## Summary The `ActionHandler.post()` method in motionEye has no authentication decorator, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to trigger camera actions including snapshots, recording start/stop, and configured action scripts (PTZ controls, alarm triggers, etc.). ## Vulnerability Details **File**: `motioneye/handlers/action.py` — `ActionHandler.post()` line 36 **CWE**: CWE-862 — Missing Authorization **CVSS**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N = 5.3 Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```python class ActionHandler(BaseHandler): async def post(self, camera_id, action): # ← NO @BaseHandler.auth() decorator camera_id = int(camera_id) if camera_id not in config.get_camera_ids(): raise HTTPError(404, 'no such camera') ... if action == 'snapshot': await self.snapshot(camera_id) # executed without auth return elif action == 'record_start': return self.record_start(camera_id) elif action == 'record_stop': return self.record_stop(camera_id) action_commands = config.get_action_commands(local_config) command = action_commands.get(action) ... self.run_command_bg(command) # executes predefined shell scripts ``` Compare with other handlers that correctly require authentication: ```python @BaseHandler.auth(admin=True) # ← properly protected async def delete(self, camera_id, filename): ... ``` ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Deploy motionEye with at least one camera configured 2. Send unauthenticated POST: ``` POST /action/1/snapshot HTTP/1.1 Host: motioneye-host:8765 Content-Length: 0 ``` 3. Observe `{}` (HTTP 200) response — snapshot triggered without any credentials For action scripts (`lock`, `unlock`, `alarm_on`, `alarm_off`, `light_on`, etc.): ``` POST /action/1/alarm_on HTTP/1.1 Host: motioneye-host:8765 ``` ## Impact - Unauthenticated attacker can trigger camera snapshots on demand - Unauthenticated attacker can start/stop video recording - If action scripts are configured by admin: attacker can trigger PTZ movement, alarm control, lighting changes — physical security bypass - Via remote cameras: SSRF by triggering action on a remote motionEye server ## Verification Dynamically confirmed on v0.43.1 in Docker lab — `POST /action/2/snapshot` with no credentials returns HTTP 200 `{}`. Server log shows the action was processed (failed only because motion daemon was not running for the test camera, not due to an auth rejection). ## Recommended Fix ```python class ActionHandler(BaseHandler): @BaseHandler.auth() # add authentication requirement async def post(self, camera_id, action): ... ```
## Summary The `ActionHandler.post()` method in motionEye has no authentication decorator, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to trigger camera actions including snapshots, recording start/stop, and configured action scripts (PTZ controls, alarm triggers, etc.). ## Vulnerability Details **File**: `motioneye/handlers/action.py` — `ActionHandler.post()` line 36 **CWE**: CWE-862 — Missing Authorization **CVSS**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N = 5.3 Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```python class ActionHandler(BaseHandler): async def post(self, camera_id, action): # ← NO @BaseHandler.auth() decorator camera_id = int(camera_id) if camera_id not in config.get_camera_ids(): raise HTTPError(404, 'no such camera') ... if action == 'snapshot': await self.snapshot(camera_id) # executed without auth return elif action == 'record_start': return self.record_start(camera_id) elif action == 'record_stop': return self.record_stop(camera_id) action_commands = config.get_action_commands(local_config) command = action_commands.get(action) ... self.run_command_bg(command) # executes predefined shell scripts ``` Compare with other handlers that correctly require authentication: ```python @BaseHandler.auth(admin=True) # ← properly protected async def delete(self, camera_id, filename): ... ``` ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Deploy motionEye with at least one camera configured 2. Send unauthenticated POST: ``` POST /action/1/snapshot HTTP/1.1 Host: motioneye-host:8765 Content-Length: 0 ``` 3. Observe `{}` (HTTP 200) response — snapshot triggered without any credentials For action scripts (`lock`, `unlock`, `alarm_on`, `alarm_off`, `light_on`, etc.): ``` POST /action/1/alarm_on HTTP/1.1 Host: motioneye-host:8765 ``` ## Impact - Unauthenticated attacker can trigger camera snapshots on demand - Unauthenticated attacker can start/stop video recording - If action scripts are configured by admin: attacker can trigger PTZ movement, alarm control, lighting changes — physical security bypass - Via remote cameras: SSRF by triggering action on a remote motionEye server ## Verification Dynamically confirmed on v0.43.1 in Docker lab — `POST /action/2/snapshot` with no credentials returns HTTP 200 `{}`. Server log shows the action was processed (failed only because motion daemon was not running for the test camera, not due to an auth rejection). ## Recommended Fix ```python class ActionHandler(BaseHandler): @BaseHandler.auth() # add authentication requirement async def post(self, camera_id, action): ... ```
Update motioneye to 0.44.