Answer in brief
CVE-2026-55598 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in PinePods: Authenticated SSRF via podcast RSS enclosure URL (server-side fetch of attacker-controlled URL, no host validation). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps madeofpendletonwool/PinePods (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps madeofpendletonwool/PinePods (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| madeofpendletonwool/PinePodsgeneric | <0.9.0 | 0.9.0 |
Published upstream
Oct 30, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 30, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Oct 30, 2026
PinePods is a complete, self-hosted podcast management system written in Rust. Prior to 0.9.0, an authenticated user can subscribe to an attacker-controlled RSS feed through `POST /api/data/add_podcast` in `rust-api/src/handlers/podcasts.rs`. `get_podcast_values` and `add_episodes` in `rust-api/src/database.rs` parse the feed with `feed-rs` and store the `<enclosure url>` verbatim in `Episodes.episodeurl` without destination host/IP validation. `POST /api/data/download_podcast` invokes `spawn_download_podcast_episode` and `download_episode_and_wait()` in `rust-api/src/services/tasks.rs`, which sends a `reqwest` GET to the stored URL and saves and records the response in `DownloadedEpisodes` for later retrieval. The `estimate_duration_from_audio_url_async()` path in `rust-api/src/database.rs` also sends an unvalidated HEAD during feed add/refresh. Default redirect following permits an initially external enclosure URL to redirect to an internal target. A low-privilege user can make server-side GET/HEAD requests to reachable loopback, private-network and cloud metadata services and read downloaded internal responses, enabling internal-service enumeration, confidential-data disclosure and possible metadata credential theft. Episode downloading requires server downloads to be enabled, which is the default; self-service signup is supported. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.