### Summary A user that is granted namespace management (`/sys/namespaces`) capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path `"root"` in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself. ### Details Several endpoints under `/sys/namespaces/*` accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or `X-Vault-Namespace` header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on. Given the special namespace path `"root"` canonicalizes to en empty path (`""`), when passed as `/sys/namespaces/root`, the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount's containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on `/sys/namespaces/root` within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead. ### Impact Users that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to: - Look up - Delete - Lock - Patch custom metadata against the namespace containing the system backend they can manage `sys/namespaces/root` in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as `/api-lock`. Notably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or "containing" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces. ### Patch This will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5. ### PoC Start a development server: ```sh bao server -dev ``` Create a namespace: ```sh bao namespace create victim ``` This will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of. Create a policy that allows management of namespaces, _inside_ of the victim namespace. ```sh bao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - <<EOF path "sys/namespaces/*" { capabilities = ["read", "update", "patch", "delete"] } EOF ``` Then create a token with above policy attached: ```sh export BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token) ``` Operate on the victim's namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it: ```sh bao namespace delete -namespace=victim root ```
### Summary A user that is granted namespace management (`/sys/namespaces`) capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path `"root"` in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself. ### Details Several endpoints under `/sys/namespaces/*` accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or `X-Vault-Namespace` header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on. Given the special namespace path `"root"` canonicalizes to en empty path (`""`), when passed as `/sys/namespaces/root`, the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount's containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on `/sys/namespaces/root` within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead. ### Impact Users that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to: - Look up - Delete - Lock - Patch custom metadata against the namespace containing the system backend they can manage `sys/namespaces/root` in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as `/api-lock`. Notably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or "containing" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces. ### Patch This will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5. ### PoC Start a development server: ```sh bao server -dev ``` Create a namespace: ```sh bao namespace create victim ``` This will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of. Create a policy that allows management of namespaces, _inside_ of the victim namespace. ```sh bao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - <<EOF path "sys/namespaces/*" { capabilities = ["read", "update", "patch", "delete"] } EOF ``` Then create a token with above policy attached: ```sh export BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token) ``` Operate on the victim's namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it: ```sh bao namespace delete -namespace=victim root ```
Update github.com/openbao/openbao to 0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOpenBao's System Backend allows Unauthorized Management of the containing Namespace affects github.com/openbao/openbao (go), github.com/openbao/openbao (go). Severity is low. ### Summary A user that is granted namespace management (`/sys/namespaces`) capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path `"root"` in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself. ### Details Several endpoints under `/sys/namespaces/*` accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or `X-Vault-Namespace` header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on. Given the special namespace path `"root"` canonicalizes to en empty path (`""`), when passed as `/sys/namespaces/root`, the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount's containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on `/sys/namespaces/root` within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead. ### Impact Users that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to: - Look up - Delete - Lock - Patch custom metadata against the namespace containing the system backend they can manage `sys/namespaces/root` in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as `/api-lock`. Notably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or "containing" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces. ### Patch This will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5. ### PoC Start a development server: ```sh bao server -dev ``` Create a namespace: ```sh bao namespace create victim ``` This will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of. Create a policy that allows management of namespaces, _inside_ of the victim namespace. ```sh bao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - <<EOF path "sys/namespaces/*" { capabilities = ["read", "update", "patch", "delete"] } EOF ``` Then create a token with above policy attached: ```sh export BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token) ``` Operate on the victim's namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it: ```sh bao namespace delete -namespace=victim root ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A low vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/openbao/openbaogo | <0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae | 0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae |
| github.com/openbao/openbaogo | >=0.1.0,<=2.5.4 | Not reported |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/openbao/openbao to 0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOpenBao's System Backend allows Unauthorized Management of the containing Namespace affects github.com/openbao/openbao (go), github.com/openbao/openbao (go). Severity is low. ### Summary A user that is granted namespace management (`/sys/namespaces`) capabilities within a non-root namespace ("the victim namespace") can abuse special handling of the literal path `"root"` in namespace path canonicalization to manage the victim namespace itself. ### Details Several endpoints under `/sys/namespaces/*` accept a namespace path segment that is canonicalized and then appended to the path of the sys mount's containing namespace (set via path prefix or `X-Vault-Namespace` header) to determine the absolute path of the namespace to operate on. Given the special namespace path `"root"` canonicalizes to en empty path (`""`), when passed as `/sys/namespaces/root`, the resulting absolute namespace path remains equal to the sys mount's containing namespace. Given ACLs are evaluated before namespace path canonicalization, this allows users with capabilities on `/sys/namespaces/root` within any given namespace to operate on the namespace itself instead. ### Impact Users that were granted the required capabilities can abuse this vulnerability to: - Look up - Delete - Lock - Patch custom metadata against the namespace containing the system backend they can manage `sys/namespaces/root` in. The exact range of operations that can be performed depends on the specific capabilities granted on said path and any sub-paths such as `/api-lock`. Notably, the root namespace is immutable and cannot be modified, deleted or locked, and is thus unaffected. Also note that users can only abuse this vulnerability to operate on the direct parent or "containing" namespace relative to their capabilities, not arbitrary namespaces. ### Patch This will be fixed in OpenBao v2.5.5. ### PoC Start a development server: ```sh bao server -dev ``` Create a namespace: ```sh bao namespace create victim ``` This will be the namespace we gain unauthorized management of. Create a policy that allows management of namespaces, _inside_ of the victim namespace. ```sh bao policy write -namespace=victim namespace-management - <<EOF path "sys/namespaces/*" { capabilities = ["read", "update", "patch", "delete"] } EOF ``` Then create a token with above policy attached: ```sh export BAO_TOKEN=$(bao token create -namespace=victim -policy=namespace-management -field=token) ``` Operate on the victim's namespace using the token, for example by outright deleting it: ```sh bao namespace delete -namespace=victim root ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A low vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/openbao/openbaogo | <0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae | 0.0.0-20260617103935-d3c1cc64b1ae |
| github.com/openbao/openbaogo | >=0.1.0,<=2.5.4 | Not reported |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard