Answer in brief
CVE-2026-57171 records a High severity (CVSS 7.7) vulnerability in Trestle is vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal in author generate commands (Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46345). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps oscal-compass/compliance-trestle (generic), compliance-trestle (pip), compliance-trestle (pip), compliance-trestle (pypi) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.7. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps oscal-compass/compliance-trestle (generic), compliance-trestle (pip), compliance-trestle (pip), compliance-trestle (pypi) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| oscal-compass/compliance-trestlegeneric | <3.12.4 || >=4.0.0 <4.1.0 | 3.12.4, 4.1.0 |
| compliance-trestlepip | <3.12.4 | 3.12.4 |
| compliance-trestlepip | >=4.0.0,<4.1.0 | 4.1.0 |
| compliance-trestlepypi | >=0 <3.12.4 | 3.12.4 |
| compliance-trestlepypi | >=4.0.0 <4.1.0 | 4.1.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 25, 2026
Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a Python SDK and command-line tool for managing OSCAL compliance documents. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate author commands write generated Markdown to an attacker-influenced output path without path-traversal validation, allowing arbitrary file write outside the Trestle workspace. These commands join the user-supplied output argument onto the Trestle root and write to the result, but guard it only with an is_directory_name_allowed() task-name-collision check rather than the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard used by the jinja command, so an absolute path or one containing traversal sequences escapes the workspace and writes files under an attacker-chosen location as the invoking process owner. The security boundary is crossed when a trusted CI job, shared service, or wrapper derives the output argument from repository-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted data while expecting output to stay inside the workspace. When --force-overwrite is used, the selected output directory is first recursively deleted, extending the primitive to destruction of an attacker-chosen directory tree and enabling indirect code execution by overwriting files a pipeline later runs. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.