Answer in brief
CVE-2026-59204 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Pillow JPEG2000 tiled decode retains a growing scratch buffer and can be used for denial of service. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps pillow (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps pillow (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pillowpypi | >=8.2.0 <12.3.0 | 12.3.0 |
Published upstream
Jul 20, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Sep 10, 2026
### Summary `src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c:853` accumulates `total_component_width` across every tile in a JPEG2000 image instead of recomputing it per tile. That accumulated value is then used in the `tile_bytes` calculation at `src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c:868`, which can make the decoder grow `state->buffer` via `realloc` at `src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c:876` up to roughly one full image's decompressed size even when each tile is small. A crafted tiled JPEG2000 file can therefore force substantially higher transient memory usage and trigger out-of-memory failures during decoding. Based on current evidence, the supported impact is denial of service, not memory corruption. ### Details - Location: `src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c:853` - Root cause: `total_component_width` is initialized only once before the tile loop and keeps growing across tiles. It is then used to derive `tile_bytes`, so later tiles are treated as if they had the combined component width of all earlier tiles. - Dangerous operation: `tile_bytes` is promoted into `tile_info.data_size`, then `state->buffer` is grown with `realloc` at `src/libImaging/Jpeg2KDecode.c:876`. - Reachability: any attacker-controlled JPEG2000 image with many tiles reaches this path during normal `Image.open(...).load()` decoding. ### PoC The attached helper script and testcase were used: [exercise_j2k_tile_realloc.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/28099912/exercise_j2k_tile_realloc.zip) Generate the testcase: ```bash pythonexercise_j2k_tile_realloc.py make poc_3664_rgba_tile1832.jp2 \ --size 3664 --tile 1832 ``` Expected geometry from the helper: - image size: `3664 x 3664` - mode: `RGBA` - tile size: `1832 x 1832` (`2x2` tiles) - `image_bytes=53699584` - uncapped RSS observed: - vulnerable build: `maxrss_kb=180264` - fixed comparison build: `maxrss_kb=138404` Load it with the current vulnerable build: ```bash python exercise_j2k_tile_realloc.py load poc_3664_rgba_tile1832.jp2 ``` Load it again under a 160 MB address-space cap: ```bash python exercise_j2k_tile_realloc.py load poc_3664_rgba_tile1832.jp2 --limit-mb 160 ``` ### Impact Conservative impact: denial of service through memory exhaustion during JPEG2000 decoding.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.