Answer in brief
CVE-2026-57171 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Trestle is vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal in author generate commands (Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46345). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps oscal-compass/compliance-trestle (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps oscal-compass/compliance-trestle (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| oscal-compass/compliance-trestlegeneric | < 3.12.4 || >= 4.0.0, < 4.1.0 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 25, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 25, 2026
Compliance-trestle (Trestle) is a Python SDK and command-line tool for managing OSCAL compliance documents. In versions before 3.12.4 and versions 4.0.0 through 4.0.3, the catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate author commands write generated Markdown to an attacker-influenced output path without path-traversal validation, allowing arbitrary file write outside the Trestle workspace. These commands join the user-supplied output argument onto the Trestle root and write to the result, but guard it only with an is_directory_name_allowed() task-name-collision check rather than the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard used by the jinja command, so an absolute path or one containing traversal sequences escapes the workspace and writes files under an attacker-chosen location as the invoking process owner. The security boundary is crossed when a trusted CI job, shared service, or wrapper derives the output argument from repository-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted data while expecting output to stay inside the workspace. When --force-overwrite is used, the selected output directory is first recursively deleted, extending the primitive to destruction of an attacker-chosen directory tree and enabling indirect code execution by overwriting files a pipeline later runs. This issue is fixed in versions 3.12.4 and 4.1.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.