Answer in brief
CVE-2026-55574 records a High severity (CVSS 8.7) vulnerability in vLLM: ReDoS via structured_outputs.regex compiled without timeout in xgrammar and outlines backends. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps vllm (pip), vllm (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.7. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps vllm (pip), vllm (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vllmpip | <0.24.0 | 0.24.0 |
| vllmpypi | >=0 <0.24.0 | 0.24.0 |
Published upstream
Jul 6, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 24, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 6, 2026
## Summary The `structured_outputs.regex` API parameter passes a user-supplied regex string directly to grammar compiler backends with no compilation timeout. In the xgrammar backend, the string reaches `compile_regex()` with no guard. In the outlines backend, `validate_regex_is_buildable()` blocks structural issues (lookarounds, backreferences) but provides zero protection against exponential DFA state-space explosion. Patterns like `(a+)+b` pass all checks and hang the inference worker. ## Root Cause `backend_xgrammar.py:91` — no timeout: ```python ctx = self.compiler.compile_regex(grammar_spec) ``` `backend_outlines.py:299–330` — structural checks only, no complexity analysis: ```python def validate_regex_is_buildable(regex: str) -> None: sre_parse.parse(regex) # AST parse only — does not detect exponential patterns _check_unsupported(...) # blocks lookarounds/backrefs, not nested quantifiers ``` `backend_outlines.py:64` — no timeout: ```python oc.Index(regex_string, vocabulary.inner) ``` ## Impact Denial of service — one request with an adversarial regex pattern hangs an inference worker indefinitely. ## Remediation Wrap `compile_regex()` and `oc.Index()` calls in a thread with a deadline (e.g., 5 seconds). Add complexity analysis to `validate_regex_is_buildable()` to detect nested quantifier patterns before compilation.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.