Answer in brief
CVE-2026-55658 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Gardens v2: StreamingEscrow buffer drains to the proposal beneficiary on cancel via the permissionless claim(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps 1Hive/gardens-v2 (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps 1Hive/gardens-v2 (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| 1Hive/gardens-v2generic | <= 3e595f3 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Sep 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 3, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 3, 2026
Gardens v2 is a modular governance framework that enables communities to create and manage multiple governance pools with customizable parameters and voting mechanisms. In 3e595f3 and prior, when a streaming proposal is funded, the cluster of streaming contracts moves real pool funds into the proposal's StreamingEscrow to back the Superfluid constant flow agreement (the CFA deposit, plus a 0.5 percent margin). cancelProposal then zeroes the escrow's GDA member units but never reclaims that parked balance, and the permissionless claim() forwards the escrow's entire balance, including the pool funded buffer, to the beneficiary. The beneficiary is chosen by the proposal submitter and defaults to the submitter. The only path that returns escrow funds to the pool is drainToStrategy, which is onlyStrategy and is reached solely from the dispute reject ruling, never from cancel or natural completion. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.