## Summary In affected versions, `Request::buildRequestUrl()` inserts path variables into the request URL without URL encoding (`implode('/', $pathVariables)`). All request classes implementing `getPathVariables()` are affected, e.g. `GetContentDetailsRequest` (`scheme`, `contentId`). If a consuming application passes untrusted input (such as an ID taken from an HTTP request parameter) as a path variable, characters like `../`, `?` or `#` are sent verbatim and can change the path of the resulting API request. ## Impact An attacker who controls a path variable value can redirect the library's authenticated request — the Bearer access token is attached in `AbstractEndpoint::sendRequest()` — to a different API endpoint of the same Canto instance, causing unintended reads or writes with the privileges of the configured app. The impact depends on how the consuming application sources path variable values; applications that only pass trusted, validated IDs are not exploitable. ## Patches Fixed in 3.0.0: every path segment is encoded with `rawurlencode()` before being inserted into the request URL. ## Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, validate untrusted values before passing them to request classes, e.g. enforce an allowlist pattern such as `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$` for content IDs and schemes.
## Summary In affected versions, `Request::buildRequestUrl()` inserts path variables into the request URL without URL encoding (`implode('/', $pathVariables)`). All request classes implementing `getPathVariables()` are affected, e.g. `GetContentDetailsRequest` (`scheme`, `contentId`). If a consuming application passes untrusted input (such as an ID taken from an HTTP request parameter) as a path variable, characters like `../`, `?` or `#` are sent verbatim and can change the path of the resulting API request. ## Impact An attacker who controls a path variable value can redirect the library's authenticated request — the Bearer access token is attached in `AbstractEndpoint::sendRequest()` — to a different API endpoint of the same Canto instance, causing unintended reads or writes with the privileges of the configured app. The impact depends on how the consuming application sources path variable values; applications that only pass trusted, validated IDs are not exploitable. ## Patches Fixed in 3.0.0: every path segment is encoded with `rawurlencode()` before being inserted into the request URL. ## Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, validate untrusted values before passing them to request classes, e.g. enforce an allowlist pattern such as `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$` for content IDs and schemes.
Update jleehr/canto-saas-api to 3.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scancanto-saas-api: Authenticated API requests can be redirected via unencoded path variables affects jleehr/canto-saas-api (composer). Severity is medium. ## Summary In affected versions, `Request::buildRequestUrl()` inserts path variables into the request URL without URL encoding (`implode('/', $pathVariables)`). All request classes implementing `getPathVariables()` are affected, e.g. `GetContentDetailsRequest` (`scheme`, `contentId`). If a consuming application passes untrusted input (such as an ID taken from an HTTP request parameter) as a path variable, characters like `../`, `?` or `#` are sent verbatim and can change the path of the resulting API request. ## Impact An attacker who controls a path variable value can redirect the library's authenticated request — the Bearer access token is attached in `AbstractEndpoint::sendRequest()` — to a different API endpoint of the same Canto instance, causing unintended reads or writes with the privileges of the configured app. The impact depends on how the consuming application sources path variable values; applications that only pass trusted, validated IDs are not exploitable. ## Patches Fixed in 3.0.0: every path segment is encoded with `rawurlencode()` before being inserted into the request URL. ## Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, validate untrusted values before passing them to request classes, e.g. enforce an allowlist pattern such as `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$` for content IDs and schemes.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| jleehr/canto-saas-apicomposer | <=2.0.0 | 3.0.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate jleehr/canto-saas-api to 3.0.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scancanto-saas-api: Authenticated API requests can be redirected via unencoded path variables affects jleehr/canto-saas-api (composer). Severity is medium. ## Summary In affected versions, `Request::buildRequestUrl()` inserts path variables into the request URL without URL encoding (`implode('/', $pathVariables)`). All request classes implementing `getPathVariables()` are affected, e.g. `GetContentDetailsRequest` (`scheme`, `contentId`). If a consuming application passes untrusted input (such as an ID taken from an HTTP request parameter) as a path variable, characters like `../`, `?` or `#` are sent verbatim and can change the path of the resulting API request. ## Impact An attacker who controls a path variable value can redirect the library's authenticated request — the Bearer access token is attached in `AbstractEndpoint::sendRequest()` — to a different API endpoint of the same Canto instance, causing unintended reads or writes with the privileges of the configured app. The impact depends on how the consuming application sources path variable values; applications that only pass trusted, validated IDs are not exploitable. ## Patches Fixed in 3.0.0: every path segment is encoded with `rawurlencode()` before being inserted into the request URL. ## Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, validate untrusted values before passing them to request classes, e.g. enforce an allowlist pattern such as `^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$` for content IDs and schemes.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| jleehr/canto-saas-apicomposer | <=2.0.0 | 3.0.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard