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  4. CVE 2026 60087 praisonai human in the loop tool approval is
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Back to active CVEs
Medium · CVSS 6.1CVE-2026-60087GHSA-29R9-67VG-QJ56

PraisonAI: Human-in-the-loop tool approval is cached by tool name and silently reused for all subsequent calls with arbitrary argumentsCVE-2026-60087

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-60087 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.1) vulnerability in PraisonAI: Human-in-the-loop tool approval is cached by tool name and silently reused for all subsequent calls with arbitrary arguments. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps praisonaiagents (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Jul 15, 2026Updated Oct 24, 2026Source checked Nov 22, 2026First seen by HOL Jul 15, 2026Material review Oct 24, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Record context

Vulnerability class
Vulnerability
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-863
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Nov 22, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record

Key facts

Risk
Medium · CVSS 6.1
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 6.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps praisonaiagents (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
praisonaiagentspip<=1.6.771.6.78

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for praisonaiagents.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update praisonaiagents to 1.6.78 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Jul 15, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 24, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Jul 15, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • Source referencevulncheck.com
Upstream source description

## Summary PraisonAI gates dangerous tools (file writes, deletes, shell/code execution) behind an interactive approval prompt. The first approval of a tool is cached for the remainder of the run and silently reused for all later invocations of that tool with arbitrary, unreviewed arguments. ## Root cause `ApprovalRegistry.is_already_approved` (`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/approval/registry.py`, around line 181) returns `True` whenever the tool name is present in a per-run context set. The cache is keyed on tool name only — arguments are not part of the key. `approve_sync` / `approve_async` (around lines 224-226 / 278-279) short-circuit on that cache before the approval backend is consulted. `clear_approved` (around lines 186-187) is the only routine that clears the cache, but it is never invoked in the shipped library (only in tests). The cache persists for the entire agent run and is inherited by child tasks via `contextvars`. Critical-tier tools (`execute_command`, `execute_code`) are exempt from the cache. But high-risk tools like `write_file` are not. ## Proof of concept ```python from praisonaiagents.approval.registry import ApprovalRegistry from praisonaiagents.approval.protocols import ApprovalDecision, ApprovalRequest class CountingBackend: def __init__(self): self.prompts = [] def request_approval_sync(self, request): self.prompts.append((request.tool_name, dict(request.arguments))) return ApprovalDecision(approved=True, reason="human approved") backend = CountingBackend() reg = ApprovalRegistry() reg.set_backend(backend) reg.add_requirement("write_file", "high") d1 = reg.approve_sync("agent", "write_file", {"path": "/tmp/safe.txt", "content": "hi"}) # Human prompted — approves a benign write d2 = reg.approve_sync("agent", "write_file", {"path": "/etc/crontab", "content": "* * * * * root evil"}) # NO prompt — auto-approved from cache assert len(backend.prompts) == 1 assert d2.reason == "Already approved in context" ``` Negative control: `execute_command` (critical) re-prompts on every call — 2 prompts for 2 calls. ## Impact A `write_file` approval for a benign path authorizes every later `write_file` call in the session with arbitrary arguments. A model steered by malicious input can write to sensitive locations with no further human prompt. ## Suggested fix - Include arguments in the approval cache key, or re-prompt on argument change. - Expire the cache per-call or per-turn. - Do not inherit the cache into child tasks.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Related CVEs

  • VoidAuth before 1.19.2 ProxyAuth Access Control Bypass via Encoded Path SeparatorsAlso CWE-863
  • Chatwoot before 4.20.0 Information Disclosure via Public Help Center Article EndpointsAlso CWE-863