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanmotionEye's missing authentication on ActionHandler allows unauthenticated camera action execution affects motioneye (pip). Severity is medium. ## Summary The `ActionHandler.post()` method in motionEye has no authentication decorator, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to trigger camera actions including snapshots, recording start/stop, and configured action scripts (PTZ controls, alarm triggers, etc.). ## Vulnerability Details **File**: `motioneye/handlers/action.py` — `ActionHandler.post()` line 36 **CWE**: CWE-862 — Missing Authorization **CVSS**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N = 5.3 Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```python class ActionHandler(BaseHandler): async def post(self, camera_id, action): # ← NO @BaseHandler.auth() decorator camera_id = int(camera_id) if camera_id not in config.get_camera_ids(): raise HTTPError(404, 'no such camera') ... if action == 'snapshot': await self.snapshot(camera_id) # executed without auth return elif action == 'record_start': return self.record_start(camera_id) elif action == 'record_stop': return self.record_stop(camera_id) action_commands = config.get_action_commands(local_config) command = action_commands.get(action) ... self.run_command_bg(command) # executes predefined shell scripts ``` Compare with other handlers that correctly require authentication: ```python @BaseHandler.auth(admin=True) # ← properly protected async def delete(self, camera_id, filename): ... ``` ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Deploy motionEye with at least one camera configured 2. Send unauthenticated POST: ``` POST /action/1/snapshot HTTP/1.1 Host: motioneye-host:8765 Content-Length: 0 ``` 3. Observe `{}` (HTTP 200) response — snapshot triggered without any credentials For action scripts (`lock`, `unlock`, `alarm_on`, `alarm_off`, `light_on`, etc.): ``` POST /action/1/alarm_on HTTP/1.1 Host: motioneye-host:8765 ``` ## Impact - Unauthenticated attacker can trigger camera snapshots on demand - Unauthenticated attacker can start/stop video recording - If action scripts are configured by admin: attacker can trigger PTZ movement, alarm control, lighting changes — physical security bypass - Via remote cameras: SSRF by triggering action on a remote motionEye server ## Verification Dynamically confirmed on v0.43.1 in Docker lab — `POST /action/2/snapshot` with no credentials returns HTTP 200 `{}`. Server log shows the action was processed (failed only because motion daemon was not running for the test camera, not due to an auth rejection). ## Recommended Fix ```python class ActionHandler(BaseHandler): @BaseHandler.auth() # add authentication requirement async def post(self, camera_id, action): ... ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| motioneyepip | <0.44.0 | 0.44.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate motioneye to 0.44.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanmotionEye's missing authentication on ActionHandler allows unauthenticated camera action execution affects motioneye (pip). Severity is medium. ## Summary The `ActionHandler.post()` method in motionEye has no authentication decorator, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to trigger camera actions including snapshots, recording start/stop, and configured action scripts (PTZ controls, alarm triggers, etc.). ## Vulnerability Details **File**: `motioneye/handlers/action.py` — `ActionHandler.post()` line 36 **CWE**: CWE-862 — Missing Authorization **CVSS**: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N = 5.3 Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```python class ActionHandler(BaseHandler): async def post(self, camera_id, action): # ← NO @BaseHandler.auth() decorator camera_id = int(camera_id) if camera_id not in config.get_camera_ids(): raise HTTPError(404, 'no such camera') ... if action == 'snapshot': await self.snapshot(camera_id) # executed without auth return elif action == 'record_start': return self.record_start(camera_id) elif action == 'record_stop': return self.record_stop(camera_id) action_commands = config.get_action_commands(local_config) command = action_commands.get(action) ... self.run_command_bg(command) # executes predefined shell scripts ``` Compare with other handlers that correctly require authentication: ```python @BaseHandler.auth(admin=True) # ← properly protected async def delete(self, camera_id, filename): ... ``` ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Deploy motionEye with at least one camera configured 2. Send unauthenticated POST: ``` POST /action/1/snapshot HTTP/1.1 Host: motioneye-host:8765 Content-Length: 0 ``` 3. Observe `{}` (HTTP 200) response — snapshot triggered without any credentials For action scripts (`lock`, `unlock`, `alarm_on`, `alarm_off`, `light_on`, etc.): ``` POST /action/1/alarm_on HTTP/1.1 Host: motioneye-host:8765 ``` ## Impact - Unauthenticated attacker can trigger camera snapshots on demand - Unauthenticated attacker can start/stop video recording - If action scripts are configured by admin: attacker can trigger PTZ movement, alarm control, lighting changes — physical security bypass - Via remote cameras: SSRF by triggering action on a remote motionEye server ## Verification Dynamically confirmed on v0.43.1 in Docker lab — `POST /action/2/snapshot` with no credentials returns HTTP 200 `{}`. Server log shows the action was processed (failed only because motion daemon was not running for the test camera, not due to an auth rejection). ## Recommended Fix ```python class ActionHandler(BaseHandler): @BaseHandler.auth() # add authentication requirement async def post(self, camera_id, action): ... ```
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| motioneyepip | <0.44.0 | 0.44.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard