Answer in brief
CVE-2026-55378 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in JS Recon: Command injection in PR Branch Checker workflow via untrusted pull request context values. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps shriyanss/js-recon (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps shriyanss/js-recon (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| shriyanss/js-recongeneric | >= 1.2.1-beta.1, < 1.3.1-beta.2 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 28, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 28, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 28, 2026
JS Recon is a JavaScript enumeration and SAST tool. From 1.2.1-beta.1 until 1.3.1-beta.2, the PR Branch Checker workflow in .github/workflows/pr_checker.yml places github.head_ref and github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name into BRANCH_NAME and SOURCE_REPO and interpolates those untrusted values into a shell gh pr comment command. A remote user who opens a pull request can use shell metacharacters in a branch or fork name to execute commands in the GitHub Actions runner with the workflow's GITHUB_TOKEN, which has pull-requests write permission. This issue is fixed in version 1.3.1-beta.2.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.