHost()` stripped a trailing port only with the regex `(\:[0-9]+)$`, which is bypassed by appending a slash (e.g. `127.0.0.1:8081/`): the string no longer ends in `:digits`, so the port survives and an arbitrary `host:port` reaches the cURL call. ## Proof of Concept ```http POST /index.php HTTP/1.1 Host: <victim> X-Forwarded-Proto: http X-Forwarded-Host: <attacker-controlled-host>:<port>/ Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 20 __serverInfoUpdate=1 ``` The server then issues a request to the attacker-supplied host, confirmed via an out-of-band interaction (DNS + HTTP) on a collaborator endpoint. ## Impact The SSRF is **blind**, **HEAD-only**, and uses a **fixed request path** (`…/index.php?response_headers_detect=1`): - The fetched response is stored server-side in the `config_ini` cache and is **not reflected** to the attacker, so internal data cannot be exfiltrated directly. - Because the path is fixed and not attacker-controlled, cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...`) cannot be reached, and `gopher://` / `dict://` request smuggling cannot inject arbitrary payloads. What an attacker **can** do: unauthenticated internal host/port discovery (connection success/timing, with the port reachable through the regex bypass), and poisoning of the cached `server_headers` (the SSRF target's response headers are stored and applied to the site). ## Severity Rated **High** rather than Critical, because the blind + fixed-path + HEAD design of the sink prevents data exfiltration, cloud credential theft, and internal RCE. - CVSS v3.1 Base Score: **7.2 (High)** - Vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N` ## Weakness - Primary: **CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)** - Contributing: CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation), CWE-644 (Improper Neutralization of HTTP Headers used by downstream components / trusting `X-Forwarded-*`). ## Remediation Fixed by validating and normalising the forwarded values at the source and gating the request before the sink: - `standardizeHost()` now extracts the host with `parse_url()` (defeats the `:port/` bypass) and lower-cases it. - `X-Forwarded-Proto` is restricted to a `{http, https}` allow-list and falls back to the real server protocol otherwise. - `X-Forwarded-Port` is validated as numeric and within range. - The incoming host is checked against `my_domains` before `includes/ini.php` is reached; non-matching hosts are rejected/redirected, and `server_info_update()` additionally re-validates its target host against `my_domains` (defense in depth). ## Workaround Configure the reverse proxy / web server to strip or override client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Proto`, and `X-Forwarded-Port` headers, and ensure `my_domains` is configured with the site's canonical domain(s).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| nukeviet/nukevietcomposer | <4.6.00 | 4.6.00 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard